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Abstract 
The competition state thesis has for twenty years sought to make sense of the 
profound changes in the global economy and explain the impacts of globalisation 
on both the nation state and the welfare state. That the thesis is still consistently 
cited by scholars stands as testament to the power of its central messages and the 
fact that the authors have revisited and revised their work so as to keep pace with 
an ever changing world. At a time when governments around the world are 
implementing ‗austerity budgets‘ to address a series of profound financial crises, 
the core arguments made by Cerny and Evans appear extremely pertinent. Gone 
they say are the days of the welfare state, created as it was to serve citizens 
bound by bonds of solidarity forged in the war. Here to stay are the days of the 
competition state, brought into being to serve the global economy in which citizens 
exist in a more atomised society, joined to one another by weak bonds of 
mutuality. 
While the arguments advanced within the competition state thesis ring true and 
hold much persuasive power, their focus on only a small collection of nations and 
the limited body of systematic empirical evidence with which they are supported 
represent an obvious and addressable flaw. This thesis sets out to provide a 
rigorous empirical investigation of the competition state and through the use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods uncovers much to support the work of Cerny 
and Evans. The competition state can indeed be evidenced through the 
application of empirical research, but it doesn‘t necessarily take the form we might 
expect. Indeed it does not merely take one form and maybe, just maybe, offers a 
glimmer of hope for the welfare state it is meant to replace. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis 
1.1: Introduction 
The Beveridge report was a statement of intent; it was a report on what the 
government of the time could and should do (Abel-Smith, 1994:15; Lowe, 
1993:125; Thane, 1996:278). In many ways the competition state thesis is similar. 
For Cerny and Evans there is a limit to what governments around the world can 
do, which is a reflection of a re-evaluation of what governments should do. In fifty 
years since Beveridge unveiled his bold plans, not only has the detail been 
compromised, the underlying ethos has been fundamentally reversed. 
The primary rationale behind the competition state thesis is that globalisation has 
acted as a ‗game-changer‘, re-writing the rules of civil association and stripping 
institutions such as the welfare state of legitimacy and relevance (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:1-3). The game has been changed economically, politically, and 
practically with old rationales and mechanisms that supported the industrial 
welfare state lost to the rise of a post-Fordist economy within a global economy 
(Burrows and Loader, 1994:1; Hudson, 2003:269; Warhurst, 2008:72). For 
scholars of social policy the implications of Cerny and Evans‘ thesis are both 
profound and disconcerting. Their vision of a qualitatively disempowered state that 
no longer exists primarily to protect its citizenry is troubling, especially for those 
who studies are concerned with the effects of poverty and social exclusion. The 
fact that Cerny and Evans‘ key contentions make such qualitative sense serves 
only as a cause of even more concern. Moreover, their thesis seeks not only to 
explain what has happened in (largely American and British) social policy, but also 
the limits of what can be done. If their key assertions are correct, they suggest a 
rather bleak future for many. 
While Cerny and Evans‘ competition state thesis rings true given the rhetorical 
abandonment of the passive and redistributive welfare state by Thatcher‘s 
Conservatives and Blair‘s New Labour, this should not be taken as evidence that 
there is indeed no alternative to the competition state. By continually adapting 
around the edges of the core thesis, Cerny and Evans have managed to ensure 
that the CST remains a source of debate within the political economy literature. 
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This is despite the fact that they only infrequently refer to systematic empirical 
evidence and certainly utilise only a limited amount of data to support their logical 
and persuasive arguments. Furthermore, Despite the UK focus, the CST purports 
to address a global phenomenon and offer a global ‗diagnosis‘. However Cerny 
and Evans core focus beyond the UK relates primarily to The US, which Cerny 
and Evans seem to model as a natural partner for policy transfer to and from the 
UK (Cerny and Evans, 2003:27). It is clear that the persuasive arguments 
advanced by Cerny and Evans merit further exploration and their thesis is ripe for 
empirical investigation.  
Hay criticises Cerny for his apparent unwillingness to explore the alternatives, 
though Cerny‘s natural defence undoubtedly rests in the fact that he doesn‘t 
believe such alternatives exist. The continued presence of the CST in the political 
economy literature renders it almost unique and deserves both a degree of respect 
and further study. What Cerny and Evans cannot escape is that their thesis is 
abundant with hypotheses that can and should be explored. Perhaps the fact that 
such exploration could raise difficult questions regarding the CST provides us with 
an explanation for why it has yet to be undertaken. Conversely of course, an 
interrogation of the CST may find much to support it. 
1.2: Purpose and aims of the study 
While it should be acknowledged that the competition state thesis is not the only 
explanatory account of welfare state change, there are a range of reasons why it is 
the focus of this thesis. First, as even a cursory review of google scholar reveals, 
this is a body of work that has received significant attention. Second, a rigorous, 
systematic investigation of all competing welfare state change theories would 
prove unwieldy and in reality impractical. And third, this is a thesis that has 
captured the researcher‘s imagination. Having been exposed to the work of Cerny 
and Evans as an undergraduate, the potential for further study in this arena has 
always held appeal. Moreover, while the authors of the competition state have 
worked hard to ensure that their thesis has retained its relevance over the last 
twenty years, there is still plenty of opportunity to add to the debate. 
This thesis seeks to address this crucial gap within the body of scholarship that 
has arisen around the competition state. The intention is certainly not to ‗close the 
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book‘ on the competition state, rather stimulate a critical debate around key 
assertions such as the inevitability of welfare restructuring. Quite simply, this 
thesis asks what a systematic empirical approach to the competition state tells us. 
Does it answer questions? Does it pose new questions? To this end the goals of 
this thesis may appear rather modest. However, the addition of empirical evidence 
to the existing debate will undoubtedly advance it and perhaps impact on wider 
debates within the arena of political economy. To achieve such an impact, this 
thesis aims to: 
 Collect and analyse the key sources within the wide range of important 
publications that pertain to the decline of the welfare state and/or the rise of 
the competition state. 
 Develop a rationale for collecting empirical evidence and determine what 
data is most relevant. 
 Operationalise the competition state thesis as a measurable concept. 
 Use the existing scholarship to inform data collection. 
 Analyse data in terms of how it relates to the key contentions of the 
competition state. 
 Illuminate any trends or observations that may inform debate around the 
competition state thesis. 
 Identify evidence that supports or challenges the competition state thesis as 
well as findings that are not easily explained in the context of the 
competition state debate. 
As mentioned, these aims are in some respects modest. They do not stem from a 
judgement about whether the competition state thesis is correct or desirable. 
Instead they reflect the identification of an important gap in the existing scholarship 
and a curiosity as to what filling it will tell us. 
1.3: Approach of the thesis 
A mixed methods approach is adopted throughout; at times the thesis relies on 
principles of qualitative research and at in places it is largely quantitative. The 
thesis utilises both deductive and inductive process within the operationalisation 
and analysis stages. Indeed the investigation is perhaps at its strongest and most 
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nuanced when it blends qualitative and quantitative methods alongside both 
inductive and deductive process as part of the fuzzy-set ideal type analysis that is 
conducted. 
The key methodological process involves operationalising the competition state 
thesis as a measurable concept. Here there is a keen commitment to engaging 
with the literature to ensure operationalisation is meaningful, truly reflecting the 
competition state thesis. As Cerny and Evans insist that the competition state is 
the welfare state‘s successor, the plethora of welfare state studies that exist 
represents an important starting point for this study. Of notable inspiration is 
Esping-Andersen‘s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). The task at 
hand, to operationalise the competition state, draws heavily on Esping-Andersen‘s 
work as well as the many responses to and extensions of his study. The 
construction of an additive competition state index that is subsequently replicated 
over time reflects the continuity between studies of welfare states and this study of 
the competition state. This is complemented by the utilisation of a rather separate, 
yet similarly comparative methodology, which blends both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to data analysis. 
The empirical approach is presented across three empirical chapters with three 
separate methodologies explored and the findings thereof presented, analysed, 
and discussed individually. The important findings from each chapter are then 
synthesised with reference to the existing literature. This serves to break up the 
analysis into more reader-friendly chapters akin to academic papers. 
1.4: Structure of the thesis 
This introduction is followed by a discussion of the birth, expansion, decline, and 
perceived death of the welfare state. This sets the context for a debate around 
whether such a death has occurred, what caused it, and what if anything has 
replaced the welfare state. The focus here is primarily on the UK case, reflecting 
the fact the UK provides the backdrop to much of Cerny and Evans‘ competition 
state work. This literature review closes by acknowledging the relevance of the 
competition state thesis, while highlighting the fact that the competition state thesis 
lacks a systematic empirical base, having never been subject to any form of 
rigorous empirical interrogation. While there is an extensive body of political 
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economy literature that offers alternative models to the competition state thesis, for 
the reasons outlined in the previous section, the literature review will be primarily 
focused on the perceived emergence of the competition state thesis.   
Following the establishment of a rationale for exploring the competition state thesis 
a brief methodological chapter introduces readers to the key approaches taken to 
operationalise the competition state. The intricate methodological details are not 
fully discussed here so as to avoid repetition. The primary purpose of this chapter 
is to air methodological debates and outline some of the key features of the three 
empirical chapters that follow. 
The operationalisation of the competition state thesis is primarily detailed not in the 
methodology, but rather within the empirical chapters. In essence there are three 
methodologies utilised within this thesis and each one is discussed as part of the 
empirical chapter in which they are utilised. In the first chapter much emphasis is 
placed upon what features of the competition state thesis can be operationalised 
and how they could be operationalised. Here there is an in-depth discussion of the 
dimensions of the competition state that are measured, what variables are used to 
represent these dimensions, and how data measured in a diverse range of units or 
scales can be standardised and thus compared. 
In the second empirical chapter the precedents set in the first are followed in terms 
of variables and dimensions. The key methodological difference is wrought by the 
fact that the purpose of this chapter is to explore whether the observations of the 
first chapter hold over time. This requires a minor yet important alteration to the 
methodology adopted in the first empirical chapter and this is discussed in detail in 
the second chapter. This chapter produces rather voluminous findings and as such 
there are many charts and tables to be found. 
The final empirical chapter adopts an altogether different methodology from those 
that are utilised in the first two empirical chapters. This is partly as a check on the 
findings of the first two chapters, to establish whether the conclusions drawn were 
truly a reflection of how things are, or rather a reflection of the methodology 
adopted. The fuzzy-set ideal type methodology also has the potential to answer 
some of the questions that prove difficult to address with an additive index 
approach. As fuzzy-set ideal type analysis is a relatively new and innovative 
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method within the social sciences, a lengthy discussion of its merits and limitations 
is hosted before findings are presented and analysed. 
Despite the clear methodological distinctions between the three chapters, they 
represent the organic development of the investigation within this thesis and seem 
to complement one another both methodologically and in terms of their findings. 
This thesis closes by acknowledging the various limitations of each empirical 
chapter, but concluding that much of value has been discovered. In terms of the 
competition state there is strong evidence of robust, stable differentiated 
competition state forms, which both supports the main thrust of Cerny and Evan‘s 
work as well as challenging some of their key assertions. These challenges must 
be addressed going forward as they potentially hold the key for understanding 
what governments within the global economy can realistically hope to achieve. 
 
1.5: Contributing to knowledge 
This thesis is first and foremost an empirical exploration of an existing thesis. 
Saying something new is no easy task. Innovation and originality is achieved 
through the adoption of an analytical, empirical, and methodological approach to 
the competition state thesis literature. Devising dimensions of the competition 
state that are theoretically rooted and feasibly measured is undoubtedly an 
ambitious and original endeavour. However, the main achievement of this thesis is 
that it advances the competition state debate through its findings. There is indeed 
much of merit to the competition state thesis, but no longer can the competition 
state be considered as a single entity, found in only one form. Moreover, the 
classification of nations into more than three worlds, however much they may be 
informed by Esping-Andersen, ensures that this thesis joins a growing body of 
literature and empirical evidence that suggests we live in a world more complex 
than that described in the „Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism‟. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1: The Changing nature of the welfare state 
 
2.1.1: Introduction 
There is no real consensus surrounding the nature of the welfare state in the UK, 
or anywhere else for that matter. While it has its critics, the model of war-time 
birth, golden-age of consensus, and finally, slow death of the welfare state seems 
eminent within the current zeitgeist. Understanding a little more about the welfare 
state and its development is an important step towards answering questions about 
whether the welfare state has indeed died, or at least begun the process of dying. 
The purpose of this thesis is ultimately to shed light on one of the many theories of 
‗post-welfare‘, this chapter will set the context for what exactly is meant by welfare, 
while the next will consider the wider implications for the welfare state. 
2.1.2: History of the welfare state: welfare before Beveridge 
Pinpointing the birth of the welfare state in Britain is a difficult task due to the deep 
roots of British social welfare. Many point to the 1940s and the creation of the NHS 
as being the most significant period in the development of the welfare state 
(Fraser, 2003:227; Patriquin, 2007:5; Sullivan, 1996:51; Thane, 1996:279). 
However, several commentators point out that some welfare structures, even at 
the national level, had been in place well before the Second World War (Fraser, 
2003:60; Silburn, 1998:4; Patriquin, 2007:1-7:90; Slack, 1988:169-173). 
When considering the development of the welfare state, it is perhaps more useful 
to think of the war period (1939-45) and its immediate aftermath as a time when 
the welfare state moved from infancy towards its adolescence (its maturation into 
adulthood and perceived demise into infirmity will be discussed later). If this period 
did represent an adolescence in the development of the welfare state, we can say 
that it enjoyed an extremely long infancy (see, Brundage, 2002; Fraser, 2003; 
Patriquin, 2007; Schama, 2000; 2001; 2002; Slack, 1988).  During this infancy, 
state action was limited to infrequent interventions, such as the poor laws of 
Elizabethan England (Fraser, 2003:34; Stewart, 1998:16; Patriquin, 
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2007:90:93:192; Slack, 1988:113:122-131). The genesis of the welfare state, or at 
least social welfare in Britain, was characterised by local programmes of relief 
aimed at the most unfortunate in society (Fraser, 2003:36; Patriquin, 2007:90-106; 
Thane, 1996:278). It was a central feature of welfare provision that the initiative 
was often left to local boards, such as the poor law boards and charities (Patriquin, 
2007:90-93; Slack, 1988:122-131; Thane, 1996:13:19-26). It is fair to say that 
without the hard work of local boards and, charities, and churches, as well as 
individual acts of philanthropy, welfare – in essence little more than ‗poor relief‘, 
would not have existed at all (Fraser, 2003:135-140; Patriquin, 2007:89-98:197; 
Thane, 1996:13:19-26)). 
While the local, small-scale nature of welfare, plus its reliance on philanthropic 
donations continued into the twentieth century (Brundage, 2002:140; Patriquin, 
2007:192; Slack, 1988:162-169; Thane, 1996:19), the sixty years that followed the 
Second Reform Act (1867) marked a turning point in terms of the delivery of 
welfare in the UK (Thane, 1996:14). What the Second Reform Act (1867) did (as 
well as the Representation of the People Act(s) (1918) (1928)) was expand the 
electorate, bringing suffrage to sections of the working and lower middle classes 
for the first time ever (Schama, 2002:144:260; Thane, 1996:14). This endowed a 
constituency facing serious social problems with a voice that was now too loud to 
be ignored in Westminster (Stewart, 1998:17; Schama, 2002:260; Thane, 
1996:14). 
The aftermath of 1867 saw the confluence of two factors that were to shape the 
development of welfare provision throughout the next century: the rise of partisan 
politics in response to the enfranchisement of working men and the subsequent 
mobilisation of class as a (party) political issue (Stewart, 1998:17-19; Thane, 
1996:14). The second factor of import was the undertaking of the first genuinely 
systematic surveys of urban poverty – most notably by Booth (1892) and 
Rowntree (1901) (Brundage, 2002:13; Schama, 2002:311:317). 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the Edwardian Liberal welfare 
reforms, notably in the arenas of pensions and health insurance, had begun to 
―create a symbiotic link between the state‘s economic policy and its social policy‖ 
(Crowther, 1988:14). The seeds were beginning to be sown for a welfare state in 
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which the policies of welfare and the economy were not only linked; they were also 
contracting towards the centre (Brundage, 2002:152; Stewart, 1998:32). Stewart 
suggests that this process of an increasingly centralised pursuit of collectivism, or 
at least the collectivist provision of welfare, has been anything but linear (Stewart, 
1998:31), however a snapshot of the first half of the twentieth century would 
suggest otherwise. 
From the nineteenth century acorns of welfare, the oak of the welfare state grew – 
first with the expansion of education (Fraser, 2003:85-97; Sanderson, 1998:133-
135; Sullivan, 1996:44), then the creation of a National Insurance system 
(Brundage, 2002:143; Sullivan, 1996:48), the abolishment of the Poor Laws 
(Brundage, 2002:151), the continuous battle with unemployment (Fraser, 
2003:184-192:212-215; Sullivan, 1996:8), and the commitment to build ‗Homes for 
Heroes‘ (Ginsburg, 1998:228-232; Schama, 2002:335). By the time that Beveridge 
published Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942), this oak may have only 
been a sapling, however its roots were already drinking deep and holding firm. 
2.1.3: Beveridge and all that: the golden age of welfare consensus? 
While the seeds of British welfare may have indeed been sown much earlier, the 
impact of Beveridge should not be under-estimated. As an economist with a keen 
interest in social insurance (Abel-Smith, 1994:11; Harris, 1994:23; Sullivan, 
1996:21; Timmins, 2001:12), Beveridge had spent much of the early twentieth 
century working within the Liberal governments on various insurance schemes 
(Abel-Smith, 1994:12; Harris, 1994:23; Sullivan, 1996:21; Timmins, 2001:13). 
Despite this, Beveridges‘ inclusion on the Social Insurance and Allied Services 
Committee (SI&ASC) owed as much to his unpopularity as to his knowledge and 
expertise. Indeed, what turned out to be a paradigm defining report by the SI&AS 
was intended as little more than a ‗tidying up‘ report (Harris, 1977:376; Land, 
Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:18; Timmins, 2001:19), which it was hoped, would 
achieve the added benefit of keeping Beveridge away from the centre of 
government (Harris, 1977:376; Lowe, 1993:125; Sullivan, 1996:22 Thane, 
1996:230; Timmins, 2001:18). 
Despite the strange route by which Beveridge joined the committee, once there he 
utilised his vast knowledge of social insurance and the rather vague terms of 
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reference provided to the SI&ASC, to embark on a review and recommendation 
exercise much larger in scope than ever anticipated. Beveridge, who saw social 
insurance as the underpinning of good citizenship (Baldwin, 1994:43; Harris, 
1994:30-32), argued that the country needed a unified and universal system of 
social insurance (as well as Social Assistance) (Abel-Smith, 1994:14; Sullivan, 
1996:24), which would provide cash benefits to protect those in employment and 
their dependents from ‗cradle to grave‘ (Daily Mail, 2/12/1942; Land, Lowe, and 
Whiteside, 1992:18; Schama, 2002:405) – though this phrase was indeed coined 
by Churchill and not Beveridge (Timmins, 1995; 47). These benefits would be 
universal for all those who made NI contributions and only means-tested for those 
who did not (Abel-Smith, 1994:14; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:6; Lowe, 
1993:127). His justification for such a bold and costly policy largely rested on the 
findings of Rowntree, who suggested that 5/6ths of all poverty resulted from 
insurable contingencies (Glennerster and Evans, 1994:61; Lowe, 1993:131; 
Rowntree, 1941:166; Timmins, 2001:21). 
For Beveridge, a genuinely successful restructuring of social insurance could not 
focus on social insurance alone; central to Beveridge‘s plan would need to be the 
creation of a National Health Service, the provision of family allowance, and the 
pursuit of full employment (Abel-Smith, 1994:15; Lowe, 1993:127; Sullivan, 
1996:24 Thane, 1996:231-232; Timmins, 2001:20). It was clear that Beveridge‘s 
plans were much grander than any had anticipated; Keynes himself warned that to 
fund a comprehensive, flat-rate, universal (for contributors) system that provided 
benefits at subsistence level and included family allowances would be difficult – 
though not impossible (Abel-Smith, 1994:17; Harris, 1977:412; Land, Lowe, and 
Whiteside, 1992:7; Thane, 1996:233).   
Having quite considerably expanded the scope of his committee, Beveridge 
manipulated the tide of public opinion to brush past the misgivings of the Phillips 
Committee (Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:18; Thane, 1996:236; Timmins, 
2001:43) and even the Prime Minister of the time – Winston Churchill (Fraser, 
2003:236; Sullivan, 1996:30; Thane, 1996:235), releasing Social Insurance and 
Allied Services in December 1942. As queues formed outside Her Majesty‘s 
Stationary Office (Sullivan, 1996:25; Timmins, 2001:23), the Daily Mirror was 
carrying the headline “Beveridge tells us how to banish want”. At a time of extreme 
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poverty, hardship, and due in large part to the war, social solidarity (Fraser, 
2003:228; Harris, 1994:39; Pierson, 1998:122; Sullivan, 1996:33; Thane, 
1996:211), popular imagination had been captured by Beveridge‘s proposals 
(Fraser, 2003; 235; Lowe, 1993:125; Sullivan, 1996:25 Thane, 1996:237). 
The Beveridge report was a statement of intent, a report on what the government 
could do (Abel-Smith, 1994:15; Lowe, 1993:125; Thane, 1996:278). While 
Beveridge made concessions with regards to pensions (and was rather miserly 
when considering the issue of women) (Abel-Smith, 1994:17; Land, Lowe, and 
Whiteside, 1992:20; Lowe, 1993:130; Thane, 1996:234-235), his plan, which 
public opinion supported, mandated the government to undertake the most drastic 
programme of intervention in the history of social welfare (Fraser, 2003:227; 
Patriquin, 2007:5; Sullivan, 1996:51; Thane, 1996:279). Indeed, so wide ranging 
were Beveridge‘s ambitions for social insurance, his plans to tackle want, idleness, 
squalor, ignorance, and disease, required not just action in the arena of social 
security, but also employment, housing, education, and health (Alcock and Craig, 
2001:126; Fraser, 2003: 236). This is perhaps best illustrated by Beveridge 
himself, who stated that, Social Insurance and Allied Services, in addressing social 
insurance: 
―[was] one part only of an attack upon five giant evils: upon the physical 
Want with which it is directly concerned, upon Disease which often causes 
that Want and brings many other troubles in its train, upon Ignorance which 
no democracy can afford among its citizens, upon squalor… and upon the 
Idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men‖ (Beveridge, 1942:170). 
This clearly required more than just policy commitments, but new infrastructure, 
institutions and, as mentioned, expenditure to almost double the social 
expenditure of the time (Abel-Smith, 1994:15; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 
1992:19; Sullivan, 1996:23). 
Turning such a grandiose plan into something concrete could not happen 
overnight and the Beveridge report would not have been the first to have found 
itself agreed in principle then left to collect dust on a shelf. However, a 
combination of support from the backbenches and prominent Ministers who were 
dedicated to the underlying principles of Beveridge‘s recommendations (Such as 
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Richard Austen Butler, Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Quintin Hogg, and Nye 
Bevan – to name a few), along with the vast groundswell of public support, 
ensured that government committed to implementing the core of Beveridge‘s plans 
(Sullivan, 1996:29; Thane, 1996:237; Timmins, 2001:46). These commitments 
were formalised by the creation, by the end of 1943, of the Sheepshanks 
Committee (to deal with social insurance) and the Steering Committee on Postwar 
Employment (Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:6). 
By 1944 formal commitments were turning into policy and even legislation; 1944 
ended with the creation of a Ministry of National Insurance in November, having 
seen the beginning of what has since been referred to as the ‗White Paper chase‘ 
(Fraser, 2003:243), with the Papers A National Health Service (February 1944); 
Employment Policy (May 1944); and Social Insurance (September 1944) released 
in quick succession (Fraser, 2003:243). These were supplemented by the ‗Butler 
Education Act‘ of 1944, which amongst other things saw the school leaving age 
increase to the age of 15 (Sullivan, 1996:45). Though not directly a ‗Beveridge 
Act‘, this began the process of tackling through legislation, Beveridge‘s five giants 
– in this case ignorance. 
A year later the Family Allowance Act was passed (Fraser, 2003:250; Land, Lowe, 
and Whiteside, 1992:39; Thane, 1996:228), addressing Rowntree‘s assertion that 
benefit increases, in order to truly address the issue of poverty – especially in 
large families, should represent an increase per child rather than an increase in 
benefits to parents (Rowntree, 1941:457). Despite the passage of the Education 
Act the year before, it was the Family Allowance Act that represented the first real 
universalist attempt to insure against ‗want‘ (Fraser, 2003:250; Timmins, 2001:48). 
Indeed it represented the only such legislation to be passed by Churchill‘s coalition 
government (Fraser, 2003:250; Timmins, 2001:48), though the following six years 
of Labour government more than compensated (Alcock, 1998:204; Fraser, 
2003:247-248; Sullivan, 1996:54).  
For six years the Labour government did indeed fight the good fight against the 
five giants Beveridge had outlined (Alcock, 1998:204; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 
1992) – though Beveridge himself played no significant role in this (Timmins, 
2001:49). In an attempt to address the issue of want, The Labour government built 
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upon the Family Allowance Act by passing the NI Act in 1946, which brought 
together sickness, unemployment, old age, maternity and widows benefits, and 
even saw pensions introduced immediately rather than waiting the twenty years 
Beveridge predicted would be need to allow for sufficient contributions to accrue 
(Alcock, 1998:206; Fraser, 2003:251-253; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:22-
23; Sullivan, 1996:55). This was supplemented by the National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Act, which extended the insurance net to cover those who had 
been rendered incapacitated at work. Subsequently, those who were injured at 
work were entitled to the same flat rate benefit as those who were unemployed for 
other reasons (Fraser, 2003:250; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:41-42; Thane, 
1996:238).  
While it was acknowledged that the issue of want could not be tackled without 
addressing the other four ‗evils‘, the granting of Royal Assent to the National 
Assistance (NA) Act seemed to neatly complete the package of measures aimed 
at directly addressing want through the social security system (Fraser, 2003:253; 
Sullivan, 1996:54; 224; Thane, 1996:238). The NA Act provided means tested 
benefits to those who had not made NI contributions (Sullivan, 1996:55; Thane, 
1996:238) and even became a supplementary form of support for those who had 
(Alcock, 1998:207; Fraser, 2003:253), thus ensuring that all were covered by 
some form of social security provision – even if this coverage did not conform to 
Beveridge‘s principle of subsistence (Abel-Smith, 1953:3; Alcock, 1999:54; Alcock, 
1998:205; Fraser, 2003:253; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:35). 
After war-time fears that the Beveridge report would somehow be diluted, Britons 
eagerly awaited the fifth of July 1948, the day when many of Beveridges key ideas 
- not just in the arena of social security, would come into action. It is fitting that the 
day on which many of Beveridge‘s plans for a flat-rate scheme of insurance 
contributions and benefits were finally realised, saw all the headlines instead 
stolen by the opening for business of the NHS (Lowe, 1994:119; Timmins, 
2001:102; 127), something Beveridge had pushed the furthest reaches of the 
SI&ASC‘s remit by suggesting; how far things had truly come from that tidying up 
exercise Beveridge had embarked upon in 1942. This newly instituted NHS, the 
product of the White Paper A National Health Service and the subsequent National 
Health Service Act (1946) was to tackle the issue of illness by providing universal 
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healthcare, free at the point of service (Jones, 1998:167-172; Sullivan, 1996:40; 
Timmins, 2001:111; Thane, 1996:221), just as Beveridge had envisaged 
(Beveridge, 1942:159). 
The NHS Act followed a similar Beveridgeian vein of unifying existing services and 
then shifting control towards the centre of government (Addison, cited by Alcock, 
1999:54; Jones, 1998:169; Sullivan, 1996:59-61). Michael Foot went as far as to 
suggest that the creation of the NHS represented the ―greatest socialist 
achievement of the Labour government‖ (cited in Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 
1992:90). Passing and then implementing the NHS Act proved difficult in the face 
of both Conservative Party and British Medical Association (BMA) – notably 
doctors‘ opposition (Fraser, 2003:259; Sullivan, 1996:41-43; Timmins, 2001:123). 
The Act, which would not only see the nationalisation of hospitals, but also the 
creation of regional boards of administration, the redistribution of doctors to under-
supplied areas, a new salary structure, and the opening of health centres (Land, 
Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:113; Morgan, 1984:157; Timmins, 2001:111) proved 
controversial outside parliament, however passed with little difficulty (Land, Lowe, 
and Whiteside, 1992:113; Fraser, 2003:257). While the next two years played host 
to some stormy negotiations between the BMA and the Ministry of Health (Fraser, 
2003:260; Sullivan, 1996:41-43; Timmins, 2001:124-126), by the 5th of July 1948 
nearly all GPs had joined the NHS (Fraser, 2003:261; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 
1992:114; Sullivan, 1996:60-61); the welfare state had the jewel firmly set in its 
crown (Titmuss, 1958). 
Combating illness wasn‘t, however, the sole giant-slaying operation tasked to 
Aneurin Bevan and the Ministry of Health; the issue of squalor also fell within 
Bevan‘s purview (Ginsburg, 1998:230; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1994:76; 
Sullivan, 1996:61) and the Housing (Building Materials and Housing) Act of 1945 
represented Labour‘s second legislative assault on the five giants (Timmins, 
2001:141). Indeed Timmins suggests that the issues of housing standards, 
homelessness, and house building dominated the 1945 General Election and the 
in-trays of many MPs (Lowe, 1993:235; Thane, 1996:243; Timmins, 2001:141).  
Labour‘s housing policy under Bevan was marked by a flurry of legislation (Land, 
Lowe, and Whiteside, 1994; Lowe, 1993:240), which brought with it a commitment 
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to separate dwellings for all families that wanted one (Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 
1994:71; Timmins, 2001:141), a high standard of housing (Land, Lowe, and 
Whiteside, 1994:71; Sullivan, 1996:62:Timmins, 2001:145), housing largely 
provided by local authorities (Lowe, 1993:245-246; Lowe, 2004:180; Timmins, 
2001:142), and lots of houses to be built quickly (Lowe, 1993:245; Lowe, 
2004:180; Timmins, 2001:140; Sullivan, 1996:62). The need for housing was 
extremely urgent, with over a half-a-million houses having been rendered un-
inhabitable or destroyed in the war and a further three million damaged to some 
extent (Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1994:70; Lowe, 1993:245; Timmins, 
2001:140). This prompted  Labour to set a target of 240,000 houses to be built 
each year, a process that began slowly and attracted much criticism (Land, Lowe, 
and Whiteside, 1994:76). Bevan was accused of putting his socialist belief in 
social housing above the need of the homeless by not allowing a free-market 
approach to building (Lowe, 1993:247; Sullivan, 1996:62; Timmins, 2001:144). 
Others referred to him as the tremendous Tory in response to his insistence that 
each council house be built with three bedrooms and toilets both upstairs and 
downstairs (Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1994:77; Sullivan, 1996:63; Timmins, 
2001:146). 
The arena of housing policy has often found itself on the periphery of welfare 
debates (Lowe, 2004:287) and indeed will not receive the attention it merits here. 
More recently described by Torgersen as the wobbly pillar of the welfare state 
(Torgesen, 1987), housing policy was at the heart of the welfare state in the six-
year period of Labour government, which saw over one million houses of a high 
standard built in an attempt to address the evil of squalor (Thane, 1996:242; 
Timmins, 2001:148). While debate now turns to that final giant, idleness, 
discussed in the context of underpinning the ‗post-war consensus‘, it is worth 
noting that the issue of housing is one that simultaneously represented 
disagreement and consensus ever since the rapid expansion in council house 
creation of the 1940s (Fraser, 2003:272; Lowe, 1993:235; Sullivan, 1996:63). 
As mentioned earlier, the pursuit of full employment - along with the provision of 
family allowances and the creation of the NHS, was one of the three necessary 
commitments that underpinned Beveridge‘s plan to tackle the five giants (Abel-
Smith, 1994:15; Sullivan, 1996:24; Thane, 1996:239). The pursuit of full 
16 
 
employment - utilising a largely Keynesian approach, has also been credited by 
some as the glue that held together a thirty-year consensus regarding the welfare 
state (Lowe, 1993:100; Pierson, 1998:124; Mishra, 1984:1; Sullivan, 1996:247; 
Thane, 1996:240). While there are those who question whether such a consensus 
every existed in reality (Pierson, 1998:122; Pimlott, 1988:129-141), the thirty year 
period that stretched from the end of the war until the election of James Callaghan 
represented a time during which both major parties in the UK embraced a staunch 
belief in social rights, combined with the notion that the state could intervene in 
industry and the economy to smooth out the peaks and troughs of the economic 
cycle, and in turn, guarantee full employment (Alcock and Craig, 2001:124-127; 
Deacon, 2002:102-107; Hudson and Lowe, 2009:44-45; Stewart, 1998:28). 
The commitment to full employment was outlined in both Beveridge‘s full 
employment in a free society (1944) as well as the coalition government‘s White 
Paper, employment policy (1944). Seen as unfeasible by many – including the 
Treasury (Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:7; Lowe, 1993:101-102; Smith, 
1997:45), this principle was leant some credence by the work of Keynes; whose 
publications:How to pay for the war (1940) and The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936), advocated an approach to economic 
policy that he believed could marry welfare policy and economic policy in a way 
that ensured welfare expenditure even in times of recession (Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:45; Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:7; Pierson, 1998:122; Smith, 1997:35). 
While Keynes‘ work was not necessarily understood by Beveridge (Thane, 
1996:239), Beveridge was convinced of its logic and viability by colleagues and as 
such became a supporter of the notion that through state regulation of demand – 
rather than state ownership of industry, full employment could become a reality 
(Pierson, 1998:124-125; Smith, 1997:45; Thane, 1996:239). Amongst Beveridge‘s 
core assertions were the notions that demand for labour be kept above the level of 
supply and that a target of no more than three percent unemployment (which 
would allow for ‗labour mobility‘) be set (Lowe, 1993:103; Smith, 1997:44; Thane, 
1996:240).  
While the Labour government did not completely adopt a Keynesian approach to 
their post war economic policy (Fraser, 2003:265; Smith, 1997:61), the issue of 
tackling unemployment was granted highest priority and with no real opposition to 
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the proposals, essential industries and welfare services were nationalised (Fraser, 
2003:248; Thane, 1996:240; Tomlinson in Page and Silburn, 1998:41). It is 
important to acknowledge that this was not merely a Labour Party endeavour; 
while many Conservatives believed that the 1944 Employment Policy White Paper 
went too far (and a similar proportion of Labour backbenchers believed it did not 
go far enough), Lowe (1993:100) and Fraser (2003:243) correctly note that this 
was a White Paper released by a coalition government. Indeed it was not only a 
coalition government, it was one that, by shifting much of the home front planning 
away from Labour Ministers and towards the Lord President‘s Committee, was 
largely controlled by the Conservatives (Land, Lowe, And Whiteside, 1992:4). 
Nonetheless, as Lowe highlights, this Conservative-dominated government 
articulated its acceptance of a more Keynesian, collectivist approach to the 
economy and the issue of unemployment in the opening section of the 
Employment Policy White Paper (1944): 
The Government accepts as one of their primary aims and responsibilities 
the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment after the war […] 
A country will not suffer from mass-unemployment so long as total demand 
for its goods and services is maintained at a high level (cmnd 6527:para 41 
and 66, cited in Lowe, 1993:100). 
By the 1950s full employment had been achieved (Fraser, 2003:248; Glynn, 
1998:186; Lowe, 1993:104; Pierson, 1998:127; Smith, 1997:56; Thane, 1996:241) 
and the British economy looked strong (Fraser, 2003:265; Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:46; Pierson:126; Thane, 1996:241; Timmins, 2001:177), two facts that many 
have suggested solidified the emerging consensus regarding the role of the state 
(Glynn, 1998:179; Lowe, 1993:100; Thane, 1996:241). There were of course 
disagreements over a range of issues, such as nationalisation (Pinker, 1998:98; 
Sullivan, 1996:248), how to manage the NHS (Sullivan, 1996:248; Webster, 
1990:149), education policy (Fraser, 2003:266; Sanderson, 1998:137-138; 
Sullivan, 1996:253), and to a lesser degree, housing policy (Fraser, 2003:266; 
Ginsburg, 1998:229; Lowe, 1993:235; Lowe, 2004:180; Sullivan, 1996:222). 
Crucially however, the commitment to full employment did not die with the fall of 
the Labour Government and therein lies the consensus that Lowe (1993) and 
Fraser (2003) insists was built across all parties. There were ideological 
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differences between how best to achieve the aims of government, but the aims 
were agreed in principle; after the resignation of Throneycroft (1958) the means 
came closer to agreement as well (Lowe, 1993:104; Smith, 1997:65; Stewart in 
Page and Silburn, 1998:31). Until the middle of the 1970s both parties, when in 
power, pursued policies that conformed to the Keynesian logic of mixed 
management, a balance between private and public investment. It is true that 
Keynes left enough ambiguity to allow the Conservatives to favour the market a 
little more and Labour to favour the state (Fraser, 2003:266; Lowe, 1993; 119; 
Pierson, 1998:26; Timmins, 2001:178), but the overall trend was easily identifiable 
as Keynesian. 
For those who still insist that the consensus was a myth (Such as Pimlott, 1988), 
that there was no real, fundamental agreement between parties, they must at least 
accept that there was a consensus about which policies were electorally correct 
(Crosland, 1956:61; Hudson and Lowe, 2009:45; Lowe, 1993:104), which 
translated into a steady rise in social expenditure (Fraser, 2003:268; Pierson, 
1998:124). Whether this truly was a consensus or rather a paradigm defined by 
the electoral success of a Keynesian approach and the pursuit of full employment, 
the thirty years following the war stand in stark contrast to the period since 1976. 
By 1976 however, the consensus had failed. Some blame a combination of the 
1973 oil crisis and general economic downturn, which precipitated rising 
unemployment‘ for ending the thirty-year consensus on the logic of Keynesian 
economics (Alcock and Craig, 2001:56; 77; Glynn, 1998:189; Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:47-49). Others (notably Keith Joseph, Milton Friedman, Freidrich von Hayek, 
and of course, Thatcher) suggested that a Keynesian approach just didn‘t work 
and point to the emergence of stagflation and the fact that unemployment had 
increased slowly, but steadily, throughout the 1960s (see Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:47; Timmins, 2001:177; 355). Some commentators – critical of ‗over-simple‘ 
consensus and crisis theories, believe that the economic conditions of the 1970s 
were exaggerated in order to move away from Keynesian economics (Castles, 
2004:5-9). Regardless of this, with unemployment spiralling out of control, the 
chief electoral bargaining chip of Keynesian economics - that it could guarantee 
full employment, was gone. It is worth noting the words of Labour Leader and PM 
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James Callaghan, who three years before Thatcher came to power, announced 
that the party was over:  
"We used to think you could spend your way out of a recession and 
increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I 
tell you in all candour that option no longer exists" (Callaghan, 1976). 
The process of financial deregulation that followed - prompted by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), privatisation, and the shift towards social responsibilities 
over social rights, has for many signalled the end of the traditional welfare state 
(Alcock and Craig, 2001:ch.1; Hewitt and Powell, 1998:10-11; Hudson and Lowe 
2004:38-40; Thatcher, 1993:626-627). It is this notion that is central to the 
competition state thesis; does the abandonment of Keynesian economics, coupled 
with the acceptance that unemployment is a ―price worth paying‖ (Lamont, 
recorded in Hansard, 1991), truly signal the end of the welfare state? Cerny and 
Evans insist that since the election of Thatcher, the prevailing logic sees ―actors in 
a competition state seeking to make the domestic economy more prosperous and 
competitive, while accepting the loss of key traditional social and economic state 
functions‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1). Moreover, they insist that in the wake of the 
1970‘s economic decline, competitive policies began to rise to the top of the 
agenda, which made social policy subservient to the economy (Cerny and Evans, 
2003:20). This stands in stark contrast to Beveridge‘s assertion that employment 
policy - in order to be effective, requires the effective subordination of private 
investment to public policy‖ (Beveridge, 1944:261). 
Whether this shift in policy did mark the end of the welfare state and the rise of the 
competition state forms the crux of this thesis. Subsequent chapters will explore 
the role globalisation has played in the changing landscape of political economy, 
explore alternative theories of post-welfare, and ultimately, delve deeper into the 
competition state thesis itself.  
2.1.4: Away from Beveridge 
The welfare state‘s death knell has, for those who wish to hear it, been sounded. 
When the killer blow was struck depends on who was listening; for some, 1996 
(see Brindle, 1996; Timmins, 2001) marked the end, for others it was 1979 (see 
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Andrews and Jacobs, 1990), and a few even suggest the great promise of a 
welfare state died with the publication of SIAS (1942) (see Ditch and Glennerster, 
1994). Others insist no such toll is pealing (see Castles, 2004; Powell and Hewitt, 
1998:1). 
What is difficult to discount however, is that a snapshot of the welfare state in 
1976, is profoundly different from a snapshot taken in 1986, again in 1996, and 
almost unrecognisable to a snapshot taken in 2006. Whilst Beveridge undoubtedly 
expected specific policies to evolve, maybe even out of recognition, whether he 
would even recognise the underlying principles, sown in his lifetime, as being 
present today, is uncertain. 
As covered, for Beveridge, welfare was best administered holistically, and 
crucially, centrally. It was to be based on contributions, offering flat rate, universal 
(to contributors), and subsistence level cash benefits. While subsistence levels 
were never met, the 1946 NI Act, covered in more detail earlier, embodied most of 
Beveridge‘s key principles. This Act, which did not means test, which linked 
benefits to contributions, and which adopted a flat-rate for benefits, stands in stark 
contrast to the state of income support and family allowance during the late 1980s 
(Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:281). While overall state expenditure was on the 
increase (Lowe, 1993:309:Thatcher, 1993:50), benefit levels were falling further 
and further below the subsistence levels anticipated by Beveridge. Moreover, 
ostensibly to target and then spend resources on those for whom the need was 
most desperate, came a reliance on means-testing and the erosion of universal 
benefits (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:59-64; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1989:145; 
Lowe, 1993:145; 314; Pierson, 1994:106-107). 
Indeed, Thatcherite welfare was built upon a rather different ethos to that which 
had gone before, so much so that Hudson and Lowe characterised it as 
representing a ―mirror image of those [values] that under-pinned the post-war 
consensus‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:50). In terms of her personal ideology, 
Thatcher differed from Beveridge in two key ways: first, she did not trust the state, 
believing it to be intrusive and inefficient and at its best when it remained small 
(Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:5; Evans, 1997:29; 34; Thatcher7-8; 626; 631). As 
such she favoured a supply-side approach to managing the economy, a clear 
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rejection of Keynesian economics (Evans, 1997:19:29; Lowe, 1993:303; Thatcher, 
1993:51; 677). Second, she was increasingly concerned with what she saw as the 
negative implications of welfare provision, particularly the notion of an 
unemployment, or poverty trap (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:56; Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:49; Pierson, 1994:105-106). This ultimately led her Conservative 
Government to pursue what Pierson identifies as four main goals: increased use of 
specific targets, the reduction in state expenditure, less bureaucracy and 
complexity, and stronger work incentives (Pierson, 1994:105).  
The second and third goals mentioned above were integral to Thatcher‘s desire of 
rolling back the state (Lowe, 1993:303; 309), which stemmed from her belief that 
not only is a large state inefficient (Evans, 1997:55; Thatcher, 1993:8; 53) and 
extremely bureaucratic (Evans, 1997:53; Lowe, 1993:315; 317; Thatcher, 1993:46-
49), its profligacy was crushing private enterprise (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:49; 
Thatcher, 1993:32; 677-680; Winter and Connolly, 1996:30). 
It was not just in the economic arena that Thatcher believed that a large state was 
a harmful state, often insisting that it too often encroached upon the natural 
workings of the individual and their family (Lowe, 1993:309; Pilcher and Wagg, 
1996:2). 
The first and fourth goals reflected the personal beliefs of Thatcher and her closest 
advisors, that the welfare state polluted the national psyche in some way (Hall, 
1983:29; Ridley, 1991:110), supporting a citizenry in which a lazy underclass, 
caught in a poverty trap, had no real incentive to work and as such had no real 
stake in society (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:54-58; Lowe, 1993:314; 316; 329; 
Oppenheim and Lister, 1996:116; Pierson, 1994:105; Winter and Connolly, 
1996:301). Thatcher‘s own words provide perhaps the best insight into her 
approach towards the welfare state in what she described as ―[N]ot so [M]uch a 
[P]rogramme, [M]ore a [W]ay of [L]ife‖ (Thatcher, 1993:625). 
Welfare benefits, distributed with little or no consideration of their effects on 
behaviour, encouraged illegitimacy, facilitated the breakdown of families, 
and replaced incentives favouring work and self-reliance with perverse 
encouragement for idleness and cheating (ibid:8). 
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The root cause of our contemporary social problems – to the extent that 
these did not reflect the timeless influence and bottomless resources of old-
fashioned wickedness – was that the state had been doing too much. 
(ibid:626) 
The problem with our welfare state was that – perhaps to some degree 
inevitably – we had failed to remember that distinction [between the 
deserving and undeserving poor] and so we provided the same ‗help‘ to 
those who had genuinely fallen into difficulties and needed some support 
until they could get out of them, as to those who had simply lost the will or 
habit of work and self-improvement (ibid:627). 
Thatcher believed that the state had not only become too big, it had also become 
too generous. Not only was private enterprise being stifled, so was individual 
enterprise, even at the basic level; the very desire to work (DHSS, 1985). Hall 
insists that these issues were not simply matters of economics for Thatcher, 
instead inherently political and moral, suggesting that they ran to the very heart of 
‗Britishness‘ (Hall, 1983:29). Just as the Liberal consensus had, for Thatcher, 
undermined the very notion of the family (Andresw and Jacobs, 1990:50; Hudson 
and Lowe, 2009:49; Lowe, 1993:317; Pilcher and Wagg, 1996:3; Winter and 
Connolly, 1996:30), it had fostered ―the image of the overtaxed [Briton], enervated 
by welfare ‗coddling‘, his or her moral fibre irrevocably sapped by state handouts‖ 
(Hall 1983:29).  
These firm beliefs about the limitations of both the state and human nature were 
expected to translate into an all-out assault on the welfare state and while some 
insist this didn‘t really happen (Lowe, 1993:311; Pierson, 1994:108), the welfare 
state and especially welfare provision, had profoundly changed by the end of 
Thatcher‘s reign (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990; Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1989:144-145). 
In the arena of Social Security, the foundation of Beveridgean welfare (Beveridge, 
1942:170), Thatcher oversaw what has been described by some as a ‗death by a 
thousand cuts‘ (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:148-150; 280-1; Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1989:125; Pierson, 1994:101; 115). Pierson (1994:107-108) outlines 
many of the often institutional barriers that hindered any possible large-scale 
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retrenchment, while at the same time highlighting how the cumulative effects of 
small policy changes left the UK with a social security system, especially in the 
realm of income maintenance, which was increasingly means-tested, poorly 
funded, and largely punished the poor (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:24-49; Evans, 
1997:19; 31; Lowe, 1993:314; Oppenheim and Lister, 1996:120; Pierson, 
1994107; 110; 114). In their work Turning the Screw, Atkinson and Micklewright 
detail no fewer that 17 seemingly minor policies, all of which either extended 
disqualification periods, abolished lower rates of benefits, tightened restrictictions, 
or just lowered the replacement rate generally (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1989:128; Lowe1993:314). The alarming situation faced by those in poverty is 
even starker when considered alongside the fact that the number of low-income 
families doubled within the first four years of Thatcher‘s premiership (Pierson, 
1994:110). 
Child Benefit is another example of how the Thatcher Governments changed, if 
not the welfare state, at least citizens‘ experience of the welfare state and the 
ethos that underpinned it. Upon their election in 1979, the Conservatives targeted 
Child Benefit as an area where money was being wasted on those who were not 
even experiencing poverty (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:282; Oppenheim and 
Lister, 1996:119; Pierson, 1994:104; 107-110; Thatcher, 1993:631). Thatcher 
herself was said to have been extremely dubious as to the moral value of such a 
programme (Pierson, 1994:107; 108) and with only limited public sympathy for 
Child Benefit (Andrews and Jacobs, 1990:54-55; Pierson, 1994:107; 108), coupled 
with the huge potential savings that could be made, it was assumed that major 
changes would occur. Indeed, the Fowler reviews were rumoured to have 
considered taxing or even abolishing Child Benefit (Pierson, 1994:107; Thatcher, 
1993:630-631). As with Income Support however, the main changes were 
delivered ‗by the back door‘, with increases being at best only partially uprated in 
line with prices and more often than not, frozen (Lowe, 1993:314; Oppenheim and 
Lister, 1996:119; Pierson, 1994:107; 109-111; 115). Coupled with the twin forces 
of economic growth and inflation, these measures reduced the real-terms impact 
of Child Benefit (Lowe, 1993:314; Pierson, 1994:107). 
By the end of the 1980s then, while an all-out war on the welfare state had not 
been declared, let alone won, the day-to-day experiences of the welfare state had 
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changed and many of the principles that had underpinned Beveridge‘s vision had 
changed (Lowe, 1993:148). Partly for institutional reasons and partly because the 
Conservatives did not ‗have the stomach‘ for it, much of the infrastructure of the 
welfare state survived the eighteen years of Conservative rule and were ready to 
be utilised in a more traditional fashion when New Labour swept to power in 1997.   
2.1.5: Social Democracy: Renewal or Removal? 
The Labour Party that swept to power that May morning was not however, the 
Labour Party of Bevan and Attlee (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003:1; Glyn and 
Wood, 2001:64; Mullard and Swaray, 2008:48; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:10-11). 
Indeed, nor was it the Labour Party of Wilson, Callaghan, Foot, Benn, or even 
Kinnock. Those names were to be consigned to the annals of ‗old Labour‘ - and 
now was the time for New Labour. 
Having undergone a long a painful process, first of introspection (Beech, 2006:77-
98; Deacon, 2000:11; Driver and Martell, 1998:15; Powell, 1999:6), then of 
personnel change (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003:51), and finally, organisational 
change (Atkins, 2010:39; Beech, 2006:98-105; Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003:3; 
Powell, 1999:7), New Labour emerged with a new plan, to take the ‗third way‘ 
between the first way of new-right free markets and the second way of old-left 
collectivism (Blair1996; Bochel and Defty, 2007:17; Giddens, 1998:26).  This new 
dawn would be marked by a commitment to supply-side economics, public/private 
partnerships (PPP), and market competition (DSS, 1998a:83; DTI, 1999; Glyn and 
Wood, 2001:63; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:9). This meant of course the formally 
unthinkable abandonment of policies such as nationalisation, redistribution, and 
progressive taxation (Glyn and Wood, 2001:50; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:8). 
Furthermore, the focus on not just rights, but also responsibilities, especially in the 
arenas of employment and benefits (Clarke, 2005:451; Deacon, 2000:11; Powell 
and Hewitt, 1998:10), saw the abandonment of a national minimum, free higher 
education, and the severance of the link between earnings and benefits (Alcock, 
2005:87; Driver, 2008:62; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:9). Indeed, in the government‘s 
own words, the New Labour project would ―rebuild the welfare state around work‖ 
(DSS, 1998a:23) replacing passive welfare, with active welfare (Clarke, 2005:448; 
Deacon, 2003:133; Driver, 2008:53). 
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Unlike Thatcher though, New Labour would temper this neo-liberal approach with 
an investment in human capital, social justice, and public services, promoting an 
equality of opportunity (Alcock, 2005:86; Atkins, 2010:40; Blair and Schroeder, 
1999:3-4; Finn, 2005:95; Sefton, 2005:110-111). While Blair railed against the 
culture of welfare dependency and demanded responsibility from citizens (Blair, 
1995:7; HM Treasury, 1997:47), he did so in the belief that a ‗new social contract‘ 
had emerged (Deacon, 2000:12). For Blair, the right to be tougher when applying 
rules relating to employment would be afforded by citizens, to the government, in 
return for the state enabling those very citizens to share a stake in society (Blair, 
1995:7). As we will see a little later, this hard-line stance, offset by a dedication to 
the cause of social inclusion, ran to the heart of Blair‘s third way approach to 
welfare provision. Powell suggests that this third way approach is built upon four 
key principles: the need for an active, preventative welfare state; the importance of 
work; the focus on equality of opportunity rather than outcome; and the matching 
of rights with responsibilities (Powell, 1999:15). 
Some however, both within the Labour Party and without, saw such rhetoric, let 
alone the polices that followed, as a betrayal of Labour values (Cruddas, 
2006:206; Gamble, 2007:32; Hattersley, 1999:26; Hattersley, 2001; Lister, 1998; 
Lister, 2007; Piachaud, 1998). Others meanwhile, merely saw such changes as a 
recasting of Labour values in a new world (Alcock, 2005:85; Field, cited in Powell 
and Hewitt, 1998:9), while cynics have suggested the changes served only one 
real master: the need for electoral success (Cruddas, 2006:205-206; Deacon, 
2000:11; Giddens, 2000:44; Finlayson, 2010:11; Klein and Rafferty, 1999:374; 
Lister, 1998:18). Tony Blair himself stated that New Labour was a project 
dedicated to modernising social democracy, committed to social justice and the 
broader centre-left principles, but crucially for him ―flexible, innovative and forward-
looking in the means to achieve them‖ (Blair, 1998:1). 
This innovation included sticking to Conservative spending plans and the 
emancipation of the Bank of England, which in turn saw control of interest rates 
pass from the government (Glyn and Wood, 2001:50; Walker and Wiseman, 
2003:6). This, Beech suggests, could be ―interpreted as a departure from social 
democracy and an endorsement of a form of neo-liberalism‖ (Beech, 2008:6). 
Indeed, much of the New Labour rhetoric had a distinctly neo-liberal – even at 
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times, Thatcherite tone to it. The White Paper, ‗Our Competitive Future‘ (DTI, 
1999) for example, stated ―The UK needs a period of sustained stability [...] for this 
reason, the Government has reformed the macroeconomic framework to focus 
policy on stability‖ (DTI, 1999:11). This reformation of macroeconomic policy is 
reflected in the Code for Fiscal Stability‘s first ‗golden rule‘, which states that ―the 
current budget be in balance or surplus over the economic cycle‖ (DTI, 1999:11).  
With so much emphasis placed on the strength of the economy, coupled with New 
Labour‘s reluctance to roll back Thatcher‘s roll-backs, there had to be losers; the 
drift towards means-testing was not reversed (Deacon, 2000:15; Deacon, 
2002:113; Sefton, 2005:111) and entitlements continued to be tightened – 
especially for young people (Finn, 2005:96; Kemp, 2005:18; Powell and Hewitt, 
1998:8; Sefton, 2005:111). No much more so was this felt than in the sphere of 
unemployment benefits. New Labour adopted a workfare approach to welfare 
provision, not too dissimilar from the Tory policy (Alcock, 2005:85; Powell and 
Hewitt, 1998:8), which saw a range of activation policies favoured rather than the 
traditional reliance on cash-transfers to the unemployed. Benefits were now 
contingent on the genuine, active search for work (Deacon, 2000:12; Piachaud, 
1998:10; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:8; Walker and Wiseman, 2003). As mentioned 
earlier, young people bore the brunt of such schemes, which had, under the 
Conservatives, seen ―entitlements for the young unemployed conditional on 
undertaking skills-enhancing training, subsidised employment, or voluntary work, 
on pain of a 40% benefit cut if they refuse‖ (Timmins, 1996:517). 
To focus on the economic policies and rhetoric of New Labour does indeed paint a 
rather neo-liberal picture of Blairite polity. Some, such as Powell and Hewitt (1998) 
would suggest that this was because New Labour had accepted the Thatcherite 
logic of the 1980s (See also Alcock, 2005:84; Burchardt and Hills, 1999:48; 
Clarke, 2005:452; Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003:49; Cruddas, 2006:206; Driver 
and Martell, 1998:3; Driver, 2008:51; Heffernan, 2001:10; Walker and Wiseman, 
2003:10) and was merely trying to present Thatcherism with a human face – or 
Thatcher without the handbag (Giddens, 2000:8). Blair however was insistent that 
the third way was decidedly not New Right. It stood apart he suggested, primarily 
in its disagreement with the New Right orthodoxy that insisted ―public investment 
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and often the very notions ‗society‘ of collective endeavour, as evils to be undone‖ 
(Blair, 1998:1). 
Whether this is borne out by New Labour policy is a hotbed of disagreement 
(Contrast Crudass, 2006; Glyn and Wood, 2001:54; Lister, 1998; Lister 2007, with 
Piachaud 1998; Finn, 2005). The ‗employment first‘ welfare state (Finn, 2003:111) 
adopted by New Labour is viewed by some as unmistakably New Right, neo 
liberal, even Thatcherite (Bochel and Defty, 2007:17; Cruddas, 2006:206; Lister, 
1998:15). The workfare approach – so heavily influenced by policy in America, 
ultimately draws its base in scholarship from underclass theorists such as 
Lawrence Mead, Charles Murray and Michael Novak (Deacon, (2000:11) for 
example compares Frank Field‘s analyses of welfare dependency to Charles 
Murray‘s; see also Freeden, 1999:43; Hewitt, 1999:150), as reflected in Blair‘s 
speeches (Blair, 1996:9-10). As such, some have argued that the ‗work-first‘ 
approach is inherently right-wing and not only punishes the poor, but also fails to 
meet many of the underlying, rhetorical principles of social justice (Clarke, 
2005:452; Cressey, 1999:178; Lee, 2008:33; Lister, 1998:15; Lister, 2007:150-
152). Walker and Wiseman for example, note that the compulsory schemes, 
especially those aimed at the young unemployed, have a relatively high attrition 
rate. This is in part due to the lack of training offered by the work first schemes, 
which results in un-prepared or ill-equipped claimants finding themselves in a 
workforce that expected a higher standard of employee and as such, ultimately 
finding themselves once again claiming benefits (Glyn and Wood, 2001:56; Walker 
and Wiseman, 2003:15). Such issues have led Ellison and Ellison to question 
whether workfare schemes offer genuine opportunities for the unemployed to fully 
integrate with the workforce (Ellison and Ellison, 2006:34). With work first schemes 
having been accompanied with a tightening of passive entitlements, especially 
with regards JSA (Finn, 2005:96; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:8; Sefton, 2005:111), 
many of the poorest still find themselves ‗abandoned‘ by the state (Clarke, 
2005:452) and excluded from society. 
For both Lister and Sefton, New Labour have crucially ‗missed the point‘ by 
focusing on equality of opportunity, suggesting that the freedom to make choices 
is nothing without the capacity and capability to enact those choices (Lister, 
2004:17; Sefton, 2005:10). Moreover, Lister insists that New Labour‘s hypocrisy is 
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evident in the unequal application of its rights and responsibilities principle towards 
the rich and poor (Lister, 2007:151). On a similar theme, Stewart and Hills suggest 
that where redistributive principles have been retained by New Labour, the focus 
has almost solely been on redistribution from the those near the middle, to those 
at the bottom, while ignoring those who are comfortably well off (Stewart and Hills, 
2005:15 – See also Lee, 2008:33), something that is seen as yet another betrayal 
of Labour principles by the traditional left (for a good discussion of New Labour 
betrayal see Cruddas, 2006 and Lister, 2007). Ultimately, those from the left who 
have not ‗bought into‘ the New Labour agenda remain sceptical largely due to the 
perceived abandonment of social democracy. Glyn and Wood suggest that ―New 
Labour has disentangled the traditional social democratic aims of promoting 
equality and eliminating poverty in ways that many on the left find both 
unacceptable (in respect of greater inequality in the top half of the distribution) and 
unconvincing (in respect of the near-exclusive emphasis on the labour market)‖ 
(Glyn and Wood, 2001:64). In this regard both Beech and Paton goes further, 
suggesting that the Third way represents a rejection of social democracy (Beech, 
2008:191; Patton, 1999:75). 
Both Blair and Giddens insist that the third way, rather than an abandonment or 
disentanglement of social democracy, represents a modernisation of social 
democracy (Powell, 1999:13), an attempt to ―sustain social democratic values in a 
modern world‖ (Beech, 2006:103; Blair, 1998:2). Indeed, they both stress that 
while the purpose of the third way is not redistribution, there is an added emphasis 
on people (Blair, 1998:2; Giddens, 2000:73; Sefton, 2005:111). The state‘s role 
within the third way is increasingly a small one (though an active one), primarily 
concerned with creating the conditions whereby a successful economy can flourish 
and in turn, ensure prosperity (Giddens, 2000:7). The state is no longer a leveller, 
rather and investor, with Giddens stressing the importance of human capital 
(Giddens, 1998:117).  
Whether the third way does mark a continuation of social democratic values or 
otherwise, it is clear that the commitment to egalitarianism has undergone some 
degree of change. Giddens is forthright in stating that there is ―no future for 
egalitarianism at all costs‖ (Giddens, 2000:85). Even the concept of poverty has 
been recast, with a broad shift from discussing material poverty, to the concept of 
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social exclusion (Alcock, 2005:85; Atkins, 2010:43; Bochel and Defty, 2007:17; 
Driver and Martell, 1998:90; DSS, 1998a:63; DSS, 1998b:6; Glyn and Wood, 
2001:57). Giddens goes as far as to suggest that inequality is exclusion, 
concerned with issues of citizenship and political rights, rather than merely 
material deprivation (Atkins, 2010:43; Giddens, 1998:102-103). To this end, while 
New Labour‘s insistence that benefits do not fight poverty (Lister, 1998:15) may 
not convince all, by shifting the goalposts with regards what is actually being 
combated (SE rather than poverty), New Labour have shaped the debate in such a 
way that seeks to consign passive welfare to history.  
This departure is bound together with a reappraisal of the roles of both structure 
and agency in combating social exclusion (Alcock, 2005:86), exemplified by New 
Labour‘s focus on both rights and responsibilities (Driver, 2008:50; DSS, 1998:31; 
Giddens, 1998:99; Giddens, 2000:52). For Blair and New Labour, the contract 
forged by matching both opportunity and responsibility represented a new deal 
between citizen and state (Blair, 1996:10; DSS, 1998a:80; Kemp, 2005:17). This 
new deal was built not only on the principle of ‗work for those who can‘ (DSS, 
1998b:8) - primarily out of a responsibility to the state, but that by working, one 
would escape social exclusion (Bochel and Defty, 2007:18).  
This emergence of work as an accepted dimension of welfare has been central to 
reconciling the left and centre left within New Labour. The third way, described by 
Giddens as the vital process in the task of shifting from passive to active welfare 
(Pierson, 2006:182), espouses work as not only being the ‗royal road from welfare‘ 
(Pierson, 2006:182), but also states that where welfare had once been seen as the 
right of citizenship, work should now be seen as the obligation of citizenship 
(Ellison, 2006:95). Central to New Labour‘s assertion that work is the best form of 
welfare (McCafferty and Mooney, 2007:209) is the notion that it is inclusion in the 
workforce that offers not only the quickest route out of poverty, but also the safest 
(Cerny and Evans, 2003:37; Deacon, 2000:11; Deacon, 2002:107; DSS, 1998:23; 
Ellison, 2006:84).  
The very notion of employment as a tool to combat social exclusion is neatly 
crystallised by considering the role of ALMPs as tackling the dependency culture 
(DSS, 1998b:9; Sunley et al, 2006:10) – propagated by passive welfare, which 
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results in the long-term unemployed finding themselves on the periphery of society 
(DSS, 1998a:9). Skills based, training intensive courses, which invest in the 
person, are seen to not only reduce the burden on the state, but also as having the 
ability to reverse the exclusion faced by an increasingly deskilled non-workforce in 
a way that passive entitlement provision cannot (Blair and Schroder, 1999:3-4; 
DSS, 1998a:23; Giddens, 1998:65; Sunley et al, 2006:5). As such, third way 
thinkers would argue, activation policies are not merely a neo-liberal response to 
the burgeoning state, rather a compassionate response to the twin problems of 
state burden and social exclusion, shifting the emphasis from passive to active 
welfare and thus combating social exclusion (Clarke, 2005:448; Giddens, 2000:88; 
Giddens, 2006:382; Hewitt, 1999:150; Kemp, 2005:16; Sunley et al, 2006:5; 
Walker and Wright, 2003:6). It may be through this very principle that New Labour 
can claim to reconcile the notion of a more competitive nation with a more 
inclusive nation. Brown for example, insists ―What is good for the nation - inclusion 
in society through paid work - is also good for the economy, which needs to utilise 
and develop the skills of the workforce if it is to become a global competitor‖ 
(Brown, cited in Ellison, 2006:95-96).  
It could be argued that nothing better underlines New Labour‘s shift in emphasis 
from a focus on structure to agency, within a broader commitment to tackling 
social exclusion, than their raft of New Deals (Beech, 2008:8; Deacon, 2003:133; 
Kemp, 2005:16). For Blair, the New Deal[s] stood in stark contrast to passive 
welfare, which stressed only rights and not responsibilities (Bochel and Defty, 
2007:19; Clarke, 2005:451; Kemp, 2005:17). Instead the New Deal would 
―promote opportunity, personal responsibility [and] enhance the skill base of the 
country, counter dependency and the growth of the underclass, and foster public 
support for benefits by emphasising conditionality and showing welfare to be 
working‖ (Blair, 1996; DSS, 1998a:24-25).  
The New Deal for Young unemployed People (NDYP), delivered by a partnership 
between the public, private, and third sectors (Sunley et al, 2006:185; Walker and 
Wiseman, 2003:11-14) encapsulates not only the distinction between ‗old‘ and 
New Labour, it also highlights how the third way sought to provide a fairer society 
than Thatcherism had. The NDYP, funded by a redistributive windfall tax on the 
profits of privatised utilities (Driver, 2008:52; Finn, 2005:94; Walker and Wiseman, 
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2003:6) is illuminating in the way it does indeed thread a path between old 
Labour‘s passive redistribution and the New Right‘s hard-line stance on 
redistribution. While direct payments were still made to young unemployed people, 
the passive Jobseeker‘s allowance (JSA) was supplemented by a raft of measures 
geared to returning the claimant to work (Finn, 2005:94). Such measures included 
intensive employment assistance, training courses, subsidised employment and 
voluntary work (DSS, 1998a:25; Cressey, 1999:177; Glyn and Wood, 2001:53; 
Walker and Wiseman, 2003:11-14), though as Bochel and Defty highlight, there 
was no fifth option, no right to opt out (Bochel and Defty, 2007:19; Cressey, 
1999:177; Glyn and Wood, 2001:54).  
As discussed however, a commitment to returning people to the workforce in order 
to combat social exclusion is insufficient if those jobs cannot be held, or worse, if 
holding a job is not sufficient to escape poverty. As such, it was necessary to 
ensure that while activation strategies had become integral to social policy, they 
would sit alongside initiatives aimed at ensuring employment did indeed promote 
social inclusion. This commitment was central to the mantra ‗making work pay‘ 
(Deacon, 2002:108; Driver, 2008:53 DSS, 1998a:29; Ellison, 2006:97), which 
reflected New Labour‘s assertion that not only would a return to employment 
ensure that people would better engage with society, it would also ensure that 
engaging with employment offered the best route out of material poverty (DSS, 
1998a:19). To this end, the minimum wage was heralded by New Labour as a 
giant step towards making employment more attractive (Driver, 2008:53; DSS, 
1998b:iv; Glyn and Wood, 2001:57), though some have suggested that this did 
primarily benefit the already established middle class, rather than acting as an 
agent of social mobility (Glyn and Wood, 2001:57; Sefton, 2005:112). 
Perhaps a more successful method of making work pay has been the introduction 
of tax credits (Bochel and Defty, 2007:20; Driver and Martell, 1998:109; Glyn and 
Wood, 2001:53; Kemp, 2005:17). These credits ensured that redistribution 
benefitted not just those without employment, but those who found themselves in 
employment (Driver, 2008:54; Glyn and Wood, 2001:53). This was achieved by 
supplementing wages, initially for those with dependents (HM Treasury, 1998), 
though the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) eventually split into both the 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC) (Beech, 2008:9; Driver, 
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2008:54; Finn, 2005:94). Tax credits have not been without their critics, with some 
suggesting that those of working age – especially those under 18 but without 
children (Hewitt, 1999:156; Driver, 2005:263), or partners of WTC claimants (Finn, 
2005:94) have found themselves worse off. However, the overall response has 
been relatively positive (Finn, 2005:94; Pierson, 2006:189). The aim of WTCs was 
to use the tax credits system as a ―step towards greater integration of the tax and 
benefits system" (HM Treasury, 1998:7). This was something New Labour had 
committed to before the 1997 election, stating in their manifesto that they would 
―examine the interaction of the tax and benefits system so that they can be 
streamlined and modernised, so as to fulfil our objectives of promoting work 
incentives, reducing poverty and welfare dependency and strengthening 
community and family life‖ (Labour Party, 1997:13). With a third way primarily 
interested in securing equality of opportunity, rather than of outcome, it is 
unsurprising that even after the creation of separate WTC and CTC, redistribution 
was more often than not aimed towards children (Sefton, 2005:111). 
None-the-less, whilst advancing a policy agenda that would surely be unthinkable 
(Deacon, 2000:6; Driver, 2008:51) under ‗old‘ Labour, this agenda was markedly 
un-Thatcher. Even in the arena of workfare, in the instances where ALMPs are 
characterised fearfully as an alternative to social policy rather than a supplement 
to it (see Powell and Hewitt, 1998:10), these seemingly draconian schemes can be 
interpreted as third way, rather than neo-liberal.  
Focusing on the adoption of ALMPs as part of a more workfare approach to 
unemployment is interesting not merely because of how it informs opinions 
surrounding the New Labour project. While such an approach certainly does 
provoke debate as to whether New Labour has managed to reconcile a 
commitment to social justice, equality of opportunity, and a fairer Britain, with a 
competitive economic policy, which also focuses on individual responsibilities; it 
also highlights the importance of policy transfer within the New Labour‘s policy 
process. Without such transfer, something that was at the heart of the 
repositioning of Labour under Blair (Beech, 2006:107-111; Deacon, 2000:6; 
Giddens, 2000:4) it is unclear how far Blair would have dared move New Labour to 
the centre.  
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While New Labour Ministers and advisors were happy to discuss the ways in 
which the workfare approach had been informed by other European countries, the 
New Labour approach to activation was indeed seen to be original within Europe 
(White, cited in Deacon, 2000:13). White insists that is in large part due to the 
profound impact Bill Clinton‘s Democratic Party had on Tony Blair‘s New Labour 
Party (White, cited in Deacon, 2000:13) – though not all commentators subscribe 
to this analysis (see Beech, 2006:107-111). Some have even suggested that the 
parallels between Blair and Clinton are almost more profound than those that 
existed between Thatcher and Reagan (Clinton, 2005:367:686:756:786:813; King 
and Wickham-Jones, 1999:268; Rentoul, 2001:194-198:432-435). Rhetorical 
similarities, which Gough insists make up no small part of policy direction 
(Gough,1991:122), were increasingly turned into firm policies under Blair, such as 
the New Deals, CTCs, and WFTCs (Finn, 2003:115; Rentoul, 2001:380). Although 
workfare programmes had been pioneered by the Reagan administration of the 
1980‘s, Thatcher had not particularly favoured them, preferring instead stricter 
benefit restrictions (Finn, 2003:115). It was not until the election of Clinton in the 
USA, that the workfare message began to take hold in British politics, initially 
under Major, but primarily under Blair (Finn, 2003:115; King and Wickham-Jones, 
1999:264-270). The success and popularity of Clinton added enormous legitimacy 
to the Blairite agenda on welfare (King and Wickham-Jones, 1999:278; Rentoul, 
2001:194-198) with Clinton himself playing a substantial role in convincing Blair of 
the need for both ‗the stick‘ and ‗the carrot‘ in welfare policy (Clinton, 2005:271-
272:720; Rentoul, 2001:194-198).  
The transfer of policy principles from America in the wake of US welfare reform 
(especially the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(1996)) was largely manifested in the New Deal programmes mentioned above 
(Deacon, 2002:102). Such policy transfer, a direct consequence of globalisation, 
highlights the importance of this very phenomenon to the New Labour project. Not 
only was the emergent epoch one in which talk of nationalisation or a return to 
managing demand were as irrelevant as discussing the divine right of Kings 
(Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003:8), it was also one marked by unstoppable force 
of globalisation. 
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Indeed, Blair and New Labour insisted that globalisation provided the ‗new‘ 
environment in which the country had to be governed (Blair, 1996:118; Finlayson, 
2007:42; Giddens, 2000:54:122). At the individual level globalisation changed 
everything, from the amount of information citizens received and the way they 
received it (Beech, 2006:115; Giddens, 2010:68), to a shifting perception of 
everything from ―traditional institutions, practices and belief systems, such as the 
family, patterns of work and political ideologies‖ (Legget, 2010:55-56) all of which 
become less sacred. At the national level, globalisation changed everything from 
international relations (Buller, 2008:146; Plant, 2008:152) to domestic economic 
policies (Evans, 2008:71; Plant, 2008:152). As such it was central to New Labour‘s 
approach to government. This is perhaps best underlined by both Blair and 
Giddens who stressed the centrality of the information revolution and globalisation 
to the third way (Blair, 1998:4; Giddens, 2000:163). 
This reference to globalisation was common to most New Labour utterances, so 
much so that throughout the Blair years, barely a speech was delivered, or policy 
proposed without the mandatory mention of globalisation, all littered with 
references to the rise of new technologies, the increasing interconnectedness of 
the global economy, and the need for a new way of thinking: 
The modern world is swept by change, new technologies emerge 
constantly, new markets are opening up (Blair, in DTI, 1999:5) 
I hear people say we have to stop and debate globalisation. You might as 
well debate whether autumn should follow summer. They're not debating it 
in China and India. They are seizing its possibilities, in a way that will 
transform their lives and ours (Blair, 2005:4). 
In truth, globalisation is a fact. It's why resisting it is self-defeating and even 
absurd (Blair, 2007:2) 
The pressures of globalization are pushing people together, obliterating 
boundaries through trade, travel, telecommunications and mass migration 
(Blair, 2008:1). 
The scope of globalisation was for Blair, immense. Both he and Mandelson 
accepted that ―globalisation imposes limits on all social and economic policies‖ 
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(Cerny and Evans, 2004:56) and as such, policies were only desirable if they 
aided competition in the global knowledge economy (Finlayson, 2010:13; Legget, 
2010:55). This knowledge economy required an increasingly educated workforce 
(Blair, 1991:32; Brown, 2005:4; Driver and Martell, 1998:33; Hassan, 2007:42; 
Hudson, 2006:277) and to facilitate this, investment in the knowledge economy 
(Finlayson, 2007:42; Hudson, 2003:271), which sat comfortably alongside New 
Labour‘s social democratic values.  
It was these twin forces, of globalisation and the knowledge economy, Blair opined 
throughout his premiership, which necessitated the renewal and restructuring of 
social democracy he insisted New Labour represented (Blair, 1998:2; Giddens, 
2000:163). Whether this renewal of social democracy is real is as contentious as 
the debate that rages around the notion that the welfare state has died. 
Globalisation has had a profound impact on the policies of New Labour; however 
the impact it has had on the welfare state, the nation state and its counterparts 
abroad is less clear and merits further discussion.  
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2.1.6: Summary 
The welfare state is steeped in a long history of redistribution, from the days of the 
Elizabethan poor laws through to creation of the NHS and the greatest socialist 
achievement of all time (Foot cited in Land, Lowe, and Whiteside, 1992:90). But 
the welfare state of post-war Britain, marked by demand management, 
nationalisation, universality and generous redistribution and combined with a 
commitment to full employment (Glyn and Wood, 2001:50; Powell and Hewitt, 
1998:8) has been consigned to history.  That is not necessarily to say that the 
welfare state has died, as the Guardian proclaimed (Brindle, 1996); it may very 
well be that the aims and outcomes of Beveridge and Attlee are being achieved 
today. However, the modus operandi has changed, economic policy focuses on 
the supply side, the market is much freer, welfare policies make much wider use of 
means-testing, are less generous, and are increasingly being delivered by private 
companies or public/private partnerships (DSS, 1998a:83; DTI, 1999; Glyn and 
Wood, 2001:63; Lee, 2008:28; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:9). For Thatcher this was 
necessitated by the ‗choking grip‘ that the inefficient welfare state held on 
individuals‘ creativity, motivation, and ‗Britishness‘ (Hall, 1983:29). For Blair these 
new principles and modes of delivery are necessary to renew and retain a 
semblance of social democracy in the face of globalisation and the knowledge 
economy- a changed world (Blair, 1998:1). 
The role of globalisation is extremely important. We‘ve seen how it was readily 
accepted by New Labour, seen by Blair and his guru, Anthony Giddens, as the 
reason why, ultimately, Old Labour‘s ideology was outdated. While Thatcher 
shifted her focus away from citizens‘ role in the production of goods as mass 
production began to die, it did not settle on a replacement role. New Labour 
helped it rest on people as buyers and sellers of those goods. This, Finlayson 
insists, has required a re-education of citizens, which necessitated a commitment 
to investment in human capital, skills, education, and ideas (Finlayson, 2007:42; 
Mullard and Swaray, 2008:48).  
Some have argued that the recasting of citizens as individuals in a global economy 
has stripped back the bonds of solidarity and commodified the individual 
(Finlayson, 2007:43). It may be however, that global pressure on markets- such a 
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threat to inefficient policies, has provided the very justification for a new contract 
for welfare, rather than the abandonment of welfare altogether. To compete in the 
knowledge economy requires an educated, skilled workforce and with it an 
investment in human capital. Blair and Giddens have talked about freedom within 
an opportunity society (Finlayson, 2007:44) and committed New Labour to the 
principle of equality of opportunity (Alcock, 2005:87; Blair and Schroeder, 1999:3-
4), which they accept, cannot be achieved by the market alone. To suggest that 
globalisation, the perceived executioner of the welfare state, is actually its saviour, 
seems a little extreme and not only ignores the ideology behind New Labour‘s 
investment in human capital, it also implies that globalisation is an extremely 
powerful agenda setting tool. 
This chapter has charted the growth of the welfare state, from a tiny acorn into a 
great oak without really addressing whether the welfare state is indeed dying – a 
popular topic amongst social policists, political economists, and sociologists alike. 
To understand that we must look closer at the role globalisation plays, how it both 
limits and liberates the state and the individual and ask the question: if the welfare 
state is obsolete, what if anything has replaced it? 
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2.2: Globalisation and the transition from welfare state to competition state? 
 
2.2.1: Introduction 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the shifting principles and priorities of the welfare 
state throughout the twentieth century. For many right of centre politicians, 
scholars, and commentators, such shifts represent a recasting towards a neo-
liberal position that reflects an ideology that is sceptical of both the state and 
welfare recipients. However the welfare state is a deeply entrenched institution, 
taken for granted by the British people, endowed as Pierson suggests with a 
constituency of its own (Pierson, 1994:277). When New Labour swept to power, 
many would argue that the road towards a more collectivist, socially democratic 
polity was still available. However, while Blair claimed that he represented the only 
viable future for social democracy, he insisted that this was a different future. 
Something had changed and that something, globalisation, had rendered the old 
approach impossible.  
 
In this next chapter we will explore just how powerful the role of globalisation is 
and has been, as well as asking whether the changing principles outlined in the 
previous chapter, have really seen the departure from a welfare state. One of the 
weaknesses of such claims has been the lack of viable alternative theories to that 
of the welfare state. We see that many have embraced the changes to the 
industrial economy as epoch-defining, but perhaps not paradigm-changing, leaving 
us to question how different such conceptualisations are from the traditional 
welfare state. One thesis that has not only captured popular imagination within the 
academy, but also evolved over time and as such remained contemporary, is that 
of the competition state. The competition state is interesting not only because it 
seeks to offer an alternative way of conceptualising government social policy, but 
also because many of the claims can be empirically tested. If the competition state 
truly is the successor to the welfare state it will be impossible to argue that a 
paradigm shift had not occurred in the political economy of the UK. Furthermore, 
while the authors initially focused on the UK and USA, their work has been 
expanded to a range of countries and ultimately, there is no fundamental reason 
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why the thesis cannot be used to compare the behaviour of a range of countries, 
not unlike Esping-Andersen‘s decommodification index.  
 
The competition state holds centrally, the notion that that the processes of 
globalisation have qualitatively disempowered the state (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:1), which would have profound implications for New Labour‘s attempt to 
sustain social democracy in the new epoch. This chapter analyses that claim, 
amongst others, and concludes by suggesting that while there is no real 
consensus on whether the competition state has indeed replaced the welfare 
state, a rigorous empirical exploration will offer more illumination. 
 
2.2.2: Myth, menace, reality 
 
Globalisation was a key factor in shaping New Labour because Blair, Brown, 
Prescott, and Mandelson all believed it should (Cerny and Evans, 2004:54; 
Finlayson, 2007:42; Rustin, 2008:274), but the debate about the real impact 
globalisation has had on the UK (and other nations) still rages. Some have 
suggested that Blair never fully grasped the concept, using it to justify all things 
new within New Labour and society (Lee, 2008:20), while others, Blair included, 
insist that the unstoppable force of globalisation marked a new epoch in how 
states could and should govern. While some would argue that the true nature of 
globalisation is somewhat immaterial given how freely New Labour adopted the 
rhetoric of globalisation and thus, willed the phenomenon into being (Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002:4), the impact of globalisation is an extremely important focus of 
interest. 
 
Legget (2010) suggests that the basis of the third way being primarily empirical 
rather than ideological is extremely important. He goes on to state that the third 
way merely sought to account for changes in the way life was being experienced 
and how the state must respond (Legget, 2010:55). Giddens, Blair, and Clinton all 
believed that the key driver of that change is and was globalisation (Blair, 1998) 
and as such, this was reflected in the policy approach New Labour (and the 
Democrats) adopted. 
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There is no consensus regarding how much of a role globalisation would have 
played in policy formation had New Labour not accepted the logic of globalisation 
so readily. Some authors insist that globalisation is nothing more than ‗smoke and 
mirrors‘, given a more corporeal feel by the continuous lip service it was paid by 
politicians such as Blair and Clinton. A minority even contest the notion that the 
world has become smaller, more interconnected, more networked (Hudson and 
Lowe, 2009:20), implying that globalisation is itself, a myth (for a summary see 
Hirst and Thompson, 1999:98; Hudson and Lowe, 2009:33-34).  
 
2.2.3: Smoke, mirrors, and globalisation 
 
The main objections to the globalisation thesis fall into two categories: the ultra-
sceptical, those who question the very existence of globalisation; and impact-
sceptics, those who accept that we live in a changed, more global world, but that 
the impact of such globalization is limited. The ultra-sceptics insist that we are not 
seeing an emerging epoch, rather history repeating itself (Desai cited in Rustin, 
2008:276; Hirst, 1997:411; Kleinknecht and Wengel, 1998:639). This is a position 
Giddens neatly summarises; ―whatever its benefits, its trials and tribulations, the 
global economy isn‘t especially different from what existed at previous periods‖ 
(Giddens, 2002:8). Such sceptics note that world trade in relation to world GDP, as 
with national trade to national GDP ratios, does not differ much between the 
1890‘s and 1990‘s (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright, 1996:6; Hirst and Thompson, 
1999:28: Krugman, 1996:212). Moreover, they opine, the fact that increased 
economic activity is confined to the rich OECD countries (Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:33-34; McGrew in Eatwell et al, 1998:11-12), or more specifically, the triad of 
the US, EU, and Japan (Held and McGrew, 2003:5; Hirst, 1997:410; Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999:98-105; Rugman and Moore, 2001:65:68; Kleinknecht and 
Wengel, 1998:638), is evidence that the phenomenon is anything but global. Even 
within this triad, many industries remain bound to national markets. Rugman and 
Moore for example, cite the fact that over 85% of all automobiles sold in North 
America are made and produced there and that the figures for Europe and Japan 
lie at 90% and 93% respectively (Rugman and Moore, 2001:65), a trend reflected 
in other industries (Weiss, 1999:63). 
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Those categorised here as ultra-sceptics accept that modernisation has indeed 
occurred especially in the world of ICT, and to this end do not contest Gidden‘s 
assertion that information is more readily available. They are however, at pains to 
stress that modernisation is not the same as globalisation (Hirst and Thompson, 
1999). Indeed, the technologies that connect the world may be new, but the 
degree to which the world is connected is in fact rather old. The cultural 
globalisation that Giddens espouses is less profound, they insist, when the impact 
of economic globalisation is judged more realistically (Hirst and Thompson, 
1999:3).  Sceptics also question whether we can truly talk of global labour, 
insisting that while capital may well be mobile (though Hirst and Thompson 
(1999:2) contest even this), people are not as mobile and labour is in fact 
nationally bound and relatively static (Hirst and Thompson, 1999:257:261; 
Krugman, 1996:61). Even Castells accepts that labour mobility is largely restricted 
to professionals and, in particularly, scientists, though he does assert that while 
labour may not move towards capital, the opposite does occur (Castells, 1998:93).  
 
The more moderately sceptical are less obsessed with the notions that history is 
repeating itself, or that the modern phenomenon is confined to the triad of Europe, 
Japan, and the US. Instead they question the proposition of hyperglobalists, that 
globalisation exerts a physical, material force on either individuals or the state 
(Hirst, 1997:410; Hobson and Ramesh, 2002:7). Indeed, the use of globalisation 
as an explanatory tool, or to legitimate decisions, does not mean that globalisation 
is in fact the cause (or inhibitor) of policy decisions (Castles, 2004:46; Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002:148-149; Held and McGrew, 2003:5; Hirst, 1997:424). Hay and 
Rosamond go further, suggesting that the increased use of the ‗rhetoric of 
globalisation‘ to legitimate unpalatable economic or social policies has clouded the 
role globalisation is in reality actually playing (Hay and Rosamond, 2002:148). As 
such, ―it is important to differentiate between: the effects of globalisation itself; the 
effects of having internalised popular constructions of globalisation; and the 
strategic and disingenuous appeal to globalisation as a convenient justification for 
unpalatable reforms‖ (Hay and Rosamond, 2002:150). It is, according to Hay and 
Rosamond, impossible to tell whether events that are consistent with the 
globalisation thesis are a product of this very force, rather than the 
fear/acceptance of it. They cite the example of corporate tax, which advocates of 
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the globalisation thesis insist needs to be low in order to avoid capital flight. When 
governments lower corporate tax and see no capital flight it seems to confirm the 
globalisation thesis, though there is no proof whether this is the real cause, rather 
than merely the ‗hegemonic delusion‘ of globalisation being the cause (Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002:150). However, Hay contends, no state seems willing to ‗call the 
bluff‘; to maintain high levels of corporate tax at the risk of such flight and 
speculate that it may indeed be possible to retain the tax revenues without the 
consequence of capital flight (Hay, 2002:204). 
 
2.2.4: The Unstoppable force 
 
Ultimately, the opinion held by such sceptics is that globalisation is what states 
and individuals make of it. This stands in stark contrast to the views advanced by 
those whom Held et al refer to as the hyperglobalists. These hyperglobalists insist 
that globalisation has changed the world beyond recognition in a very short space 
of time (Held et al, 1999:3) and represents the great transformation of our time 
(Polanyi, cited by Munck, 2002:1). What Holton calls ‗globetalk‘ has pervaded our 
lives (Holton, 1998:1), fuelled by the phenomenal rise and improvement of 
information technologies, technologies that have demolished (Wriston, 1993:117) 
or stretched (Held et al, 1999:15) time and distance. As Giddens notes, knowledge 
is no longer bound to the place where it is created, rather shared across the globe 
(Giddens, 2002:12) and this has had a profound impact on the individual. 
Globalisation influences everyday as well as world events (Giddens, 2002:4) and 
consequently, the world can no longer be viewed with old assurances; 
globalisation has begat a world that is more abstract and immaterial (Guehenno, 
1995:9). This new world has, according to Giddens, restructured ―the ways in 
which we live, and in a very profound manner […] by propelling us into a global 
order that no one fully understands‖ (Giddens, 2002:4-7). 
 
Hyperglobalists contend that individuals are perfectly aware that ‗something is out 
there‘ (Held et al, 1999:6) and are beginning to understand that the ―fate of all 
parts of the globe is somehow bound together more intensely than before through 
the ties of interdependence and the interpenetration of economic, political, and 
cultural relationships across existing borders‖ (Holton, 1998:1). This awareness 
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has begun, Giddens suggests, to make a mockery of tradition, with even the most 
recognisable institutions – the family, Church, community, and the state - seeming 
less concrete (Giddens, 2000:4:45:51; Legget, 2010:55-56). Even the role of the 
citizen, traditionally that of worker (Finlayson, 2007:42), has changed with the birth 
of the ‗global citizen‘, consumer of global products (Ohmae, 1990:18:22). The 
intertwining of neo-liberalism, to the extent that Munck defines globalisation as ―the 
worldwide application of laissez-faire principles‖ (Munck, 2002:175) has, through 
the ―diffusion of consumerist ideology‖ (Held et al, 1999:4), further supplanted 
tradition. 
 
For hyperglobalists, globalisation has also effectively ‗destroyed geography‘ by 
removing the borders that have traditionally separated nations (Munck, 2002:4; 
Ohmae, 1990:18-19; Wriston, 1993:122). These boundaries have found 
themselves: redundant in the face of the global economy (Ohmae, 1995:3-4); 
meaningless as a consequence of the weightless nature of the informational 
economy (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:34); and blurred by information itself (Ohmae, 
1990:18-19). Where once the precious guarding and expansion of national borders 
was necessitated by the centrality of natural resources to economic success, the 
global economy pays scant heed to such resources (Ohmae, 1990:11). Guehenno 
cites the example of the electronic component, which he insists is the symbol of 
the new age. Within this component, the ―raw materials represent less than 1%‖ 
and as such, to be successful one no longer need to be master of a material 
producing territory (Guehenno, 1995:8), which has led to what Munck terms a 
deterritorialisation of the world (Munck, 2002:4). Wriston cites a further example, 
that of declarations at the airport customs desk. Where once wealth was bound 
together with resources and as such, nation states felt it was necessary to ask 
whether passengers had ‗anything to declare‘. Wriston suggests that in terms of 
the global economy, the value of physical belongings pale into insignificance in 
comparison to the knowledge and ideas of the skilled participants of the 
knowledge economy (Wriston, 1993:217). More and more the notion that actors in 
the global economy will have to, when stopped at customs, echo Wilde‘s 
supposed declaration of possessing nothing but their genius (Ransome, 1912:64), 
is becoming a reality. However, as Ohmae points out, while stopping the 
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movement of individuals is still possible, preventing their ideas from crossing the 
increasingly porous borders is not (Ohmae, 1995:4). 
 
For those such as Wriston and Ohmae, all maps may as well be thrown away as 
―the new world financial market is not a geographical location to be found on a 
map, but rather more than two hundred thousand electronic monitors in trading 
rooms all over the world‖ (Wriston, 1993:126). Ohmae suggests that to talk of 
nation states is foolish within what he insists we must call the global economy 
(1990; 1995). Indeed, Ohmae questions how we can possibly believe that the 
nation state has somehow survived as the most important aspects of a functioning 
economy. He notes that investment, industry, information technology, and 
individual consumers are all now globally mobile, paying little heed to the archaic 
national borders that once contained them (Ohmae, 1995:3-4).  
 
Even in the arena of trade, both Wriston and Ohmae dismiss the role of the state 
with Wriston insisting that to talk of international trade is to employ an obsolete 
term insisting that ―technology has made us a global community in the literal sense 
of the word. Capital will go where it is wanted and stay where it is treated well. It 
will flee from manipulation or onerous regulation of its value or use and no 
sovereign power can restrain it long‖ (Wriston, 1993:126). Even those dominant 
companies that seem to wear their nationalism on their sleeve cannot be held as 
champions of the national economy (Ohmae, 1995:13). Where once (1953) the 
U.S Secretary of Defense and former CEO of General Motors was able to proclaim 
that ―what was good for our country was good for General Motors and vice-versa‖ 
(cited in Reich, 1992:48), the notion of a national company is now outdated. 
Ohmae highlights the case of IBM Japan, which is based in Japan, staffed by a 
Japanese workforce, pays tax to the Japanese government, but its equity holders 
are American, and asks the question: ―is IBM Japan a Japanese or American 
company‖ (Ohmae, 1990:8). 
 
The deterritorialisation of the world, the disintegration of national borders, and the 
birth of the global citizen, a consumer of global products owned by multinational 
companies trading in the global economy, has profound implications, 
hyperglobalists opine, for the nation state (Giddens, 2002:8; Guehenno, 1995:12; 
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Munck, 2002:3; Ohmae, 1995; Wriston, 1993:117). The dilemma facing the state is 
not singular, though globalisation lies at the heart of each individual threat to the 
state. For Wriston the demise of the national company and rise of the global 
knowledge economy not only changes the nature of the work we do and the way 
we do it, but also our view of sovereignty (Wriston, 1993:117). As the global 
economy follows its own logic and develops its own webs of interest, which rarely 
duplicate the historical borders between nations (Ohmae, 1990:190), Munck 
suggests that national competitiveness has lost its purchase and the very notion of 
the nation state is drawn into question (Munck, 2002:3).  
 
Munck is not alone amongst the hyperglobalists who question the state‘s 
legitimacy in a global economy. For Guehenno the state has historically shown 
itself to ―be ill-equipped to collect taxes and manage expenses‖ (Guehenno, 
1995:12), which is central to success in the global economy. Furthermore, 
Guehenno believes that the state is too remote to manage the problems of our 
daily life yet too constrained to confront the global problems that affect us and has 
become little more than an outdated ‗straightjacket‘ (Guehenno, 1995:12-13). 
While Ohmae sees the state as a generally benign ‗nostalgic fiction‘ that, ―in terms 
of the global economy, has become little more than a bit actor‖ (Ohmae, 1995:12), 
others question whether an institution that is so inept in supporting economic 
success (Guehenno, 1995:12) and unable to truly adopt a social democratic 
approach, which is seen by hyperglobalists as untenable in the global economy 
(Held et al, 1999:4), has been stripped of legitimacy to such an extent that it has or 
should cease to exist (Guehenno, 1995:12-13; Munck, 2002:3; Wriston, 
1993:117). Whether the growth of global governance, dominated as it is by 
national interests (Weiss, 1999:59) is seen as a facilitator of this disintegration or a 
bar to it largely depends on whether you ask a hyperglobalist or those whome 
Held calls the transformationalists. Suffice to say, the sceptics have long-since 
dismissed the notion that such governance exists (Hirst and Thompson, 1999:60). 
 
2.2.5: The (global) voice of reason? 
 
It is to these transformationalists we now turn. As Giddens notes the majority of 
‗globalisation scholars‘ find themselves closer to the hyperglobalist position than 
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the sceptics‘ standpoint (Giddens, 2002:9). Ohmae‘s discussion of the global 
economy marked by more porous borders and the prominence of transnational 
companies, is indeed adopted by a range of transformationalists authors (Giddens, 
2002; Held et al, 1999; Hudson and Lowe, 2009), though assimilated into more 
moderate perspectives on the role of the nation state. Most of these commentators 
believe that some element of control has been surrendered to the forces of 
globalisation, though there is little consensus on how much control has been lost. 
 
At the heart of the transformationalists‘ stance on globalisation is a belief that it ―is 
not only an economic transformation of the world but involves the reprogramming 
of many aspects of social and political life‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:35). As both 
Giddens and Hudson and Lowe point out, this in itself brings the 
transformationalists position to rest much closer to the hyperglobalist position than 
that of the sceptics (Giddens, 2002:9; Hudson and Lowe, 2009:35). It is indeed the 
firm belief of transformationalists that globalisation is the ―central driving force 
behind the rapid social, political, and economic changes that are reshaping 
modern societies and our world order (Held et al, 1999:7). Giddens proclaims that 
―we are all internationalists now‖ (Giddens, 2000:123), due in large part to what 
Held et al refer to as the ―stretching of social, political, and economic activities 
across frontiers such that events, decisions, and activities in one region of the 
world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant 
regions of the globe‖ (Held et al, 1999:15). 
 
Unlike both the hyperglobalists and sceptics however, transformationalists make 
no bold claims about the future trajectory of globalisation believing it is flexible, to 
be moulded and as such, whatever effect it has, is not yet ‗set in stone‘ (Held et al, 
1999:7). Giddens for one, is profoundly optimistic, believing that globalisation 
offers the opportunity to secure social democracy and fight truly global vices such 
as global poverty (Giddens, 2000:124:131), insisting that economic globalisation 
has been a success (Giddens, 2000:124). Transformationalists insist that central 
to globalisation is the expanding role of world trade, a process that sees global 
financial markets operating at staggering levels in real time (Armstrong, 1998:463; 
Drezner, 2001:75; Evans, 1997:67; Giddens, 1998:30), which they do concede 
creates new political pressures on governments where trade is directly linked to 
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levels of unemployment and associated with more labour market risk (Hays, 
2009:10).  
 
Refuting the type of claims that were presented by sceptics such as Hirst and 
Thompson, transformationalists argue that economic globalisation is a reality and 
not merely a continuation of previous trends and that trade is much more open 
than has ever been seen before (Giddens, 1998:30). Indeed it is the opinion of 
some that, rather than being ―an exchange of goods between domestic productive 
systems, trade is increasingly a flow of goods within production networks that are 
organised globally rather than nationally‖ (Evans, 1997:66). Such a fixation on 
trade rates or the comparisons between trade rates are, according to Held et al, 
irrelevant anyway (Held et al, 1999:11). They contend that this is because such 
statistics do not tell the full story, being unable to encapsulate what the ―social, 
political, and economical impact‖ of late 19th century trade (Held et al, 
1999:11).Transformationalists are also at lengths to stress that globalisation 
cannot merely be considered in economic terms, but as the ―transformation of time 
and space in our lives‖ (Giddens, 1998:30). We have already seen this referred to 
as a stretching of activities, however Held et al go further, noting how globalisation 
not only stretches, but also intensifies, speeds up, and increases the impact of 
events that are experienced by both the state and the individual (Held et al, 
1999:15-16). 
 
2.2.6: Globalisation and the Nation-State 
 
If by embracing the notion of globalisation as a ‗game-changer‘ sets the 
transformationalists apart from the sceptics, it is with regards their view of the 
nation state that transformationalists stand furthest away from the hyperglobalists 
(Giddens, 2000:122). As mentioned, transformationalists do concede that 
globalisation does create political pressures on governments where trade is 
directly linked to levels of unemployment and associated with more labour market 
risk (Hays, 2009:10). This is not the only challenge that transformationalists accept 
the nation state faces as a consequence of globalisation. However, crucially, for 
transformationalists, Nation states remain the most important agents on the 
international scene, not because of their power as an economic entity per se, but 
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rather due to what Giddens terms a ‗generic power‘ (Giddens, 2000:122; Prior and 
Sykes, 2001:205). Giddens accepts that sovereignty has begun to change a little 
due to globalisation from below (Giddens, 2000:123), but rejects the idea that 
successive moves away from national sovereignty ―restricts the policy options of 
member states leaving them less able to cope with global competition‖ (Leibfried 
and Pierson, 1995:3). Indeed, if anything, the redistribution of power within states 
(Sassen, 2009:48) has been facilitated in order to keep pace with globalisation 
(Hudson and Lowe, 2009:24), while retaining a sense of the nation state. 
Furthermore, while sceptics such as Holton, believe that sovereignty is flowing 
towards the EU, WTO, and World Bank (Holton, 1998:82), the transformationalists 
position is that institutions such as the WTO are ―weak and are increasingly relying 
on the consent and support of nation states‖ (Cable, 1995:51).  
 
This is not to say that the pressures of the global economy are not being felt by 
nation states, quite the contrary. Indeed transformationalists concede that 
boundaries are being broken down (Armstrong, 1998:461) or becoming fuzzier 
(Giddens, 1998:32), with Giddens accepting Ohmae‘s example of the Catalan 
trading region as being one that transcends the nation state (Giddens, 1998:32). 
Trade, which is central to the ‗new‘ globalisation that transformationalists believe is 
changing the world (Armstrong, 1998:463; Drezner, 2001:75; Evans, 1997:67; 
Giddens, 1998:30) is placing pressure on nation states, forcing them to respond. 
However the response comes from within nation states, reflecting their own 
institutions and, as Hudson and Lowe argue, ―their own cultural histories‖ (Hudson 
and Lowe, 2009:35). The state is not eclipsed by the simple fact that it is becoming 
more dependent on trade (Evans, 1997:67), rather a process of adjustment is 
occurring, one that has prompted a more activist state in some ways (Held et al, 
1999:9). Indeed Giddens suggests that the role of the state has actually expanded 
with the rise of globalisation, creating new possibilities, especially with regards its 
role in shaping regional identities (Giddens, 1998:31-32). 
 
For Hudson and Lowe, the ―central paradox of globalisation is that it 
simultaneously creates a convergent economic order while nation states are 
compelled to redefine their role and purpose in the faces of these new challenges‖ 
(Hudson and Lowe, 2009:24). While the economic role of the state has begun to 
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change, maybe even as Cable argues, decline (Cable, 1995:38), other aspects of 
the state have definitely expanded. Not only is the state involved in regulation of 
the global economy (Holton, 1998:83), Hays insists that the ―continued integration 
of national markets and growth of the global economy depend on domestic 
political support‖ (Hays, 2009:150). With this need comes the scope for expansion 
of the state‘s role suggests Sassen, and maybe even the possibility of a trade off 
between the state‘s support of the global economy, for its right to pursue a social 
democratic programme of social provision (Sassen, 2009:51-52). It is possible 
then, that as Hudson and Lowe suggest, the ―network society has, paradoxically, 
strengthened the nation state‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:26).  
 
2.2.7: Globalisation and the welfare state  
 
Sassen‘s speculation that nation states may be able to use their centrality to the 
new global economy does, as she freely admits, run contrary to the ―typical view of 
the state today as somewhat powerless in economic matters‖ (Sassen, 2009:53). 
Indeed, even amongst transformationalists, there is a sense that the downward 
pressure of the global economy pulls away some of the power that nation states 
used to possess, especially those that underlay Keynesian economics (Giddens, 
1998:31; Sassen, 2009:36). For Cerny and Evans, in the wake of the 1970‘s 
economic decline (covered in the previous chapter), competitive policies began to 
rise to the top of the agenda, which in turn has seen social policy find itself 
subservient to the economy (Cerny and Evans, 2003:20). They insist that the 
prevailing logic that developed throughout the Thatcher years and is still present 
today, sees ―actors in a competition state seeking to make the domestic economy 
more prosperous and competitive, while accepting the loss of key traditional social 
and economic state functions‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1).  Largely through a 
process of ‗hollowing out‘ (discussed later) and embedding financial orthodoxy, 
Cerny and Evans insist that the state is being qualitatively disempowered and 
stripped of legitimacy, to the point where the state can no longer perform the 
generic functions mentioned earlier (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-3). The key focus of 
the state has thus become the controlling of inflation (Cerny and Evans, 1999:10-
11).  
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For Pierson, the global economy can potentially catalyse a downward spiral of 
social provision (Pierson, 1995:452) towards what Kühner summarises as ―lowest 
common denominator social policies‖ (Kühner, 2007). This race to the bottom, 
sees welfare states ―progressively dismantle themselves so that they can compete 
on more equal terms with economies where labour costs are much lower‖ (Gray, 
1998:92). For Cerny, it is the nature of competition in the changing world 
environment that searches for effectiveness (Cerny, 1999:199) necessitating that  
―big spenders reconsider the generosity of their social provision […] and move 
towards reforms designed to make their welfare systems leaner, meaner, and 
more residual in character‖ (Castles, 2004:74). In reality, the race to the bottom is 
dismissed by most authors, aided somewhat by the fact that statistics have failed 
to highlight such a trend. While countries such as the UK have seen the 
emergence of a ―more contract-orientated, post-industrial, less egalitarian, and 
more workfare form of social provision‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:25), they have 
not seen a convergence towards lowest common denominator social policies 
(Castles, 2004:45; Drezner, 2001:75; Hays, 2009:128). Indeed, quite the opposite 
has happened, with the UK reaching a social expenditure of 21% as a proportion 
of GDP in 1998, compared to 8% of GDP in the 1960‘s (Castles, 2004:25). Even 
with regards more nuanced arguments that speculate about a race to the middle 
(Hays, 2009:128), or a ‗downwards harmonisation‘ towards a European model 
(within Europe only) (see Castles, 2004:74; Prior and Sykes, 2002:198), the reality 
is that convergence towards a single point has not occurred on many of the 
dimensions that can be measured (for example, see Castles, 2004; Horsfall, 2009; 
Hudson and Kühner, 2009). 
 
This lack of convergence is, according to Drezner, a consequence of the fact that 
the extent of policy convergence is determined by the states‘ ability to cooperate 
and their ability to agree on norms of governance (Drezner, 2001:78). Quite 
simply, ―even as pressures generated by global phenomena increase, they are 
likely to be viewed through the lens of domestic policy‖ (Ellison and Pierson, 
2003:4), which on a global scale results in a variety of different state, market, and 
family relationships, contained within national boundaries (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:26). Indeed, countries ―viewing globalisation through their own domestic 
lens‖ (Ellison and Pierson, 2003:4) has led to a what Prior and Sykes see as a 
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range of nationally flavoured responses to globalisation (Prior and Sykes, 
2001:205). The UK is not alone in responding in its own fashion; while the UK 
approached the late 1980‘s economic pressures with what Esping-Andersen terms 
‗its liberal tendencies‘ (Esping-Anderson, 1990:26), moving towards workfare 
principles (Jessop, 2002:248), marked by means-testing and welfare qualification 
(Pierson, 1994:49), commentators have highlighted how other countries shaped 
their reactions in the context of their institutional histories. Germany for example, 
faced with increasing pressure being exerted on wage rates and labour costs, 
which created unprecedented unemployment rates (Daly, 2001:83-85) responded 
by introducing a slight increase in tax and social insurance contributions from 
employees along with higher unemployment spending (Daly, 2001:83-85). This 
higher spending was aimed at providing an ‗exit strategy‘ for individuals from the 
labour market, and was criticised for being passive, thus fostering a sense of 
welfare before work (Alcock and Craig, 2001:163-166). Likewise Sweden, facing 
similar economic pressures to those being experienced in both the UK and 
Germany sought to tackle this problem in an altogether different manner. Here, a 
programme of ‗active social expenditure‘ was favoured, featuring a combination of 
job creation, and education and skills schemes often aimed at the young and long-
term unemployed (Kosonen, 2001:157; Salonen, 2001:156; Sødersten, 2004: 
155).  
 
At the heart of these variations lie domestic factors such as institutions, path-
dependency, the values of the electorate, and the ideology of decision makers 
(Hudson and Lowe, 2009; Prior and Sykes, 2001). Institutions are particularly 
important within the policy process, ―establishing the ‗rules of the game‘ for all 
political struggles‖ (Pierson, 1994:31) and it can be convincingly argued that the 
welfare state has become intertwined with the institutional fabric of British politics, 
and as such, become extremely resilient, even in the face of profound exogenous 
change (Ellison, 2006:5; Peters, 2003:41). Pierson goes as far as to imply that the 
conservative nature of institutions, coupled with the depth to which the welfare 
state is embedded into many UK institutions, has brought the welfare state to 
represent the status quo, which not only means that decisions are generally 
considered within such a context, but non-decisions also favour the welfare state 
(Pierson, 1996:173). From a position of such institutional stability and normality, 
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the welfare state has become entrenched within the hearts and minds of the 
British people (Peters, 2003:41), effectively creating a constituency of its own, 
consisting of enormous levels of public support (Pierson, 1996:174) and maybe 
even dependency (Bartholomew, 2004:33-34:332-333; Thatcher, 1993:8:626-627). 
With so many having a stake in the survival of the welfare state, even the most 
ardent supporters of retrenchment find that existing commitments are hard to 
reverse, and politically provide an increasing return of support when followed 
(Giddens, 1998:115; Pierson, 1996:173-174).  
 
As Hudson and Lowe suggest, decision makers are constrained by the prevailing 
ideological paradigm (Hudson and Lowe, 2004:34), yet the previous chapter has 
already outlined that a sizeable shift did occur at the dawn of the 1980s. Such a 
shift may be explained by what Peters et al call ―punctuated equilibrium‖, which 
sees the relatively stable status quo undergo quite sizeable shifts due to moments 
of severe crisis (Peters et al, 2005:1289). However, even when such windows of 
opportunity present themselves, the emerging paradigm is shaped by the existing 
institutions, policies and voter expectations (Peters et al, 2005:1289-1290). 
Indeed, as Hudson and Lowe point out, the shift from Keynesian to post-
Keynesian economics was largely facilitated by the Civil Service (Hudson and 
Lowe, 2004:34).  
 
When considering the demise of the welfare state and the role that globalisation 
has played in this process, it is also worth considering Therborn‘s belief that a true 
welfare state is one that spends more on welfare than other purposes (Therborn, 
cited in Castles, 2004:31). To follow this criterion denotes that only Germany and 
Denmark from within the OECD had ever managed to achieve this by the mid 
1980‘s (Castles, 2004:31). By 1998 fourteen OECD countries had achieved 
Therborn‘s welfare state status (Castles, 2004:31). True welfare state ascension 
came not in the ‗golden years‘ of the 1960‘s, rather in the ‗crisis years‘ of the 
1980‘s and 1990‘s (Castles, 2004:31). Castles appears to be correct in asserting 
that there has been no ‗race to the bottom‘ (Castles, 2004:21), with global 
convergence, if it exists at all, being limited to ‗types‘ (Castles, 2004:21) of the kind 
classified by Esping-Andersen (1990). This convergence is not towards a 
retrenched welfare state, instead a ―steady state welfare state‖ (Castles, 
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2004:168), which is squeezed in spending terms both from the top, and from the 
bottom (Castles, 2004:168). What is even more interesting is that social spending 
has occurred within a context of decreased total expenditure, which suggests that 
non-social expenditure has been downsized in order to maintain the privileged 
position of social policies (Castles, 2004:35). 
 
As we have seen, the emerging epoch is one where competitive rhetoric and 
workfare principles are fused with an expansion of welfare, through regulation of 
programmes such as a minimum wage and maternity benefits. This has led some 
to characterise this epoch as ‗paradoxical‘ (Ellison and Pierson, 2003:11). 
Rosenau observes that ―diverse and contradictory forces have been unleashed 
that can be summarised in the clash between globalisation, centralisation, and 
integration on one hand, and localisation, decentralisation, and fragmentation on 
the other hand‖ (Rosenau, 2002:70), a clash Rosenau calls ‗fragmegration‟ 
(Rosenau, 2002:70). It is also possible that we are merely witnessing welfare 
states moving beyond their traditional growth trajectories (Castles, 2004:169). 
Castles uses Hinrich‘s simile of social security systems being, like ‗elephants on 
the move‘, to suggest, ―when they are young they stampede ahead, but when they 
mature they generally move more slowly. Irrespective of age, turning them around 
involves much energy and no little persuasive power‖ (Castles, 2004:22; Hinrichs, 
2001:79).  
 
2.2.8: If not a welfare state, then what? 
 
There is then, little consensus about whether the welfare state has begun to die 
and whether such a death has been catalysed by the process of globalisation. 
However, an increasing number of authors have suggested that the departure in 
principles from those of Beveridge, the epochal shifts in policy between Attlee, 
Thatcher, and Blair, combined with the decline of the industrial economy must 
prompt a re-evaluation of the welfare state. If we simply define, as Therborn 
suggests, a welfare state to be one that dedicates over half of its expenditure 
towards social provision (Castles, 2006: 234), such a re-appraisal may not be 
necessary. If we take Lowe‘s belief that a ―welfare state is a society in which 
government is expected to provide, and does provide, for all its citizens not only 
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social security, but a range of other services at a standard well above the barest 
minimum‖ (Lowe, 1993:14), it could be argued that no such welfare state has 
existed in the UK. If however, one is to focus on the centrality of Keynesian 
economics, the (Fordist) industrial economy, the pursuit of full employment, and 
the principles of universality and a national minimum (as Cerny and Evans, (1999), 
Hudson and Lowe (2009), and Jessop (2002) suggest such elements are central 
to the traditional welfare state), the label ‗welfare state‘ may no longer be 
adequate. Indeed, as we will see, perhaps no ‗one-size-fits-all‘ label will ever do 
justice to the range of systems of social provision present on planet Earth. 
 
While Burrows and Loader still talk of a welfare state, their notion of a post-Fordist 
welfare state is one that reflects the profound changes in the fields of technology, 
communications, industry, and ultimately, the economy (Burrows and Loader, 
1994:1; Hudson, 2003:269; Warhurst, 2008:72). In what they deem a crude yet 
reasonably accurate analysis, the traditional welfare state was built upon the 
Fordist principles and process of ―mass production, mass consumption, modernist 
cultural forms and the mass public provision of welfare‖ (Burrows and Loader, 
1994:1), whereas the post-Fordist welfare state is ―characterised by an emerging 
coalition between flexible production, differentiated and segmented consumption 
patterns, post-modernist cultural forms and a restructured welfare state‖ (Burrows 
and Loader, 1994:1). While globalisation is undoubtedly an important factor and 
has indeed played an important role in precipitating such changes, for Burrows 
and Loader the crucial separation has been between the ways in which the state 
has been able to guarantee the economic and social conditions required for capital 
accumulation (Burrows and Loader, 1994:1). Where once this was achieved as 
part of a cycle of mass-production and mass-consumption (Jessop, 1994:15; 
Pierson, 1998:60), which in turn engendered mass solidarity (MacGregor, 
2003:62), the rise of the service industry and knowledge economy has rendered 
such Fordist methods obsolete (Jessop, 2000:97) and possibly seen the rise of 
what MacGregor calls narrow mutuality (MacGregor, 2003:62). For Pierson, this 
has necessitated a series of structural adjustments ―designed to make social 
policy more consonant with a quite new international political economy‖ (Pierson, 
1998:59), without creating substantial problems for the functioning of the welfare 
state (Pierson, 1998:59). 
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One particular weakness of the idea of a post-Fordist welfare state is that there is 
no real consensus on what has substantively changed within the welfare state. 
Most accept the advent of a post-Fordist industrial economy, 1 however little is 
advanced as to what this new post-Fordist welfare state is about, what principles 
underlie this welfare state and how they truly differ from before. The processes 
may have changed, but in terms of welfare provision, the post-Fordism thesis 
offers few tangible differences from what has gone before, except to suggest that 
owing to the changes to how capital can be accumulated, the needs of the 
economy may no longer be subservient to the welfare needs of citizens (Burrows 
and Loader, 1994:1; Hudson and Lowe, 2009:54-55; Jessop, 2002:152; Pierson, 
1998:61). Thus they argue, the post-Fordist welfare state is likely to be both leaner 
and meaner (MacGregor, 2003:62) than the industrial welfare state. It is important 
to note however, that while Burrows and Loader propose that the emerging post-
Fordist era marks a new epoch (Burrows and Loader, 1994:1), there is still a place 
for what can be defined as a welfare state. 
 
The attachment to the welfare state label is however sundered by Jessop who, 
building upon the post-Fordist debate, advances an alternative characterisation of 
state action. This Schumpeterian competition state is concerned with maintaining 
a competitive advantage in the realm of capital accumulation (Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:55; Jessop, 1994:24; 1999:9; 2000:175; 2002:119-120; Pierson, 1998:61). It 
is, according to Jessop, Schumpeterian ―insofar as it tries to promote permanent 
innovation and flexibility in relatively open economies by intervening on the supply-
side and to strengthen as far as possible their structural and systemic 
competitiveness‖ (Jessop, 1999:9). 
 
However, the shift from Keynesian economics towards Schumpeterian economics 
is not limited to macro-economic policies related to competition; the nature of the 
economic shift has for Jessop, profound implications for welfare delivery, 
encompassing what is delivered, how it is delivered, and by what it is delivered 
(Hudson and Lowe, 2009:55; Jessop, 1994:24-25). Over time Jessop has 
                                                          
1
 Though see Harris and Macdonald, 2000, who argue that the post-Fordist thesis is over-simplistic and 
misses many of the constants that exist within both the Fordist and post-Fordist time-periods. 
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developed the notion of a Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (SWPR) 
to explain how the post-Fordist epoch and the shift towards Schumpeterian 
economics has pervaded every aspect of what he refers to as the KWS (see table 
2.1 for a summary).  
 
This SWPR differs significantly from the traditional welfare state in its 
Schumpeterian economics (as detailed above), but also in its pursuit of a more 
workfare approach (Hudson and Lowe, 2009: 55; Jessop, 1994:24-25; Jessop, 
2000:173; Jessop, 2002:152-153; Pierson, 1998:61). This transition is again 
evidence of a shift from Keynes to Schumpeter, in this case with regards to a 
(Keynesian) welfare model based on the rights of worker-citizens to welfare, 
towards a (Schumpeterian) model whereby workers are obliged to support 
themselves as much as possible. Furthermore, within the Schumpeterian model 
innovation in the form of supply-side flexibility, rather than demand management, 
is seen as key to economic prosperity in the long run (Jessop, 2000:174). In this 
respect and in a departure from Keynesianism, the social wage becomes a cost of 
production and in the drive to create and maintain a competitive advantage; such a 
cost being subject to downward pressure (Jessop, 2002:157; Pierson, 1998:61). 
This stands alongside the abandonment of full-employment commitments and an 
increasing desire for a more effective workforce. Central then to the SWPR is this 
shift from welfare to workfare, which Jessop opines is associated with a change in 
societal values, identities, and society‘s relationship with the concepts of welfare 
and social democracy (Jessop, 2000:176-177). 
 
The post-Fordist shift from mass-solidarity to narrow mutuality (MacGregor, 
2003:62) has been reflected in the abandonment of class-based redistributive 
politics (Jessop, 2000:176-177) which has, in the UK, allowed the expression of 
‗traditional liberal work ethic norms‘ (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26) that continue to 
distinguish between the ‗deserving‘ and ‗undeserving‘ poor (Alcock and Craig, 
2001:33-34). This subordination of social policy to the demands of labour market 
flexibility and structural competitiveness has profound implications for social policy. 
Jessop states that whilst the KWS tried to extend the social rights of citizens, the 
SWPR is ―concerned to provide welfare services that benefit business and thereby 
demote individual needs to second place‖ (Jessop, 1999:355). As we saw in the 
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previous chapter, authors such as Clarke (2005), Lee (2008), and Lister (1998; 
2007) have suggested that such a workfare approach marks a clear departure 
from social democratic values and the centrality of workfare to the New Labour 
project is possibly the strongest form of support for Jessop‘s claims. 
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of the Keynesian Welfare State and the Schumpeterian Workfare 
Post-national Regime 
Keynesian Welfare National State Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national 
Regime 
Keynesian  Full employment 
 Closed economy 
 Demand management 
Schumpeterian  Innovation and 
competitiveness 
 Open economy 
 Supply-side 
policies 
Welfare  Welfare right Workfare  Social Policy 
subordinated to 
economic policy 
 Downward 
pressure on social 
wage 
 Attacks on welfare 
rights 
National  Primacy of national 
scale 
Post-national  Hollowing out of 
the state 
State  Mixed economy 
 State intervention to 
correct market failures 
Regime  Increased role of 
governance 
mechanisms to 
correct market and 
state failures 
 State role in 
metagovernance 
Source: Adapted from Hudson and Lowe, (2009:55); Jessop, (2002:252) 
 
Interestingly, it is not merely the policy approach that Jessop believes has shifted 
with the transition towards a post-Fordist epoch; the SWPR is marked also by the 
changing role of the state. Indeed Jessop insists that to talk of the state, especially 
in terms of the welfare (or workfare) state hides the fact that the state is losing its 
primacy in the policy process (Jessop, 2000:175). Welfare/workfare and the wider 
economy are no longer contained within the national territorial state. To this end 
Jessop echoes the assertions of Ohmae2 that the knowledge based economy has 
rendered such economic borders obsolete (Jessop, 2002:98) and that we should 
now think of such issues as being post-national, as opposed to the economic and 
                                                          
2
 Covered earlier 
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social policies of the KWS, which saw decisions taken at the national level 
(Jessop, 2000:172-174). The state has, for Jessop, not only ceased to provide the 
territorial boundaries for such policy decisions, it has also undergone a ‗hollowing 
out‘ (Jessop, 2002:235).  
 
This hollowing out, which is discussed in more detail later, has seen policy 
decisions and sometimes delivery, shift from the traditional nation state, to sub-
national, regional, and supranational forms of governance (Rhodes, 1997:53-54) 
and further underlines Jessop‘s belief that such action cannot be considered either 
national or state-led (Jessop, 2002:235). Furthermore, not only has the unitary 
state seen the translocation of certain powers to both regional and supranational 
bodies, there has also been an increasing role in what both Jessop (2002) and 
Rhodes (1997) call governance for non-state actors such as quasi-governmental 
agencies, private corporations, and the voluntary sector (Jessop, 2002:51-53; 
Rhodes, 1997:53-54). All of this means that the generic functions of the welfare 
state have not only changed in becoming more Schumpeterian in their workfare 
nature, they are also being formulated by a network or regime that extends beyond 
the direct control of the state (Jessop, 1994:24-27; 1999:354; 2000:175; 2002:252-
253). 
 
The idea that the KWS has undergone such a profound transition under the four 
dimensions of the SWPR is rather radical. Crucially however, even in what must 
surely be regarded as a thesis that implies a paradigm shift in welfare policy, 
Jessop does not abandon all hope for the state. Indeed, he highlights certain 
circumstances in which state action increases, such as the arena of what he calls 
metagovernance (Jessop, 2002:211). Jessop is also at pains to point out that the 
neo-liberal SWPR is not the only form of SWPR that can be theoretically 
conceived (Jessop, 2000:177-179). Hudson and Lowe even characterise the 
SWPR as less a break from welfare traditions and more a ―new way of reconciling 
the demands for social policies that meet the needs of citizens with economic 
policies that meet the needs of the capitalist class‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:54). 
 
Moreover, for all Jessop‘s insistence that we should now talk of a workfare regime 
rather than a welfare state, he concedes that the SWPR often promotes 
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decommodification rather than commodification3 (Jessop, 2000:179). With 
decommodification being a central tenet of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:21-22; 37) it could be argued that such processes are evidence of continuity 
between the KWS and the SWPR. Indeed, Jessop himself acknowledges that 
while many of his claims can be justified, the term SWPR is largely used for 
heuristic purposes, to clarify the difference between what is Fordist and what is 
post-Fordist (Jessop, 1994: 35; Jessop, 2002:255). There is in fact much 
continuity between the KWS and the post-KWS epoch and in reality the 
experiences of the post-KWS era will in many cases be less extreme than those 
foretold in the articulation of Jessop‘s SWPR (Jessop, 2002:255). It is worth 
remembering that Jessop outlines a view of ideal-types that are not only 
significantly different from each other, but that also contain much diversity within 
(Jessop, 2000:181; 2002:255).  
 
Perhaps one of the key difficulties with Jessop‘s work is that for all its assertions 
about the demise of the KWS and the suitability of the SWPR as a replacement 
framework, he never really outlines how individual nations (or regimes for that 
matter) fit into his theory. Jessop mentions that the US and Finland would pursue 
the neo-liberal SWPR on the back of what he calls their transition from flawed 
Fordism to post-Fordism (Jessop, 1994:35). He also highlights how East-Asian 
countries are examples of arenas in which ‗pure‘ Fordism has translated into ‗pure‘ 
post-Fordism and as such, is a perfect arena for the development of the SWPR 
(Jessop, 2002:255). However, on the whole he is ambiguous with regards what 
form of the SWPR various countries are taking and offers little concrete evidence 
that regions are becoming more important than nations. What is hard to discern 
from a reading of Jessop is precisely which regions or regimes he is trying to 
describe; it is unclear how a traditional nation state would move towards its SWPR 
future and towards which ideal-type it would travel. 
 
The key arguments: that the economy has become more Schumpeterian; welfare 
policy has become more intertwined with workfare principles; that such policies are 
formulated and delivered beyond the traditional state boundaries; and that this 
                                                          
3
 In what Jessop calls the SWPR’s Neo-Statist and Neo-Communitarian forms. 
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policy direction and delivery comes less from a state and increasingly from a 
regime, are advanced without specific reference to an ‗end-game‘. Are all welfare 
states undergoing this transition towards a form of SWPR and if so, which form? It 
would be easy to assume that the downward pressures that Jessop discusses 
would favour a neo-liberal form of the SWPR, however he insists that this is not 
the sole incarnation of the SWPR. Even when he highlights countries like the US 
that would naturally lend themselves to the neo-liberal model, his arguments are 
qualified with caveats, which insist that the development of a neo-liberal SWPR is 
not inevitable, rather reflects the political will and even then, processes of 
decommodification will still continue (Jessop, 2000:182). To this end Jessop is 
also insistent that limits to neo-liberal retrenchment are embedded within most 
nations‘ politics of representation (Jessop, 2002:151). With regards the UK, 
Jessop questions whether a post-Fordist era can really exist given that in his 
opinion, the UK at best experienced flawed Fordism (Jessop, 1994:35). This he 
opines, is reflected in the flawed SWPR that will rise from the ashes of the flawed 
KWS. An example Jessop highlights is Major‘s use of workfare principles as part 
of his policy agenda, which he suggests was less a part of some grand plan to aid 
competitiveness or labour market flexibility and instead, was largely motivated by a 
moral revulsion towards the lazy (Jessop, 1994:34) 
 
For Jessop, we do indeed live in a new epoch, profoundly changed by 
technologies, globalisation, and also by citizens themselves (Jessop, 2000:176). 
He is unambiguous in his claims about the nature of the economy, the importance 
of new technologies and the rise of the knowledge economy and from this he 
builds upon regulation theory (Jessop, 1988:159-160) to advance a theory of what 
would ideally replace the traditional welfare state (Jessop, 1994; 1999; 2000; 
2002). However, he doesn‘t actually suggest that such transitions [from the KWS 
to SWPR] have occurred and though he insists that evidence can be found to 
justify such claims (Jessop, 2002:255), he doesn‘t present it in any systematic 
fashion. Jessop‘s work seems to stop just short of detailing the end of the state 
and in particular the welfare state, all but suggesting its death in most instances, 
only to then talk of the former‘s important role in metagovernance (Jessop, 
2002:242) and its retention of national sovereignty (Jessop, 1994:24), and with 
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regards the welfare state, even the possible emergence of a welfare society 
(Jessop, 2000:183). 
 
It is then difficult to use Jessop‘s own work to measure the salience of his claims. 
However, many of his major assertions run parallel to a much more assertive 
thesis, developed over the last twenty years by Phil Cerny and Mark Evans. 
Where Jessop has sought to add to the broad understanding of political economy 
from a primarily sociological perspective, the competition state thesis (CST) has 
largely been informed by the political science literature (Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:54). What has evolved over the past twenty years is a thesis that not only 
continues to challenge the notion that the KWS still functions, but also advances 
bold claims about the existence of a competition state in various countries. The 
CST, which will be explored now, is a thesis that has kept pace with the changes 
of the 21st century. It presents many policy problems and is ripe for empirical 
exploration. 
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2.3: The competition state thesis 
 
2.3.1: Introduction 
 
The competition state is interesting and important due not only to the bold claims it 
makes, but also due to its ability to hold a privileged position in the political science 
literature for twenty years, despite making such bold statements. Throughout 
twenty years of debate, the authors have suggested that the very nature of social 
policy has changed to the degree that it is now serving a different master in the 
form of the economy rather than the citizenry. Many of the core assertions of the 
competition state hint at profound implications for social policy, even suggesting 
that social policy is not fully under the control of the state and as such, merit 
further exploration. Herein lies a crucial problem however; the competition state, 
like the welfare state, is not a solid entity with a straightforward definition.  
 
The thesis evolved as a tool to understand the changes wrought by globalisation 
and the responses to the global economy. It is marked by policy approaches, 
methods of delivery, institutions, rhetoric and importantly, changes, which are 
often subtle. It is then difficult to develop a clear picture of the competition state, 
what exactly is this leviathan that has replaced the welfare state? This section 
explores in detail the core assertions and key features of the competition state with 
the ultimate aim of outlining a clear and structured form of the competition state 
that can be analysed and empirically tested. Only then can we move beyond a 
theoretical discussion of the effects of the competition state and begin to measure 
such effects. 
 
The first in a series of questions that must be addressed is: what is the competition 
state? This is quickly followed by: how is the competition state thesis (CST) 
different from other theories such as the SWPR? What has brought about the ‗rise 
of the competition state‘? What are the implications of the competition state? And 
finally: can we rigorously test the assertions of the competition state thesis? 
Exploring the competition state literature does not bring us to a definitive answer to 
this first and most basic of questions, as the competition state is many things. 
Cerny and Evans seemingly answer the first question by stating that ―the 
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competition state is the successor to the welfare state, incorporating many of its 
features but reshaping them, sometimes quite drastically to fit a globalizing world‖ 
(Cerny and Evans 2003:24). This of course tells us that the competition state is 
thought to exist at the same level or scale as the welfare state, though as there is 
little consensus as to how one defines the welfare state, this definition is not 
entirely illuminating. It helps then to look at what Cerny and Evans believe has 
changed with regards the welfare state, to highlight the difference between the 
features of a welfare state and a competition state and question exactly why these 
changes have occurred. 
 
2.3.2: The good old days? 
 
The previous chapter looked at how the ideals behind the welfare state have 
changed over the last sixty years, however the CST suggests that much more than 
the principles underlying the welfare state have changed. For Cerny and Evans, 
there is a clear difference between not only the welfare state of thirty years ago 
and the competition state of today, but also such differences can be witnessed 
with regards the very nature of the economy, the structure of the state, and 
ultimately, the very purpose of the state. They opine that prior to the rise of the 
competition state the economy was deployed very much as the servant of the 
state (Cerny and Evans, 2003:20), a tool in its arsenal to support its pursuit of the 
general well being of its citizens (Cerny and Evans, 1999:27). The general 
consensus, built around what Cerny has often referred to as a sense of 
gemeinschaft, was that the state should ensure that social policies, which served 
to decommodify its citizens, were not affected by the peaks and troughs of the 
economy (Cerny and Evans, 1999:3). To meet this end, the state was able to 
adopt the type of Keynesian approach highlighted in the previous chapter, and 
ultimately, insulate social policy from the externalities of the global economy 
(Cerny and Evans, 1999:4-5). In essence, the economy was at this stage national 
in scale (Cerny, 1997: 258-259; Cerny and Evans, 2003:24; 2004:52), serving to 
promote domestic prosperity, which it managed by taking up the slack of 
inefficiency, while ensuring that the national markets that prospered after the war 
were able to remain relatively closed and thus insulate domestic business from 
international competition (Cerny, 1997:259; Cerny and Evans, 2003:24; 2004:52). 
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That the state was able to do this was a testament to a range of factors, namely 
the size and structure of the state, which was large (Cerny and Evans, 2004:51), 
powerful and extremely hierarchical (Cerny, 1995:5-7; Cerny and Evans, 1999:5; 
Cerny and Evans, 2004:51). Most importantly however, was the degree of 
legitimacy granted to the state, borne out of a sense of gemeinschaft, which was 
fostered by the very fact that social policy was debated on the basis of ethics and 
voter choices (Cerny and Evans, 2003:20), and remained autonomous from 
economic policy (Hudson and Lowe, 2004:44).  This support, granted through the 
bonds of civil-association (Cerny and Evans, 1999:2), legitimised programmes of 
state intervention and redistribution (Cerny 1997: 261; Cerny and Evans, 1999:4-5; 
2004:52), regardless of whether they were profligate or caused inflation (Cerny 
and Evans, 2003:20; 2004:52). Inflation could be tolerated and indeed it was seen 
as a necessary consequence of the pursuit of full employment (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:6; 2004:52). 
 
A final factor in the success of the state in achieving what Cerny and Evans refer 
to as its generic functions4 (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-2) was ultimately the 
success of the domestic economy itself. The embedded liberal orthodoxy that 
emerged (Cerny, 1997:259; Cerny, 2010b:129 Cerny and Evans, 2004:53), which 
allowed social policy to remain largely autonomous from the economy (Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:20:24), did so in a time when unemployment remained low and the 
domestic economy enjoyed prosperity (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:46). The 1970s 
saw an end to this period however (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:46), and as a 
consequence, Cerny and Evans argue that the walls of legitimacy that 
safeguarded the Keynesian approach were brought crashing down (Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:23; 2004:52). 
 
2.3.3: The Party’s over 
 
That the post war boom was over could be in no doubt; the 1970s had seen a 
worldwide oil crisis compound domestic market failures, which had in turn led to 
                                                          
4
 Stabilising the national polity, promoting the domestic economy in the public interest, promoting wider 
public interest, and social justice (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-2) 
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the ‗winter of discontent‘ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:47-47); whilst inflation 
continued almost unchecked, the economy was seen as increasingly stagnant 
and, as Hudson and Lowe note, unemployment had pushed through the 
―psychologically important ‗one million mark‘‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:47). It is 
important to note that it took a serious, ten-year failure of the market to uproot the 
liberal consensus that was so deeply embedded not only in the structures of the 
state, but also in the ‗hearts and minds‘ of the citizens (Cerny, 1997:259; Cerny 
and Evans, 2004:53). Cerny and Evans point to what was seen as a failure of 
Keynesian economics to correct the failures of the 1970‘s market as pivotal in 
ushering in the final days of the welfare state and the first days of the competition 
state (Cerny, 2008:14). General economic downturn was not of course unheard of, 
but the Keynesian belief that the economy would prove to be cyclical and that the 
negative implications of downturn could be mitigated by the state was sundered by 
the cycle of decline in which the economy seemed to be stuck (Cerny and Evans, 
2003:19; 2004:52).  
 
The market was not only stagnant, it also found itself suffering the implications of 
increased inflation and this stagflation (Cerny, 2008:20; Cerny and Evans, 1999:6: 
2004:51), coupled with rising unemployment, undermined the very legitimacy of 
the national programme, based on intervention within a Keynesian model (Cerny 
and Evans, 1999:3; 2003:23; 2004:52). It became apparent that the state could not 
- at least indefinitely - insulate the economy from either domestic or international 
complications, while taking up the slack of inflation and inefficiency (Cerny, 
1997:262; Cerny and Evans, 1999:5; 2003:4-5; 2004:52). Moreover, the state 
appeared increasingly overloaded (Cerny, 2008:39), locked into what Cerny and 
Evans call a ‗lame duck syndrome‘, whereby the state found itself in a perpetual 
cycle, which saw it taking responsibility for an ever-increasing range of 
unprofitable aspects of the market (Cerny and Evans, 2003:25). This was 
compounded by what Sir Keith Joseph termed the ‗ratcheting up‘ of welfare 
expenditure (Cerny, 2008:20; Cerny and Evans, 2003:24).  
 
Ultimately, during the early 1970s, the failures of the market prompted further 
expansion of the state, which in turn prompted more failure. We saw in the 
previous chapter how Thatcher felt that the state had become too big in ideological 
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terms, however with regards its economic role, the lame duck state found itself 
simply servicing debt through successive governments, while at the same time 
expanding its frontiers. This of course enabled critics on the right who were 
already suggesting that the era of big government had bred laziness as well as 
inefficiency (Evans, 1997:55; Thatcher, 1993:8), to proclaim that the Keynesian 
method for managing the economy could no longer protect citizens form its own 
inefficiency (Cerny, 2008:14; Cerny and Evans, 1999:5). Such arguments were 
lent credence when in the late seventies, the IMF was called upon to assist with 
The UK‘s balance of payments (BoP) crisis (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:49). 
 
The implications of such market failure were, at face value, that theresources that 
were desperately needed for investment were propping up the burgeoning state 
(Cerny and Evans, 2003:24-25; 2004:52). Furthermore, as Cerny and Evans 
summarise, market failure saw the cost of capital rise, inflation spiral out of control, 
and prompted a genuine crisis regarding the BoP (Cerny, 2008:10; Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:5; 2003:25; 2004:52). The main implication of the market crisis was 
however, that the embedded liberal consensus began to splinter as the legitimacy 
of big government eroded (Cerny and Evans, 2003:23; 2004:52), to the extent that 
‗big government‘ was beginning to be viewed as the problem and not the solution5 
(Cerny and Evans, 2003:21; 2004:52). Importantly it was not just the legitimacy 
borne out of the assumed wisdom of Keynesian economics that had started to 
wither; rather the presupposed contract between citizens and the state was being 
torn up, as the civil association bonded by gemeinschaft was replaced by what 
Cerny calls the enterprise association6, marked by relationships more akin to 
gesellschaft7 (Cerny, 1997:255). For Cerny This shift away from mutualistic bonds 
of gemeinschaft reflects the increasingly global nature of the domestic crisis 
(Cerny, 2008:239). Indeed for both Cerny and Evans, the role of globalisation and 
international trade was not limited to the domestic sphere. While serving to 
undermine the state‘s ability to insulate domestic industry and ultimately 
undermining the precepts of the national economy (Cerny and Evans, 2003:20; 
                                                          
5
 A phrase coined by Ronald Regan 
6
 The terms civil association and enterprise association were originally coined by Oakshott (1976) (Cerny, 
1997:255) 
7
 See Tonnies (1887)  or Christenson (1984) for a comprehensive discussion of distinction between the terms 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft 
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2004:52), globalisation was also seen to atomise individuals, or at least free them 
from the bonds of civil association, which until that point had held people together 
in pursuit of a general well-being within the territorial borders of the UK (Cerny, 
1995:10; 1997:255). Globalisation shattered those borders however, primarily in 
terms of international trade, which in the face of a crippled domestic economy was 
playing an increasingly prominent role (Cerny and Evans, 1999:9).  
 
Cerny and Evans find themselves amongst those who believe that globalisation is 
the main challenge facing governments (Cerny, 1997:251-253; Cerny and Evans, 
1999:1), a process that is hard, if not impossible to reverse (Cerny, 1997:269; 
Cerny and Evans, 2004:51). For Cerny, who can reasonably be placed at the 
globalist end of the transformationalist school of thought, globalisation not only 
changes much, it affects such changes in its own self-interest, thus begetting 
further globalisation, which ensures that it cannot be rolled back (Cerny, 1997:251; 
2008:39; Cerny and Evans, 2004:51:60). Every time policy makers take a 
decision, and increasingly when non-decisions are made (Pierson, 1994:162; 
1996:173; 2001:437), the grip of globalisation is tightened, increasing the 
likelihood that future decisions that foster globalisation will be taken. This is an 
important issue that we will return to soon, along with a discussion of the role state 
actors have played in the embracing of globalisation. However it is first important 
to highlight what Cerny and Evans see as the key implications of globalisation and 
how this fits with their competition state thesis. 
 
2.3.4: New Realities? 
 
Hyperglobalists or those such as Cerny and Evans who can be placed at the 
hyperglobalist pole of transformationalism, insist that market failure helped shape 
a new paradigm. For them, the primary response to market failure was the 
acceptance by much of the policy making elite of new ‗realities‘ about what the 
state could and should do, and who was best placed to deliver many of the 
traditional state services. Whether such realities were forced upon governments, 
or whether they were willingly accepted is both a contested and ultimately moot 
point. Castles for example suggests that the market failure of the 1970s, rather 
than representing a crisis for the welfare state, simply provided an opportunity for 
68 
 
opponents of the welfare state to undermine it from a position of political cover 
(Castles, 2004:46; see also Hay, 2004:44; Pierson, 2001:99). As Radcliffe notes 
however, the assumption that new realities had to be faced is as important as the 
process that was purported to have necessitated such realities (Radcliffe, 
2010:125). In short, for those who accept the general thrust of the competition 
state thesis it doesn‘t matter whether globalisation and the failure of the domestic 
market did necessitate the abandonment of previously held truths. They posit that 
the embracing of new ‗realities‘ by state and non-state actors established the new 
‗realities‘ as the rules of the political and economic game. What had been decided 
was that the state should be smaller, efficient, and importantly, competitive on the 
world stage (Cerny, 1997:259; 2008:25; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2003:25; 
2004:61; Evans, 2010:104). 
 
Regardless of how these new realities and practices came to be accepted, those 
who argue that they were indeed accepted insist that they mandated the pursuit of 
new financial goals and ultimately represented a new financial paradigm in which 
state action could exist. The fundamental shift was the establishment of a new 
doctrine, one that placed market success at the heart of government policy (Cerny 
and Evans, 2003:20; Evans, 2010:102; Taylor, 2010:41) and abandoned the prior 
commitment to privileging the domestic over the international (Cerny, 2000:448). 
This doctrine was enshrined within the embedding of a financial orthodoxy (Cerny, 
1997: 259; Cerny and Evans, 1999:6; 2003:21; 2004:51), which established the 
commitment to prioritising the needs of the economy over the general welfare 
requirements of the citizenry (Cerny and Evans, 1999:9). Central to the new 
orthodoxy was an emerging ethos, if not of austerity, at least one of prudence 
(Cerny, 2008:22; Cerny and Evans, 1999:8:17; 2003:23). It was this very need for 
prudence that gave birth both to Gordon Brown‘s tag as the ‗Iron Chancellor‘ 
(Driver and Martell, 1998:76; 2006:79; Fielding, 2003:155) and his broad fiscal 
framework (Cerny and Evans, 1999:17; 2003:28-29), which included a code for 
fiscal stability (Cerny and Evans, 2004:55; HM Treasury, 1998).  
 
The pursuit of ―prudent, pre-determined, balanced budgets‖ (Eatwell, 1998:85) 
necessitated tackling the twin issues of inflation (Cerny, 1997:270; 2008:20; Cerny 
and Evans, 1999:6; 2003:20-21:25; 2004:53:61) and inefficiency (Cerny, 2008:22; 
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2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2003:21; 2004:56). Inflation, which was once seen as 
a palatable by-product of an inefficient national economy became the primary 
focus of governments (Cerny and Evans, 2003:25; Evans, 2010:101) and, Cerny 
and Evans posit, the competition state (Cerny and Evans, 1999:6; 2003:25). 
Indeed the task of controlling inflation can be seen as the key battleground for 
governments in their bids to adapt to the new realities of the global economy. In 
particular, the need to prevent capital flight was used by policy entrepreneurs to 
justify an economic approach that conformed to ―the anti-inflationary norms of the 
international financial markets‖ (Cerny and Evans, 2003:25). Tackling inflation not 
only required that ―monetary policy was privileged over fiscal policy‖ (Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:25), but that the broader issue of inefficiency was broached. 
Inefficiency was not simply considered in the narrow terms of departmental 
‗slippage‘ or waste however (Cerny, 2008:22; Cerny, 2010b:144); key actors not 
only believed that the large unwieldy state – however well intentioned - was too big 
to be efficient, but that the priorities of the state had reached the stage where they 
almost ensured waste, inefficiency, and ultimately, huge deficits (Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:25; Evans, 2010:104). 
 
Perhaps the biggest and for some, most unpalatable of the new ‗realities‘ was that 
politics and economics could not stop at the water‘s edge. Efficiency could not be 
achieved with introspective national policies and it was deemed necessary to 
reduce the barriers to international trade, in order to maintain a competitive 
advantage in the global market (Cerny, 1995:12; 2008:18; 2010a:17; Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:21-23). Political actors were particularly concerned with ensuring that 
the domestic economy was not ―disadvantaged in terms of investment behaviour 
in international markets‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:17). Cerny has suggested that in 
embracing the global nature of the financial markets, by reducing barriers to 
international trade, states and state actors have played an important role in 
hastening the spread of globalisation (Cerny, 1997:269; Cerny, 2008:34), or as 
Radcliffe opines, ―locking in globalisation‖ (Radcliffe, 2010:25). 
 
With the pursuit of a competitive advantage in the international markets becoming 
an increasingly pivotal goal for the state, and the emerging consensus within the 
political elite holding that this could not be achieved by a large unwieldy state 
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focusing on macro-level policy, major changes were deemed necessary. In 
particular, the focus of intervention was abruptly shifted from the macro, to the 
micro-level (Cerny, 2008:10; Cerny and Evans, 1999:8:21), embodied in the 
development of what Cerny and Evans term pro-competitive micro-industrial policy 
(Cerny and Evans, 1999:21). Whilst private enterprise was indeed central to plans 
for a more competitive economy under both Thatcher and Blair (Glyn and Wood, 
2001:63; Lee, 2008:28; Thatcher, 1993:32; 677-680; Winter and Connolly, 
1996:30), the state obviously had a role to play. Often however this was a 
facilitating role, investing in innovation, science and research, supporting small 
and medium enterprises, entering into public/private partnerships (PPP), and 
promoting competition (Cerny and Evans, 1999:21-23).  
 
Ultimately the belief became that governments should, wherever possible, simply 
get out of the way (Cerny et al, 2005:17). This prompted not just a reliance on 
business, especially private enterprise, but also led to both deregulation and the 
inevitable privatisation. Indeed, Cerny and Evans speak of a general marketisation 
of the UK, for which they have coined the phrase UK Plc (Cerny, 1997:259; Cerny 
and Evans, 1999:17: 2003:23; 2004:451; Evans, 2010:96) to reflect the degree to 
which the state was being run like a business both in terms of its methods and 
desired goals (Cerny, 1997:259; 2008:10; 2010a). Gone suggest Cerny and Evans 
was the commitment to the general well being of the citizenry, replaced by the 
prioritising of the economy and as a consequence, gone also was the hierarchical 
bureaucracy (Cerny and Evans, 1999:8)8. For Cerny and Evans, the importance of 
the competitive advantage was and remains at the centre of every decision taken 
by policy makers, reinforcing the fundamental shift that had turned the ethos of 
and very reason for the state on its head (Cerny and Evans, 1999:25). 
 
The commitment to a low-spending, business-like, competition-promoting, state, 
one which existed in the global market place not only pervaded those who found 
themselves amongst the policy making elite in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 
reality a neo-liberal consensus had been accepted, initially by the Thatcher 
governments (and Regan governments abroad), but eventually by state and non-
                                                          
8
 The shift from top-down government to multi-layered governance will be returned to in detail 
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state actors across both the political spectrum and the geographical map (Cerny, 
2008:11; 2010b:136; Cerny and Evans, 2003:21:26; 2004:53:55:60; Cerny et al, 
2005:19). It was this neo-liberal consensus, marked by an embedded financial 
orthodoxy, which not only paved the way for the rise of the competition state, but 
also formed some of its core features (Cerny, 1997:251:264:266; 2008:16). The 
neo-liberal orthodoxy or competition state had become both the engine room and 
steering mechanism for globalisation (Evans and Lunt, 2010:1) and at the heart of 
the competition state, as its core institution or ordering mechanism, lay the market 
(Cerny, 2008:10; Cerny, 2010b:134). 
 
The neo-liberal approach is well documented. In order to meet both financial 
imperatives and ideologically rooted beliefs, neo-liberal orthodoxy held dear the 
ideals of low-spending, limited intervention, and of course, low taxes (Cerny, 
1997:259; 2008:21-22; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2003:21:25; 2004:61; Evans, 
2010:104). Cerny and Evans, who have historically held that the neo-liberal model 
represents the orthodox competition state, are keen to stress that such policy 
goals are a by-product of the constant search for the competitive advantage 
(Cerny, 1997:259; 2008:10:25; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2003:25; 2004:51:61). 
To this end reducing expenditure and especially waste (Cerny, 2008:22; 
2010a:17), is a pivotal task for the competition state (Cerny, 1997:259).  It is only 
by doing so, opines Cerny, that a state can avoid ‗crowding out‘ private investment 
(Cerny, 1997:259). The primary goal of the competition state (controlling inflation 
in the pursuit of a competitive advantage in the global financial markets) often 
necessitates the removal of government from the market. A reduction in state 
intervention, as with a reduction in spending, paves the way for increased private 
enterprise, which is central to running the state on business lines, thus making the 
domestic economy more competitive and in turn, more prosperous. Likewise, 
competition states concerned with economic performance, seek to incentivise 
entrepreneurial behaviour and private enterprise, which is most easily achieved 
through the tax system (Cerny and Evans, 1999:22). Cerny and Evans 
demonstrate how corporate tax has been manipulated by New Labour, who 
reduced the National Insurance contribution and rate of tax required from small 
and medium enterprises, in an attempt to encourage risk-taking in the market 
(Cerny and Evans, 1999:22). For Cerny and Evans then, the neo-liberal 
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consensus is marked by an agreement between those who have ideological 
reasons for favouring a policy approach that is more austere, with those who 
simply see economic growth as the key social policy (Cerny, 2010a:7; 2010b:135; 
Cerny and Evans, 2004:55). 
 
The pursuit of the competitive advantage and the neo-liberal direction such a 
pursuit has taken conjures the image of the state leviathan streamlining in some 
race to the bottom in terms of expenditure and general involvement. Indeed the 
rolling back of the state was a key priority of Thatcher‘s governments and while 
huge programmes of both deregulation and privatisation were pursued (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:3; 2003:25-26; Evans, 2010:98; Hudson and Lowe, 2009:49; 
Thatcher, 1993:32; 677-680; Winter and Connolly, 1996:30), competition is difficult 
to achieve simply through passive measures. Both deregulation and privatisation 
are important steps in the development of a competitive economy, with Conway et 
al suggesting ―regulation is perhaps the most pervasive form of state intervention, 
potentially too intrusive, possibly affecting productive efficiency and a corporation‘s 
ability to compete‖ (Conway et al, 2005:4). In particular, Cerny and Evans point to 
the deregulation and flexibilisation of the financial markets under both the Tory and 
New Labour governments (Cerny and Evans, 1999:10), alongside the privatisation 
of public services under the Tories, and the rise of PPPs under New Labour, as 
key processes in the embedding of the competition state (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:10:23). However, as both Cerny and Jessop highlight, the pursuit of pure 
economic competition is both an active and perpetual process (Cerny, 2010a:7; 
Jessop, 2002:119:123) and while Cerny and Evans maintain that the many 
traditional functions of the state have withered away, the promotion of competition 
is one arena in which the state remains active (Cerny, 2000:450; Cerny and 
Evans: 2000:10; Taylor, 2010:46). In particular, Cerny is keen to point out that 
competition does not occur naturally and that to assume that neo-liberalism is built 
upon laissez-faire ideals is incorrect (Cerny, 2010a:7). Rather the circumstances 
needed to facilitate competition require substantial state involvement (Cerny, 
2010a:7; Cerny and Evans, 1999:17) and in reality while we may think of the 
invisible hand of the market as ensuring economic prosperity, the sleight of the 
invisible hand is that it masks the once noticeable state, which is still working away 
to maintain the competitive advantage. Indeed for Cerny and Evans, one of the 
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central features of the competition state is the way in which regulation as a 
concept has been turned on its head, from the restrictive market regulation to the 
pro-competitive regulation of the competition state (Cerny, 2008:3:10; 2010b:134; 
Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:9). 
 
Adjusting to the new realities wrought by globalisation has been a big undertaking, 
one that has seen the flexibilisation of state apparatus as well as restructuring of 
the mechanisms for policy formulation and delivery. This has disempowered some 
actors, institutions, and maybe even the state, while privileging others, most 
notably creating a new policy making elite. Examples at the organisational level 
include, the different roles that have been adopted by central banks all over the 
world (Cerny and Evans, 1999:9:17), with the relinquishing of powers to the Bank 
of England being seen as one of the most profound acts of competition state 
conformation imaginable (Cerny and Evans, 1999:9; 2003:28)9. Much of this has 
been seen to lock in not just the neo-liberal competition state but also globalisation 
as a process (Cerny, 1997:264-266; 2008:16), with Cerny implying that the two are 
locked in a symbiotic and mutually entrenching relationship (Cerny, 2008:2; 
2010a:17; Radcliffe, 2010:125). The tendency however is to overstate the 
economic changes precipitated by the rise of globalisation and by focusing on the 
centrality of tackling inflation and maintaining the competitive advantage, one can 
neglect the role of people and ideas. Indeed, Castles, Hay, and Pierson have 
suggested that it is people rather than inalienable power of globalisation and 
subsequent market failure that rendered the Keynesian approach obsolete 
(Castles, 2004:46; Hay, 2004:44; Pierson, 2001:99), which provokes the question, 
is the competition state testament to the triumph of neo-liberalism, or the success 
of neo-liberals? 
 
2.3.5: More than a matter of economics 
 
Cerny and Evans readily accept the role played by individuals and ideas in the 
embedding of neo-liberalism, or the rise of the competition state (Cerny, 2000:448; 
2008:32; Cerny and Evans, 1999:i; 2004:51; Cerny et al, 2005:12). Indeed it is the 
                                                          
9
 The qualitative disempowering of the state will be discussed in more detail at a later stage. 
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very acceptance by the policy-making elite that has ensured the success and 
longevity of the competition state project. They suggest that the rise of the 
competition state is not merely a manifestation of the economic by-products of 
globalisation; instead it is the embodiment of the acceptance of such new realities 
and the adoption of policy and rhetoric that serves the very needs of the 
competition state (Cerny, 1997:251; 2008:32; Cerny and Evans, 2004:51:61). 
Central to this have been people and their ideas (Cerny, 2000:448; 2008:32; 
Cerny and Evans, 1999;I; 2004:51; Lunt, 2010:24). Cerny highlights the fact that it 
is not actually nations that compete, rather actors (Cerny, 2008:23) and this 
perhaps explains why a policymaking elite so bound to pro-competitive policies 
and strategies that served the needs of the competition state emerged (Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:39). The needs of the competition state were very much their own 
and again we can ask, did neo-liberalism come to dominate, or simply neo-
liberals? Both Cerny and Evans insist that it has been through policy 
entrepreneurship that agents have rejected redistribution and ―sought to capture 
the benefits of globalisation […] in order to reshape their political coalitions and 
prospects of power‖ (Cerny and Evans, 2003:21; see also Cerny, 1997:251; 
Evans, 2010:101). They have actively participated in the expansion of international 
business for with business‘ success, comes their own (Cerny, 2008:32). It is the 
fact that the interests of the competition state, globalisation, and the new policy 
making-elite are not only complementary, but also reinforcing of one-another, 
which ‗locks in‘ the effects of globalisation, entrenches the competition state, and 
privileges the entrepreneurial elite (Cerny, 1997:251; 2008:32; Cerny and Evans, 
2004:51:61). 
 
The locking in of the competition state has only occurred -indeed could only have 
any chance of occurring- with the aid of self-interested actors who have played 
both economic and political roles (Cerny, 2000:448; 2008:34; Cerny et al, 
2005:19). Earlier, the role of Sir Keith Joseph was discussed and Cerny and 
Evans draw parallels to the role of Gordon Brown, who was influential in shaping 
New Labour Policy (Cerny and Evans, 2004:56), while Evans has speculated on 
the importance of David Cameron in shaping the future of the competition state 
(Evans, 2010:110). It is actors such as these who have accepted either the limits 
of redistribution, the importance of globalisation, the need for economic prudence, 
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or in Cameron‘s case, the value of tempering the harsh realities of the New Right 
(Cerny, 2000:448; Cerny and Evans, 2004:60; Evans, 2010:110). Such 
acceptance being of course the first step towards the persuasion of others, 
ultimately affecting a shift in party politics (Cerny, 1997:260; Cerny and Evans, 
1999:9; 2004:61). In the UK this began with the adoption of an ideology of 
marketisation (Cerny and Evans, 2003:21), which fused the language of austerity 
with the language of opportunity. Once the feared outsider, globalisation was 
arguably softened by those who stood to gain most from it and possibly quite 
altruistically believed that the many stood to gain also, and the rhetoric of 
globalisation with a human face become all the more frequent (Cerny, 2000:450; 
Cerny and Evans, 1999:28; 2003:40; Evans, 2010:96:102). This represented not 
only a huge task within political parties, with Blair, Brown, and Mandelson and 
Thatcher and Joseph in essence recasting their parties‘ ideologies (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:11-13), but also a huge public task. As mentioned earlier, the 
redistributive nature of politics was publicly popular and thus entrenched and while 
some of the legitimacy of the big state project may have withered with the 
perceived failure of Keynes (Cerny, 2008:10), no such legitimacy had been 
established for the competition state project. Cerny has suggested that 
globalisation created a more ―complex consumer society‖ (Cerny, 1995:10), which 
saw the sense of gemeinschaft upon which the legitimacy of the big state and the 
principles of redistribution were built and sustained break down (Cerny, 2008:10). 
Others such as MacGregor echo Cerny‘s analysis of a withering solidarity 
(MacGregor, 2003:62), suggesting that the breakdown of mass production in 
society has indeed atomised society and what we witness now, rather than a 
sense of gemeinschaft, is a more opportunistic gesellschaft (Cerny, 1997:255)10. 
This sense of gesellschaft, being induced by globalisation, has, according to not 
just Cerny, but also Lunt (2010:26), Soderberg (2010:77), and Radcliffe 
(2010:121), been fostered globally and it is upon this phenomenon that actors 
have sought to construct a sense of legitimacy for the competition state project 
(Lunt, 2010:27). 
 
                                                          
10
 See Christenson (1984) for a comprehensive discussion of the differences between gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft as principles according to Toennies. 
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The first tentative attempts to legitimise a programme that, whether inevitable or 
not, challenged many of the entrenched and publicly popular collectivist and 
redistributive policies, revolved around the successful marketing of the competition 
state as a national programme (Evans, 2010:102). What Lunt has labelled the 
―battle for the hearts and minds‖ (Evans, 2010:102) concerning the competition 
state, utilised a sense of patriotism that seems paradoxical when one considers 
the international implications11 of the competition state. The creation of the image 
a British competition state, one built around the idea of a young Britain competing 
against the rest of the world involved no little razzmatazz and a quite a substantial 
amount of misdirection. A Blair government that happily rode the tide of ‗cool-
Britannia‘12 (Cerny and Evans, 2004:55), which had swept the UK throughout the 
mid-nineties, presented popular policies such as lower taxation as central to a 
patriotic national programme (Cerny, 2008:21). The impressive sleight-of-hand 
involved was that somehow, actors managed to present support of an open, 
competitive global market, as a support for an almost closed Britain, akin to what 
was found in the 1970s (Lunt, 2010:28). Lunt goes further, suggesting that the 
British, Kiwi, and Irish competition states (Lunt, 2010:29) managed to mask what 
can be seen as a decline of solidarity or march towards gesellschaft and instead 
foster an image of togetherness and gemeinschaft (Lunt, 2010:28). 
 
The patriotic competition state project was not however simply just a mirage; 
Cerny highlights the pivotal role played by lowering taxation in establishing a 
baseline of legitimacy (Cerny, 2008:21). More importantly however is the 
investment in skills and the investment in human capital (Cerny, 1997:271). When 
Cerny and Evans draw the distinction between the competition state mark one and 
the competition state mark two, they are not simply highlighting a more embedded 
form of the competition state under New Labour, but also a more legitimate 
competition state. The very fact that Cerny and Evans are able to even suggest 
that the welfare state has been replaced by the competition state stands as a 
testament to not only the new economic realities, but also the hard work of those 
wishing to convince the citizenry of the existence and implications of those new 
                                                          
11
 And indeed the implications for the nation state, which will be discussed shortly 
12
 Which included a formal invite to Downing Street for Oasis, who were more than happy to roll with New 
Labour’s New Britain 
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‗realities‘. Whether the welfare state has truly been replaced by the competition 
state is however a matter of contention. 
 
2.3.6: From the welfare state to the competition state 
 
It follows that in a political environment that favours austerity, is wary of the public 
sector, and fears the ill of idleness, the welfare state would find itself in peril. Cerny 
and Evans insist that the days of welfare are gone (Cerny, 1995:14; Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:10) and that as such the welfare state has died and that in its place is 
the competition state (Cerny and Evans, 2003:24). Cerny and Evans insist that 
what once was the welfare state has been so dramatically restructured along 
market lines (Cerny, 1997:259; Cerny and Evans, 1999:17: 2003:23; 2004:451; 
Evans, 2010:96) that it no longer serves the same purpose as upon its inception 
(Cerny and Evans, 2003:39). It is not simply the providers of services or the 
methods of provision that have altered; rather citizens are simply living ―without the 
kinds of public services and redistribution characteristic of welfare states‖ (Cerny 
and Evans, 1999:10).  
 
Cerny and Evans argue that this marketisation has pervaded all aspects of the 
welfare state to the extent that social policy has been incorporated into the 
economic orthodoxy of the competition state (Cerny and Evans, 1999:7; 2003:25). 
The traditional welfare functions across not just traditionally liberal countries, but 
also more corporatist countries (Cerny, 2008:14-15; Cerny and Evans, 1999:8), 
have shrunk and have had to adapt to a more financially rigorous environment, 
resulting in a downsized labour force, which seek to integrate wherever possible 
into the private sector (Cerny and Evans, 1999:7). Such marketisation has been 
achieved through the creation of internal markets, privatisation, the rise of new 
public management, performance indicators, the contracting out of services, and 
crucially, the adoption of more workfare principles (Cerny and Evans, 2003:19). 
Indeed the commitment to workfare is crucial, because while all other features of 
marketisation could, possibly, be pursued within a traditional ethos of welfarism, 
the workfare approach fundamentally alters many of the underlying principles of 
the welfare state. 
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In the previous chapter the shift towards means testing and the more active role 
for the welfare state were discussed in depth; for Cerny and Evans these are 
symbolic of the shift from the welfare state to the competition state. Hay 
summarise their main argument: ―Whereas the welfare state‘s principal priority 
was the promotion of the welfare of its citizens […] the competition state principal 
strategy is one of marketisation in order to make activities located within the 
national territory more competitive‖ (Hay, 2004:40). Cerny and Evans insist that 
there is now no welfare state that seeks to decommodify citizens and as such, so 
central is decommodification to the entire raison d'être of the welfare state; there is 
no welfare state whatsoever (Cerny and Evans, 2003:39). The principal approach 
of the competition state is one that turns the ideals of the welfare state on its head 
and seeks to marketise and commodify citizens (Cerny, 1995:15; 1997:266; 
2010a:8) and as such, to accept the rise of the competition state is to accept the 
decline of the welfare state.  
 
Working Tax Credits, the New Deals, and Active Labour Market Programmes 
(ALMPs) are for Cerny and Evans, examples of the shift from welfare to workfare, 
from the welfare state to the competition state, in action (Cerny and Evans, 
2003:30-38)13. However, as covered earlier, central to New Labour‘s assertion that 
work is an integral form of welfare is the notion that it is inclusion in the workforce 
that offers not only the quickest route out of poverty, but also the safest (Cerny 
and Evans, 2003:37; Deacon, 2003:120; Ellison, 2006:84). It may be through this 
very principle that New Labour can claim to reconcile the notion of a more 
competitive nation with a more inclusive nation. Brown for example, insists ―What 
is good for the nation - inclusion in society through paid work - is also good for the 
economy, which needs to utilise and develop the skills of the workforce if it is to 
become a global competitor‖ (Brown, cited in Ellison, 2006: 95-96). Indeed even 
Cerny and Evans accept that the WTC has reduced the tax bill of around one 
million workers by around £20 per week, and that the CTC is equivalent to a 2.5% 
tax cut for the average family (Cerny and Evans, 2003:38). It may be that citizens 
are not yet living ―without the kinds of public services and redistribution 
characteristic of welfare states‖ (Cerny and Evans, 2003:10), however Hay 
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 See the previous chapter for a discussion of WTCs, ALMPs, and the New Deals. 
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supplies the answer, suggesting that for those who subscribe to the thesis, in a 
competition state, welfare is merely a by-product of successful competition (Hay, 
2004:40). The debate about whether New Labour‘s approach is truly a rejection of 
social democracy has been hosted earlier, what cannot be questioned is that 
Cerny and Evans are able to point to a range of policies that seem, at least on the 
face of things, to conform more to economic needs than welfare needs. 
 
The risk of course is that welfare service may reach an irretrievable state, that 
those who rely most on such services find themselves further and further from the 
policy making elite, the elite that is so well served by policies that favour the 
competition state. If welfare truly is a by-product of economic policies, there may 
come a day when either welfare fails to be such a by-product, or the economy fails 
to be successful. That surely is the logic of the competition state thesis, however 
Cerny‘s more recent work does suggest that even the competition state has a 
place for and a role in the compensation of ‗losers‘ (Cerny, 2010a:9). This 
precipitates two important questions: first, what then is the difference between the 
welfare state and the competition state if not the level of generosity at which losers 
are compensated? And secondly, if such altruistic decisions are being made 
contrary to the new economic realities of the competition state, what is to stop 
other decisions being reversed? Ultimately, if the complex consumer society, 
marked by a sense of atomisation and gesellschaft suddenly rediscovers its 
solidarity, could the welfare state once again rise to prominence? For Cerny and 
Evans the answer to the final question is quite simply no. Cerny repeatedly asserts 
that the neo-liberal competition state is not only the orthodox model, but also the 
unavoidable model (Cerny, 1997:266; 2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; Cerny 
et al, 2005:21-22). Other approaches may be highlighted but Cerny suggests that 
they exist merely while the economic circumstances permit them (Cerny, 
1997:251:263). This is in large due to the ‗locking in‘ of globalisation, the pro-
competition state policy making elite, and ultimately, the competition state itself 
(Cerny, 1997:251; 2008:2; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2004:58). Just as the 
welfare state found itself woven into the fabric of many UK institutions, and indeed 
society itself, to such an extent that it came to represent the status quo (Pierson, 
1994:162; 1996:173; 2001:437), so now has the competition state (Cerny, 
2010a:17).  
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Shifts of the magnitude that the transition from welfare state to competition state 
represents are not normally possible due to path dependency and institutional 
‗lock-in‘ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:176:290; Pierson, 2001:411; Wood, 2001:407), 
however such was the collapse of the 1970s and the failure of Keynesian 
economics that a window opened, a moment of punctuated equilibrium occurred 
(Hudson and Lowe, 2009:192), a moment where the ‗parameters of possibility‘ 
shifted (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:57). It would, presumably, take such a moment to 
facilitate a shift from the competition state towards its successor, or perhaps its 
predecessor. 
 
Whether ‗active‘ and means tested policy approaches have come about due to the 
ideological changes seen over the last thirty years, a belief that there is no 
alternative to a mean, lean welfare state, or a genuine withering of support for the 
welfare state due to an increasing sense of gesellschaft, is neither clear, nor, 
ultimately, of great importance. What is important is that such changes have 
occurred and that they have become ‗locked in‘ (Cerny, 1997:264-266; 2008:16). 
For Cerny and Evans, the fundamental shift in welfare provision centres on the 
role of contracts. The underlying ideological changes and economic realities have 
led in the first instance to the replacement of entitlements with contracts, often tied 
to labour-force participation (Cerny and Evans, 2003:30).  
 
The second use of contracts is seen in service provision, with many aspects of 
traditional welfare being provided by a mix of state and non-state bodies (Cerny 
and Evans, 1999:3). Cerny and Evans label this the post-welfare contracting state, 
noting that provision has moved beyond its traditional attachment to welfare. 
However the implication seems to be that we should talk of the Post Welfare 
Contracting State (PWCS) not simply because of how services are delivered but 
also because of the very services that are delivered. Indeed the contracting out of 
services to NGOs, PPPs and even the private sector (Cerny and Evans, 1999:27) 
suggests that Post Welfare Contracting Post state may be a more accurate label 
to describe the replacement of not only welfare as a national priority or service, but 
also the state as the key provider. Cerny and Evans, unlike Jessop, do stop short 
of removing the state from their thesis, something that initially seems paradoxical. 
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How can the state remain pertinent if it has been disempowered to such a degree 
by globalisation that it cannot fulfil what Cerny and Evans refer to as its generic 
functions14 (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-2)? Moreover, if non-state actors and 
organisations are at least delivering services (if not also formulating them), what 
role does the state have? 
 
2.3.7: The competition state and the nation state 
 
Perhaps the greatest difference between Jessop‘s SWPR and the CST is that 
while Jessop insists that State is obsolete, the regime that replaces it still exerts 
enough influence to pursue, should it wish, welfare objectives (Jessop, 2000:177-
179). He theorises that welfare would indeed be replaced by workfare, but neither 
claims that this has happened, nor that this is the only option open to regimes 
(Jessop, 1994:24-25; Jessop, 2000:173; Jessop, 2002:152-153). Cerny and Evans 
on the other hand believe that while the state is being qualitatively disempowered 
and stripped of legitimacy, to the point where the state can no longer perform the 
generic functions mentioned earlier (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-3), the demise of 
the state is limited to its role in promoting and providing welfare services. 
Ultimately Jessop insists that the state as a term is obsolete and rather we should 
refer to regimes. He believes however that while the state has been replaced by a 
regime, this transition has not entirely disempowered the state/regime with regards 
welfare policy. This contrasts with Cerny and Evans who believe that the state 
exists but has been disempowered to such an extent that, in the arena of welfare 
policy, it cannot fulfil the functions synonymous with the nation state of the welfare 
state era. 
If the provision of welfare is such a central feature of the state, it is at first rather 
difficult to understand how Cerny and Evans can be so adamant in their 
convictions with regards the demise of the welfare state, while stopping short of 
proclaiming the end of the nation state. Cerny suggest that the case of the state is 
not as ‗black and white‘ as the welfare state (Cerny, 1997:268); while public 
opinion, actors, and most importantly, the economic realities of the competition 
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 Which they define as stabilising the national polity, promoting the domestic economy in the public interest, 
promoting wider public interest, and social justice. 
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state do, he contends, render the welfare state obsolete (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:8), contradictory forces supplied by those same individuals and processes 
mean that while the state is disempowered in many arenas it is, sometimes 
paradoxically, being strengthened in others (Cerny, 1997:258; 2008:24; 2010a:17; 
Cerny and Evans, 1999:10; Taylor, 2010:46). There is, in short, ―no simple decline 
of the state‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:8). Even in states where the rise of 
governance and infusion of transgovernmental networks has been most 
ubiquitous, certain elements of the state have been strengthened (Cerny and 
Evans, 2004:57).  
 
For Cerny it is still pertinent to talk of states for three primary reasons: first, Cerny 
believes that states retain their relevance due to their differentiated nature, 
suggesting that states are ―organisationally distinct from families, Churches, 
classes, races, interest groups […] economic institutions like firms or markets; and 
indeed, from non-state political organisations such as pressure groups or social 
movements and as such, the state stands on its own‖ (Cerny, 2010a:10). Second, 
Cerny highlights that states are still the primary unit of analysis in any international 
study. This opines Cerny, is because there is nothing ‗above‘ states, there exists 
―no international ‗state‘ or authority structure that has the kind of legal, political, 
social, economical, or cultural reality or claim to primacy that the state possesses‖ 
(Cerny, 2010a:11); and finally as we shall soon discuss, the state has an important 
role to play in fostering competition (Cerny, 2008:24; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 
1999:10). 
 
The state cannot however continue to serve as a decommodifying institution 
(Cerny and Evans, 1999:8) and has indeed become ―residual not only in terms of 
policy instruments but also the outcomes they entail‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:10). 
Gone indeed are the days of welfare insists Cerny (Cerny, 1995:14) and gone also 
is the legitimacy that supported such a state (Cerny, 1995:2; Cerny and Evans, 
2003:25). However, if the competition state represents a triumph of neo-liberals, 
forged from a new emerging legitimacy based around neo-liberalism, an 
ideological transition, why then should the state be affected? Surely the neo-liberal 
elite, having wrested control from the previous state masters would simply use the 
state apparatus to suit their own ends. Indeed as we have covered briefly and will 
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explore in a little more detail, that is what did in fact happen. However using the 
state to meet neo-liberal ends, or more importantly to retain the competitive 
advantage that is central to the global economy has frequently necessitated the 
loosening of the state apparatus (Cerny, 1995:12; Cerny and Evans, 1999:25-26). 
The rolling back of the state empowered many new networks and organisations 
that exist sometimes beyond the fingertips of government (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:26). This new governance represents almost a coalition of power built upon 
the principle that we can simply fuse the efficiencies inherent with business and 
the markets, with the legitimacy of elected officials (Cerny, 1995:12; 2008:26-27). 
However, as Cerny highlights, the more that happens outside the state, the less 
legitimate the state becomes (Cerny, 1995:2) 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the combining of the ideological and 
structural competition state comes with the ceding of power by New Labour to the 
Bank of England (BoE). For Cerny and Evans, this is a fusion of not just financial 
orthodoxy, but also flexibilisation of state apparatus and the development of 
competitive micro-industrial policy (Cerny and Evans, 1999:19-21). Moreover, the 
surrendering of power to the BoE is an example of the state not only ―occupying 
the norms of global finance, but also accepting and reinforcing the structural 
autonomy and power of those agencies that guard such financial orthodoxy‖ 
(Cerny and Evans, 1999:9). Whilst in itself this measure seems benign, it is one of 
many that when collected represent the key challenges to the state. The issue 
being that the restructuring Cerny and Evans insist was necessitated by and then 
further precipitated the rise of the competition state, is subject to the same laws of 
the policy process as all others. In particular it can become locked into the very 
same types of path dependency that had, until the tipping point of the 1970s crisis 
afforded actors a window in which to make profound changes, entrenched welfare 
policy so deeply (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:176:290; Pierson, 2001:411; Wood, 
2001:407).  
 
With regards the BoE it may well be that as Held suggests, this was not a measure 
enforced on New Labour (Held, 2001:394) by the irresistible nature of globalisation 
and the global economy. For Cerny and Evans this is largely irrelevant, building as 
they do upon institutionalist theory to insist that however this orthodoxy and 
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openness comes about, a process of path-dependency, driven by increasing 
returns, ensures this openness breeds even further openness (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:19-21). For both Cerny and Evans, the genie is quite simply out of the bottle 
(Cerny, 1997:251; 2008:2; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2004:58). The problem 
then becomes that the initial decision to separate steering from rowing in order to 
harness the positive aspects of the market results in more and more of the state‘s 
control being drawn to its finger tips and beyond, rendering states less able to act 
as ―strategic sites‖ (Cerny, 1997:270). Cerny highlights the increasing prevalence 
of ―political and economic structures that are frequently (though not always) more 
transnational and multinational in scale (and therefore more significant) than the 
state, have a greater impact on outcomes (i.e. may be more ‗Sovereign‘) than the 
state, and may permit actors to be decisionally autonomous of the state‖ (Cerny, 
1995:1-2). Ultimately, the state becomes qualitatively disempowered by virtue of 
its ‗hollowing out‘ (Cerny, 2008:11; Cerny and Evans, 1999:26; 2004:59), which, 
somewhat ironically, relied on constitutional reform to legalise such governance 
from within the state‘s own authority (Cerny and Evans, 1999:24-25; 2003:23; 
Evans, 2010:99-100). 
 
Whether the increasing shift towards governance as opposed to top down 
Westminster style government has indeed served to hollow out the state is still a 
matter of debate some twenty years after the notion was first broached. Rhodes 
insists that the state is being hollowed in three ways. Firstly the state is hollowed 
outwards through a process of privatisation, which limits the scope and forms of 
public intervention. Secondly, the state is hollowed downwards through looser 
delivery mechanisms, which remove the generic functions of the state to non-state 
actors. And thirdly, upwards towards the European Union (EU) and the IMF 
(Rhodes 1997:17:46:53-54). Indeed, as with globalisation, New Labour adopts the 
rhetoric of governance, proclaiming that government has a critical supporting role 
– not an interventionist role (DTI 1999:11).  
 
New Labour‘s hope that the development of local networks and clusters will 
produce regionally tailored policy (DTI 1999:42) is turned on its head by Rhodes 
who opines: ―as networks multiply so do doubts about the centre‘s ability to 
coordinate and plan‖ (Rhodes, 1997:54). Cerny and Evans go further, simply 
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insisting, ―networks resist central guidance (Cerny and Evans, 1999:26). There is a 
belief that policy makers have begun to worry that they are losing control over their 
ability to make and deliver policy (Woods, 2002:25). If Cerny and Evans are 
correct in asserting that the control of inflation is the top priority for the New Labour 
government (Cerny and Evans, 1999:17), to what extent have policy makers truly 
felt in control of this priority since the decision to cede interest rates to the BoE 
was made (Cerny and Evans, 1999:18-21)?  Even Jessop believes that, whilst 
retaining authority, the hollow state struggles to translate this into effective control 
(Jessop, 2002:212). Sanger envisages a more alarming problem for the state, that 
the qualitative loss of power is not accompanied by an equal loss of accountability, 
which in turn can severely damage the perceived legitimacy of the state (Sanger, 
2003:9). 
 
There is a contrary belief amongst some who accept that governance has 
replaced government, that this governance may be a very positive aspect of the 
welfare state.  Peters, for example, suggests that not only are networks more 
humane, flexible and responsive to the needs of clients, than traditional 
demeaning hierarchies (Peters, 2003:42), but also as opposed to the view of 
Sanger, believes that networks hide the long arm of the state, insulating it from 
public scrutiny (Peters, 2003:51-52). Jessop declares, ―[l]ike a hollow corporation 
and its headquarters, the state maintains its core of power at the centre‖ (Jessop 
2002:212). Cerny and Evans concede that the use of short-term contracts leaves 
contractors open to political manipulation (Cerny and Evans 2000:18), and that 
even the BoE has been careful to stick to their code of governance, so as not to 
anger the government (Cerny and Evans 2000:19). In the literature there is even 
an implication that decentralisation is a reward for those agencies that have been 
successful in fostering economic success, alongside improved welfare delivery 
(Ellison and Pierson, 2003:12).  
 
The notion that governance improves welfare is seized by Giddens who suggests 
that wider public partnerships have helped to create a welfare community 
(Giddens, 2006:382-386). Peters highlights that the regulatory state is able to go 
further than its predecessor by ―effectively requiring the creation of new services 
and benefits above those provided traditionally, and that examples of these; 
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maternity leave, childcare and a minimum wage, have been provided by private 
action under state regulation‖ (Peters, 2003:45). Even Jessop, who accepts the 
general demise of the Keynesian welfare state, insists that the emergent regime 
has incorporated a range of ‗extra-economic‘ factors such as the allocation of 
resources for innovation (Jessop, 2002:122), and social policies that meet both the 
needs of citizens and the demands of the capitalist class (Hudson and Lowe 
2004:45). For such thinkers, ―governance need not mean hollowing out, 
partnerships can be seen as a further dispersal and penetration of the state‖ 
(Newman, 2001:125), or as Kettl phrases it, ―instead of privatising the public 
sector, partnerships have governmentalised the private sector‖ (Kettl, cited in 
Sanger 2003:11). 
 
Cerny and Evans however are most definitely from the school that believes 
governance has lead to a hollowing out of the state, rejecting out of hand the 
notion that ―the contemporary restructuring of the state is aimed at maintaining its 
generic functions‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-2). This makes Cerny‘s insistence 
that the state within the competition state ―is not dead‖ (Cerny, 1997:268) all the 
more puzzling. When one considers from Cerny and Evans‘ perspective, that the 
state has undergone a restructuring that has destroyed many of the bureaucratic 
hierarchies in which its power rested along with much of its raison d'être in terms 
of welfare provision, combined with the increasing diffusion of transgovernmental 
networks, the future and purpose of the state does indeed look bleak. 
Furthermore, as Cerny highlights, in this global marketplace it is actors and firms 
that compete, not nations (Cerny, 2008:5:33).  
 
It would seem that the state had a role in providing welfare, firmly putting the state 
into the welfare state, however as the competition state has rendered much if not 
all of that prior input obsolete, what role could it possibly play in the competition 
state? To accept Cerny and Evans‘ main contentions, that the state has been 
stripped of legitimacy (Cerny, 1995:2), undermined (Cerny and Evans, 1999:2; 
2004:45), robbed of purpose (Cerny and Evans, 1999:8; 2004:59-60), and 
disempowered (Cerny and Evans, 1999:2), all due to the unstoppable and 
irreversible rise of globalisation and the new economic realities it entails, renders it 
difficult to see how Cerny and Evans envisage a future for the state. It is important 
87 
 
to finish Cerny‘s proclamation, ―the state is not dead, but it serves a different role‖ 
(Cerny, 1997:268), indeed it has changed in terms of both its ―structure and 
purpose‖ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:10). 
 
The paradox is resolved by considering the changes that the state has undergone, 
the breakdown of bureaucratic hierarchies (Cerny and Evans, 1999:8), the 
diffusion of transgovernmental networks (Cerny, 2000:450; 2008:3:34; Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:10), even the stripping of its generic functions (Cerny and Evans, 
1999:1-2), as the very processes that guarantee the state‘s long-term significance. 
Consider the arguments of Cerny and MacGregor who both believe that 
contemporary society is with regards to the increasingly complex and consumerist 
in its nature (Cerny, 1995:10). For them this consumer society is one that has 
seen the bonds of solidarity disintegrate only to be replaced by the weak, 
mutualistic bonds (MacGregor, 2003:62) of gesellschaft (Cerny, 1997:255). As a 
consequence the legitimacy of the big state project has withered and its continued 
existence is not viable. The competition state, rather than signalling the state‘s 
demise instead offers its salvation. 
 
Within the competition state, the state has gained a new purpose, primarily, the 
promotion of competition (Cerny, 2008:24; Cerny and Evans, 1999:10; 2004:58). 
Cerny cites the words of Foucault: 
…[P]ure competition is not a primitive given. It can only be the result of lengthy 
efforts and, in truth, pure competition is never obtained. Pure competition must 
and can only be an objective, an objective thus presupposing an indefinitely active 
policy […] Government must accompany the market from start to finish (Foucault, 
cited in Cerny, 2010a:7). 
 
Promoting competition or perhaps more accurately, regulating to ensure 
competition, has become, for Cerny and Evans, the new raison d'être of the state 
(Cerny, 2008:24; Cerny and Evans, 1999:10; 2004:58). While the regulation that 
Conway et al describe as ―too intrusive, possibly affecting productive efficiency 
and a corporation‘s ability to compete‖ (Conway et al, 2005:4) has indeed been 
stripped back, the regulation of the competition state represents its mirror image.  
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Cerny talks of pro-market regulation the ostensible purpose of which is ―to prevent 
fraud, promote competition and restrict monopolistic and oligopolistic practices, 
counteract ‗market failures, enforce contract and property rights, and generally 
provide a quasi-legal environment for actors to operate in efficient market fashion‖ 
(Cerny, 2008:24). While global in nature many of the markets can be located both 
within and without states (Cerny, 1997:253). Furthermore, owing to the lack of any 
‗world government‘ to provide the necessary pro-market regulation (Cerny, 
2010a:11), such a burden falls on the state (Cerny, 2008:24). Ironically, the re-
regulation of the markets has, in many cases become more intrusive and 
bureaucratic than the regulation of the late 1970s15 (Cerny, 2008:25). The state is 
thus not only far from dead due to its symbolic value, its military role, or its 
territorial significance, the state is central to the working of the competition state. 
The promotion of the general welfare of the citizenry has been replaced by the 
promotion of economic competition and the environment within which it can thrive. 
The state thus becomes active in fostering openness (Cerny, 2008:1) and 
stabilising such openness (Cerny, 1997:257) and ultimately, becomes perhaps the 
most important instrument – along with state actors - in the competition state. All 
this results in Taylor suggesting that Neo-Liberalism as a broad philosophy and 
the competition state requires, just as Keynesianism did, a big state to support it 
(Taylor, 2010:46). 
 
2.3.8: The competition state: a vignette and a critique 
 
The competition state is then both a response to globalisation and a replacement 
for the welfare state. Typically marked by lower social spending, lower tax, a 
reliance on active market programmes and governance through flexible networks 
consisting of state and non-state actors, institutions and organisations, the 
competition state is fundamentally geared towards ensuring the conditions for a 
successful (global) market economy (Evans, 2010:104). In the UK we can chart 
the developments of first the Thatcher (and Major) governments and subsequently 
the Blair governments, ‗ticking off‘ the elements of the competition state as they 
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 Cerny cites the example of insider trading laws in the US (Cerny, 2008:25). 
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emerged. As discussed, first came the ideological rejection of Keynes, which was 
followed by the streamlining of welfare services (though expenditure remained 
high), the replacement of entitlements with contracts, and eventually the move 
towards a more ‗active‘ workfare approach (Clarke, 2005:448; Deacon, 2003:133; 
Driver, 2008:53).  
 
Under Blair the more structural dimensions of the competition began to elucidate; 
the apparatus of the state became much more flexible, networks began to deepen, 
and the (re)regulation of competition policy became entrenched (Cerny, 2008:25; 
2010a:7-8; Fielding, 2003:160). The impact of this on the citizen has been 
variable, depending on their socio-economic status. For those who Mead, Murray 
and Novak branded the ‗underclass‘ (See Deacon 2000:11), benefits have 
become less generous, available for shorter terms, and nearly always means-
tested (DSS, 1998a:83; DTI, 1999; Glyn and Wood, 2001:63; Lee, 2008:28; Powell 
and Hewitt, 1998:9). The emphasis has been shifted towards participation in the 
labour force, a requirement that was crystallised in the series of New Deals, and 
perhaps somewhat offset by the introduction of a minimum wage (Beech, 2008:8; 
Deacon, 2003:133; Driver, 2008:53; Glyn and Wood, 2001:57; Kemp, 2005:16). 
For those who are better off, the commitment to work is still there, with WTC 
rewarding those who previously may have stayed out of work. This, combined with 
the increasing access to education (especially Further and Higher Education) and 
availability of service and information sector employment, has led to a burgeoning 
and increasingly ‗active‘ middle class (Lowe, 2004:205). Both home ownership 
(Bramley and Morgan, 1998:2; Lowe, 2004:187) and the numbers of small and 
medium enterprises (Carree et al, 2002:274) have increased and entrepreneurs 
are encouraged to take risks and are supported in such endeavours (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:22). This is surely the portrait of the orthodox, neo-liberal competition 
state. 
 
Not all are convinced however by the orthodox model or the competition state 
thesis. Indeed the CST can be criticised for being little more than a narrative of the 
Thatcher and Blair governments, with an air of there being ‗no alternative‘ 
attached. Hay for example suggests that Cerny falls into the trap of extrapolating 
―from ongoing developments to provide an account of the emergent competition 
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state, which is then retroductively presented as the only possible response to the 
crises of the old regime […] The result is an inadvertent neo-liberal apologism 
which both naturalises and seemingly necessitates whatever political processes 
throw up‖ (Hay, 2004:42). Given that many of Cerny‘s assertions concerning the 
competition state emerged prior to the Blair government and their raft of 
competition state-conforming policies, this is perhaps a little harsh. 
 
However, it is also true to say that certain elements of the competition state thesis 
have shrunk from or found prominence as the New Labour project has been 
played out. As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, giving a ‗straight 
answer‘ to what the competition state is proves difficult because ‗it‘ is not fixed, 
which seems to be a flexibility the authors have ‗exploited‘ to ensure that the CST 
has remained pertinent throughout the profound changes of the last twenty years. 
There are other criticisms of the CST, chiefly that it overstates issues, especially 
that of the crises faced by governments, the impact on the state, and the power of 
neo-liberalism (Hay, 2004:44). Even Cerny has recently suggested that neo-
liberalism is what we make of it (Cerny, 2008:40), which surely represents a 
departure from earlier assertions that the orthodox neo-liberal model of low 
spending represented the only viable option for governments pursuing the 
competitive advantage (Cerny, 1997:251:264; 2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 
1999:3:7; 2004:60). Hay for example takes issue with the almost unwavering focus 
on economic determinants of the ideological and structural changes of the last 
twenty years within the CST.  
 
For Hay, the CST is both simplistic and single-minded, brushing under the carpet 
the roles of political parties and the political process in general (Hay, 2004:43-44). 
This is perhaps again a little over-critical from Hay16, with the role of both politics 
and economics being intertwined by Cerny and Evans in their discussion of both 
the Thatcher and New Labour governments‘ competition state policies. It could be 
argued that rather than being apolitical, the CST is on the contrary overtly political. 
Both Cerny and Evans continuously stress the role played by actors in shaping 
and perpetuating both the course of globalisation and the competition state 
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 Although see also Taylor, 2010:42-43 for a discussion of what he sees as oft overlooked socio-political 
determinants of state change. 
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(Cerny, 2000:448; 2008:34; Cerny et al, 2005:19). Indeed as discussed, for Cerny 
and Evans the role of actors in bringing together both the economic and political 
dimensions of the competition state was and continues to be paramount. It is fair 
to say that Hay‘s analysis of the CST17 is purposefully critical and while some of 
his criticisms can be dismissed or have been addressed by more contemporary 
work by Cerny and Evans, some observations remain pertinent. It is hard to 
escape the suggestion that Cerny and Evans have overstated the importance of 
their thesis. From the work of Hay and more recently, Taylor, three main 
challenges to the competition state thesis can be posited: first, the CST is not 
significantly different from Jessop‘s SWPR; second, the CST is possibly over-
reliant on a priori assumptions or minimal evidence, making bolder claims than it 
can substantiate; and finally, many of the central assertions of the CST haven‘t 
actually been borne out. 
 
This thesis has already addressed many of the similarities and discussed some of 
the subtle, but extremely important differences between the competition state and 
the SWPR, however table 2.2 (overleaf) is instructive. Here we can see that both 
the competition state and the SPWR represent a significant theoretical departure 
from the industrial welfare state, while at the same time appearing rather similar to 
one another. 
 
Hay suggests that the primary difference between the two theses is that Cerny‘s is 
simply more stylised (Hay, 2004:43), though again this criticism seems to stem 
more from a personal disapproval of both the CST and SWPR than any rigorous 
academic critique. For Hay, both are flawed theses due to the very fact that they 
attempt to explain something so abstract as the profound changes in political 
economy witnessed over the last twenty to thirty years, with apparent parsimony 
(Hay, 2004:45). For Social Policists or indeed anyone with a scholarly interest in 
the welfare state however, the subtle differences are extremely important and the 
notion that either the state has broken down or remained intact but disempowered 
within the arena of welfare policy is extremely important.  
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 Along with Jessop’s SPWR. 
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Table 2.2: displaying the similarities and differences between the Keynesian welfare state, the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime, and 
the competition state. 
Keynesian Welfare National State Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime Competition State 
Keynesian  Full employment 
 Closed economy 
 Demand management 
Schumpeterian  Innovation and 
competitiveness 
 Open economy 
 Supply-side policies 
Schumpeterian  Innovation and 
competitiveness 
 Open economy 
 Supply-side 
policies 
Welfare  Welfare right Workfare  Social Policy 
subordinated to 
economic policy 
 Downward pressure on 
social wage 
 Attacks on welfare 
rights 
Workfare  Social Policy 
subordinated to 
economic policy 
 Downward 
pressure on social 
wage 
 Attacks on welfare 
rights 
National  Primacy of national 
scale 
Post-national  Hollowing out of the 
state 
Blurred boundaries of 
national and post 
national 
 Primarily national 
though hollowing 
out has occurred 
State  Mixed economy 
 State intervention to 
correct market failures 
Regime  Increased role of 
governance 
mechanisms to correct 
market and state 
failures 
 State role in 
metagovernance 
State  Primarily market 
economy 
 State intervention 
to prioritise market 
 Increased role of 
governance 
mechanisms to 
correct market and 
state failures 
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The second charge, that the CST is over-reliant on a priori assumptions or minimal 
evidence, making bolder claims than it can substantiate is perhaps more 
significant. One of the difficulties in providing a credible defence for the CST is that 
it is almost wholly formulated from a largely qualitative analysis of the UK. Little 
empirical evidence is offered by the authors, nor is any rigorous analysis of policy 
or welfare outcomes forthcoming for that matter. Despite this, first Cerny and then 
both Cerny and Evans use their narrative of the Thatcher and New Labour 
governments to make rather bold claims about the global state of political 
economy (Cerny, 1995; 1997; 2000; Cerny and Evans, 1999; 2003; 2004).  
 
On more than one occasion Cerny discusses the emergence of China as a leading 
competition state, one with neo-liberalism at its heart (Cerny, 2008:15; 2010a:18), 
a statement that, prima facie, seems rational. However, this claim seems largely 
based on the simple if not flawed logic that China has a successful economy and 
therefore, must be a competition state. While Cerny concedes that China is of 
course a different type of competition state due to its undemocratic nature (Cerny, 
2010a:18), it is actually rather puzzling to consider it to be any form of competition 
state. Indeed, it is rather difficult to see by what criterion beyond economic 
success Cerny bases his assertion that China is a competition state. Evans 
accepts that competition state can be broken down in terms of the following 
expected characteristics, behaviours, and processes: the shift from government to 
governance; the development of a post-welfare contracting state; the shift from 
market regulation to pro-market regulation; the adoption of lower taxation; and the 
utilisation of international policy transfer (Evans, 2010:10418).  
 
It is possible that Cerny is quite correct, however at no stage does Cerny present 
any data, any case studies of Chinese social or economic policy, nor even any 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that China has shifted from government to 
governance; developed a post-welfare contracting state; shifted from market 
regulation to pro-market regulation; adopted of lower taxation; or made use of 
international policy transfer. It may also be that Cerny incorrectly presents China 
as a competition state. It is interesting to compare Cerny‘s brief discussion of the 
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 Evans presents a development of Horsfall’s work, which puts forth ‘key dimensions’ of the competition 
state. 
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Chinese competition state with Taylor‘s more nuanced investigation of the Chinese 
model of political economy. Taylor, while acknowledging China‘s economic 
success, highlights that this has been achieved despite ―pervasive macro-
economic interventions, endemic corruption and close synergies between officials 
and business leaders from municipal politics upwards; ambiguous property rights 
and the uneven enforcement of the rule of law‖ (Taylor, 2010:41). It would require, 
he argues, the incorporation of vastly divergent state and institutional forms to 
even begin to stretch the CST to cover the case of China (Taylor, 2010:41). Even 
the issue of economic success is far from clear-cut; Taylor insists that China‘s 
growth owes more to the sheer scale of its market, than it does to any active policy 
(Taylor, 2010:42). 
 
Despite the UK focus, the CST purports to address a global phenomenon and 
offer a global ‗diagnosis‘. The only substantial analysis beyond the UK relates to 
the US, which Cerny and Evans seem to model as a natural partner for policy 
transfer to and from the UK (Cerny and Evans, 2003:27). Such a narrow focus, 
especially one that involves rather little empirical investigation, does somewhat 
damage the credibility of the bold, global claims that Cerny makes. It is such bold 
claims that ultimately, there is ‗no alternative‘ to the neo-liberal competition state 
(Cerny, 1997:251:264; 2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; 2004:60), states are 
bound to converge (Cerny, 2008:16), and that alternatives to the neo-liberal model 
will remain viable only in the short to medium term, until they inevitably fail in their 
pursuit of the competitive advantage (Cerny, 2010a:18; Cerny and Evans, 1999:8), 
which invites the most concerted and hardest to refute criticisms. It is the 
unwillingness to explore alternatives, or at least present the exploration of 
alternatives, thus providing support for the CST that seems to provide the greatest 
source of Hay‘s ire (Hay, 2004:13). Cerny of course would argue that there is 
simply no alternative to explore. The data does not for example bear out the notion 
there is some race to the bottom, nor does it necessarily support the idea that 
there is any form of convergence in policy, spending or outcomes (Castles, 
2004:45-46:170-171). Cerny and Evans sidestep such arguments by accepting 
that path dependency ensures that different state forms will continue to exist 
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(Cerny, 2010a:17) and by highlighting that they never suggested we would witness 
a race to the bottom19.  
 
The issues raised above do leave the CST rather hollow; either the competition 
state does signal the end of the welfare state while at the same time precipitating 
the transformation of the state to best facilitate the pursuit of neo-liberal ends, or it 
doesn‘t. Even if, under closer inspection, Cerny and Evans prove correct in many 
of their assertions, if globalisation and the competition state are pulling from 
without and pushing from within states towards a neo-liberal orthodoxy, how is this 
likely to be affected by a crisis or series of crises similar in scale and magnitude, to 
the very situations that set in progress the rise of the competition state? It will take 
some time before perspective can be gained on the current global recession, but 
already there is much debate as to how nations are likely to or able to respond to 
the ‗credit crunch‘. Cerny insists that the logic of the competition state can be 
witnessed in early responses, though his claim that it is the market economy itself 
that has begun to correct the sub-prime housing fiasco (Cerny, 2010a:17) is yet 
again made without any real evidence. Indeed, it could be argued that the vast 
fiscal stimulus packages injected by the Obama and Brown governments into the 
domestic economies of the US and UK respectively (Davig and Leeper, 2010:1; 
Feldstein, 2009:7; Watt and Nikolova, 2009:13) are symbolic of the unwavering 
supremacy of the state over the market.  
 
Evans, while predicting an even leaner, meaner, more orthodox competition state 
under David Cameron‘s Conservative Government (Evans, 2010:110), is slow to 
attribute this to the continuing pertinence of the CST. Rather Evans accepts that 
the global financial crisis represents a real test of the CST, being a time when 
ideological differences become more discernable between and within nations 
(Evans, 2010:112). Perhaps this represents a similar window, a similar opportunity 
for punctuated equilibrium, which Cerny and Evans believe provided the resolve, 
mechanism, and legitimacy to support the breakdown of the welfare state.  
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 While Cerny and Evans both hold that the neo-liberal competition state represents the orthodox 
competition state and similarly suggest that convergence is likely, they have stopped short of predicting a 
race to the bottom. One logical interpretation of their work would however be that such a race to the bottom 
would be a likely consequence of the competition state. 
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The CST is a powerful thesis, one that sits easily with the changes we have 
witnessed over the last twenty to thirty years. In a parsimonious manner it offers 
explanations for those changes and prompts the social scientist to consider many 
important questions regarding the future of welfare provision. It is a testament to 
the strength of Cerny and Evans‘ convictions, their persuasive power, and the fact 
that their work has continued to ring true with people from academic, government, 
or lay backgrounds, that it remains pertinent. At times however it seems that Cerny 
and Evans have succeeded in putting the CST at the forefront of academic debate 
without ever having their work rigorously critiqued. Whether it has been an 
unwillingness to address the ambiguities that Evans himself acknowledges exist 
(Evans and Lunt, 2010:2), the endeavour to incorporate almost all events within 
the rubric of the competition state (Hay, 2004:42; Taylor, 2010:41), or the lack of 
systematic empirical research, the CST is possibly at risk of slipping from its 
privileged position within the political economy literature. The main protagonists 
have worked tirelessly to ensure that the CST remains contemporary and 
pertinent, however the time seems ripe to force their hand and truly investigate, in 
a systematic fashion, the rise and possible demise of the competition state. 
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2.3.9: Summary 
 
The last twenty to thirty years has seen profound changes to the provision and 
experience of welfare services, the structure of the state, and the very nature of 
society. Whether such changes were wrought by the unstoppable nature of 
globalisation or whether they simply represent the manifestation of states‘, policy 
entrepreneurs‘, and institutions‘ responses to the perceived unstoppable nature of 
globalisation is unclear and perhaps, no longer pertinent. The competition state 
thesis has for twenty years sought to explain the shifts in policy, governance, and 
to a lesser extent, the welfare outcomes experienced in states around the 
industrial world.  
 
By continually adapting around the edges of the core thesis, Cerny and Evans 
have managed to ensure that the CST remains a source of debate within the 
political economy literature despite offering very little empirical evidence and 
certainly little data to support their logical and persuasive arguments. Hay criticises 
Cerny for this apparent unwillingness to explore the alternatives though Cerny‘s 
natural defence undoubtedly rests in the fact that he doesn‘t believe such 
alternatives exist. The continued presence of the CST in the political economy 
literature renders it almost unique and deserves both a degree of respect and 
further study. What Cerny and Evans cannot escape is that their thesis is 
abundant with hypotheses that can and should be explored. Perhaps the fact that 
such exploration could raise difficult questions regarding the CST provides us with 
an explanation for why it has yet to be undertaken. Conversely of course, an 
interrogation of the CST may find much to support it. 
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Chapter 3: Operationalising the competition state thesis. 
 
3.1: Methodology 
A deeper understanding of the competition state thesis, alongside an appraisal of 
its relevance, lends itself to empirical study. Evans and Cerny (1999; 2003; 2004), 
as well as others such as Hay (2004), Lunt, Soderberg, and Taylor (all 2010), have 
sought to explore the competition state model largely from a theoretical and 
usually qualitative basis. Where quantitative evidence has been offered in support, 
it has often been ad hoc, isolated, and at best, unsystematic. Of course, the 
competition state thesis seeks to explain a fluid and complex process and as such, 
there are no simple alternatives to the theoretical approaches favoured by its 
authors. Indeed, it is important that any quantitative investigations are as rooted 
within the theoretical literature as possible to ensure measurement, analysis, and 
subsequent discussions are truly linked to the phenomenon one sought to explore 
at the outset. 
As with the operationalisation of any theory, one is faced by a series of questions 
and more often than not, problems. The first question, perhaps the most 
fundamental, is quite simply, can the theory or phenomenon, be operationalised? 
If a quantitative approach is favoured, can we conceive of a method to construct a 
quantified variable? For example, could the concept of policy transfer be 
operationalised as a quantitative variable?  More pertinently, is data available to 
allow the operationalisation of the aforementioned phenomenon? The next series 
of questions relate to what should be operationalised. Is the entire thesis of 
interest? Taking one element of the CST, the issue of taxation, what type of 
taxation are we interested in? Personal taxation or corporate taxation? If personal 
taxation is what we are interested in, should we look at the tax burden of a single 
worker at median income? Or should we investigate the tax burden of higher 
earners? Similar questions involve the source of such data and when the data 
should be taken from. Finally, we‘re faced by the question of how to operationalise 
the phenomenon. How should variables be constructed and if relevant, measured? 
These are all questions that must be asked when attempting to operationalise the 
competition state and furthermore, additional complication is encountered due to 
the unfixed nature of the CST and at times, the lack of available data. 
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With the competition state being the successor to the welfare state (Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:24), a natural point of reference is the countless studies of the 
welfare state. While the purpose, methodologies, and subsequent findings of these 
studies are extremely diverse, one common theme is the comparative approach 
they take. Perhaps it is a by-product of the competition state that so much 
endeavour is dedicated to comparing how countries are performing or perhaps it is 
simply the manifestation of a more evidenced based approach to the social 
science (see Hudson and Lowe, 2009:280). Regardless of the reasons, social 
scientists are consistently attempting to understand the welfare state in a global, or 
at least ‗rich Western‘ context. And, as Cerny and Evans have developed the CST 
as an analytical tool for understanding the global phenomenon of globalisation and 
welfare state change, a comparative approach seems extremely pertinent. At this 
stage it is worth  heeding the words of Hudson and Kühner, who insist that no 
comparative study of the welfare state can escape the groundbreaking work of 
Esping-Andersen, whose seminal publication „The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism‟, has shaped all subsequent welfare state investigations (Hudson and 
Kühner, 2010:168). In his work Esping-Andersen grouped many richer nations into 
three typologies having indexed them in terms of the degree to which citizens are 
decommodified by the state, and how stratification occurs within countries (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). One example drawn from his decommodification index is the 
issue of unemployment protection policy; Esping-Andersen measures 
unemployment decommodification by looking at both the minimum and average 
replacement rates in a country, the length of the period that the benefit can be 
claimed, the number of days a claimant must wait before they can make their first 
claim, and also the length of any mandated contributory periods (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:54). It is his contention that the degree to which a nation 
decommodifies its citizens, or allows them to exist outside the influence of market 
forces, is a key insight into the nature of its social policy (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:35). Furthermore, advanced industrial nations can be categorised as 
belonging to one of three regimes by exploring how decommodified they are and 
the ways in which society is stratified (Esping-Andersen, 1990:52:74). 
It could be argued that the comparative welfare studies exist within the Esping-
Andersen paradigm, with researchers seeking to either explore and extend his 
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work, refute his analysis and conclusions, or simply learn what they can from his 
work and apply many of his principles to their own. Examples of those who 
embraced Esping-Andersen‘s „The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism‟ include 
the works of Goodin et al (1997; 1998), which sought to chart welfare outcomes 
within Esping-Andersen‘s ‗three worlds‘ typology, using data from Denmark, the 
US, and Netherlands to analyse how citizens‘ experience of welfare ranged across 
different welfare regimes. Similarly, the works of Castles and Mitchell (1990; 
1993), Bambra (2005; 2007), and Korpi and Palme (1998), accepted the broad 
approach of Esping-Andersen while attempting to assimilate an increased range of 
dimensions into his index, often resulting in suggestions that more than three 
worlds exist. Indeed such was the interest in adding dimensions to Esping-
Andersen‘s study and in turn, the subsequent clamour to suggest fourth and fifth 
worlds,  inspired the publication of Arts and Gelissen‘s ‗Three worlds of welfare 
capitalism or more? A state of the art report‟ (2002), which sought to provide a 
mechanism for ‗wading through‘ the increasingly populous series of published 
responses to „The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism‟. Esping-Andersen has also 
inspired replication studies that sought to test the validity of his methods and 
conclusions (see Scruggs and Allen, 2006), and provoked criticism from those who 
question the validity of using decommodification as the key variable with which to 
cluster welfare states (Bonoli, 1995). Indeed, one of the major criticisms of Esping-
Andersen‘s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism‟, as highlighted in studies 
such as those by Cousins (1997) or Kemeny (1995), is that the complexities of 
welfare states can be and often are missed or blurred by quantitative comparative 
approaches.  
While twenty years has passed since Esping-Andersen published his still hotly 
debated work20, his influence is still felt, be it in the syllabi of Social Policy courses 
around the globe, or the output of contemporary comparative research (Scruggs 
and Allen, 2006:55:69). Recent comparative studies by Hudson and Kühner (2009; 
2010) for example, which have moved away from comparing additive indexes, do 
not focus solely on decommodification or stratification, and offer a more nuanced 
approach to classifying welfare states, still maintain a commitment to comparing 
welfare state ‗ideal types‘. The authors are forthcoming in citing the influence 
                                                          
20
 And indeed, the data Esping-Andersen used is now some thirty years out-of-date. 
101 
 
Esping-Andersen has exerted on their work (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:35; 
2010:168) and while their methods and conclusions represent a clear departure 
from Esping-Andersen‘s work, they are fundamentally still attempting to address 
the very same questions that occupied him, utilising an approach that still makes 
use of macro-level data in order to group countries with regards the nature of their 
welfare provision. 
The purpose of this study is to quite simply investigate whether, when subjected to 
empirical research, the CST remains pertinent. Esping Andersen insists that it is 
only through the utilisation of ―comparative empirical research [that we] will 
adequately disclose the fundamental properties that unite or divide modern welfare 
states‖ (Esping-Andersen, 1990:3). The same can of course be said for the 
competition state and as noted, the time for such an approach is ripe. The first 
step in this process involves addressing the most basic, yet potentially problematic 
question of whether the competition state can be operationalised in a way that 
allows comparative analysis. From there we can learn more about the ‗true‘ nature 
of the competition state, asking, just as Esping-Andersen did of welfare states, 
whether they cluster into types, converge to a single point, or represent individual 
units following personalised trajectories through time. The investigation within this 
thesis is presented as a series of three empirical chapters, which reflects the 
organic development of the research. The first empirical chapter relies heavily on 
the approach of Esping-Andersen in the construction of a tentative index of 
competition states. The chapter is preoccupied with operationalising dimensions of 
the competition state in a way that is not only measurable, but also meaningful. 
This chapter was developed, presented, and eventually published as a ‗first step‘ 
in the quantification of the CST. Partly as a natural second step, but also in 
response to the feedback that was received for the first empirical chapter, the 
second chapter seeks to introduce an element of time-series into the comparative 
analysis of competition states. This chapter is marked by a series of fundamental 
methodological debates that deal with how one charts changes over time, arriving 
at the conclusion that while the principle method that has been adopted is sound 
and illuminating, it is not the only possible method and perhaps, may not be the 
most appropriate. The third empirical chapter builds upon the two previous 
chapters, offering a methodology that is not only more stable for time-series 
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analysis, but perhaps offers a more theoretical rooting to the quantitative approach 
adopted in this thesis. 
The rationale for including all three chapters is that they not only represent three 
stages in an organic process of investigation, but that they also afford an important 
discussion as to the role methodologies play in forming conclusions, shaping 
debates, and even establishing paradigms within research. Esping-Andersen‘s 
triumvirate of welfare regimes was cemented in the social policy psyche (even 
amongst its critics) to such an extent that it shaped the very research that has 
subsequently been undertaken. When one considers the claims of Scruggs and 
Allen (2006) that methodological mistakes and data inaccuracies hide what would 
have been merely two worlds or perhaps no real worlds of welfare capitalism 
(Scruggs and Allen, 2006:69), it becomes important to endeavour to ensure that 
one‘s findings are not simply a product of the methodology that has been adopted. 
If one methodology provides results that provoke certain conclusions about the 
nature of competition states and a different methodology, making use of the same 
data, offers contrary conclusions, the researcher has to question not only the 
methodologies, but also the very thesis as an explanatory tool. 
3.2: A brief introduction to the empirical chapters 
All three empirical chapters have been prepared with the intention that they would 
be submitted for publication and in their final formats include a brief literature 
review. However, as they are presented in this thesis after an already lengthy 
literature review, their introductions or context have been removed or at least 
shortened. With this exception aside, the empirical chapters are designed to ‗stand 
alone‘ and include analyses and discussions regarding that particular chapter only. 
A broader discussion of what the three chapters tell address the findings 
collectively, along with an appraisal of the various methods utilised follows the 
three chapters and is treated as the concluding discussion within the thesis. A 
series of brief summaries of the three chapters is included to highlight the 
methodologies used and the justification for doing so, and a brief discussion of the 
difficulties faced and the possible limitations to the methods and analysis. 
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3.2.1: Operationalising the competition state, or from competition state to 
competition states? 
In this chapter the primary focus is on establishing a meaningful method for 
operationalising elements of the competition state. As such the initial debate is 
split between what elements can and should be operationalised and what method 
should be used to compare countries‘ behaviour. In the first instance, five 
dimensions of the competition state are operationalised using data soured from 
various locations within the OECD. The objective being the creation of an index of 
competition states akin to Esping-Andersen‘s decommodification index. The 
dimensions of the competition state presented here are in most cases the product 
of more than one variable and are constructed in such a way that we can measure 
a country‘s  ‗behaviour‘ against a simple statement of whether we would expect to 
see high scores, expenditure, or behaviour within a competition state. The 
simplest example being the taxation dimension of the competition state; this is 
constructed using average scores for average taxation, the top rate of personal 
taxation, and the top rate of corporate taxation. The logic, drawn from the 
literature, being that a competition state would best flourish and in turn encourage 
an environment of low taxation. 
 
Having discerned what variables should be used to construct a meaningful index 
of competition states, the method of indexing and subsequently ranking countries 
according to the ‗competition stateness‘ is then next addressed.  Here the 
rationale for following Esping-Andersen‘s methodology is tempting, however in 
attempting to address some of the criticisms of his methodology, a Z-score based 
approach is adopted. This not only standardises all the data so as to facilitate an 
easy comparison between rather different data from a range of sources, but also 
reveals how far a country falls above or below the mean for the group as a whole. 
As we would expect competition states to exhibit high scores in some dimensions 
of the index and low scores in others, the data is transformed for simplicity, 
ensuring that a high score on the index indicates competition state behaviour. 
What chapter four presents then is an index based on the z-scores of data drawn 
from the OECD, measuring the degree to which countries exhibit competition state 
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behaviour on the dimensions of the post-welfare contracting state; overall welfare 
expenditure effort; the regulation of industry by Government; the generosity of the 
state; and taxation21. The findings are interesting and on the whole, intuitive. They 
seem to confirm some of Cerny and Evans‘ key positions, whilst posing one-or-two 
questions of their own. 
3.2.2: Charting the competition state over time, or from competition states to 
competition state? 
The purpose of this second chapter is to build upon the findings of the first 
chapter, which suggest that if we are to accept Cerny and Evans‘ competition state 
thesis, we must at least talk of variant forms of the competition state. One of the 
key weaknesses over the first chapter is that it uses data from only one point in 
time and as such, we cannot definitively state whether the two or possibly three 
types of competition state represent stable, differentiated models, or rather 
whether the three groupings are merely separated by how far they have moved 
towards the orthodox competition state model. If we accept that one group of 
nations, including the ideal-types Ireland and Korea as well as the Antipodes, the 
UK and the US, do indeed exhibit the behaviour expected of orthodox competition 
states, we would expect in accordance with Cerny‘s views, to witness two trends 
develop over time: the first trend being that those established orthodox competition 
states will continue to exhibit high scores on the index. This reflects the fact that as 
Cerny and Evans posit, turning back the tide of globalisation and the competition 
state is extremely difficult, becoming perhaps impossible as the features, goals, 
and policy actions of the competition state become further embedded (Cerny, 
1997:269; Cerny, 2008:34). Secondly, we would expect, or at least Cerny and 
Evans would predict, that over time, the behaviour of those nations that occupied 
the remaining two ‗types‘ of competition state would begin to exhibit behaviour 
more akin to the orthodox competition state model (Cerny, 1997:251:264; 2008:16; 
Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; 2004:60; Cerny et al, 2005:21-22). 
The natural procedure for testing the two hypotheses outlined above would seem 
to be the replication of the investigation presented in chapter four at other points in 
                                                          
21
 In his most recent publication on the subject, Evans accepts both the dimensions that are operationalised as 
accurate indicators of the competition state, and the z-score approach for indexing. See Evans, M. (2010). 
Cameron’s Competition State. In Policy Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.95-116. 
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time. This in itself is illuminating and worthy of inclusion, showing as it does how 
countries‘ performance relative to one another has changed over time. It allows us 
to chart whether Ireland, the ideal-type orthodox competition state in 2003, held 
that position in 1998 and whether it retains that position in 2008. This is interesting 
because we can seek to explain the relative changes in success over time in terms 
of policy approaches, global conditions, and domestic environments. This 
methodology is extremely popular in business, showing as it does the degree to 
which organisations or in this case nations, are performing against competitors. It 
allows for example the Financial Times newspaper to compare the relative 
success and performance of European business schools in a league table and 
demonstrate how schools have slipped or risen in the rankings from year-to-year 
(Financial Times, 2010). Similarly, Bradshaw and Richardson‘s indexes of 
childhood well being in Europe (2007 and 2009) are used to highlight, especially in 
the British press, the degree to which the UK is in terms of childhood well being, 
finding itself outperformed  by other European nations. While Bradshaw and 
Richardson are forthcoming in accepting that their indexes of 2007 and 2009 are 
not directly comparable, they still draw conclusions about the position occupied by 
the UK in both the 2007 and 2009 indexes. By offering statements such as ―The 
UK came bottom of the OECD league table and fourth from bottom of the EU25 
league table, and this ranking indicates that British government efforts to eradicate 
child poverty and improve child well-being have yet to improve its comparative 
position‖ (Bradshaw and Richardson, 2009:325), or ―that the UK is making such 
slow progress out of the bottom of this league table is an indication of the long 
term damage that can be done by neglecting children, especially in a recession‖ 
(Bradshaw and Richardson, 2009:350), suggest that the UK is failing to improve. 
What these statements mask is that an index built on average z-scores cannot be 
used to prove or refute such a claim. While the comparison of two indexes at two 
different points in time can confirm how a country‘s performance has changed 
relative to the group of countries being measured, it cannot illuminate a discussion 
around how its performance has changed relative to its own previous results.  
 
The primary problem with comparing z-scores over time is directly related to what 
makes a z-score based index so useful when analysing just one point in time. The 
z-score is a measure of how far a country‘s behaviour, be it expenditure or a score 
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that has been generated within a specific domain, falls from the mean score for all 
the countries measured on that domain. It allows the researcher to build an index 
that ―compares apples and oranges‖ by standardising the data. However, the z-
scores, by being dependent on the mean and standard deviation of the sample or 
population, become meaningless when compared to the z-scores derived from 
another sample and by extension, a different mean and standard deviation. In 
chapter four for example we saw that on the dimension of the post-welfare 
contracting state, the UK exhibited an averaged z-score of 0.222. If we imagine 
that when the index is recalculated for 2008, the UK‘s averaged z-score for the 
post-welfare contracting state dimension was 1.200, the tendency would be to 
assume that the UK had got ‗better‘ or in this case, more competitive with regards 
this domain. Such an assumption would be lent credence if the UK also increased 
in rank on this dimension, let‘s say from fifteenth to tenth. Indeed we could quite 
correctly declare that relative to other (measured) OECD countries, the UK was 
more competitive in 2008 compared to its relative position in 2003. However the 
increase in z-score and/or increase in rank cannot be cited in support of a 
statement that suggests the UK has become more like a competition state in this 
domain over time. The UK‘s  increased Z-score could simply be a product of  a 
series of cutbacks in ALMP expenditure across the states that had previously 
exhibited lower expenditure in this arena, while expenditure across the remaining 
nations, the UK included, held steady. This would result in a lower group mean 
and as such, would result in those countries that were already above the mean 
finding themselves to be further away from it in 2008. Similarly, the rise in rank 
could be attributed to a combination of the above scenario alongside the reduced 
expenditure on this dimension by nations previously ranked higher than the UK, all 
while the UK‘s behaviour remains static. As the index masks this, one would have 
to compare the raw data to check whether the UK‘s behaviour in absolute terms, 
which in this case is expenditure, has increased. This would then have to be 
weighted for inflation and other such changes. 
Comparing z-score indexes over time is still, as mentioned, illuminating; by 
charting the relative changes in rank we can assess which countries are proving to 
be most successful at pursuing the competitive advantage in terms of competition 
state behaviours. We can also add extra depth by referring to raw data and as 
long as both the researcher and the reader is aware of what the data can and 
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cannot be used to say, the endeavour is a useful one. However, with a slight 
alteration to the z-score formula, it is possible to not only compare relative 
behaviours over time, but also compare absolute behaviours. This chapter 
addresses the comparability issue of z-score indexes by employing a further layer 
of investigation. Following the lead of Scruggs and Allan (2003:33), rather than 
simply using z-scores, a reference year is built into the compilation of the index. In 
this instance the z-score equation is altered for the compilation of the index in 
years two and three so that: 
(Adapted from Field, 2006) 
becomes: 
 (Adapted from Field, 2006) 
In the second equation, z is calculated by ascertaining how far a country‘s 
behaviour falls above or below the year one mean. This will not only allow us to 
rank countries in order of their behaviour, but will also allow some comparison to 
previous behaviour. In this instance we can suggest that an increase in averaged 
z-score such as that outlined above where the UK moved from 0.222 to 1.200 is 
due to an increased score, a score that moves further away from the average 
established in year one. 
 
As the chapter‘s title suggests, what is uncovered can be thought of as a 
convergence towards the competition state model, just as Cerny hypothesised 
(Cerny, 1997:251:264; 2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; 2004:60; Cerny et al, 
2005:21-22). However, this convergence masks much divergence or at least 
difference in behaviours. Rather than a uniform transition to the neo-liberal 
competition state, we can see the rise of potentially distinct competition state 
models, some of which similar to other models, others rather different. 
Furthermore, while the rise of the competition state can on some level be 
evidenced, the decline of the welfare state is not so easily charted. This chapter 
then answers and poses questions in almost equal measure. What this chapter 
also suggests is that the methodological debate and potential weaknesses of the 
additive index methodology weakens the findings to some extent. It also highlights 
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the fact that up to this stage, what is being measured is the relative behaviour of 
nations, assessing which countries are acting most like competition states. The 
simple fact is that the underlying assumption has been not only that the 
competition state exists in at least one, if not more forms, but also that nations are 
to differing extents exhibiting competition state behaviours. The indexes show that 
in year one for example, Korea spends the least in terms of social expenditure and 
as such, on that dimension is the leading competition state. What it doesn‘t show 
is whether the expenditure exhibited by Korea is what we would expect of a 
competition state; does Korea‘s social expenditure fall beneath a threshold 
whereby it can be truly symbolic of a welfare state and such can be considered as 
the behaviour of a competition state, or is the z-score indicate high competition 
state behaviour simply because compared to other nations, it spends relatively 
modest amounts? If most social expenditure as a proportion of GDP is around 
50% in most nations, compared to around 30% in Korea, the index will indeed 
show that Korea is acting most like a competition state on this dimension. But we 
must ask, at what threshold is social expenditure as a proportion of GDP 
symptomatic of a welfare state and at what threshold is it symptomatic of a 
competition state? It may very well be that social expenditure of 35% of GDP is 
sufficient to support a traditional welfare state, if perhaps not as generous as those 
where 50% of GDP is dedicated to social expenditure, but sufficient nonetheless. 
That level of complexity is masked by simply accepting the original premise and 
then ranking nations in terms of their relative ‗competition stateness‘. The chapter 
ends therefore with a suggestion that a methodology that allows, where possible, a 
closer link to the expectations of the competition state thesis, could add real depth 
to the already much-illuminated debate. 
 
3.2.3: A fuzzy set approach to operationalising the competition state, or the 
stable diversity of competition state forms 
 
This chapter‘s raison d‟être owes much to the complications faced during the 
investigation detailed in chapter five. The findings of chapters four and five have 
been illuminating, however they have possibly stopped short of providing definitive 
answers to perhaps the most important questions: Does the competition state 
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exist? Are there different types of competition state? Are competition states 
changing? 
 
Chapter six employs a rather different methodology from those utilised in the first 
two chapters, in an attempt to not only address some of those unanswered 
questions, but also to tie the quantitative analysis much tighter to the qualitative, 
theoretical approach of the authors and of the CST as well as the observations of 
other commentators. Perhaps the major finding of the first two chapters is that the 
competition state and welfare state do not exist in a binary, mutually exclusive 
relationship. Just as many have suggested that there are different types of welfare 
state (Bambra, 2005; 2007; Bonoli, 1995; Castles and Mitchell 1990; 1993; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hudson and Kühner, 2009; Vis, 2007), so too does it 
appear that there are different types of competition state. It is worth remembering 
that Cerny and Evans believe that ―the competition state is the successor to the 
welfare state, incorporating many of its features but reshaping them, sometimes 
quite drastically to fit a globalizing world‖ (Cerny and Evans, 2003:24). The type of 
competition state that emerges is then reflective of what features have been 
incorporated and the way they have been reshaped. Throughout the literature 
review it was demonstrated that while there was no consensus as to what features 
would be reshaped and how, this process was likely to be framed by existing 
national policies, state and non-state actors, institutions, and public opinion. The 
league table approach, however nuanced in its construction, cannot effectively 
capture this. What is needed is a methodology that can reflect the 
multidimensionality of the competition state (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:35:88; 
2010:169; Kvist, 2007:475; Vis, 2007:108). The first two chapters suggest that at 
least two types of competition state exist, based largely on the fact that some 
states seemed to conform to the low expenditure orthodoxy of Cerny‘s 
expectations whilst other states‘ competition state behaviour seems confined to 
active labour market programmes. In chapter six we will see whether these do 
represent two distinct competition state models. 
 
While the standardisation of data in the form of z-scores allowed the construction 
of an index that was able to capture the overall picture of a process that involved 
elements that were at times contradictory, it still faced some major limitations. In 
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terms of the data, z-score indexes, along with factor analysis and cluster analysis 
is dependent on mean averages, which as Hudson and Kühner highlight, ―mask 
important elements of cross-national diversity22‖ (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:36; 
2010:169:170). With regards the type of additive index presented in chapters four 
and five, it is possible that a high score on one dimension may mask what would 
have otherwise been a low score overall. This can quite easily be illustrated with 
both the neo-liberal competition states and Nordic competition states in chapter 
four. If we posit that the competition state is marked by both high ALMP 
expenditure and low social expenditure, it would be difficult to suggest that either 
the neo-liberal or Nordic nations had developed competition states. However, as 
both indicators were simply fed into the same index, ‗extreme‘ performance on one 
of the dimensions could carry the overall score through lower scores on the other 
dimension. Furthermore, the entire z-score index was based on deviations from 
the mean, which in itself means that the index can be skewed or squashed due to 
the existence of outliers (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:38; 2010:169:170). As 
highlighted in chapter four, in the realm of the post welfare contracting state, 
Denmark most definitely represented such an outlier. Finally, as mentioned earlier, 
the z-score index can be used to merely paint a picture of the relative behaviour of 
nations. In chapter four we saw that from our sample of nations, Ireland and Korea 
exhibited the most competition state-like behaviour.  Taken alongside the 
assumption or at least acceptance that the competition state thesis is correct, we 
are then moved to suggest that Ireland is the ideal type competition state. In 
reality, it may have fallen well short of competition state behaviour, despite 
appearing more like a competition state than any other nation. 
 
In this chapter fuzzy set ideal type analysis is utilised in an attempt to address all 
of these problems. The real strength of employing this methodology is that is 
allows the researcher to operationalise a concept that has distinct dimensions in a 
way that ensures that the behaviour in one dimension is quantified and analysed 
separately from the other dimensions, while still being considered in the ‗final 
reckoning‘ when one address the concept as a whole (Vis, 2007:118). To take the 
competition state as an example, fuzzy set analysis allows the researcher to 
                                                          
22
  A point also advanced by Vis (2007:118) 
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determine whether nations are acting as competition state in the arena of ALMPs 
whilst simultaneously ascertaining whether the same nations are acting as 
competition states in terms of social expenditure. This is achieved through the 
method itself, which requires the researcher to set thresholds that relate to the 
behaviour they are measuring (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:25-26; 
Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009:77; Ragin, 2000:150:318; 2009:93:118; 
Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:132). This is because a fuzzy set is based on a score 
that ranges from 0 to 1 where a score of one signals that a country or unit of 
analysis is fully in that set and zero denotes that it is fully out of the set (Ragin, 
2009:89). Again, drawing on the competition state thesis, we could argue that any 
nation that spends 100% of GDP on social measures is definitely not a competition 
state and as such we could give it the score 0. This denotes that such a country is 
fully out of the social expenditure within a competition state set. In terms of the 
competition state, the nation in question is not displaying the expected competition 
state behaviour. Conversely we could state that any nation that spends 0% of its 
GDP on social programmes is demonstrating perfect competition state behaviour 
and as such is offered full membership of the social expenditure within a 
competition state set and a subsequent score of 1. As Ragin, Kvist, and Hudson 
and Kühner note however, such absolutes are unusual in the real world, or to 
invoke the language of the methodology, cases are often fuzzier, rather than crisp 
(Hudson and Kühner, 2009:36; 2010:169; Kvist, 2007:477; Ragin, 2000:149). 
 
In reality what fuzzy set analysis requires, is for the researcher to consider the 
thresholds or qualitative breakpoints that make sense in the context of the 
literature (Ragin, 2000:123; 2009:118). So to take the example of social 
expenditure, a researcher interested in the welfare state may build upon the work 
of Therborn and suggest that a country that is spending over 50% of its total 
outlays on social measures is a true welfare state (Therborn, cited in Pierson and 
Castles, 2006, p.234). It doesn‘t really matter whether the actual figure is 51% or 
80%; taking Therborn‘s lead 50% could be used to set the upper qualitative 
breakpoint and all nations exhibiting such expenditure levels at or above this level 
would achieve the score of one. We could also look at historical trends and argue 
that social expenditure above 30% as proportion of total outlays has always been 
maintained by the majority of welfare states and expenditure at the level is 
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necessary to maintain a welfare state. Any countries with expenditure below that 
level would consequently be assigned the score of zero. Many countries however 
would lie between these two breakpoints and here the midpoint, the score of 0.5, 
which would be assigned to any country with social expenditure at 40% of GDP, 
becomes extremely important (Kvist, 2007:478). Below such a score we can say 
that a country lies more out of a set than in and at levels above 0.5 a country can 
be viewed as more in than out of the set.  
 
To continue with the example of the welfare state, it could be suggested that 
expenditure represents only one dimension and as such, that set would be 
complemented by others, which address other facets of the welfare state, perhaps 
even contradictory elements. If for example we believed that a welfare state was 
one that had high social expenditure, high levels of decommodification, generous 
benefit levels and maybe even low levels of poverty, we could follow a similar 
process to that outlined for social expenditure to create sets for each dimension. 
At the most basic level we could then insist that to be a welfare state a nation must 
be fully in, or at least more in than out of each set. So, to be defined as the ideal 
welfare state a nation would have to exhibit scores of above 0.5 in the social 
expenditure AND the generosity AND the decommodification AND the poverty 
outcomes sets. We may, alternatively suggest that a nation, to qualify as a welfare 
state must belong to at least two of the sets and we may even suggest that one of 
these must be the decommodification set. This way there is more than one route 
to being classified as a welfare state. 
 
While setting the qualitative breakpoints and the justifications used for such points 
is a key consideration of chapter six, the example outlined above does not 
represent the limits of fuzzy set analysis.  Fuzzy set analysis is indeed even more 
nuanced than the example above is able to demonstrate, allowing the researcher 
to capture not simply different routes to the same goal, but also different goals 
themselves. Hudson and Kühner for example use fuzzy logic and Boolean algebra 
to assign nations to different ideal types within the world of welfare, drawing the 
distinction between productive elements of welfare and protective elements 
(Hudson and Kühner, 2009). Similarly, Vis builds a model that reflects traditional 
welfare policies and behaviour alongside more workfare approaches (Vis, 2007). 
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Fuzzy set analysis is extremely useful when one wishes to capture the 
multidimensional nature of a process or phenomenon (Hudson and Kühner, 
2010:177). With regards the competition state thesis, evidence presented earlier 
suggests that there may be at least two distinct competition state models. By using 
fuzzy set analysis not only can we test this finding more rigorously, we can also 
explore other manifestations of competition state that may have been masked in 
earlier research. 
 
In chapter six then, sets that reflect the important dimensions of the competition 
state thesis are constructed and Boolean algebra is used to demonstrate all 
possible combinations of the sets (Berg-Schlosser et al, 2009:8:13; Ragin, 
2000:39:71). This is tied to theoretical debates about the competition state, 
ultimately leading to the construction of ideal types. As Boolean algebra ensures 
that the number of combinations is equal to 2k, with k being the number of sets in 
the analysis (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:37), it is possible to produce more ideal 
types than there are cases, as such some ideal types can be collapsed as being 
extremely similar while others can be dismissed as not relevant to the literature, 
though this must be justified of course (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:27). 
The results of this analysis, which involves the same countries and time periods 
investigated in chapter five, offer much to support the key findings of chapter five. 
Ultimately, fuzzy-set ideal type analysis confirms that nearly all countries 
demonstrate competition state behaviour within at least one domain of the 
competition state thesis. Moreover, this almost universal adoption of the 
competition state does not imply a uniformity of competition state forms. Instead, 
as the findings of chapter five suggested, there is clear evidence of stable, 
differentiated competition state models. 
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3.3: Summary 
 
The competition state is ripe for the kind of empirical exploration to which the 
welfare state has been subject for so long. In many respects the approaches to 
comparative welfare state studies can be easily transferred, however this relies on 
meaningful operationalisation of the competition state as a measurable concept 
first. This is not a straightforward task, which must be completed successfully so 
as to ensure that any conclusions reached do indeed reflect the true nature of the 
competition state thesis.  It is important also that conclusions are reached as a 
consequence of the data and not simply the methodology and as such a multi-
method approach is desirable. 
 
The next three chapters detail linked, yet methodologically distinct investigations 
into the competition state thesis. They do not represent the only methods that can 
be used, but they do represent valid, interesting, and innovative approaches to a 
concept that has never been operationalised in such a fashion. As we will see, 
there will be much evidence provided over the next three chapters to support 
many of Cerny and Evans‘ key assertions, alongside findings that ask searching 
questions of the competition state thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Can the competition state thesis be operationalised 
and if so, what does it tell us? 
 
4.1: Introduction 
While measuring the competition state is relatively unchartered territory, this is a 
task that Cerny and Evans had indeed prepared for, deeming it both possible and 
necessary (Cerny and Evans, 1999:11). Indeed, Cerny and Evans provide 
dimensions on which they believe the competition state can be analysed. The 
goals of this ‗analytic framework‘ were limited to monitoring the British experience 
of the competition state, notably the interaction between New Labour and the 
competition state (Cerny and Evans, 1999:11). This is the first of a series of 
problems faced by those wishing to use Cerny and Evans‘ own framework as a 
tool for operationalising the competition state. The contention of the competition 
state thesis is that the competition state is a global phenomenon constructed by 
the forces of globalisation. Whether this is taken to imply some form of ‗race to the 
bottom‘ or global convergence, or conversely, that national institutions will succeed 
in filtering out the global economic pressures they face, a rigorous appraisal of the 
competition state must surely not be limited to just one country. 
When selecting appropriate countries for this study, certain issues had to be 
acknowledged: firstly, standardised data does not exist for every country in the 
world, and secondly, the competition state thesis is primarily concerned with 
advanced welfare states (see Cerny 1997; Cerny and Evans, 1999; Cerny and 
Evans, 2003). A good starting point is Esping-Andersen‘s Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990). This seminal piece of work established the paradigm within 
which contemporary comparative studies of welfare states have existed (Alcock 
and Craig, 2001:5; Arts and Gelissen, 2002:143; Gough, 1996:222; Hudson and 
Lowe, 2004:51). Esping-Andersen classified eighteen nations into regimes to 
reflect the degree to which citizens of those countries were protected from the 
commodifying pressures of the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hudson and 
Lowe, 2004:51). Esping-Andersen suggested that advanced nations could be 
categorised as belonging to one of three welfare regimes: liberal, social 
democratic, and conservative/corporatist regimes. Each regime was marked by a 
116 
 
different approach to welfare provision, equality, and social rights (Hudson and 
Lowe, 2004:51). The OECD does, however, provide the opportunity to widen the 
lens of Esping-Andersen‘s study, which has been criticised for omitting countries 
(see Bambra, 2007:1098). It would not have been worthwhile to include all OECD 
nations; countries such as Mexico and Turkey can hardly be described as mature 
welfare states. Likewise, following Castles‘, lead, Luxembourg and Iceland, two 
very small nations with ‗patchy‘ data collection (Castles, 2004:13), were also 
omitted.  
Table 4.1: Countries covered by this study 
Countries and their country codes 
Australia (AUS) Austria (AUT) 
Belgium (BEL) Canada (CAN) 
Czech Republic (CZE) Denmark (DEN) 
Finland (FIN) France (FRA) 
Germany (GER) Greece (GRE) 
Ireland (IRE) Italy (ITA) 
Japan (JAP) Korea (KOR) 
Netherlands (NED) New Zealand (NZE) 
Norway (NOR) Poland (POL) 
Portugal (POR) Slovak Republic (SLO) 
Spain (SPA) Sweden (SWE) 
Switzerland (SWI) United Kingdom (UK) 
United States of America (USA)  
 
A second issue is that the competition state has undergone an evolution; 
speculative elements of Cerny and Evans‘ early framework have changed to 
varying degrees of magnitude. The importance of pensions policy and the 
centrality of the post-welfare contracting state are more clearly pronounced in later 
works for example (compare Cerny and Evans, 1999:11:27, with Cerny and Evans 
2003:30-36). This evolution of the competition state thesis has seen stronger 
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elements of the competition state survive and be supplemented by other elements 
at the detriment of slightly less illuminating dimensions of the competition state. 
This may, of course, be a reflection of a theory that is constantly in development, 
and not a tool to insulate the competition state from empirical testing. Regardless 
of the motives however, the unfixed nature of the competition state makes it 
difficult to induce solid, fixed indicators for empirical testing of the thesis.  
 
Added to this, among stable elements of thesis that seem ideal candidates for 
operationalisation, it is possible that constructing a robust variable is difficult 
because some elements of the thesis are difficult to quantify. For example, 
‗recasting party ideology‘ is one of the dimensions highlighted by Cerny and Evans 
as providing an empirical foundation for testing the competition state (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:11). It is possible to think of the ‗recasting of party ideology‘ as a 
theoretically measurable indicator of the competition state, with some form of 
coding reflecting that a country with centre-left parties undergoing such ideological 
recasting, being a country witnessing the competition state23. Quantifying this 
however, would undoubtedly prove more complex. For example, while there is 
general agreement that in the UK, New Labour has undergone profound 
ideological change, how one would measure the scope of this is unclear24. A 
simple dichotomy of ‗undergone ideological recasting‘ on one hand and ‗not 
undergone recasting‘ on the other hand tells us very little. Furthermore, the very 
notion that parties haven‘t adjusted naturally over a fifteen to twenty year period is 
possibly naïve. Attempting to differentiate the different degrees to which a party 
has recasted its ideology would prove a subjective and ultimately arbitrary task, 
and would again tell us very little. These issues would be further complicated when 
one attempted to standardise this measure across a wide range of various nations 
to aid a meaningful comparative study. 
Operationalising the competition state is not, then, straightforward. Where 
indicators can theoretically be induced, they cannot always be quantified, where 
quantification should be possible, data may not exist, and where data is available it 
                                                          
23
 Indeed the comparative manifestos project (CMP) has a wealth of data on the ideology of political parties.  
24
 Using the CMP to assess whether Labour became a party with a ‘new’ ideology would prove complex and 
highly subjective. Moreover, this would need to be undertaken for all countries in the sample. 
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may not be applicable in the manner we had envisaged. What is necessary for a 
meaningful investigation of the competition state is a range of indicators that can 
be easily quantified, collected, and directly attached to the competition state. 
Acting on the assumption that these goals can be achieved by focusing on direct 
government action, asking what we would expect a government acting in a 
competition state to do in certain policy areas, this chapter outlines an index of the 
competition state-ness and subsequently uses this index to highlight any distinct 
patterns or clusters of competition states. In order to achieve these goals, a 
lengthy review of potential variables, and the relative importance of these variables 
to the competition state thesis, is necessary. It is to this review that we now turn. 
4.2: Constructing and index 
4.2.1: Selecting meaningful variables 
There are many dimensions to the competition state, and each dimension has a 
plethora of potential indicators. What follows is a brief discussion centred on the 
specific variables selected for inclusion in a meaningful index of the competition 
state. Each variable is introduced with a brief rationale for its inclusion, along with 
a description of what the variable measures, the dimension of the competition 
state it represents, and how we would expect a competition state to behave with 
regards to this variable. The variables vary in their level of complexity and 
subsequently some variables will require a deeper discussion than others. 
Following the lead of studies such as the recent UNICEF investigation into child 
poverty in rich countries (UNICEF, 2007), the dimensions of this index will be 
weighted equally and be comprised of the average Z-scores of the variables within 
that dimension. A brief summary of this chapter can be found in 4.2.25 
 
4.2.2: Overall welfare effort 
 
Social Expenditure 
According to Cerny, reducing expenditure is a pivotal task for the competition state 
(Cerny, 1997:259).  It is only by doing so, opines Cerny, that a state can avoid 
                                                          
25
 In this UNICEF report the authors stress that unless there is a compelling reason to do so researchers 
should resist the urge to weight aspects of the investigation. Rather, it is sensible to treat all dimensions as 
equally important (UNICEF, 2007:5). 
119 
 
‗crowding out‘ private investment.  Coupled with this is the assertion of Cerny and 
Evans, that a competition state subjugates social policy to needs of the economy, 
ultimately reneging on the traditional promises of the welfare state (Cerny, 
1997:258; Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-2).  These two statements imply that social 
expenditure should be lower in competition states than in more traditional welfare 
states.  The insistence that governments are becoming increasingly preoccupied 
with ‗prudent, balanced budgets‘ that foster competition (Eatwell, 1998:85) has 
indeed led to many assuming that we should witness a ‗global race to the bottom‘ 
in terms of social spending (Castles, 2004:221; Kennett, 2001:16-17).   
 
The practice of measuring social expenditure is well established, with both 
aggregate and disaggregate spending forming the basis to a plethora of studies 
that focus on welfare states (for example, see Bryson, 2001:70; Castles, 2004; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 2006:131). While some have suggested that a 
focus on expenditure hides much in terms of the welfare state (See Esping-
Amderson, 1990), Cochrane et al suggest that such methods allow for objective 
cross-national comparisons (Cochrane et al, 2001:9), and aid the construction of 
typologies.  Castles adds to this, by insisting that social expenditure is the most 
widely used measure of welfare effort (Castles, 2004:21).  One issue with 
analysing social expenditure is that the definitions of what constitutes social 
expenditure may differ between countries (Castles, 2004:21).  However, this data 
is successfully standardised if one utilises the OECD social expenditure database 
(SOCX) as one source of data.  The SOCX database provides a thirteen-
component measure of social expenditure (SOCX, 2007), which ensures that 
social expenditure in one country reflects the same dimensions of spending as the 
social expenditure in another country (SOCX, 2007).   
4.2.3: The post-welfare contracting state  
 
Active Labour Market Programmes 
The next dimension pertains to what Cerny and Evans call ‗the post-welfare 
contracting state‘ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:27).  Central to this is the notion that 
welfare entitlements are being replaced by schemes that favour integrating people 
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into the private sector workforce (Cerny and Evans, 1999:27).  It is hypothesised 
that competition states would make use of Active Labour Market Programmes 
(ALMP‘s) as an alternative to social assistance.  Commentators such as Clarke 
and Giddens insist that ALMP‘s facilitate a ‗shift from passive to active welfare‘ 
and shift the focus of government expenditure from unemployment benefits to 
subsidised employment or training programmes (Clarke, 2005:448; Giddens, 
1998:115; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:10). Walker and Wiseman argue in a way that 
is consonant with Cerny and Evans‘ competition state, that ALMPs in the UK, 
which are applied to all irrespective of age, gender, or reason for being in receipt 
of either social insurance or social assistance, reflect both the economic and social 
goals of the Government (Walker and Wiseman, 2003:22). In the UK then, 
perhaps the inspiration for Cerny and Evans competition state, along with all other 
competition states, we would expect to find a relatively high usage of ALMPs. 
ALMPs are, at their most basic, strategies or programmes designed to return 
unemployed people to employment. This can be direct through job creation, job 
harmonisation, or job subsidisation, or through education or training (Fay, 1996:6; 
Martin, 2000:93-98; Robinson, 2000:17; Walker and Wiseman, 2003:9). 
SOCX provides data on ALMP‘s, both as a proportion of GDP, and as a 
percentage of government expenditure and both measures will be included in the 
index.  This allows us to highlight not only which governments are spending the 
most on ALMP‘s, but also what the relative importance is of ALMP‘s within 
individual state‘s policy programmes. 
4.2.4: Traditional welfare responsibilities 
Pensions generosity ratio 
Pension policy has become an increasingly important aspect of the competition 
state.  Not only does this represent an arena where ‗government expenditure 
crowds out private investment‘ (Cerny, 1997:259), it also represents a policy arena 
in which citizens could take greater responsibility (Cerny and Evans, 2003:37). It 
should also be noted that unlike ALMP‘s, which may ultimately aid 
competitiveness, pensions expenditure represents a form of spending that cannot 
be categorised as investment in the long-term performance of the market. These 
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integral elements of the competition state (and the third way) dictate that overall 
government spending should be modest.  Indeed, Cochrane et al highlight how 
reducing pension expenditure as a proportion of GDP was an early target for New 
Labour (Cochrane et al, 2001:82-83), who sought to supplement a basic state 
pension with private second and third tier pensions. 
Once again SOCX provides data on old age spending, both as a proportion of 
GDP, and as a proportion of government expenditure.  However, this may not be 
sufficient to create a meaningful indicator of pension policy.  This is because high 
levels of spending may be artificially driven by higher numbers of older people in 
some countries, compared to lower numbers in other countries.  This is potentially 
a major problem, especially if, as many commentators contest, most advanced 
welfare states are facing a ‗demographic time-bomb‘ (Hay, 2001:206).  
 In ‗The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism‘ (1990), Esping-Andersen measures 
pension effort by looking at both the minimum and average replacement rates in a 
country, as well as taking into account the length of any necessary contributory 
periods (Esping-Andersen, 1990:54).  Castles however, utilises an altogether 
simpler method to produce what he terms a ‗welfare generosity ratio‘ (Castles, 
2004:37).  This is generated by dividing a country‘s total social expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP by the sum of the percentages of people at or above retirement 
age, and the percentage of people who are unemployed (Castles, 2004:37).  This, 
Castles argues, gives an indication of social expenditure per welfare recipient, and 
as such provides a measurement of a country‘s generosity (Castles, 2004:37).  
One obvious problem with this approach is that the unemployed and elderly are 
not the sole recipients of welfare, a point Castles himself concedes (Castles, 
2004:37).  The basic method however, is sound, and if instead of attempting to 
create a composite generosity measure, we simply divide old age spending as a 
proportion of GDP (available through SOCX), by the percentage of people who are 
at or above pensionable age (available through OECD General Indicators), this 
could be considered as a measure of old age generosity.  As stated above, we 
would expect to find low levels of generosity amongst competition states. 
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Unemployment generosity 
The notion that competition states favour more active forms of welfare, and how 
ALMP‘s are central to what Cerny and Evans label ‗the post-welfare contracting 
state‘ (Cerny and Evans, 1999:27) has already been discussed.  This empirical 
section has also highlighted how competition states seek to decrease their levels 
of overall spending.  While ALMP‘s represent attempts to increase participation in 
the workforce, there will still be many people not in employment, subsidised 
employment, education, or training.  If welfare entitlements represent what Clinton 
often referred to as a ‗carrot‘ (Clinton, 2005:271-272; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:11; 
Pierson 2006:182), low levels of passive unemployment benefits and stricter 
qualification criteria surely represent the ‗stick‘ of a more workfare approach 
(Clinton, 2005:271-272; Powell and Hewitt, 1998:11; Pierson 2006:182).  
Competition states, in trying to minimise their involvement in the labour market, 
alongside an attempt to foster a greater notion of responsibility, would not favour 
high levels of passive unemployment spending.   
 
As with the case of pension spending, a simple indicator of national expenditure is 
not particularly useful on its own.  While creating a generosity ratio is not the only 
option available (Esping-Andersen, for example, looks at replacement rates and 
qualification periods, 1990:54), it does again provide a simple yet realistic measure 
of government effort.  As with the old age generosity ratio, unemployment 
spending as a proportion of GDP is divided by the percentage of the civilian 
workforce who have found themselves unemployed (available from OECD Labour 
Force Statistics).   
Combined with our old age generosity ratio, unemployment generosity represents 
a broader welfare effort dimension to our competition state index, and as noted, 
this is a generosity we would expect to be lower amongst competition states.   
 
4.2.5: Government regulation of industry 
 
Product Market Regulation 
Another dimension to the competition state index is ‗government regulation of 
industry‘, which comprises of the variables Employment Protection Legislation 
(discussed below) and Product Market Regulation (PMR). PMR is a measure 
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compiled by the OECD, of the ―relative friendliness of regulations to market 
mechanisms‖ (Nicoletti, et al, 2000:2). This relative friendliness is measured along 
three dimensions: state ownership of business; barriers to entrepreneurship; and 
barriers to trade and investment and the aggregate PMR score reflects how easy it 
is, in a nutshell, to do business. If, as highlighted earlier, competition states are 
concerned with the risk of crowding out private enterprise, it would follow that 
competition states would also seek to ensure that business is not impeded by a 
restrictive and overly regulated market. Conway et al opine, ―regulation is perhaps 
the most pervasive form of state intervention, potentially too intrusive, possibly 
affecting productive efficiency and a corporation‘s ability to compete‖ (Conway et 
al, 2005:4). Indeed, research shows that PMR raises barriers to trade, investment, 
and even research and development (Schiantarelli, 2008:46-48). Moreover, 
Schiantarelli notes that the higher and ―faster rate of productivity growth 
associated with less stringent PMR reduces, ceteris paribus, inflationary pressure‖ 
(Schiantarelli, 2008:48). Low PMR then is directly related to the principle goal of 
the competition state, the reduction of inflation. Perhaps more stark is the simple 
assessment of Nicoletti and Scarpetta that PMR presents a barrier to both 
productivity and investment, while the contrary force or pro-competitive reforms 
towards lower PMR scores can lead to higher per capita GDP growth (Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta, 2006:83). 
 
A PMR score has been generated for a range of countries on the basis of various 
economic indicators collected by the OECD, and answers to a questionnaire. 
Despite the connotations, the questions avoid subjectivity, requiring relatively 
straightforward answers to questions across the range of domains included in the 
PMR, one example being: ―are there any National, state or provincial laws or other 
regulations that restrict the number of competitors allowed to operate a business 
[in a range of industrial sectors]?‖ (Conway et al, 2005:48)26.  This largely 
qualitative data is then converted into a quantitative ‗score‘, with a low PMR score 
                                                          
26 Other examples include: “Are there statutory or other legal limits to the number or proportion of shares 
that can be acquired by foreign investors in publicly controlled firms?” (Conway et al, 2005:52). And, “is 
there an explicit program to reduce the administrative burdens imposed by government on enterprises 
and/or citizens?” (Conway et al, 2005:45). 
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reflecting a country that has weaker regulatory barriers to business. Cerny has 
argued that the competition state has prompted the re-regulation of markets 
(Cerny, 2008:25; 2010a:7-8), turning the purpose of regulation on its head (Cerny, 
2008:3:10; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:9). As such it is important to ensure that the 
regulation in question is indeed prohibitive. Conway et al accept that regulation 
can indeed be pro-competitive and address this by ensuring that ―the indicators 
are constructed from the perspective of regulations that have the potential to 
reduce the intensity of competition in areas of the product market where 
technology and market conditions make competition viable‖ (Conway et al, 
2005:4). As lower levels of regulation imply a more open and competitive market 
(Nicoletti et al, 2000:36), we would expect competition states to exhibit low PMR 
scores. 
There is, however, one area of concern: the PMR is a composite measure of over 
fifteen indicators, ranging from: the simplification of rules, to price controls, and 
barriers to foreign ownership. As a result, this can lead to country‘s PMR scores 
masking contrary trends along certain indicators. The US for example, generally 
exhibits low levels of regulation, except in the case of tariffs on foreign goods, and 
barriers to foreign ownership (Conway et al, 2005:10) which may reflect an often 
protectionist industrial history (McGee, 1996:3-5). The overall PMR score for the 
US is subsequently raised due to slightly higher regulations on foreign ownership 
(McGee, 1996:3-5). 
Employment Protection Legislation 
A further indicator of the degree to which governments regulate business is the 
strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) within a country. EPL was 
first introduced to safeguard the welfare of workers, and was primarily concerned 
with limiting a company‘s ability to fire employees (OECD Economic Outlook, 
2004:2). Over the last twenty years however, there has been a growing debate as 
to whether EPL has a negative effect on labour market performance (OECD 
Economic Outlook, 2004:16; Nicoletti et al, 2000:54). There is a belief that EPL 
presents a particular difficulty for new industries, especially those requiring the use 
of new technologies for which the market is uncertain (OECD Economic Outlook, 
2004:20). This is particularly relevant to the competition state thesis, which 
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envisages an era of borderless states interconnected by information and 
communications technologies (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-3).  
 
The measure of EPL utilised in the index was taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook (2004), and was compiled from a plethora of indicators. It ultimately 
reflects a variety of employment issues. These issues range from how difficult it is 
to fire a person, to the use of temporary contracts in industries (Nicoletti et al, 
2000:43; Conway et al, 2005:27). A low EPL score reflects a country with a more 
lax system of employment protection, and if the implications noted above have any 
basis, a country that places fewer obstacles in the path of companies. As such, we 
would expect to find low EPL scores amongst competition states. 
4.2.6: Taxation 
 
Colin Hay invokes the writings of Adam Smith in considering the vexatious 
inquisition of taxation, noting that the proprietor of stock would, rationally, abandon 
any country that burdened him with taxation (Hay, 2001:209). For Hay, the 
competition state is underpinned by the very issue of capital mobility and 
investment (Hay, 2001:209), and if the competition state is marked by anything, it 
is the opening of economic borders, which in theory, makes such flight a 
possibility. It is Hay‘s contention that capital is much more fixed than Cerny and 
Evans would argue and as such, relatively high levels of taxation, especially on 
corporations, can be sustained by the countries that wish to do so (Hay, 
2001:212). The competition state is though, in part, a product of active policy, the 
pursuit by a neo-liberal policy elite, to chase the competitive advantage. It is 
central to the competition state as it not only directly affects business, but also is a 
key factor in building the legitimate competition state (Cerny, 2008:21), or as Lunt 
argues, instrumental in winning hearts and minds for the competition state (Lunt, 
2010). 
Average rate of income tax 
According to the competition state thesis, a government that is endeavouring to 
reduce its various forms of expenditure while at the same time favouring policies 
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that stimulate the domestic market should require a smaller financial contribution 
from its citizens. It will also undoubtedly relish a situation where the population has 
a higher disposable income. Lower taxes would reflect both the above points, and 
as such we would expect to find lower rates of tax amongst competition states. In 
the index, the tax burden of a worker earning the average weekly wage, payable to 
all forms of government, and any mandatory social security contributions is 
retrieved from the OECD Wages and Taxes (2006), and provides an accurate 
picture of the tax burden of the average worker. 
 
Top-rate of income tax 
Competition states, concerned with economic performance are less likely to 
institute a high top-rate of personal tax as this may render that state less attractive 
to entrepreneurs and established business owners. They also make use of tax 
cuts to encourage risk taking in the markets (Cerny and Evans 2000:22). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that competition states, existing in what may be 
referred to as a more liberal context, often place an emphasis on meritocracy 
(Hay, 2001:210; Hudson, 2003:283; Hudson, 2006:11), and that embedded in the 
fabric of such regimes is what Esping-Andersen terms ―traditional liberal work ethic 
norms‖ (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26). As with the average worker, competition 
states would be expected to favour a low rate of tax for the high earners, but here 
there is an added incentive, retaining the capital they possess, and increasing the 
number of potential risk takers.  
 
Data for this variable is taken from the OECD Wages and Taxes database (2006). 
It measures the top-rate tax burden of a single person, including all taxes payable 
to all forms of government, and any mandatory social security contributions. The 
top rate of tax would be expected to be lower among competition states than 
traditional welfare states. 
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Top-rate of corporate tax 
For many of the same reasons as we would expect to find lower rates of personal 
tax in competition states, we would also expect to find low rates of corporate tax. 
Indeed, in the rush to ensure that domestic markets are attractive to corporations, 
one may even expect a ‗race to the bottom‘ with regards to corporate tax rates. 
Cerny and Evans demonstrate how corporate tax has been manipulated by New 
Labour, who reduced the National Insurance contribution and rate of tax required 
from small and medium enterprises, in an attempt to encourage risk taking in the 
market (Cerny and Evans, 1999:22). Data from the OECD in figures (2005), 
provides information on the top-rate of corporate tax across the OECD, and 
includes necessary social security contributions. Once again, we would expect to 
find this at a low level amongst competition states. Table four summarises the 
dimensions, variables, and expectations involved in the creation of this index. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of the competition state index 
Dimension Variables Expectation and operation  Source 
Overall 
Welfare Effort 
Social Expenditure as 
%GDP 
Low amongst competition 
states. (Z*-1) 
OECD 
SOCX 2007 
The Post-
Welfare 
Contracting 
State 
Active Labour Market 
Expenditure as %GDP  
High amongst competition 
states. (Z*1) 
OECD 
SOCX 2007 
Active Labour Market 
Expenditure as % Total 
Expenditure 
Government 
regulation of 
industry 
Product Market 
Regulation 
Low amongst competition 
states. (Z*-1) 
OECD 
Strictness of 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
Traditional 
Welfare 
Responsibilities 
Unemployment 
Generosity 
Low amongst competition 
states. (Z*-1) 
OECD 
SOCX 2007; 
OECD 
Labour Force 
Statistics 
Old Age Generosity 
Taxation Tax Burden of Average 
Worker 
 
Low amongst competition 
states. (Z*-1) 
OECD 
Wages And 
Taxation 
2006 Top-Rate of Income 
Tax 
Top-Rate of Corporate 
Tax 
OECD in 
Figures 2005 
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4.2.7: Method of indexing  
This study adopted a methodology based on the Z-scores of different government 
actions in certain policy fields. The Z-score based approach (ZBA) is, like Esping-
Andersen‘s famous decommodification index, devised to place welfare states into 
different ideal types (Esping-Andersen, 1990), based upon deviations from the 
mean.  By using Z-scores, the ZBA is able to standardise the data, transforming it 
into a form whereby the mean becomes zero and the standard deviation becomes 
one, thus: 
 
  (Field, 2006:13) 
 
This is a useful approach, which avoids many of the problems faced by Esping-
Andersen‘s work (See Ditch, 1999:118; Pierson, 2006:174-176; Scruggs and 
Allen, 2006:1-5) and has been adopted not only in the realm of social science, but 
psychology, medicine, and business.  Z-scores are put to uses as diverse as 
compiling an international index of childhood well-being across nations (see 
UNICEF, 2007), and the compilation of university league tables (see Chauhan, 
2005).  By using a scale whereby the upper and lower limits are defined by the 
countries in the index, the ZBA reveals, ―how far a country falls above or below the 
average for the group as a whole‖ (UNICEF, 2007:7). 
 
Z-scores can be both positive and negative in nature, which reflects that a data 
point might lie above or below the mean.  Because we would expect competition 
states to produce relatively high Z-scores on some dimensions, and low Z-scores 
on other dimensions, it is necessary to transform some of the results. Z-scores for 
dimensions where we would expect competition states to score lower, will be 
multiplied by minus one (Z(-1)).  This approach is therefore called the ZBA, and 
not merely the Z-score approach.  By employing this function, a high overall ZBA 
score would be expected from competition states. 
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4.3: Findings 
 
Table 4.3 shows that Ireland and Korea score highest on the competition state 
index (ZBA), while Poland and Austria score the lowest. Ireland appears to act as 
a competition state on all five dimensions used in compiling this index, an 
achievement matched only by the UK. Interestingly, all countries display 
‗competition state behaviour‘ on at least one dimension of the index. Poland for 
example, registers a relatively high index score in the dimension of taxation, 
whereas France, Belgium, and Germany, all score high in the dimension of post-
welfare contracting state. Indeed, the post-welfare contracting state appears to be 
a dimension of the index where the countries displaying overall competition state 
behaviour, seem to be acting in a manner contrary to expectations. It is possible 
that such states, while favouring active labour market policies over unemployment 
benefits, still view any expenditure as a burden on competitiveness. 
 
Table 4.4 (p.138) shows the competition state index compiled using the ZBA. Here 
only the overall index score for each country is presented. Two broken lines have 
been used to divide the index into three groups of countries. These lines have 
been placed at seemingly ‗natural‘ divides in the data. The first group, of ‗relatively 
high scoring states‘ (RHSS) runs from Ireland with an overall score of 9.419, to the 
United States with an overall score of 1.909. 
 
A second group of ‗middling states‘ (MS) includes all of the Nordic nations, and 
runs from Sweden with an overall score of -0.029, to Spain with a score of -1.514.  
The final group, of ‗relatively low scoring states‘ (RLSS) runs from Italy with a 
score of –2.611, to Poland, with a score of –5.892. While these divisions are 
mathematically arbitrary (not unlike Esping-Andersen‘s), chart 4.1 (p.139) helps to 
illustrate the almost ‗natural‘ nature of these divides.  
 
Indeed, chart 4.1 (p.139) clearly shows two distinctive blocks of countries 
registering visually clear positive and negative scores at opposite ends of the 
index, with a ‗flatter‘ block of countries lying in the middle, scoring between –0.029 
and -1.514. 
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Table 4.3: The competition state index, shown in rank order of total score, displaying dimension 
scores, and total index score 
Country Dimension of the competition state index 
Overall 
welfare 
effort 
Post-
welfare 
contracting 
state 
Traditional 
welfare 
responsibilities 
Government 
regulation of 
industry 
Taxation Total 
Score 
Ireland 1.081781 1.316376 1.229554 1.792017 4.000032 9.41976 
Korea 3.034466 -1.74499 2.935126 -0.41678 3.177291 6.985116 
United 
Kingdom 
0.18363 -0.52917 1.530778 2.769879 0.973382 4.9285 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.613399 -1.18545 0.604971 0.680775 3.253356 3.967053 
Switzerland 0.321481 0.11987 0.020321 0.289593 2.919913 3.671178 
Australia 0.698156 -1.19251 1.447238 2.313524 -0.19001 3.0764 
New 
Zealand 
0.514355 -0.92519 0.612069 1.298723 0.946906 2.446866 
Canada 0.729819 -1.23276 1.52224 2.0523 -1.47828 1.593323 
United 
States 
0.981579 -2.47478 0.921751 3.196482 -1.43409 1.190949 
Sweden -1.8069 3.840945 -0.62265 0.045573 -1.48634 -0.02936 
Finland -0.15076 0.647501 0.322505 0.092993 -1.34016 -0.42792 
Czech 
Republic 
0.014503 -2.54996 0.163516 -0.85337 2.327931 -0.89738 
Portugal -0.20617 -0.27759 -0.04531 -2.36183 1.811779 -1.07913 
Japan 0.696804 -1.73632 0.746824 0.428779 -1.34092 -1.20484 
Denmark -1.12209 4.667521 -3.09115 1.379347 -3.15562 -1.32199 
Norway -0.67533 0.207783 0.417723 -1.01438 -0.29955 -1.36375 
Netherlands 0.226298 1.949265 -1.46334 -0.16809 -1.96703 -1.42289 
Spain 0.163358 0.770024 -0.0513 -1.97201 -0.42456 -1.51449 
Italy -0.52879 -0.16691 0.182099 -1.22827 -0.86889 -2.61077 
France -1.32442 1.85234 -0.90995 -2.20437 -0.42301 -3.00941 
Greece -0.04593 -2.28439 -0.23975 -2.2634 1.735818 -3.09766 
Belgium -0.97323 1.874175 -1.18197 -0.21441 -3.91754 -4.41298 
Germany -1.14004 2.511027 -1.22187 -0.4382 -4.15109 -4.44019 
Austria -0.90933 -0.66808 -2.30156 0.065878 -0.74172 -4.55481 
Poland -0.37665 -2.78873 -1.52785 -3.27074 2.072416 -5.89155 
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Table 4.4: Overall index scores 
Country Score 
Ireland 9.41976 
Korea 6.985116 
United Kingdom 4.9285 
Slovak Republic 3.967053 
Switzerland 3.671178 
Australia 3.0764 
New Zealand 2.446866 
Canada 1.593323 
United States 1.190949 
Sweden -0.02936 
Finland -0.42792 
Czech Republic -0.89738 
Portugal -1.07913 
Japan -1.20484 
Denmark -1.32199 
Norway -1.36375 
Netherlands -1.42289 
Spain -1.51449 
Italy -2.61077 
France -3.00941 
Greece -3.09766 
Belgium -4.41298 
Germany -4.44019 
Austria -4.55481 
Poland -5.89155 
 
While the findings of this index will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, 
it is worth highlighting at this early stage that the index is not merely an inversion 
of Esping-Andersen‘s de-commodification index. It is true that the nations Esping-
Andersen labelled as ‗liberal regimes‘ have all scored high on the index, however 
they have not retained the same order. Another point that will receive attention 
later is the fact that the states Esping-Andersen classified as ‗social democratic‘ lie 
closer to the liberal regimes in this index than they did in Esping-Andersen‘s de-
commodification index. 
 
Referring back to table 4.4, the RHSS are largely as expected, with liberal regimes 
dominating the group. What is interesting is that all of the RHSS display low levels 
of welfare effort and generosity. This point is illustrated in table 4.3, which tells us 
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that the RHSS are also states with a ‗laggardly‘ approach to welfare effort and a 
‗miserly‘ approach to generosity. 
Chart 4.1: Bar chart showing the competition state index  
 
 
This point is illustrated in table 4.5 (overleaf), which tells us that the RHSS are also 
states with a ‗laggardly‘ approach to welfare effort and a ‗miserly‘ approach to 
generosity. This is particularly interesting when we consider Cerny and Evans‘ 
assertion that competition states undermine a state‘s ability to perform its generic 
functions. If, as was suggested earlier, the most important generic function is 
providing a decent level of welfare, and such a level is related to how much the 
government spends on such measures (Castles 2004:178), it would appear that 
the RHSS below, may indeed be failing to perform their generic functions. 
 
What is also interesting is the relatively high position of the Nordic states in the 
index. Table 4.6 compares the index with Esping-Andersen‘s de-commodification 
index. This table (4.6, p.134) illustrates that the ZBA is not merely an inversion of 
Esping-Andersen‘s de-commodification index, if that were the case, a country‘s 
rank in the ZBA index would be virtually analogous to its rank in terms of 
commodification. As the third column shows, all countries except Japan either 
move up or down as we shift from the ZBA to a rank of commodification. 
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Interestingly, the ‗big movers‘ are Esping-Andersen‘s social democratic regimes 
and his conservative regimes. 
 
Table 4.5: The RHSS and their index scores in selected dimensions 
Country Overall welfare effort Traditional welfare 
responsibilities 
Ireland 1.081781 1.229554 
Korea 3.034466 2.935126 
United Kingdom 0.18363 1.530778 
Slovak Republic 0.613399 0.604971 
Switzerland 0.321481 0.020321 
Australia 0.698156 1.447238 
New Zealand 0.514355 0.612069 
Canada 0.729819 1.52224 
United States 0.981579 0.921751 
 
Table 4.6 shows how these two regimes inhabit much higher ranks in one index 
compared to the other with the social democratic regimes scoring much higher in 
the index, and the conservative regimes scoring much higher in terms of 
commodification. 
 
The high scoring by social democratic regimes on the index seems to be largely a 
consequence of the ‗post-welfare contracting state‘ dimension of the index. Table 
4.7 shows that Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway all present high 
positive scores in terms of ‗post-welfare contracting state‘.  
 
 
The raw data used to compile this index is even more illuminating here: both 
Sweden and Denmark produced raw z-scores of above 2 in the variable of 
‗spending on active labour market polices as a percentage of public expenditure‘.  
With a sample size of twenty-five, the expectation would be that only one country 
(1.25) would present a z-score above 2, as a z-score of 2 or above (either positive 
or negative) represents 5% of all z-scores in a normal distribution. Furthermore, 
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the figure of 2.49 achieved by Denmark represents a data point that we would only 
expect to find in 1% of cases (0.25 cases in this sample), as illustrated in figure 4.1 
(p.136).  
 
Table 4.6: Countries included in Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification index, ranked both 
in terms of commodification and their competition state index scores  
Index score Commodification Difference in ranks 
Ireland Australia Ireland -4 
United Kingdom USA United Kingdom -4 
Switzerland New Zealand Switzerland -10 
Australia Canada Australia +3 
New Zealand Ireland New Zealand +2 
Canada UK Canada +2 
United States Italy United States +5 
Sweden Japan Sweden -10 
Finland France Finland -2 
Japan Germany Japan +2 
Denmark Finland Denmark -5 
Norway Switzerland Norway -5 
Netherlands Austria Netherlands -2 
Italy Belgium Italy +7 
France Netherlands France +6 
Belgium Denmark Belgium +2 
Germany Norway Germany +7 
Austria Sweden Austria +5 
Spearman’s Rho coefficient of correlation = 0.591; p= 0.010 
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Table 4.7: Selected social democratic countries and their post-welfare contracting state 
dimension scores 
Social democratic countries Post-welfare contracting state 
Denmark 4.668 
Sweden 3.841 
Netherlands 1.949 
Norway 0.207 
 
This tells us that both Sweden and Denmark are spending a much higher 
percentage of their social expenditure on active labour market polices relative to 
all the other countries in this study, indeed a higher relative level than we would 
expect in such a sample. 
 
With Sweden often referred to as the most developed ‗universal welfare state‘ 
(Salonen, 2001:143), the fact that Sweden scores highly could have three possible 
implications: firstly, Cerny and Evans are correct in insisting that the competition 
state forces nations into a post-welfare contracting state; secondly, ALMP‘s may 
be a perfectly routine part of the universal welfare state; or, thirdly, what we are 
seeing are two distinct forms of the competition state - one that conforms to Cerny 
and Evans‘ low spending model and one that shifts expenditure towards more 
active social policies, while not reducing overall expenditure. 
 
It is worth noting that the Swedish use of ALMP‘s is nothing new, stretching as far 
back as the 1930‘s (Ellison, 2006:121). It is also true that the nature of these has 
shifted amongst the social democratic regimes over the past twenty years, largely 
in the face of an ‗unemployment crisis‘ (Salonen, 2001:156). The nature of this 
change is worthy of exploration because it will help to clarify which of the two 
scenarios mentioned above is most realistic. 
 
Ellison concedes that the use of ALMP‘s in the ‗Nordic Block‘ and the Netherlands 
has witnessed what he calls a ‗neo-liberal drift‘ (Ellison, 2006:117). This neo-liberal 
drift reflects EU and OECD attachment to the emerging themes of social 
responsibility and more active welfare, and has seen the Nordic Block and the 
Netherlands tighten up their historically generous ALMP‘s (Ellison, 2006:124-125). 
In the case of the Netherlands, Ellison claims this may even represent a paradigm 
shift in term of labour market policy (Ellison, 2006:115).  
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A now somewhat dated report commissioned by the Social Policy Research 
Centre at the University of New South Wales showed that throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, Swedish utilisation of ALMPs was extremely high compared to the 
other Nordic countries (Larsen, 1991:13). Moreover it argues that ALMPs are by 
their very nature a force of commodification, as indeed is any policy geared 
towards full-employment. At the time of writing, Larsen demonstrated how over 
70% of Sweden‘s policy approach was based on active measures. This stood in 
contrast to Denmark, which provided more passive support and in addition, 
generated more exit strategies for older workers (Larsen, 1991:13). Despite this 
Larsen, in his discussion of the Danish ‗Job Offer Scheme‘, highlights the fact that 
the 1990s represent an era in which the intention of the Government in Denmark 
―is to transfer resources from passive public support to active employment 
measures for all the long-term publically supported‖ (Larsen, 1991:25; see also 
Daguerre, 2004:42; and Lindsay and Mailand, 2004:196-197). Furthermore, as 
Daguerre (2007:103) and Dwyer and Ellison (2009:402) note, this refocusing of 
Danish policy reflected a shift towards what they call a more American work first 
principle. As the results of this study show however, some 12 years after Larsen‘s 
report, it seems that Denmark was successful in increasing its commitment to 
ALMPs while at the same time failing to shake off the shackles of high expenditure 
and generous public support. 
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The increasing use and strictness of ALMP‘s in these countries, should not 
however, be taken as evidence that Cerny and Evans are correct in their 
assertions regarding the post-welfare contracting state. Robinson suggests that 
ALMPs around the world representing a balance between serving as a mechanism 
to ―meet one of three objectives: the reduction of unemployment; the reduction of 
welfare expenditure or at least the cost of welfare dependency; and finally, the 
reduction of poverty‖ (Robinson, 2000:14). Moreover he argues that these 
objectives can conflict, either in an outright fashion or simply due to the unintended 
consequences of certain measures (Robinson, 2000:14).  
 
The answer lies not in exactly how much a country is spending on ALMPs or even 
whether ALMPs rather than passive measures represent a greater proportion of a 
country‘s policy approach to dealing with unemployment. The USA for example is 
preoccupied with the first of Robinson‘s ALMP objective – the reduction of 
unemployment and inactivity. As such it is increasingly making use of what Ellison 
calls ‗work first programmes‘ primarily utilised for economic reasons (Ellison, 
2006:119). The UK on the other hand, or at least Robinson argues, is pursuing all 
three objectives, attempting to tackle unemployment and reduce expenditure, 
while also endeavouring to tackle the causes and experiences of poverty 
(Robinson, 2000:14). If that is indeed the case, one would have expected to 
identify higher ALMP expenditure than was actually exhibited by the UK. 
 
With regards Sweden and the other ‗Nordic‘ countries it is clear that the twin goals 
of ALMPs are to reduce unemployment, but also to reduce income poverty 
(Calmfors, et al, 2002:4). This explains both the high ALMP expenditure and high 
passive expenditure. Furthermore, it is argued that the countries covered here are 
taking a more ‗human capital approach‘ (Alcock and Craig, 2001:156; Pierson, 
2001:442). Such human capital approaches are centred on lifelong learning, job 
creation, and tax credits for employers who employ the long term unemployed 
(Alcock and Craig, 2001:156).; Jonasson and Petterson, 2004:173).  Here, the 
emphasis is more focused on work as a means of social integration (Jonasson and 
Petterson, 2004:173), at the heart of citizenship (Ellison, 2004:120). This doesn‘t 
necessarily mean that the Nordic ALMPs are not indicators of a shift towards a 
competition state. It is a direct response to economic conditions that Denmark has 
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embarked upon a programme that makes increased use of ALMPs and even in 
Sweden, where public support is extremely generous and ALMPs are incredibly 
human capital intensive (Calmfors et al, 2002:4; Pierson, 2001:442; Salonen, 
2001:156; Sianesi, 2004:134), they are still mandatory and strict (Wood, 
2001:400). The aim of these policies, whether we look at Denmark‘s Job Offer 
scheme, the UK‘s New Deals, or even Sweden‘s historical commitment to ALMPs, 
they all have one thing in common and that is that they ultimately commodify the 
citizen. 
 
To assess then, whether a high score in the index within the dimension of ‗post-
welfare contracting state‘ alludes to a neo-liberal drift, requires an extra layer of 
depth to the data used to comprise this index. A composite measure of ALMP 
spending cannot differentiate between countries whose ALMP‘s are marked by 
human capital ideals, or work first principles.  
 
Finally, a brief mention of those states that do not favour ALMPs is pertinent. The 
relatively low post-welfare contracting state scores exhibited by the overall RHSS 
are particularly intriguing. Chart 4.2 shows that no countries exhibit scores vastly 
below the mean, and that the countries that lie between the two broken lines 
(which includes all the overall RHSS) show very little variation. As suggested 
earlier, the inclusion of states that seem to, in all other dimensions, exhibit 
‗competition state behaviour‘ runs contrary to expectations. This could possibly be 
explained if the RHSS all favour a more work first ALMP approach. If this is the 
case, and ALMP‘s are solely a tool to enforce labour market participation, 
expenditure per unemployed person on ALMP‘s could be lower in such countries. 
In the cases of the Slovak Republic, Poland, and the Czech Republic, the low 
levels of expenditure may owe more to the stage of development that their market 
economies find themselves in. Indeed research by Lubyova and van Ours (1998), 
Kluve et al (1998), and Boeri and Burda (1995), suggests that the Slovak 
Republic, Poland, and Czech Republic respectively have made increasing use of 
ALMPs. Boeri and Burda go further suggesting that the Czech ‗miracle‘ of low 
unemployment stands as testament to the efficacy of ALMPs (Boeri and Burda, 
1995:807), though a contrary assessment is offered by Lehman (1995:8). Lehman 
actually believes that ALMPs are not the correct tool to battle the levels and types 
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of unemployment faced by Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Even the Czech 
Republic (Lehman, 1995:54). He suggests that each of these markets lacks the 
structure within which ALMPs can be successful and ultimately, they will not 
reduce unemployment (Lehman, 1995:55).Wherever the truth lies, it is clear that 
expenditure does not match the rhetorical importance that is placed on ALMPs in 
these countries (Lehman, 1995:8). It is important however to consider the 
observation that these are all market economies in their infancy and much more 
may be to follow (Boeri and Burda, 1995:809; Kluve et al, 1998:3; Lubyova and 
van Ours, 1998:8). 
 
Chart 4.2. Bar chart showing countries’ post-welfare contracting state scores 
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4.4: Conclusion 
This empirical chapter opened with the question: can the competition state be 
measured?  This was not a straightforward task; the unfixed nature of the 
competition state made it difficult to construct dimensions that could be 
operationalised. This problem was at times, further compounded by a lack of 
useful, available data. 
 
Despite these obstacles, a functioning index was compiled. Nations previously 
categorised by Esping-Andersen as ‗liberal regimes‘, were relatively high scoring 
in the index, suggesting that these nations were more like competition states than 
other nations were. Two intriguing findings to emerge involved the performance of 
the social democratic regimes, as well as the performance of countries that were 
not part of Esping-Andersen‘s ‗three worlds of welfare capitalism‟ (1990). Here we 
found that largely due to their extensive use of ALMP‘s, social democratic regimes 
scored high on the index. It was considered that if it had been possible to separate 
more human capital based ALMP‘s from work-first ALMP‘s, we may have 
witnessed a different pattern. Countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 
seemed to be grouped together with the conservative regimes of France, 
Germany, and Italy, forming a group that could be called ‗continental European 
regimes‘. In this study, as with studies by Castles (2004) and Esping-Andersen 
(1990), countries that shared a similar geography or recent political history, 
generally seemed to inhabit the same groups as one another. What was 
particularly interesting was that the countries from Eastern Europe seemed to 
follow paths that were independent of one another. It might have been 
hypothesised that three bordering countries, all of which, until recently, were under 
Soviet influence, may have exhibited similar trends. It would be potentially 
worthwhile, if, data permitting, future studies included more Eastern European 
countries as this may add illumination to this hypothesis. 
 
Tasked with determining whether the competition state thesis could be 
operationalised and then measured, and what such measurement would tell us; 
this study has revealed the existence of at least two distinct forms of the 
competition state. The first, largely made up of those countries that were 
categorised by Esping-Andersen as liberal regimes, seem to conform to the 
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competition state thesis as detailed by Cerny and Evans. This is especially evident 
in terms of welfare expenditure and generosity. Even here though, this 
investigation cannot necessarily attribute these findings directly to the rise of the 
competition state. It may be possible to explain the high levels of competition 
stateness in Ireland and South Korea, two countries with extremely ‗open‘ 
economies (Chung, Jung, and Yang, 2006:125-126; Cotter, 2004:2; O‘Riain, 
2004:28) as being a direct product of the irresistible demands of the economy and 
subsequent processes of hollowing out that Cerny and Evans mention (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:26). This may not necessarily be the case with other countries that 
scored high in the index. These high scores, driven by low expenditure and 
generosity, in countries such as the UK, USA, Australia, and New Zealand may 
owe more to what Esping-Andersen calls ―traditional liberal work ethic norms‖ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990:26).  
 
As for the second type of competition state, the predominantly Nordic countries 
are marked by a conflict between seemingly generous levels of welfare 
expenditure and a propensity towards ALMP‘s. We really need to discern whether 
these ALMP‘s truly represent what Giddens calls active welfare (Giddens, 
1998:115), or whether they represent a more neo-liberal drift towards a greater 
reliance on the ‗stick‘ in more draconian ALMP‘s (Ellison, 2006:124-125). The 
answers may help us understand whether this second type of competition state 
represents an example of countries adapting to the rise of the competition state by 
moulding the competition state to fit traditional national ideals.  
 
The discovery of at least two types of competition state raises some interesting 
questions regarding the competition state thesis; for starters, does the existence of 
these two distinct competition states run contrary to the competition state thesis 
itself? This is especially salient if the ‗Nordic model‘ differs from the more 
traditional, ‗liberal model‘ largely on the basis of national, institutional action. If it 
has been possible for countries such as Sweden and Denmark to filter the effects 
of the competition state in a fashion that protects and promotes human capital, 
could this also be attempted in countries such as the UK and South Korea?  
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Is there anything that can be gleaned by looking at the countries that have scored 
lowest in the index?  Is this evidence that some forms of governance are more 
susceptible to the rise of the competition state than others? Are some forms of 
governance impervious to the competition state? Or can we surmise that as even 
in this block of countries there is some indication of competition ‗stateness‘, the 
competition state really is as pervasive as Cerny and Evans suggest?  
 
We should also not lose sight of the fact that what has been measured here is a 
country‘s competition stateness relative to other countries in this study. Yes 
Ireland is the most like a competition state in our sample and yes Poland appears 
to be least like a competition state within our sample; but can we really infer that 
this means Poland is still a welfare state and Ireland is the competition state ‗ideal 
type‘? Even if we decided Ireland was a fully fledged competition state, without 
further, deeper study, we cannot really appraise the degree to which this 
competition stateness has begun to undermine the nation state as Evans and 
Cerny suggest it does (Cerny and Evans, 2003:25). If Ireland has succumbed to 
the rise of the competition state while maintaining the ability to perform generic 
state functions, does this provide a more optimistic lens through which to view the 
competition state? 
 
As the competition state thesis outlines a dynamic, irresistible process, it may be 
that such questions cannot be satisfactorily answered until we have observed if, 
and how, a country‘s competition ‗stateness‘ has altered over time. Indeed, a 
longitudinal approach may help us to ascertain whether the ‗Nordic‘ competition 
state is not only distinct, but robust and here to stay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
Chapter 5: There and back again? Or: From competition states to 
competition state? 
5.1: Introduction 
In chapter four the competition state thesis was explored in terms of its viability for 
operationalisation. A methodology was developed to allow for an indexing of 
nations with regards to how they behaved on five dimensions of the competition 
state thesis. It was suggested that anticipated behaviour amongst competition 
states would include low expenditure on welfare, higher expenditure on active 
market labour programmes (ALMPs) signalling a shift towards a post welfare 
contacting state (PWCS), low levels of generosity in the arenas of unemployment 
and old age expenditure, low levels of government regulation of industry, and low 
levels of taxation. By measuring twenty five OECD nations against such 
expectations, the following league table of overall competition state behaviour was 
developed for the year 200227. 
Table 5.1 shows that Ireland and Poland lie at the two extremes of this league 
table, indicating that Ireland was in 2002, relative to the other countries in this 
study, the nation exhibiting the strongest competition state behaviour, while 
Poland was exhibiting the weakest competition state behaviour.  Moreover, 
seemingly ‗natural‘ divides appeared within the data suggesting that we were 
witnessing three distinct groups or clusters within the data and, consequently 
raised the question of whether three distinct approaches to, or manifestations of 
the competition state were being witnessed. Further study of the separate 
constituent elements of the index provided evidence of at least two distinct 
competition state forms, one exhibiting a fidelity to Cerny and Evans‘ traditional, 
low spend-low tax competition state model, and one driven by an active approach 
to labour market policy. The third group was ambiguous, indicating either a 
rejection of either competition state model or perhaps a competition state so infant 
that it was imperceptible. 
While the findings of this chapter were illuminating, there was one key weakness 
to the approach; the study focused on only one year. As such, we cannot 
                                                          
27
 Though the data for the government regulation of industry dimension was drawn from 2003 
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definitively state whether the two or possibly three types of competition state 
represent stable differentiated models, or rather whether the three groupings are 
merely separated by how far they have moved towards the orthodox competition 
state model. 
Table 5.1: Competition state index scores for 2002 as taken from chapter four 
Country Total score 
Ireland 9.41976 
Korea 6.985116 
United Kingdom 4.9285 
Slovak Republic 3.967053 
Switzerland 3.671178 
Australia 3.0764 
New Zealand 2.446866 
Canada 1.593323 
United States 1.190949 
Sweden -0.02936 
Finland -0.42792 
Czech Republic -0.89738 
Portugal -1.07913 
Japan -1.20484 
Denmark -1.32199 
Norway -1.36375 
Netherlands -1.42289 
Spain -1.51449 
Italy -2.61077 
France -3.00941 
Greece -3.09766 
Belgium -4.41298 
Germany -4.44019 
Austria -4.55481 
Poland -5.89155 
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This ‗snapshot‘ problem (See Bowen and Wiersema, 1999:626) is especially 
pertinent when discussing the competition state thesis as the key driver of the 
thesis is identified as globalisation, a process that is ongoing. Globalisation is 
clearly too complex to consider in terms of before and after, rather it represents a 
continuum of interconnected process that are enforced and mitigated both 
nationally and globally. Ultimately, things change. The year 2002 may be atypical; 
it may represent a moment of unique prosperity or conversely a moment of crisis. 
Given that 2002 saw countries dealing with the aftermath of 9/11 and in some 
countries, the additional financial commitment to military responsibilities, it may 
indeed represent an unusual year. 
With regards the competition state thesis, the possibility that 2002 may be an 
atypical year is not really the key problem. Rather, the fact that a snapshot cannot 
illuminate trends is the major limitation. Cerny for example accepts that 
globalisation and the competition state do allow for variant state forms, however 
insists that such variant forms can only exist while the state remains economically 
successful (Cerny, 2010a:18; Cerny and Evans, 1999:8). Ultimately however, the 
classical competition state model, that is to say the neo-liberal model, is likely to 
be the only viable state form in a global financial market (Cerny, 1997:251:264; 
2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; 2004:60). It is therefore imperative that we 
seek to answer that question: do the two or possibly three types of competition 
state represent stable differentiated models, or rather are these three groupings 
are merely separated by how far they have moved towards the orthodox 
competition state model? If we accept that one group of nations, including the 
ideal-types Ireland and Korea as well as the Antipodes, the UK and the US, do 
indeed exhibit the behaviour expected of orthodox competition states, we would 
expect in accordance with Cerny‘s views, to witness two trends develop over time: 
the first trend being that those established orthodox competition states will 
continue to exhibit high scores on the index. This reflects the fact that as Cerny 
and Evans posit, turning back the tide of globalisation and the competition state is 
extremely difficult, becoming perhaps impossible as the features, goals, and policy 
actions of the competition state become further embedded (Cerny, 1997:269; 
Cerny, 2008:34). Secondly, we would expect, or at least Cerny and Evans would 
predict, that over time, the behaviour of those nations that occupied the remaining 
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two ‗types‘ of competition state would begin to exhibit behaviour more akin to the 
orthodox competition state model (Cerny, 1997:251:264; 2008:16; Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:3:7; 2004:60; Cerny et al, 2005:21-22). 
 
This chapter seeks to build upon the snapshot of the competition state presented 
in chapter four by creating indexes for two more years (1997 and 2007) and 
charting any apparent changes. This is not straightforward however; as will be 
discussed, there are methodological issues that have to be addresses when 
comparing indexes over time. Furthermore, it is important to realise that even by 
analysing the most recent data available, the transitions towards competition 
states across the world may still be in progress and such investigations should be 
revisited in the future. 
Building on the approach adopted in chapter four, the obvious procedure for 
addressing the two hypotheses mentioned above would seem to involve simply 
replicating the investigation carried out in chapter four, at two other points in time. 
There would be some value in this; such an approach would show how countries‘ 
performance relative to one another has changed over time. It would allow us to 
chart whether Ireland, the ideal-type orthodox competition state in 2002, held that 
position in 1997 and whether it retains that position in 2007. This is interesting 
because we can seek to explain the relative changes in success over time in terms 
of policy approaches, global conditions, and domestic environments. Indeed this 
method has proven popular in both business and academia and as such, has 
impacted on government debate. While the comparison of two indexes at two 
different points in time can confirm how a country‘s performance has changed 
relative to the group of countries being measured, it cannot illuminate a discussion 
around how its performance has changed relative to its own previous results.  
 
The primary problem with comparing z-scores over time is directly related to what 
makes a z-score based index so useful when analysing just one point in time. The 
z-score is a measure of how far a country‘s behaviour, be it expenditure or a score 
that has been generated within a specific domain, falls from the mean score for all 
the countries measured on that domain. It allows the researcher to build an index 
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that ―compares apples and oranges‖ by standardising the data. However, the z-
scores, by being dependent on the mean and standard deviation of the sample or 
population, become meaningless when compared to the z-scores derived from 
another sample and by extension, a different mean and standard deviation. To 
address this issue one can continuously refer to raw data to supplement the 
indexes, thus providing some illumination with regards real changes over time. 
This is perhaps rather inelegant however and can be avoided through the use of a 
reference year within the analysis. This can be achieved through slightly different 
means. One approach is to set first years values as representing 100% and 
recording subsequent years as percentages relative to the first year (See Land et 
al, 2007:112). In this chapter however the approach of Scruggs and Allan 
(2003:33) is adopted. This allows for the comparison of indexes in a way that can 
reflect a country‘s change relative to itself as well as its standing relative to other 
countries. This is achieved by altering the equation used to calculate z-scores in 
years two and three so that: 
(Adapted from Field, 2006) 
becomes: 
 (Adapted from Field, 2006) 
In the second equation, z is calculated by ascertaining how far a country‘s 
behaviour falls above or below the year one mean. This will not only allow us to 
rank countries in order of their behaviour, but will also allow some comparison to 
previous behaviour. In this instance we can suggest that an increase in averaged 
z-score is due to an increase in raw data, which means that the country has 
exhibited a score that moves further away from the average established in year 
one. As such, a higher score for a country in years two and three does, within this 
investigation, indicate more competitive behaviour than exhibited by the same 
country in year one. 
 
While it was necessary to affect the minor alteration detailed above to the method 
of indexing, the core of the approach to operationalising the competition state has 
been maintained from chapter four.  The same sample of countries is utilised here 
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for example, as are the same dimensions of the competition state and the same 
variables used to construct these dimensions. Table 5.2 summarises the how the 
indexes are constructed for all three years.  
Table 5.2: Summary of the competition state index 
Dimension Variables Expectation Source 
Overall Welfare 
Effort 
Social Expenditure as 
%GDP 
Low amongst 
competition states 
OECD SOCX 
2010 
The Post-
Welfare 
Contracting 
State 
Active Labour Market 
Expenditure as %GDP  
High amongst 
competition states 
OECD SOCX 
2010 
Active Labour Market 
Expenditure as % Total 
Expenditure 
Government 
regulation of 
industry 
Product Market Regulation Low amongst 
competition states 
OECD SOCX 
2010 
Strictness of Employment 
Protection Legislation 
Traditional 
Welfare 
Responsibilities 
Unemployment Generosity Low amongst 
competition states 
OECD SOCX 
2010; OECD 
Labour Force 
Statistics 
Old Age Generosity 
Taxation Tax Burden of Average 
Worker 
 
Low amongst 
competition states 
OECD Wages 
And Taxation 
1998; 2006; 2010 
Top-Rate of Income Tax 
Top-Rate of Corporate 
Tax 
OECD in Figures 
2005; 2006; 2009 
 
5.2: Findings 
5.2.1: The observation of change 
Perhaps the simplest and most obvious finding is that change is indeed witnessed 
over time. This is illustrated in charts 5.1 and 5.2, which show that not only do 
countries shift in ranks over time, but that their scores are also shifting over time. 
Chart 5.1 shows that Ireland retains its position at the top of the index and as such 
cements its reputation as the leading competition state, which was established in 
chapter four. Similarly, Korea, the UK, the Antipodes are all established within the 
‗top ten‘ during 1997 and all retain those positions throughout all three years of the 
study. The United States, much lauded as the archetypal competition state falls 
from sixth position in 1997 to ninth in 2002 and tenth in 2007. At the other end of 
the scale, the bottom 6 nations remain relatively stable also. But for a brief 
incursion by Poland in 2002, this relatively corporatist block of Germany, France, 
Austria, Belgium, Italy and Greece, while shifting between one another, occupy the 
bottom spaces throughout. 
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Chart 5.1: Line chart showing changes in ranks within the competition state index over time 
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Chart 5.2: Line chart showing changes in index scores over time
28
 
 
                                                          
28
 This chart along with charts 5.8, 5.13, and 5.14 have been broken into more ‘manageable’ smaller charts and can be found in the appendix as items A.6.1-A.6.4. 
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The Nordic countries, those that appeared to make up a second type of 
competition state in chapter four, are again to be found lying between these two 
poles, that which seemed to conform to the traditional competition state approach 
and that which seemed to reject it. As mentioned however, the change in ranks 
over time only reveals so much. We can say that with the exception of a few 
countries (which will be discussed later), the overall picture is relatively static, or at 
least movement is generally contained within the three categories identified in 
chapter four. This apparent inertia however, is masking quite profound change. 
Even at the aggregate level, focusing on changes in ranks and therefore the 
relative competiveness of countries within this sample masks the fact that scores 
are changing across time in a less uniform manner. Germany, which inhabits 24th, 
23rd, and 25th place in 1997, 2002, and 2007 respectively, exhibits a score of -
0.517 in 2007, which in chapter four would have placed it amongst the second 
group of countries, ensconced between the Czech Republic and Finland, much 
closer to the neo-liberal competition states than its corporatist neighbours. Indeed, 
even here, Germany‘s 2007 score of -0.517 would have seen it rank 14th in 1997.  
 Chart 5.3: Bar chart showing total index scores in 1997 
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5.2.2: Towards the competition state? 
This shift in overall scores towards levels that were considered symptomatic of the 
competition state  in chapter four are perhaps best illustrated by a visual 
comparison of the bar charts for 1997, 2002, and 2007. Chart 5.3 shows the 
characteristic         shape produced when one creates a bar chart by plotting 
z-scores. Charts six and seven however, appear different. This is because 
countries‘ scores are calculated using the year one means and standard 
deviations and as such the characteristic shape will only hold if the data remains 
relatively close to those original means and standard deviations. As we can see 
from charts 5.4 and 5.5, only a few countries lie below the zero line. 
Chart 5.4: Bar chart showing total index scores in 2002 with 1997 as a reference year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with chapter four, chart 5.3 has been divided into three by two, red, broken 
lines. These lines have been placed between so as to divide the countries into 
blocks, one that exhibits scores over +2, one that exhibits scores below -2, and 
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one block between +2 and -2. These lines have been replicated in charts 5.4 and 
5.5. While the high scoring states still consist of nine countries (almost the same 
nine, with Canada taking the place of Norway) in 2002, only three countries have 
scores below -2. 
 Chart 5.5: Bar chart showing index scores in 2007 with 1997 as a reference year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The transition is even more marked by 2007, with chart 5.5 showing that only three 
countries exhibit overall scores below zero. Moreover, not one country has a score 
that would have seen it included in the third category of nations, those that 
seemed to be displaying behaviour contrary to the expectations of the competition 
state in 1997 here or, in chapter four. Quite simply, by 1997 standards, all 
countries can be categorised as competition states. Furthermore, both charts 5.4 
and 5.5 reveal that the no country categorised as either an ALMP driven 
competition state or a neo-liberal competition state in 1997 shifts towards the third 
category in 2002 or 2007. Indeed, while the US moves towards the periphery of 
the neo-liberal group in 2002, none of the states labelled in chapter four as 
relatively high scoring and therefore neo-liberal competition states, fall out of that 
category at any time. The second type of competition state, the ALMP driven 
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competition state also retains a degree of stability. Here we see Sweden, Norway, 
the Netherlands and Denmark maintain relatively similar scores and ranks across 
the three years (Sweden and the Netherlands actually swap positions), though the 
Netherlands is, by 2007, demonstrating scores that would have seen it classified 
as a competition state in 1997. It is also worth noting that by 2007, the second 
category of countries consists largely of those identified by Esping-Andersen as 
social democratic or corporatist; the bulk of the additions to the neo-liberal 
competition state group comes from those countries that were not part of Esping-
Andersen‘s study, such as the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Spain. 
To focus on ranks, the relative position of countries within this sample obscures 
two important trends. The first is that, if we look at chart 5.2, we can see that the 
ceiling is relatively stable, with Ireland scoring 8.29, 10.15, and 9.91 in 1997, 2002, 
and 2007 respectively. This stands in contrast to the base, where the lowest 
scores have increased from -6.30 in 1997, to -2.37 in 2002, and -0.52 in 2007. It 
could be argued that 2002 saw the limits of competition state behaviour reached, 
while also seeing overall behaviour across the countries becoming more akin to a 
competition state. In essence, while there has been no runaway in terms of 
competition state behaviour,  there has been no collapse amongst the most 
competitive in a neo-liberal sense, and there has been an abandonment of the 
third category, the category that did not appear to exhibit competition state 
behaviour. If we look at the shape of the graph, the trend is generally upward, 
though the gradient is steeper for those countries that exhibited extremely low 
scores in 1997 than those that had relatively high scores. It appears as if a 
threshold has been established and while countries are not racing to catch up with 
Ireland necessarily, they are all shifting towards a minimum level of competition 
state behaviour.  
Perhaps the most interesting cases are Poland, which seems to display erratic 
behaviour though by 2007 inhabits the previously defined neo-liberal group; the 
Czech Republic, which transitions through all three categories, coming to rest in 
the neo-liberal group by 2007; and the Slovak Republic, which consolidates it‘s 
place in the neo-liberal group over time with astonishing rise in both its league 
table position and overall points score. All of these cases, along with others, 
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deserve attention and will receive it in due course. At this stage however, if one 
were to address Cerny‘s assertion that nations would move towards the 
competition state model, specifically the neo-liberal model, they would have to, 
prima facie, concur. Indeed we can say conclusively that by the levels established 
in 1997, all countries in 2007 would be classified as competition states based on 
their overall scores. More importantly perhaps for Cerny is that the major 
transitions have been a wholesale desertion of the third, possibly un-competition 
state category on one hand, and a majority of countries moving into the neo-liberal 
competition state category. Even here however, it is worth noting that two ALMP 
driven nations, Sweden and Denmark, remain relatively static within this 
competition state type, resisting the move towards the neo-liberal model. 
5.2.3: Unpacking the index 
The problem with focusing on the overall scores is that due to the nature of 
indexes, the increased score could be due to small increases in competition state 
behaviour on all dimensions, which would result in a large overall increase. 
Conversely, the overall increase may be driven by increasing competition state 
behaviour in just one or two categories. In chapter four we saw that the second 
category was driven by high ALMP expenditure and the first driven by low welfare 
expenditure and generosity, low taxation, and low levels of government regulation. 
It is necessary therefore to look beyond the overall scores and ask whether the 
neat distinction between neo-liberal and active competition states is still present 
and meaningful. 
The first step in this process is to ask whether all countries exhibiting scores in 
2007 that would have seen them classified in 1997 as neo-liberal competition 
states are in fact conforming to expected behaviour in all dimensions of the index. 
That is to ask, are all these states low tax, ungenerous, low spend, nations free of 
onerous industrial regulation? Table 5.3 shows that those countries identified in 
chapter four as neo-liberal competition states (in black) demonstrate a relative 
stability over time and as such, fidelity to the low spend, ungenerous model 
synonymous with the neo-liberal competition state. Those countries that were not 
originally identified as neo-liberal competition states in the first instance are far 
less uniform. The Czech Republic seems to conform to the neo-liberal model on 
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both dimensions presented in table one over time. However, this conformation is 
relatively weak, especially in terms of generosity levels. The Netherlands and 
Norway are particularly interesting, playing it seems contrary games. Norway for 
example seems to conform to the neo-liberal position of ungenerous expenditure, 
while demonstrating overall welfare expenditure levels atypical of the neo-liberal 
competition state model.  
Table 5.3: RHSS and their welfare scores over time* 
Country Welfare 
Effort 
1997 
Welfare 
Effort 
2002 
Welfare 
Effort 
2007 
Welfare 
Generosity 
1997 
Welfare 
Generosity 
2002 
Welfare 
Generosity 
2007 
Ireland 1.120526 0.861173 0.721326 2.138505 1.329701 1.025516 
Slovak Republic 0.457058 0.449938 0.827102 0.406549 0.531797 1.261501 
Korea 2.841917 2.575614 2.210656 3.28996 3.23712 2.829575 
Switzerland 0.321618 0.193637 0.346706 -0.72902 -0.06066 0.595455 
United 
Kingdom 
0.260594 0.072605 0.004292 1.623785 1.618891 1.740213 
Canada 0.530117 0.552154 0.628942 1.376023 1.627621 1.917653 
New Zealand 0.125154 0.362979 0.368573 -0.10259 0.60582 1.800717 
Australia 0.700985 0.524354 0.771332 1.283314 1.549664 1.616077 
Czech Republic 0.295344 -0.07589 0.300768 0.129662 0.048203 0.512422 
United States 0.965932 0.773197 0.74082 1.326012 0.927978 1.161331 
Norway -0.24201 -0.68155 -0.03944 0.467895 0.368673 1.027731 
Poland -0.28405 -0.41932 0.094981 -0.57855 -1.92616 -0.05052 
Netherlands -0.2154 0.110067 0.082776 -1.4572 -1.67442 -0.57608 
Spain -0.02707 0.054807 -0.17166 0.115814 -0.15316 -0.02231 
*Countries in red were not classified as traditional neo-liberal competition states in chapter 
four. 
The Netherlands by contrast appears to conform to the neo-liberal competition 
state principle of low overall spending while spending more generously on 
individuals, contrary to the expectations of a neo-liberal competition state. It should 
also be noted that on the dimension of overall welfare effort, no country other than 
Korea scores over 1; even those countries such as Ireland, the UK and the 
Antipodes, which exhibit positive scores, are much more pronounced in the 
welfare generosity dimension. Here again, trends are not uniform. Korea, Ireland, 
and the USA have maintained a competition state stance in terms of generosity 
relative to other nations, but have all become slightly more generous than they 
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were in 1997.The Slovak Republic, UK, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia on the other hand, have all become less generous over time. 
It is difficult then to identify any key trends by studying those countries classified in 
2007 as being neo-liberal competition states and their welfare scores. Indeed it 
may not be appropriate to continue classifying all countries in this group as neo-
liberal competition states. Instead, category one states, for now, may be a more 
useful moniker. Within the category one nations there appears to be four crude 
groups: those that are behaving in typical neo-liberal competition state ways, with 
relatively low overall expenditure and ungenerous benefit levels. Interestingly, all 
nations classified in chapter four as being neo-liberal competition states (all the 
countries found in black in the above table) can still be considered as low spend, 
ungenerous nations. The only addition to the group highlighted in chapter four is 
perhaps the Czech Republic, which exhibits scores similar to Switzerland and as 
such deserves inclusion at the periphery of this group. The second group within 
category one consists of those countries such as Poland and the Netherlands, 
which exhibit low overall welfare expenditure and thus can be considered aligned 
with the expectations of the competition state in this respect, but do not conform to 
the ungenerous expectations of the competition state. In the third group we simply 
have Norway, which does not demonstrate competition state behaviour in terms of 
overall welfare expenditure, but do appear to be less generous with regards 
benefit expenditure per recipient and in this respect, can be considered to be 
demonstrating competition state behaviour. Finally we have Spain, which is 
included because it exhibited a high overall index score, but which does not seem 
to conform to the neo-liberal competition state approach to either welfare 
expenditure or generosity.  
Conceptually, it is interesting to consider whether the Norwegian hybrid model – 
higher overall welfare expenditure but lower levels of generosity- is more closely 
attuned to the principles of the competition state than the Dutch/Polish model, 
which sees higher levels of generosity within a lower overall welfare spend. It 
could be argued that while both models are equal in their overall economic 
compatibility with the neo-liberal competition state model, the Norwegian approach 
is perhaps closer to the ideological and rhetorical positions of the competition state 
thesis. After all, while overall expenditure is a key concern for competition states, it 
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is possible that such levels can be dictated by high levels of unemployment, an 
ageing population, and the sheer size of the administrative burden begat by the 
state. Generosity however reflects the policy approach of governments, decisions 
taken regarding how much each recipient should receive, and perhaps reflects 
ideological positions held by policy makers. Reducing overall expenditure may be 
a goal common to all nations and reflect the rise of the competition state; however 
this can theoretically be achieved in ways that do not necessarily imply the shift 
towards a competition state. The provision of ungenerous benefits and the 
decreasing generosity of such benefits over time does however suggest that 
decisions are being taken that are concordant with competition state thinking. 
Without a more detailed investigation into Norwegian benefit policy it is of course 
impossible to tell whether the decreasing generosity of welfare expenditure reflects 
rhetorical shifts towards the language of the competition state.  
 Chart 5.6: Bar chart showing overall welfare effort scores in 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can however say with certainty that even in the high scoring states identified in 
chapter four and reaffirmed here as neo-liberal competition states, overall welfare 
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effort does not seem to be as important a factor in determining overall competition 
state behaviour. Quite the contrary, with the exception of Korea, competition state 
behaviour seems more profound in terms of welfare generosity than overall 
welfare effort. Indeed, overall welfare effort scores were closer to the mean (in the 
full sample of countries in all three years of the study) than on any other dimension 
and as charts show29, did not alter much over time. 
Chart 5.7: Bar chart showing overall welfare effort scores in 2007 with 1997 as a 
reference year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see, the basic shape of both charts 5.6 and 5.9 is similar, with Korea 
appearing as the only major peak or trough. The rest of both charts are relatively 
flat, which is indicative of a lower standard deviation within the data. 
A thorough analysis of overall welfare effort and welfare generosity through table 
5.3 and charts 5.6 and 5.7 reveals a few interesting points: first, the countries 
identified in chapter four as neo-liberal competition states still appear to conform to 
                                                          
29
 Charts for 1997 and 2007 are shown, 2002 is omitted in the interests of brevity but can be found as 
appendix item A.1 
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this label in the realms of welfare effort and welfare generosity. Second, we can 
tentatively add the Czech Republic to this category. Third, with the exception of 
Spain, all countries whose overall index scores placed them in the first category, 
presumed to still be the neo-liberal competition state category, conform to neo-
liberal competition expectations on at least one of the ‗welfare‘ dimensions. Fourth, 
despite the conformation on one dimension, all additions to this first category30, 
with the exception of the Czech Republic, exhibit behaviour on at least one welfare 
dimension that is contrary to the expectations of the competition state. Fifth, while 
overall index scores are uniformly higher across all nations in 2007 than they were 
in 1997, this trend is not witnessed in the dimension of overall welfare effort, within 
which scores and as such behaviour, remains relatively static over time. Sixth, the 
data lies considerably closer to zero (the mean) in chart 5.7 than it does for any 
other dimension in 200731. From these six observations we can conclude that 
welfare effort and generosity are still determinants of neo-liberal competition state 
behaviour amongst traditional neo-liberal countries. We can also posit that while 
welfare effort and generosity are important aspects of the neo-liberal approach to 
the competition state, they are not the sole determinants of the neo-liberal 
competition state, nor are they central to the overall index scores exhibited by all 
nations in the sample, not even those that find themselves in category one in 
2007. Whereas the countries that scored high in the overall index in chapter four 
all exhibited neo-liberal competition state behaviour in the realms of welfare effort 
and generosity, the same cannot be said for all the countries that are located in 
category one in 2007 within this chapter. As such, we must consider the roles of 
other dimensions within the index and abandon the neat classification of category 
one as a neo-liberal competition state. For sure, this category does include such 
nations, however it also includes nations whose competition state status is driven 
by other dimensions of the index. 
We have seen then that to achieve a high score on the index does not necessarily 
require a conformation to the neo-liberal competition state model of welfare effort 
and generosity. This begs the question, does the second category of competition 
states, those identified in chapter four as being driven by the PWCS, appear stable 
                                                          
30
 Additions since chapter four. 
31
 Compare chart with all other charts for 2007. Those that are not included here are appended. 
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over time? If we look at Chart 5.8, which depicts the PWCS scores of countries 
over time, we can see that Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands – nations 
identified in chapter four as having an ALMP-driven competition state – all exhibit 
relatively high scores on the PWCS dimension across all three years of this study. 
Two other observations can easily be made however: these nations are not the 
only countries exhibiting high scores (especially in 1997); and secondly, all nations 
(except Belgium) see an overall reduction in their PWCS score over time. The 
overall trend and the trend for those countries that do exhibit high scores on the 
PWCS dimension are both interesting. If we focus on the overall trend, we can see 
from charts 5.9 and 5.10 that the ‗ceiling‘ decreases in each year (from 4.577 in 
1997 to 2.081 in 2007), while the basement remains at roughly the same level (-
2.568 in 1997 to -2.489 in 2007). The charts display the characteristic      shape 
indicative of a distribution with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, 
which implies a relative stability over the three time points32. 
Gradually over time however, the charts show a ‗squashing of the data towards 
zero on the positive side of zero and a stretching away from zero on the negative 
side. Put simply, the overall picture is one of a shift towards low PWCS scores, 
though not beyond the levels demonstrated by the Czech Republic in 1997.  What 
is particularly interesting is that the liberal regimes, the states that Cerny and 
Evans identify almost a priori as competition states, indeed the states around 
which the competition state thesis was constructed, do not seem to move towards 
a PWCS at any stage. In fact, as chart 5.10 shows, the United States, the home of 
the hand up not the hand out (Clarke, 2005:448; Deacon, 2000:13), exhibits 
consistently low PWCS scores, inhabiting the lowest rank in this dimension by 
2007. 
 
 
                                                          
32
 As the mean and standard deviation are taken from 1997 as a reference point, the maintenance of the 
characteristic  z-score shape within the same scale over time denotes that the data remains within the 
same range throughout the time period. Put simply, the data remains relatively stable over time and is 
similarly dispersed around the mean. 
162 
 
Chart 5.8: Line chart showing changes in PWCS over time
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  Chart 5.9: Bar chart showing PWCS scores in 1997.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Chart 5.10: Bar chart showing PWCS scores in 2007 (1997 as a reference year) 
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While the characteristic  shape is maintained over time, it is clear that it is 
becoming ‗bottom heavy‘, which of course means that the direction of change is 
away from the PWCS. This is particularly intriguing owing to the fact that Cerny 
and Evans placed the PWCS at the heart of the competition state thesis (Cerny 
and Evans, 2003:30). Indeed, Evans identifies the PWCS as a key element of the 
competition state that can and should be compared (Evans, 2010:104) and 
argues, along with Cerny, that the rise of the competition state necessitates a 
more active approach to welfare provision (Deacon, 2003:133; Evans, 2010:104). 
What we actually witness is an almost uniform ‗inactive‘ approach to labour market 
policies amongst the category one nations, which includes those identified as neo-
liberal competition states in chapter four. As chart 5.11 reveals, only the 
Netherlands and perhaps Spain from category one can be considered as 
conforming to the expectations of a competition state in the arena of the PWCS by 
2007.  
Ireland, perhaps the ideal type neo-liberal competition state and the only country 
to meet competition state expectations on all dimensions both in chapter four and 
in 1997 and 2002 here, demonstrates a rapid de-scaling of its ALMP expenditure 
and subsequent PWCS scores. It is true that Ireland saw a decrease in overall 
unemployment rates between 1997 and 2007, thus it can be argued, reducing the 
need for any labour market programmes. However, unemployment rates and 
PWCS scores show at best only a weak correlation and appear positively 
correlated at two points and negatively correlated at another33. We can accept 
then that the unemployment rate is not driving the conformation to a PWCS in 
either the neo-liberal competition states or the wider sample. 
While Ireland was classified as a neo-liberal competition state in chapter four, it 
could perhaps have also be labelled as the ‗pure‘ competition state, conforming as 
it did to the expectations of Cerny and Evans‘ competition state thesis along all 
dimensions.   
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 In 1997 Pearson’s r =0.183 while Spearman’s rho=0.282; In 2002 Pearson’s r =-0.281while Spearman’s 
rho=-0.192; in 2007 Pearson’s r = 0.015 while Spearman’s rho =0.055 
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Chart 5.11: Line chart showing PWCS scores over time for those countries classified as neo-liberal competition states in 1997 
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While its behaviour reflected many of the expectations of a neo-liberal competition 
state, Ireland also exhibited a PWCS score close to that of the Netherlands and 
greater than that of Norway. By 2007 however, Ireland‘s PWCS score, while not 
reaching the low levels demonstrated by other neo-liberal competition states, had 
abandoned the levels at which we can argue that the Irish competition state is 
driven by the PWCS.  
The PWCS in the form of ALMPs has not then become central to the neo-liberal 
competition state model during the past fifteen years. Moreover, if we look back to 
charts 5.6 and 5.7 as well as table 5.3, the ambivalence towards the PWCS has 
existed alongside relatively inertia in the realms of welfare expenditure and 
generosity. The last fifteen years have simply not seen a race to the bottom, an 
increasingly ungenerous approach to passive expenditure, or a more active 
approach to social security. That said, it is worth reminding ourselves that 
relatively low expenditure levels and ungenerous benefit expenditure had already 
been established within neo-liberal competition states as of 1997. What the data 
shows, is that these levels have not become lower or less generous, nor has a 
shift towards ALMPs been witnessed. 
If we refer to chart 5.12 (p.168) and turn our attention to those nations identified in 
chapter four as inhabiting a second ‗type‘ of competition state, one driven by 
ALMPs, we can make three key observations: first, the general direction of PWCS 
scores is negative; second, Norway appears to shift away from the active 
competition state model; and third, by 2007 it is not merely the ‗Nordic‘ nations that 
place a heavy emphasis on the PWCS. With regards the first observation, 
Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands have indeed seen a reduction in their 
PWCS scores. However, even in 2007 these countries are exhibiting scores that 
are as pronounced as the scores demonstrated by the neo-liberal competition 
states in the dimensions of welfare effort and welfare generosity. We can say with 
some confidence, that the PWCS is still an integral feature of those nations. 
Furthermore, when coupled with charts 5.8 through 5.12, we can state that these 
nations still represent a model of the competition state that is distinct from the neo-
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liberal model and driven by the PWCS34. Moreover, while there is, seemingly, a 
trend towards lower PWCS scores, there is no ‗collapse‘; scores are lower in 2007 
than they were in 1997, however they are still high relative to other nations and 
comparable to high scores demonstrated by ‗leading‘ nations in other dimensions 
of the competition state index. 
The second observation, that Norway has seen a reduction in its PWCS scores to 
such an extent that we cannot perhaps classify it as being a PWCS driven 
competition state is interesting for a couple of reasons. It should be acknowledged 
that while Norway was identified in chapter four as such a competition state, it was 
clearly on the periphery of this group. Norway registered a positive score, however 
at a level much less profound than the PWCS scores exhibited by Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden. It would appear that by 2007, Norway‘s PWCS had 
dropped beyond the level that would have seen it merited inclusion when 
discussing the distinct ALMP driven competition state model. Norway‘s case is not 
straightforward however; the reduction in PWCS score that we can witness in the 
Norwegian case is similar to the reductions observable amongst the other ‗Nordic‘ 
states. In Norway‘s case, this was sufficient to generate a score by 2007 that 
cannot really be considered as competition state-like in the arena of the PWCS. 
That is not to say that ALMP expenditure collapsed in Norway – it did not – merely 
that the behaviour moved from the periphery of this category of countries, to just 
beyond the periphery of this group.  
It should be remembered however that this reduction in PWCS score occurred 
alongside an increase in competition state behaviour with regards welfare effort 
and welfare generosity. Furthermore, while Norway‘s overall competition state 
index rank fell slightly, its score within category one, the group that includes the 
neo-liberal competition states, was consolidated over time. Furthermore, while 
Norway‘s overall competition state index rank fell slightly, its score within category 
one, the group that includes the neo-liberal competition states, was consolidated 
over time. 
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 Though as we will see, also driven in part by competition state behaviour in the arena of industrial 
regulation. 
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Chart 5.12: Line chart showing PWCS scores for selected countries over time 
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This of course begs the question: has Norway become a neo-liberal competition 
state? Answering this is complex as Cerny and Evans hypothesise that the PWCS 
is a central tenet of the neo-liberal competition state (Cerny and Evans, 2003:30). 
In this sense, Norway is simply behaving less like a competition state in the PWCS 
arena. However, if we look at the bigger picture, we can first see that overall, 
Norway is acting more like a competition state in 2007 than it was in 1997 and 
second, it would appear that the neo-liberal competition states do not make use of 
ALMPs to the extent that Cerny and Evans would expect. On the basis of the 
analysis that has been conducted thus far35, it may be useful to consider Norway 
as neo-liberal competition state rather than an ALMP driven competition state36. 
If we turn to the third observation, chart 5.12 clearly demonstrates that it is not 
simply the ‗Nordic‘ nations that exhibited high PWCS scores. In chapter four the 
focus was correctly placed on these ‗Nordic‘ nations and not others as it was 
largely the dimension of the PWCS that drove overall index scores higher in those 
nations. In countries such as France, Germany, and Belgium, ALMP expenditure 
was relatively high, however not at levels sufficient to distract from the extremely 
low scores being demonstrated overall. As such, it was not necessarily clear 
whether we could talk about these corporatist nations as competition states in any 
sense. Conversely, while a high PWCS was exhibited by Ireland, the hugely 
positive overall score achieved by Ireland blunted the impact of the PWCS. 
Moreover, the fact that Ireland conformed to competition state expectations on all 
dimensions, meant that it was not reasonable to classify its competition state as 
largely ALMP driven.   
If we look at the data for 2007, the decision not to classify Ireland as an ALMP 
driven competition state still holds, indeed is perhaps added credence. The same 
cannot necessarily be said for Belgium, France, and Germany. If we look at chart 
seven we can see that despite occupying the three lowest ranks, Belgium, France, 
and Germany all exhibit scores that would have seen them included in the second 
category of nations in 1997. The demonstration of overall behaviour that while still 
not a staggering conversion to the competition state, is closer to the levels 
demonstrated by countries such as Denmark and Sweden, opens up the 
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 i.e. before government regulation of industry scores and tax scores have been discussed. 
36
 Though obviously a much ‘weaker’ neo-liberal competition state than the UK, Ireland, and Korea. 
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possibility that it may now be pertinent to talk of the transition from 
Corporatist/Conservative regime to competition state. There are caveats of course 
and these will be addressed in due course. On a basic level however, these three 
nations, along with Spain and Finland are not only demonstrating competition state 
behaviour in terms of the PWCS, they are also no longer demonstrating overall 
behaviour that contradicts the competition state thesis. It is of course important to 
consider other explanations - and again, these will be considered in time – 
however, whereas in 1997 or in chapter four, there was almost insurmountable 
evidence that Belgium, France, and Germany were not competition states of any 
sort and as such other explanations of high ALMP expenditure had to be sought, 
by 2007 the competition state thesis seems more legitimate as an explanatory 
tool. 
The full picture will not become clear until the index is unpacked in full – perhaps 
not even then – but it is clear that the neat divisions made in chapter four have 
been complicated by taking a more longitudinal look at the competition state index. 
In chapter four we could argue with conviction, that the first group represented a 
neo-liberal competition state, the second group represented a model that could be 
considered as a competition state owing to the high scores within the PWCS 
dimension, and a third group that appeared to act contrary to the expectations of 
the competition state. It may be possible to divide the data into three arbitrary 
groups to again support such assertions. However, if we adhere to the levels 
outlined in chapter four, by 2007 we are left with only two categories. These are 
not however homogenous categories. Even before we turn to the government 
regulation and tax dimensions we can see that there is a variable approach to 
competition state behaviour within category one and two and thus it is important to 
talk of category one and two rather than neo-liberal and ALMP driven competition 
states. It is clear that these terms are still relevant, however they do not 
necessarily best describe all nations in the category they are applied to as perhaps 
they did in chapter four where we looked at only one year. It is clear that in 
category one we have neo-liberal competition states but also competition states 
that do not adhere to neo-liberal behaviour in the dimensions of welfare effort and 
generosity. Some nations in this category do exhibit high PWCS scores, which 
while we would expect this amongst neo-liberal competition states, is seemingly 
171 
 
not the case. Furthermore, while Sweden and Denmark have remained relatively 
static in terms of overall score and rank respectively, over time they have been 
joined in category two by high PWCS scoring countries such as Belgium, France, 
and Germany, but also by low PWCS scoring countries such as Greece, Italy, and 
Japan. 
At this stage we turn then to the government regulation of industry dimension. 
Here chart 5.13 (overleaf) clearly shows that the trend across all nations (except 
New Zealand) is towards higher government regulation of industry scores and 
thus, lower levels of government regulation of industry. If we recall from chapter 
four, this dimension consists of Product Market Regulation (PMR) and 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). Higher scores on this dimension denote 
lower levels of EPL and PMR and as such mean that it is easier to terminate 
employee contracts and that there are fewer regulatory burdens placed on 
industry37. What we can unambiguously observe is a move by all nations towards 
the levels demonstrated by neo-liberal nations in 1997. Indeed, by 2007 only 
France, Greece, Poland, and Portugal exhibit negative scores and even here all 
nations have increased their scores since 1997. As with overall index scores 
however, while the ‗basement‘ has risen since 1997 (from -2.977 in 1997 to -1.211 
in 2007), the ceiling has remained relatively stable (from 3.127 in 1997 to 3.809 in 
2007). It would appear that government regulation levels are converging, or at 
least there is evidence to support that assertion, but that they are not undergoing 
further relaxation beyond the levels demonstrated by neo-liberal countries in 1997.  
What is particularly interesting is that on this dimension, all neo-liberal competition 
states with the exception of Korea demonstrate higher scores than in either the 
welfare or welfare generosity dimensions. It is also here that the US behaves most 
like a competition state, scoring highest at all three time points. Given that the US 
and the UK, which also scores highly, are the nations upon which much of the 
competition state thesis is built we would perhaps expect to see them leading the 
field on more dimensions, however this is not the case. 
                                                          
37
 Cerny discusses at length the importance of pro-competitive regulation to the competition state. PMR is 
however a measure of anti-competitive, regulatory burden. 
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Chart 5.13: Line chart showing Government regulation of industry scores over time 
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Even in New Zealand, where regulation of industry scores decline over the time 
period, the score of 1.842 is not only relatively high with regards to other nations, it 
is also the second highest score achieved by New Zealand on any dimension. The 
regulation of industry can be considered then a core driver of the neo-liberal 
competition state model. More than that in fact, the regulation of industry seems to 
be a driver of the rise in index scores across the board, even in countries that still 
exhibit negative scores in 2007. Interestingly, we can see from chart 5.13 that 
much of the shift in regulation scores had occurred by 2002. In fact, we can cite 
three examples of countries demonstrating a higher score in both 2002 and 2007 
compared to 1997, but lower in 2007 than in 200238. 
If we look at Germany, by 2007 its government regulation of industry score is 
closer to that of Ireland in 1997 than itself in 1997. The same can be said for 
Austria, Italy, and Denmark. Indeed, by 2007 Denmark not only scores higher than 
Ireland did in 1997, it exhibits a score similar to those of Australia and Switzerland 
in 2007 and higher than the 2007 scores of the Slovak Republic, Korea, and New 
Zealand. Denmark cannot then be described as solely an ALMP driven 
competition state as it clearly conforms to the expectations of a competition state 
in terms of its approach to the regulation of industry. The same can be said of the 
Netherlands, which if we recall also demonstrated competition state behaviour in 
the dimension of welfare effort (albeit weak competition state behaviour), Sweden, 
Belgium, and Germany. In 1997 we could only say this of Denmark from within the 
ALMP driven competition states, whereas by 2007 the only ALMP driven 
competition state to not demonstrate competition state behaviour on the 
government regulation dimension is France. 
If we turn to the dimension of taxation however, we see that France appears to 
conform to competition state expectations by 2007, so we are left with no countries 
that can be classified as solely ALMP driven competition states. Chart 5.14 
(overleaf) shows that as with government regulation of industry scores, the overall 
trend within taxation is towards competition state behaviour.  
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 This is the case for Greece, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, the Slovak Republic, and Australia. 
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Chart 5.14: Line chart showing tax dimension scores over time 
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Once again, as with government regulation of industry, a bigger shift is witnessed 
between 1997 and 2002 than between 2002 and 2007 and as with government 
regulation of industry scores, nearly every country sees an increase from 1997 to 
2007. 
For those countries that see a reduction in score it is minimal, with New Zealand 
shrinking from 2.945 in 1997 to 2.254 in 2007 and the UK seeing a reduction from 
2.010 in 1997 to 1.955 in 2007. Both of these reductions are small and both 
nations‘ scores can still be considered as symptomatic of competition state 
approaches to taxation. Unlike government regulation of industry, which saw the 
‗basement‘ rise in terms of dimension scores while the ‗ceiling‘ remained stable, 
taxation scores see an increase in both the ‗basement‘ and the ‗ceiling‘. 
What is particularly interesting about the tax dimension is that it is an arena of the 
competition state that is synonymous with neo-liberalism (Hay, 2001:209). It holds 
that in a competition state, for both ideological and economic reasons, we would 
expect to witness lower levels of taxation. Low personal taxation is expected 
because disposable income is spent on the high street, stimulating business 
(Cerny and Evans, 1999:22). Low top rates of taxation are expected because 
those who are subject to such taxation are the risk takers and entrepreneurs who 
drive successful economies by establishing small and medium enterprises (Cerny 
and Evans 1999:22). And finally, low levels of corporate taxation are expected 
because they attract foreign investment (Hay, 2001:209). Or so the theory goes. 
However, it is worth looking at the UK and the US, both nations upon which the 
competition state thesis was constructed (Cerny and Evans, 2004:52) and both 
nations that can be considered as neo-liberal at least in terms of the rhetoric used. 
Taxation is a key issue in both of these countries (Hay, 2006:203), yet neither 
display particularly high scores on the tax dimension of the competition state 
index. The score exhibited by the US is particularly surprising given how much 
attention is paid to the issue in the media, the fact that it was at the heart of 
George W. Bush‘s 2000 election campaign (Blair, 2010;393; Bush, 2010:442-446), 
and that the US is frequently cited as a low-tax nation (Blair, 2010;393; Bush, 
2010:442-446; Cerny, 1997:272; Deacon, 2000:7) 
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Chart 5.14 shows that all nations classed as neo-liberal competition states score 
relatively high on the taxation dimension. Furthermore, for the Slovak Republic, it 
could be suggested that low levels of taxation represent the key driver of their 
overall index score. Ireland similarly demonstrates extremely high scores in both 
2002 and 2007, which is undoubtedly a product of the huge cuts to corporate tax, 
which resulted in Ireland having the lowest rate within this sample by a 
considerable distance. However, for most neo-liberal competition states, tax 
dimension scores are relatively high within the sample but generally less profound 
than those demonstrated by Korea, Ireland, and the Slovak Republic, and also 
relatively stable over time. The UK, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Norway, and 
the US, along with countries such as Austria, Italy, Finland, Japan, Spain, and 
France, none of which were classified as neo-liberal competition states in chapter 
four, all demonstrate positive scores between 0.5 and 2.5. The first group have 
held steady at these levels over time while the second group shifted from much 
lower levels between 1997 and 2002. The really big scoring group is equally 
diverse, consisting of Ireland, Korea, the Slovak Republic, and the Czech 
Republic, but also nations such as Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, and Greece.  
Low taxation scores, a key expectation of the competition state, are not neatly tied 
to previous groupings of nations based on competition state behaviour. 
Furthermore, where the core neo-liberal countries seemed to have established a 
‗ceiling‘ by 1997 in all other dimensions of the index, in the arena of taxation, this 
has been shattered, sometimes by nations that appear to conform no more than 
weakly to competition state expectations within any other dimension. Indeed in 
Greece, overall welfare expenditure is high, use of ALMPS is low, generosity is 
reasonable low, employee rights are strong, industry is heavily regulated, but 
taxation is extremely low. This seems inconsistent with either a competition state 
or welfare state approach and perhaps goes someway to explaining the collapse 
of the Greek economy (See IMF, 2010a; IMF, 2010b; Roberts, 2010). 
The lack of uniformity within the taxation scores and the seeming disparity 
between the reality of taxation within neo-liberal competition states such as the US 
and UK and the expectations is both interesting and confusing. Taxation levels do 
not seem to converge even to type, with neo-liberal, corporatist, and social 
democratic countries all demonstrating variance within their typologies. Taxation is 
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low in neo-liberal nations, but also lower in some neo-liberal nations than other. 
Moreover, it is lower in some nations not previously considered as neo-liberal than 
it is in some neo-liberal competition states. As mentioned, taxation is even lower in 
some nations that would appear to demonstrate hardly any other evidence of 
competition state behaviour than it is in core neo-liberal nations such as the US. Is 
it possible then to suggest that there is a tax driven competition state? 
It could be argued that if we discount the countries that score high on all 
dimensions, discount the neo-liberal nations and we discount also those countries 
that exhibit high scores within the PWCS dimension we are left with two categories 
of countries. The first group, consisting of Austria and Japan, do not exhibit 
particularly high tax scores. In Austria‘s case, this perhaps reflects the fact that it 
scores relatively low on the competition state index overall. The progress it makes 
over time being largely driven by small increases in each dimension score and 
moderate conformation to the expectations of a competition state in the 
dimensions of taxation and regulation of industry. Japan acts as a neo-liberal 
competition state in many regards, though as a much weaker version than most 
other neo-liberal nations and as such finds itself on the periphery of that group. No 
one dimension seems to drive its overall score, which sees Japan occupy ground 
near the middle of the table in all three years. Neither Austria nor Japan can be 
said to be particularly strong competition states on any dimension, and certainly 
not on the tax dimension. 
The second category of countries consists of Poland, Greece, and Portugal, none 
of which demonstrate strong competition state behaviour on any dimension other 
than taxation39.  We could then argue that as low levels of taxation is a core 
expectation of the competition state thesis and that as these countries actually 
register higher scores than neo-liberal countries such as the UK and US, we 
should classify these nations as low-tax competition states. It may also be that the 
Czech Republic, which conforms to competition state expectations on all 
dimensions except the PWCS, though in a weak rather than strong manner, may 
also be better described as a low-tax competition state. Alternatively we could 
suggest that the Czech Republic exists on the boundary of the neo-liberal/low tax 
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 Though by 2007 all three exhibit positive, albeit weak positive scores on one other dimension. 
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competition state models. Or, we could simply suggest that as low levels of 
taxation is an expectation of the neo-liberal competition state and as the Czech 
Republic does conform to other elements of the competition state thesis, it should 
be considered as a neo-liberal competition state, not a peripheral or weak neo-
liberal competition state. 
 
5.3: Discussion 
Classifying nations into ‗types‘ of competition state is not as straightforward as it 
appeared in chapter four. What we have seen throughout this chapter is however, 
that the overall picture seems to suggest a movement towards competition state 
behaviours amongst the nations studied. This movement is not uniform, it is not 
unambiguous, and it is certainly open to challenge. While unpacking the findings 
along the different dimensions of the competition state is important, it is necessary 
at this at this point to step back and attempt to view the complete picture. It is also 
necessary to ask: what have we discovered about the competition state? Are the 
models elucidated in chapter four stable over time? Have other models emerged? 
If we look at the competition state index as a whole, it is clear that there is a 
general movement towards more competition state behaviours. However, the 
overall growth of index scores masks a diversity of trends. For some nations the 
increase in scores is a result of an increase primarily in one dimension. For others 
we see a big increase in one dimension and small increases in other dimensions. 
Some countries simply demonstrate small increases across the board, which given 
the nature of additive indexes, results in a pronounced increase overall. 
Furthermore, those nations that were defined in chapter four as being neo-liberal 
competition state maintain that label over time, but do not seem to be becoming 
more neo-liberal. Equally, the nations that were seen as being ALMP driven, while 
maintaining high PWCS scores, are now also demonstrating competition state 
behaviour in at least one other dimension. But again, there is a lack of uniformity; 
some of these ALMP driven competition states can be classified as ALMP and tax 
driven, whereas seem to be ALMP and low regulation driven competition states. 
Even within the neo-liberal group, we have the nations with an almost even 
approach, achieving relatively high scores across the index, as well as those 
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nations that exhibit spikes of extremely high scores on one dimension. Whereas in 
chapter four we could neatly categories countries as they either seemed to not 
conform to the competition state thesis, conform to only one feature of the thesis 
(the PWCS), or conform to all but the PWCS, dividing nations here is much more 
complex. What appears to emerge are core competition state types such as the 
neo-liberal model, but also hybrid types, which combine different features of the 
competition state. 
The role of the PWCS within the competition state, especially the role of ALMPs is 
worthy of discussion. Cerny and Evans place such an approach, as part of a wider 
shift from welfare to workfare, at the heart of the competition state (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:30). The consistently low levels of ALMP expenditure amongst the 
core neo-liberal competition states might be taken to imply that active approaches 
are less central to such a model than the core goals of reducing overall spending 
and providing ungenerous benefits. We must question whether this is true though, 
as low levels of ALMP expenditure are maintained within a stable or in some 
cases burgeoning arena of welfare expenditure and generosity. Moreover, when 
the ALMP driven competition states appeared to reject other dimensions of the 
competition state thesis, it could be argued that perhaps the assumptions 
underlying the inclusion of ALMPs within the index was erroneous. However, as 
those states conform to at least one other expectation of the competition state 
thesis by 2007, it becomes harder to argue that ALMPs are not a core dimension 
of the competition state thesis or that ALMP expenditure is perhaps contrary to 
competition state expectations. A rational explanation, one which allows for the 
inclusion of ALMPs within the index but perhaps can be used to explain low ALMP 
expenditure amongst the neo-liberal competition states is not forthcoming as a 
product of the data analysis in this chapter. It could be posited that the nature of 
ALMPs is different in neo-liberal countries to those programmes utilised in the 
‗Nordic‘ nations. As we asked in chapter four: is it possible that ALMPs in neo-
liberal countries are more focused on the enforcement of job seeking, while 
ALMPs in ‗Nordic‘ nations take a more expensive, human capital intensive 
approach to ALMPs? Again, a depth is required that is not offered in the OECD 
data. 
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The real purpose of a longitudinal investigation of the competition state thesis was 
to first and foremost, avoid the problem of the ‗snapshot‘ and reflect the fact that 
the competition state thesis seeks to explain a process that is still in motion. In 
chapter four we identified two possible competition state types; by including 
additional data points it is possible to determine whether these competition state 
forms are stable over time, or whether others emerge alongside them, or even to 
replace them. And finally, charting the growth, decline, or inertia of competition 
states, it is possible to address Cerny‘s assertion that nations would not only see 
the rise of the competition state and death of the welfare state, but that we would 
witness a movement towards the neo liberal competition state model (Cerny, 
1997:251:264; 2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; 2004:60; Cerny et al, 
2005:21-22). In the first instance we can say that the neo-liberal model has 
survived, though it is possible that there may be two tiers of neo-liberal nations 
emerging. As for the more active competition state it is clear that ALMPs are still 
central to the competition states of a burgeoning group of social democratic and 
corporatist nations, but as discussed, it is also clear that is no longer the sole 
driver of the competition state in those nations. What emerges over time are 
different mixes of the competition state, with all nations conforming on one 
dimension, but none conforming on all. The complexity of such competition state 
forms is hard to decipher using the additive index that was adopted in this chapter 
and as such it may be useful to adopt a more nuanced method to categorise 
nations into competition state ‗types‘. 
Cerny made two central and linked hypotheses: that nations will undergo a 
transformation from welfare states to competition states over time, and that 
competition states once established will eventually metamorphose into neo-liberal 
competition states. These can be addressed in part, though perhaps not 
conclusively, through the analysis of the findings within this chapter, which prima 
facie, would seem to support at least Cerny‘s first hypothesis. It is clear that by the 
standards of 1997, all countries are much more compliant with the expectations of 
the competition state in 2007, than they were in 1997. It is clear also that much of 
the increase in overall scores has been driven by tax and regulation policies in 
differing combinations. These are key policy tool of the competition state and over 
a ten-year period they were universally adopted across the OECD nations 
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sampled in this study. Where there is significant levels of conformation to 
competition state expectations in the domain of taxation, it can be argued that the 
competition state form that is emerging has neo-liberal characteristics. So to that 
end, there are nations beyond those identified in chapter four, which it can be 
claimed, have shifted towards a neo-liberal competition state. Active policy that 
can be considered concordant with a competition state is being pursued and 
implemented across the sample of countries and again, to that end, it can be 
suggested that Cerny‘s first hypothesis is correct. Where the competition state 
policies relate to taxation, we can even argue that his second hypothesis is 
correct. 
However, as noted throughout, the big picture, which is extremely important, 
masks other interesting trends. To address Cerny‘s second hypothesis, while there 
has been conformation to the expectation of the competition state thesis in the 
domain of taxation, there has not been wholesale adoption of neo liberal principles 
in the arenas of welfare effort and welfare generosity. The diversity that was 
apparent within both these dimensions in both chapter four and here in 1997, is 
stable over time; some countries are relatively generous, some relatively 
ungenerous. Similarly, some nations spend relatively large sums on social 
programmes, whereas others do not. This expenditure remains reasonably stable, 
suggesting that it is determined separate from decisions made about pro-
competitive policies such as taxation and regulation.  
There are two central policy dimensions to the competition state: the 
establishment of competition state behaviours or policies, and the rolling back, 
reshaping, or abandonment of key welfare state behaviours, principles, and 
policies. The decreases in taxation levels and regulatory burdens suggest that the 
first dimension of competition state policy has been adopted and implemented 
almost universally. The stability of welfare effort and generosity – perhaps even 
the stability of ALMPs - suggest that the second dimension of competition state 
policy, the reversal of welfare policy, has not occurred. Even in the relatively high 
scoring nations such as Korea, Ireland, and the UK, we can point to evidence of 
not only stability, but also small shifts away from competition state expectations in 
at least one of either overall welfare effort or welfare generosity. Why this may be 
is not clear, though a range of possible explanations logically present themselves. 
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The first is that Cerny and Evans were simply wrong in their convictions; the 
competition state does not signal the end of the welfare state. Far from replacing 
the welfare state, it could be argued that competition state has emerged as its 
partner. This perhaps supports the second conclusion, that nations are developing 
a more competitive approach, encouraging risk taking and entrepreneurship in 
order to support the welfare state. Third, we could hypothesise that for some 
nations it has been the experience that sufficient competitive advantage has been 
achievable without retrenchment. While there may be an ideological commitment 
in such nations to the competition state model, a successful economic 
environment - manageable debt alongside reasonable growth – may have allowed 
nations to ‗have their cake and eat it‘. Perhaps this alludes to a fourth conclusion, 
that the process is not yet completed. Cerny and Evans both accept that path 
dependency, ‗sticky‘ institutions, and other domestic factors will mitigate, slow 
down, and in some instances, stymie the transition towards a competition state 
and these forces will undoubtedly be stronger where there is general economic 
success. Conversely, it may be that the pursuit of low taxation without the rolling 
back of welfare expenditure represents failed implementation of the competition 
state model, which may in turn explain economic failure in countries such as 
Greece and Ireland. Indeed, while these cases are the most pronounced, they are 
by no means the only countries responding to severe economic crises as this 
thesis is written (Balakrishnan and Berger, 2009; IMF, 2009:83; IMF, 2010c). From 
Cerny and Evans‘ point of view it could be argued that such examples of failure 
not only relate to the incomplete adoption of the neo-liberal competition state but 
perhaps also underscores the power and inevitability of the competition state. 
Finally, we could conclude, as Hacker and Pierson opine (Hacker and Pierson, 
2010:290:291-292), that the welfare state has simply become less relevant in the 
broad debate around economic success. The core function of the competition 
state - to pursue economic success – endows success on certain groups and 
elites. It may very well be that such ends can be achieved through measures that 
bypass the welfare state and in reality, welfare is an irrelevant or at least marginal 
dimension of the competition state programme. Rationally, if the entrepreneurial 
elite are reaping the rewards of the competition state without incurring the distaste 
and policy confrontation of the welfare state‘s advocates and constituents, there 
may be little motivation to engage with welfare retrenchment.  
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There is however another issue that we must not lose sight of and should temper 
any conclusions that are being drawn about the nature of the competition state. It 
is extremely important to remember that we are only referring to nations that 
appear, relative to past behaviours and/or the behaviours of other nations, to be 
acting like a competition state. We cannot definitively say that any nation is in fact 
a competition state, rather that these countries can be identified as ‗relatively high 
scoring nations‘. This means that they are acting most like a competition state 
relative to other nations on the relevant dimension (or the index overall). It does 
not necessarily mean that the nations are exhibiting competition state behaviour. 
At no stage are thresholds that mark the levels at which we should consider 
behaviour to be that of a competition state set. Indeed it is rare for such thresholds 
to be set in comparative studies of welfare states; their existence is simply 
accepted40. Likewise, in this investigation the initial decision was taken to accept 
Cerny and Evan‘s competition state thesis and it is within that context that Ireland 
is classified as the most prominent competition state. It may very well be that while 
Ireland is the most competitive nation, the most like a competition state, it is still a 
welfare state. Indeed outside the community of scholars who have engaged with 
the competition state thesis, Ireland is often referred to as a welfare state (Arts and 
Gelissen, 2002:148; Bonoli, 1997:361; Daly, 2005:152; Hudson and Kühner, 
2010:172; Korpi and Palme, 1998:670:684; see also NESC, 2005:36).  
The issue of uncertainty surrounding the levels at which we can argue a 
competition state has emerged cannot really be addressed through the utilisation 
of an additive index. This, coupled with the sheer complexity of the findings - the 
apparent emergence of different competition states, which mix competition state 
and non-competition state expectations on different dimensions - suggest that to 
truly address the basic question of whether a country has a competition state and 
if so, what type of competition state it has, requires a different approach. What we 
can say by studying additive competition state indexes over time is that there is 
much to support Cerny and Evans‘ competition state thesis. Indeed if we look at 
table 5.4 we can see that performance on the competition state index shows some 
correlation to economic success.  
                                                          
40
 Therborn does advance one principle that can be used to set a threshold. He argues that a welfare state is 
one where over 50% of total government expenditure is directed to social programmes (Therborn, cited in 
Castles, 2006:234,) 
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We can see that the weakest correlation recorded is -0.408, which is the 
Spearman‘s rho figure for the correlation between index rank position and the rank 
position of nations‘ debt levels in 1997. This tells us that the nations that are acting 
more like competition states have relatively lower levels of government debt41. 
Similarly, we witness even stronger relationships between performance on the 
competition state index and annual growth rates. Here we see, especially in 2002, 
a strong, positive relationship, which tells us that the nations that exhibit the 
highest competition state index scores also enjoy the highest level of growth.  
Table 5.4: Correlations between index scores and both government debt and growth levels 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
So, while there are key questions left to be resolved, there is much then to support 
Cerny and Evans‘ competition state thesis; the index does not contradict the 
competition state thesis, rather offers evidence that there is an overall shift 
towards more competition state behaviours over time. Moreover, such behaviours 
have links to reduced levels of debt and higher levels of growth, both key concerns 
of the competition state thesis.  
                                                          
41
 Debt measured as a percentage of GDP, ranging, in 2007, from 5.179% in Australia to 164.184% in Japan. 
   Total index score 
Year Test 1997 2002 2007 
Debt 1997 Pearson‘s 
correlation 
-0.413*  
Spearman‘s rho -0.408* 
2002 Pearson‘s 
correlation 
 -0.447*  
Spearman‘s rho -0.645* 
2007 Pearson‘s 
correlation 
 -0.472* 
Spearman‘s rho -0.679** 
Growth 1997 Pearson‘s 
correlation 
0.501*  
Spearman‘s rho 0.462* 
2002 Pearson‘s 
correlation 
 0.732**  
Spearman‘s rho 0.593** 
2007 Pearson‘s 
correlation 
 0.541** 
Spearman‘s rho 0.410* 
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5.4: Conclusion 
The previous chapter provided much of interest, but called for further exploration, 
particularly through the analysis of other time points. Here in chapter five a similar 
message can be communicated.  A workable, appropriate methodology for 
charting the competition state index over time was developed and utilised to do 
just that. This showed that there has been a shift in the ranks inhabited by 
countries over time, but that within those shifts, there is some stability. Ireland, the 
league table leader in chapter four remains in pole position across three time 
points spanning ten years. While most countries experience small shifts, these are 
relatively small, so while Germany moves upwards and downwards across the 
three time points, it stays relatively low overall. Similarly, Sweden and Denmark – 
nations that switch places in the league table – both remain within the ‗middle‘ 
block of countries. 
The methodology that was adopted however, sought and successfully managed to 
offer greater depth than simply an analysis of which countries remained or became 
more or less competition state-like relative to other nations over time. We saw that 
the overall picture was one of transition towards competition state expectations. 
We saw also that such transition was correlated to economic growth and lower 
levels of debt; in essence we saw the rise and success of the competition state. 
However, these observations, while valid, mask a complexity that is not easily 
unpicked. Alongside a transition towards overall scores in 2007, which by 1997 
standards would have defined all nations as competition states, we witnessed 
stasis in the realms of welfare expenditure and behaviours. While the rise of the 
competition state appears to have occurred at pace, the decline of the welfare 
state does not seem to have followed. 
Whilst the competition state models that seemed to crystallise in chapter four 
appear stable, it is clear that they no longer provide the only model of competition 
state, nor do the assumptions about these models fully explain the models over 
time. The neo-liberal group for example is not a uniform group of countries, 
instead consisting of those with extreme competition state behaviours as well as 
those with consistent, yet comparatively more muted competition state behaviours. 
Relative to the wider sample, all such countries appear as neo-liberal competition 
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states, however within the cluster, it is clear that there are two groups, one marked 
by extremely low social expenditure and low taxation and one group that appears 
moderately low on these dimensions42. Interestingly, those ‗extreme‘ countries 
such as Korea or the Slovak Republic represent much ‗younger‘ nations in terms 
of open democracies. Perhaps what we can see is how the competition state 
would develop free of an established welfare state, free of the burdensome 
institutions, which along with the path dependent nature of the policy process, filter 
the effects of economic globalisation (Hudson and Lowe, 2009:176:290; Pierson, 
2001:411; Wood, 2001:407).  
While the neo-liberal model holds fast, albeit with almost two divisions appearing 
within the cluster, the more ALMP driven competition state burgeons as a group. 
Even here though, the simplicity of the explanation offered in chapter four is 
replaced by a more complex situation. Where all nations that in chapter four 
appeared in this group owed their inclusion to their PWCS scores alone, by 2007 
this was no longer the case. All nations in this group conformed to competition 
state expectations on one other dimension of the index as well as the PWCS. And 
it is here that things are particularly interesting. While a snapshot of one year 
seemed to depict a world where nations were split into three groups, the traditional 
competition states, the active competition states, and the non-competition states, a 
longitudinal analysis illustrates a much more nuanced landscape. All nations have 
become more like competition states and this has largely been driven by pro-
competitive policy in the arenas of taxation and regulation of industry. However it 
has not been uniform and it possible to find evidence for almost as many 
competition state types as there are potential combinations of the competition 
state index43. It may very well be however that we can consider competition state 
behaviours exhibited by nations on different dimensions as still being part of the 
same general approach to the competition state. It could be argued that a 
relatively high score overall, with conformation on all but the welfare effort 
dimension, represents a situation that is qualitatively similar enough to one 
whereby the overall effort score is high, but the welfare generosity score is low, to 
such an extent that we can categorise both of these approaches as belonging to 
                                                          
42
 Though still relatively low compared to the full range of countries sampled. 
43
 There are 32 possible combinations (2
5
). 
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the same ‗type‘ of competition state. Conversely, we could argue that conforming 
to the expectations of the competition state in the dimensions of welfare effort and 
generosity but not on the PWCS and regulation is qualitatively different from 
conforming on the dimensions of regulation and the PWCS, but not with regards to 
welfare effort and generosity. As such these would be categorised as separate 
incarnations of the competition state. 
What this study has highlighted is that there is not only a range of different 
competition state forms that can be theorised, but also that different mixes are, in 
practice, emerging. It is clear that we cannot find evidence for all the possible 
combinations of the index as they outnumber the number of countries in the 
sample, and it is unlikely that all possible combinations are qualitatively distinct. 
However it is clear that this convergence towards a competition state masks much 
divergence to type. Cerny argues that ultimately there will be only one type of 
competition state – the neo-liberal competition state – and it is true that a study of 
three time points spanning ten years may not have captured what is possibly a 
never-ending process. However, what this investigation suggests is that this is not 
the case, diversity is actually increasing over time. This, considered alongside the 
fact that the elements of the competition state that pertain to the breakdown of the 
welfare state do not seem to have flourished as freely as those that are not directly 
related to social provision, raises yet more questions for the competition state 
thesis. 
After two methodologically separate yet linked investigations we can see much 
evidence of a shift towards the competition state. We are however left asking still, 
are there different forms of the competition state that are stable over time? 
Moreover, are we perhaps too presumptuous in accepting so readily that what we 
have found is truly evidence of the transition to the competition state? There can 
be no argument that Ireland acts more like a competition state than Germany 
does, but if we move beyond relative behaviours, is Ireland – the nation most like a 
competition state – truly a competition state? The use of additive indexes and their 
analysis over time has told us much. Indeed they tell us all some researches wish 
to know44; which country is best? Did they get better? In what ways did they get 
                                                          
44
 See UNICEF 2007 
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better? But they do not tell us everything. They do not help us set thresholds and 
allow us to say that country X is definitely a competition state whereas country Y is 
not. Further analysis needs to learn from what has been uncovered, reflect on the 
literature and finally address whether nations have moved to the point whereby the 
term welfare state is obsolete. 
The following chapter is built around a methodology that is perhaps more nuanced 
than what has been utilised to now. Importantly, the approach taken in the next 
chapter better captures the multi-dimensional nature of the competition state 
thesis. That said, for all the methodological differences between this chapter and 
the next, the fuzzy-set approach reinforces many of the core messages that have 
emerged from chapters four and five. 
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Chapter 6: A fuzzy set approach to operationalising the 
competition state, or the stable diversity of competition state 
forms 
6.1: Fuzzy set ideal-type analysis 
6.1.1: Introduction 
The previous two empirical chapters have offered much for discussion, implying 
with not inconsiderable strength, that a shift towards some form of the competition 
state has occurred during the last fifteen years.  As noted though, we can only say 
with confidence that nations are acting more like competition states than once they 
were; we cannot on the basis of what has thus far been presented, assert that any 
country has reached or moved beyond the tipping point at which the welfare state 
has been replaced by a competition state. While chapters four and five offer much 
illumination and hint at various competition state forms and trends, we are still left 
without a conclusive answer to the most basic questions: are there any countries 
that have become competition states? If so, is there more than one type of 
competition state? And finally, if different competition state forms exist, do they 
remain stable over time? 
As was noted, additive indexes are a useful and interesting approach for 
operationalising a concept such as the competition state and are commonplace in 
the arena of international and comparative research. However, there are three 
main limitations to such approaches, all of which are consequences of the reliance 
on means and standard deviations in their construction. The first problem being 
that as Hudson and Kühner highlight, the reliance on means and standard 
deviations has the propensity to ―mask important elements of cross-national 
diversity45‖ (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:36; 2010:169:170). For example, with 
regards to the type of additive index presented in chapters four and five, it is 
possible that two countries with almost opposing approaches to the competition 
state may present similar overall scores. The US and Norway may for example, 
both exhibit a similar overall score, however this fails to reflect the fact that Norway 
                                                          
45
  It should be noted that while the exact wording of this quotation is indeed taken from Hudson and 
Kühner’s work, they draw on the work of Kvist (2007), Ragin (2000), and Vis (2007) in making that 
statement. 
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scores much higher than the US in the more active arena, while the US 
significantly outscores Norway in terms of (lower) expenditure levels. Furthermore 
a high score on only one dimension may be sufficient to drive the overall score to 
a level that doesn‘t reflect that scores were extremely low in all the other 
dimensions. Herein lies the second key problem; additive indexes that rely on 
deviations from a mean such as Esping-Andersen‘s decommodification index, z-
scores indexes such as those presented in chapters four and five, and typologies 
created using cluster analysis or factor analysis, are all at risk of outlier effects 
(Ragin, 2000:167). Where outliers are extreme there is potential for results to be 
skewed to the extent that they become unreliable. Finally, as chapter five 
concluded, the z-score index - as with any method that relies on means and 
standard deviations - can be used to merely paint a picture of the relative 
behaviour of nations (Ragin, 2000:169). In chapters four and five we saw that from 
our sample of nations, Ireland and Korea exhibited the most competition state-like 
behaviour. Taken alongside the assumption or at least acceptance that the 
competition state thesis is correct, we are then moved to suggest that Ireland is 
the ideal type competition state. In reality, it may have fallen well short of 
competition state behaviour, despite appearing more like a competition state than 
any other nation. 
6.1.2: A fuzzy set approach 
In order to answer these pivotal questions it is obvious that a more nuanced 
methodology is required; one that can capture the multidimensional nature of the 
competition state and is not subject to outlier effects. Following the lead of Hudson 
and Kühner (2009), Kvist (2006; 2007), and Vis (2007), this study will turn to fuzzy 
set-deal type analysis, which can, Hudson and Kühner insist, ―overcome these 
issues‖ (Hudson and Kühner 2010:169). Briefly, fuzzy set ideal type is able to 
avoid many of the issues faced by methods such as additive indexes and cluster 
analyses in two key ways. Firstly, fuzzy-set ideal type analysis requires the 
researcher to engage with the literature, be it based on empirical studies – 
quantitative or qualitative – or not and identify the key dimensions that make up 
the phenomenon, process, or concept that is to be the focus (Berg-Schlosser et al, 
2009:9; Caramani, 2009:87; Ragin, 2000:122:161; 2009:92; Yamasaki and 
Rihoux, 2009:134). This in itself is not a departure from an index-based approach. 
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However, unlike such approaches behaviour in each dimension is analysed 
separately rather than simply feeding into an overall score. Whereas behaviour on 
individual dimensions determines the overall score of additive indexes, with fuzzy 
set ideal type analysis behaviour on an individual dimension impacts only on the 
score for that dimension (Ragin, 2000:39). This score, which will lie between 0 and 
1 can then be analysed alongside scores from other dimensions to build a more 
complete picture of how a case (in this study cases are nations) acts on the 
various, often contradictory dimensions of the concept or phenomenon46 (Berg-
Schlosser et al, 2009:8:13; Ragin, 2000:71). Within the fuzzy method, these 
dimensions are referred to as sets and it is through membership (or lack of 
membership) of these sets, that we can construct a picture of how countries may 
in reality differ even when they appear similar to one another in additive indexes 
(Ragin, 2000:167). 
Consequently, the construction of sets is perhaps the most important stage in 
fuzzy-set ideal analysis. Not only is it important that the researcher thinks carefully 
about what dimensions are important and where relevant, what variable 
represents the best proxy for that dimension, the researcher must also, from a 
position of embedded knowledge, also set the parameters within which countries 
can gain membership of a set (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:25-26; 
Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009:77; Ragin, 2000:150:318; 2009:93:118; 
Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:132).  
The role of the researcher in establishing what behaviour constitutes membership 
of a set and what constitutes a lack of membership owes its import to the very 
nature of fuzzy-set ideal type analysis and consequently its strength in negating 
the outlier problem. This is because fuzzy-set ideal type analysis fuses the 
principles of quantitative and qualitative analysis by merging quantitative values 
with qualitative descriptors (Ragin, 2000:154). For example, a set score lies 
between 0 and 1, with one representing fully in a set and zero representing fully 
out (Ragin, 2009:89). Vis, along with Hudson and Kühner cite the example 
outlined by Kvist whereby welfare states can be classed as generous or otherwise 
(See Kvist, 2007). In his study Kvist assigned countries to worlds of welfare 
                                                          
46
 How this is achieved will be discussed later 
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dependent upon whether they were generous in terms of benefit levels, whether 
these benefits were readily accessible, and whether such benefits mandated 
certain obligations on the recipients‘ part (Kvist, 2007:478). To ascertain whether a 
country‘s unemployment benefit is generous, he suggests we look at replacement 
rates. Here he argues that while we could without doubt suggest that a nation that 
replaces 100% of an unemployed person‘s previous wage could be considered as 
fully generous and thus attain a fuzzy score of one, in reality not only does that not 
happen anywhere, but lower levels (Kvist uses 90%) should still be considered 
fully generous. Similarly, while a replacement rate of 0% is most definitely fully not 
generous and merits the score of zero, so would a rate of 20%, which Kvist and 
Vis both cite as the level at which an individual is unable to maintain their standard 
of living (Kvist, 2007:478; Vis, 2007:112). What is important is that the researcher 
thinks critically about what constitutes fully in and fully out (Ragin, 2000:123; 
2009:118). This not only has the advantage of ensuring that the scores of one and 
zero are meaningful and relate to the concept one is studying, it also has the 
ability to negate outlier effects. This is because the scores of zero and one 
represent levels of sufficiency and once a country demonstrates behaviour that is 
sufficient to score one or zero, further variation is ignored (Hudson and Kühner, 
2009:36; Ragin, 2000:314; 2009:94). This way, all that is important and all that 
counts is whether a country reaches the threshold and no amount of extreme 
behaviour – high or low- can affect the overall composition of the set.  
Setting the breakpoints of one and zero in such a way as to avoid the outlier 
effects of extreme behaviour is extremely useful and for many, the generation of 
binary data represents a useful tool for analysis (See Caramani 2009 and Ragin 
2000 for a discussion of studies that have utilised Crisp-Set comparative analysis). 
However, these crisp distinctions between in and out not only hide much useless 
variation, they also hide the interesting variation that lies between zero and one. 
As first Ragin, then Kvist, Vis, and Hudson and Kühner note, the social world is 
much more complex than a series of binary conditions (Hudson and Kühner, 
2009:36; Kvist, 2007:476; Ragin, 2000:149; Vis, 2007:108). Indeed, the world is 
undoubtedly marked by nations that are not simply in or out, but also nearly out, 
nearly in, and somewhere in between, or to use Ragin‘s phrase, fuzzy rather than 
crisp. As such Fuzzy-set analysis offers a much more nuanced, arithmetic 
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approach to scoring countries‘ behaviour whilst maintaining the researcher‘s 
requirement to engage with the theoretical underpinnings of the concept (Ragin, 
2000:6). This is managed by not only including the scores of zero and one, but 
also scores that reflect what Hudson and Kühner call ―graded, partial 
memberships of sets‖ (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:37). This is achieved by 
recoding all raw data that lies above and below the theoretically derived 
breakpoints as one and zero respectively, then subtracting from each recoded 
score the lower breakpoint and dividing this result by the difference between the 
two breakpoints47 (Vis, 2007:111). This produces a continuous range of data 
between zero and one and includes the score of 0.5, which is the point at which a 
country exists at the crossover point between being more in and more out of a set. 
For many, the five descriptors outlined in table 6.1 are sufficiently descriptive for 
their needs (see). However, Ragin does offer a nine-point package of descriptors 
(see table 6.2) that can be utilised to add extra information as to the strength of 
membership. While this study does not make use of this application, it should be 
noted that the use of such descriptors can be reversed so that these qualitative 
descriptors can be used to generate scores48 (Ragin, 2000:170:265; Walton and 
Ragin, 1990:882; Zadeh, 1972:4). This is particularly useful where the researcher 
is interested in comparing both qualitative and quantitative data (Again see both 
Caramani, 2009 and Ragin, 2000 for a discussion of various studies that have 
made use of the Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Approach). 
Table 6.1: Fuzzy-set scores and descriptors Table 6.2: Fuzzy-set scores and descriptors 
Score Descriptor  Score Descriptor 
1 Fully in 1 Fully in 
0.5 <x<1 More in than out 0.83 < x <  1 Almost fully in 
0.67 < x < 0.83 Fairly in 
0.5 < x < 0.67 More or less in 
0.5 Crossover: neither in nor out 0.5 Crossover: neither in nor out 
 0<x<0.5 More out than in 0.33 < x < 0.5 More or less out 
0.17 < x < 0.33 Fairly out 
0 < x < 0.17  Almost fully out 
0 Fully out 0 Fully out 
Sources: Tables 6.1 and 6.2 were adapted from Ragin (2000:156), Hudson and Kühner 
(2009:37), and Kvist (2007:477).  
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 Fuzzy score (f)= (((x-lower breakpoint)/(upper breakpoint-lower breakpoint))) 
48
 Indeed such an approach is extremely common in uses of csQCA 
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To put the process of set construction and threshold setting in less abstract terms, 
it is useful to analyse in detail how others have constructed sets in their use of 
fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. If we explore the approach of Hudson and Kühner in 
their 2009 paper, ‗Towards Productive Welfare? A comparative study of 23 OECD 
countries‘, we can see how their Education Investment set was constructed in a 
way that was both tied to theoretical knowledge and avoided the impact of outliers. 
From a Beveridgean perspective, they suggested that a welfare state faced with 
five key policy goals (defeating the five ills of society) should, regardless of overall 
commitment to welfare, spend roughly equal shares of their budget on each of the 
five core policy areas (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:40-41). This gave them a 
breakpoint of 20%, which of course represents one fifth of a budget. For Hudson 
and Kühner this represented what they saw as the mid-point (0.5) of their 
Education Training set and combined this with an historical analysis of data to set 
their floor at 15% and ceiling at 25% (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:41). In this way, 
their breakpoints are theoretically derived. Moreover, if we look at their raw data, 
which they rather usefully make freely available, we can see that by setting their 
breakpoints thus, they avoid the potential outlier effects of Korean education 
training expenditure as a proportion of total government outlays, which stood in 
1994 at 42.72% (Hudson and Kühner, 2009b). By scoring above 25% Korea is 
rightly considered to belong to their productive Education and Training set, 
however owing to the fuzzy-set method, Korea‘s ‗extreme‘ behaviour on this 
dimension does not affect the membership scores of other countries. The raw data 
also shows that with regards to productive and protective welfare, in the arena of 
education expenditure, the OECD does indeed represent a fuzzy rather than crisp 
world with countries exhibiting scores across the full range of Ragin‘s nine-point 
descriptors (Hudson and Kühner, 2009b). 
6.1.3: From sets to combinations of sets 
The construction of sets is then, pivotal. However, as Hudson and Kühner note, 
taken in isolation these set membership scores do not reveal much (Hudson and 
Kühner, 2009:37; see also Ragin, 2000:33:122). Indeed what makes fuzzy-set 
ideal type analysis so powerful is the use of fuzzy logic – an extension of Boolean 
algebra - to combine membership of different sets in order to produce an overall 
picture of how a country behaves with regards the concept as a whole (Berg-
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Schlosser et al, 2009:8:13; Ragin, 2000:39:71). As each case has a membership 
score for each set, which is derived from its behaviour in that dimension, it is clear 
that nations may differ in the configurations of their set memberships. One nation 
for example may belong fully to all sets, while another country may belong fully to 
one set, partially to another and not at all to the remaining sets. To determine the 
configuration of these sets, fuzzy-set ideal type analysis draws on two key 
operators of Boolean logic; the principles of AND (which is represented by the 
symbol●) and NOT (Which is represented by the symbol ~) (Caramani, 2009:79; 
Ragin, 2000:174). By using these operators it is possible to outline all possible 
combinations of sets within a study. For example, table 5.3 - which is often 
referred to in fuzzy studies as a truth table (Ragin, 2009:87-89) - shows all 
possible combinations or property space (Ragin, 2000:77) for a study that includes 
two sets. 
Table 6.3: Truth table showing the property space for a two-set study 
Generous Accessible 
In In 
In Out 
Out In 
Out Out 
Table constructed through the adaptation and simplification of the property space produced 
by Kvist’s (2007) study of welfare states 
 
To ascertain how many possible combinations of sets exist, one simply needs to 
know how many sets there are. This is because the total number of combinations 
is 2k, where k is the number of sets that have been operationalised as part of the 
study (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:27; Ragin, 2000:183). Where  the total 
number of combinations in table nine is four as this is equal to 22, in more complex 
studies where four (16 combinations) or five (32 combinations) sets are being 
operationalised, the number of possible combinations can become rather 
unwieldy. Moreover, many of these combinations, while logically different, may be 
qualitatively similar. As such it is common for fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to make 
use of only a small number of sets (Caramani, 2009:27; Ragin, 2000:79). This is 
useful as it not only produces a more parsimonious model in terms of 
combinations, it also requires the researcher to think carefully about what 
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information is absolutely necessary and in turn, which dimensions are the most 
important to the concept (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:27). 
Once the property space has been defined, each case will fall into one of the 
possible combinations of sets. This requires assigning cases their membership 
scores for each set as well as scores for their lack of membership. The method for 
generating membership scores was covered earlier and it is through a simple 
operation that these scores are used to generate scores of non-membership. 
Using the negation principle one subtracts a set score from 1 to provide the score 
for membership of the NOT (~) set (Ragin, 2009:94; Vis, 2007:113). This is 
perhaps best demonstrated through an example. If we look at Vis‘ study of welfare 
and workfare states, her Conservative welfare type is marked by not being a 
member of the activation set, whilst being a member of both the generosity and 
protection sets49 (Vis, 2007:110). Whilst each case has a score for activation, they 
lack a score for belonging to the opposite set, the NOT activation set. This is 
generated by subtracting the activation score from 1, so where a case has an 
activation score of 0.2 for example, its score for NOT activation becomes 0.8. This 
negation principle, along with what is referred to as the minimum principle is used 
to generate overall ‗type‘ scores (Caramani, 2009:79; Ragin, 2000:173:189; Vis, 
2007:110). In the case of Vis‘ Conservative welfare type, a country has to 
demonstrate membership (in this case it must be more in than out and exhibit a 
score above 0.5) of the following sets: NOT activation AND generosity AND 
protection (Vis, 2007:113). Here the case will have differing scores for each set, so 
to determine the overall score for this model or type, one simply takes the lowest 
score. Therefore, if a country exhibits the following scores: ~A= 0.8; G= 0.55; and 
P= 0.9, the country‘s overall score for the Conservative welfare set will be 0.55.  
6.1.4: Linking possibilities to theory 
The final task facing the researcher before they actually collect or at least ‗fuzzify‘ 
their data is to make sense of the possible combinations produced by the fuzzy 
analysis (Ragin, 2000:123). Again, here we see another example of the fuzzy-set 
approach necessitating the researcher to engage with the literature and existing 
empirical evidence, to construct what they believe to be the ideal types they would 
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 The model being ~A●G●P 
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expect to exist (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:25-26; Cronqvist and Berg-
Schlosser, 2009:77; Ragin, 2000:150:318; 2009:93:118; Yamasaki and Rihoux, 
2009:132). Furthermore, the researcher must then consider what model 
(combination of sets) or in some cases combinations of models best describes that 
ideal type. In this respect, Vis labelled the model that saw membership of the 
activation set, membership of the generosity set, but not membership of the 
protection sets as describing a generous workfare approach to social security (Vis, 
2007:110). Similarly Hudson and Kühner suggested that four of their possible 
models represented pure ideal-types, which demonstrated the productive-
protective mixes they expected to witness amongst various nations (Hudson and 
Kühner, 2009:39). Of course with four sets, Hudson and Kühner‘s study generated 
sixteen possible models. Here they again drew on theoretical knowledge to identify 
the four important and distinctly ‗pure‘ types as well as describing the other types 
in terms of hybrids, which combine elements of their pure types but do not fully 
conform to the ‗pure‘ behaviours (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:39). At this juncture 
they also made qualitative decisions about the differences between models and 
where they felt that such difference was small or qualitatively insignificant. As such 
they labelled these differing models as belonging to the same ideal type. So for 
example, to belong to their ‗hybrid‘ ideal type, protective plus, a country could be 
best described by either model E●T●~L●B or E●T●L●~B (Hudson and Kühner, 
2009:39). Again, the decision to classify models as being demonstrative of specific 
ideal-types is one for the researcher, requiring engagement with the existing 
scholarship around the subject. Moreover, to improve the credibility of this 
process, proponents of fuzzy-set approaches strongly advise researchers to be 
transparent in their decision making (Ragin, 2009:93; Rhioux and De Meur, 
2009:43; Rihoux et al, 2009:167). Best practice, Caramani and Ragin both insist, 
involves the researcher involving the audience in, or at least informing them of, the 
debates about the rationale used for the Breakpoints they set, the types they 
construct, and the models they fit to ideal types (Caramani, 2009:87; Ragin, 
2000:125:162:190). Consequently, discussion of how fuzzy-sets are 
operationalised becomes as important as the findings they reveal, because as 
Kvist implies, the findings are only as good as the sets and models that begat 
them (Kvist, 2007:477). 
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6.2: Operationalising the fuzzy-set ideal type competition state 
6.2.1: Selecting Cases 
A small matter that Ragin insists is central to fuzzy-set analysis best practice 
(Ragin, 2000:122), but has not yet been covered in this chapter relates to the 
selection of cases. Ragin and others insist that the researcher think carefully about 
whether the cases in their study are truly comparable, offering similarity as well as 
diversity (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:20; Ragin, 2000:54-55). Evidence 
from the previous two chapters has perhaps hinted at the notion that the age of a 
democracy – how old a country is in terms of being a democracy - may have some 
role in determining what form a nation‘s competition state may take. It might be 
that younger democracies represent a considerably different group of countries to 
those with deeper democratic roots. However, every country sampled in chapters 
four and five have demonstrated sufficient significance and like-mindedness to be 
granted membership of the OECD (See Noboru, 2004:16; OECD, 2010d). As such 
we can say that regardless of a country‘s age, what unites those countries 
sampled in the first two chapters is more significant in terms of economic, social, 
and competition state policy than that which divides them and consequently, this 
same sample is used here. 
Maintaining the same sample here as in the previous approaches is useful as it 
facilitates more meaningful comparison of findings and allows for a more 
controlled appraisal of the roles played by the different methodologies in producing 
these findings. To this end it is desirable to provide as much continuation as 
possible between the two methodologies. In terms of set construction this primarily 
manifests itself in the selection of variables used. Previously this investigation has 
operationalised five dimensions of the competition state thesis, some of which are 
aggregates of two or three variables. Here the commitment to continuity must be 
balanced with fidelity to the best practice principles of fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. 
To ensure that more types are not generated than there are cases in the study, it 
is useful to reduce what was five dimensions of the competition state index to four 
sets. This of course not only ensures that the number of combinations or types 
does not exceed the number of cases, which is best avoided (Berg-Schlosser and 
De Meur, 2009:27), it also prompts the researcher to consider how best to make 
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the output more parsimonious by reducing the available property space (Ragin, 
2000:9).  
6.2.2: Selecting dimensions as sets 
It should be acknowledged that this process of dimension removal does represent 
a loss of information, which is undoubtedly a weakness of the fuzzy set method. 
To mitigate the effect of this weakness and ensure that the greater resulting 
parsimony enriches the study, the decision about which dimension should be 
removed must not be taken arbitrarily and requires justification. Making this 
decision is of course difficult; all aspects of the index were deemed important 
enough to include and by the same logic, developing a rationale for removal is not 
straightforward. It was decided that while all dimensions are important, the welfare 
expenditure and welfare generosity dimensions were perhaps qualitatively similar 
enough to merit the removal of one in favour of the other. Indeed in his 
representation of the index, Evans actually groups these two dimensions together 
(Evans, 2010:104). It is not really that the two measures are particularly similar, 
rather that they are more similar than any other two dimensions of the index. 
Moreover, these dimensions make use of the same expenditure data and as such 
it perhaps easier to justify removal of one of these dimensions as opposed to a 
dimension that makes use of separate data. 
Removal of one welfare-based dimension can then be justified for both theoretical 
and methodological reasons. However, the decision regarding which of the 
dimensions should be removed and which should survive is less clear. In reality, 
either could be included and it is difficult to justify the removal of one over the 
other. After much deliberation it was decided to operationalise welfare expenditure 
as a fuzzy set for two main reasons. As will be covered, the active set involves a 
slight adjustment to the formula used within the previous methodology and in this 
iteration is combined with unemployment data. As part of the rationale behind 
removing a welfare dimension rested on the fact that using both dimensions 
resulted in using the same core data twice, it seemed pertinent to extend this to 
the selection of which of the welfare dimensions should be removed. More 
pertinent however was the consideration of the core theoretical underpinnings of 
the competition state thesis. Here, as Ragin and others suggest, the importance of 
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establishing a constant dialogue between cases, sets, types, and theory is crucial 
(Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:14; Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009:77; 
Ragin, 2000:150:318; 2009:93:118; Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:132).  
The competition state, Cerny posits, is the successor to the welfare state because 
it is better placed to triumph in the global economy (Cerny and Evans, 2003:20; 
Evans, 2010:102). Ultimately this requires the qualitative reduction of the state 
alongside shrinkage in its overall cost (Cerny, 1997:259). In essence, while the 
competition state may have taken onboard the need to build legitimacy through 
providing opportunity (Lunt, 2010) and investment in human capital (Cerny, 
1997:271), its core objective has remained the same; the pursuit of economic 
success (Cerny, 1997:251:263). Reducing the cost of the state is central to this 
(Cerny, 1997:259) and as such, whether a nation achieves this over-arching ideal 
is perhaps more important than whether it meets its ideological commitment 
reducing generosity levels and returning citizens to work. Of course in a perfectly 
functioning competition state one would expect both conditions to be met, however 
it is clear that reducing overall expenditure is a key priority, with reducing 
generosity a key step in achieving this. Given the difficult task of choosing 
between the two dimensions, the centrality of social expenditure and the overall 
size of the welfare state to the competition state thesis is therefore used as the 
rationale for selecting this dimension and not operationalising welfare generosity 
as a fuzzy set. 
While it is not necessary to remove other dimensions, similar discussions must be 
had when operationalising each dimension as a set. That is because as part of the 
index approach, the PWCS, government regulation of industry, and the taxation 
dimensions were all composite measures. While the fuzzy set method is capable 
of utilising composite sets, such an approach weakens its ability to avoid 
compensation effects and would allow enable the masking of multidimensionality. 
As the real strength of this method is its ability to avoid such issues, building 
composite sets does not seem worthwhile. Moreover, one of the real benefits of 
fuzzy-set ideal type analysis is that the output means something in real terms. By 
setting a breakpoint for the membership of a set based upon the behaviour on one 
dimension, the researcher or any reader can understand exactly what that 
breakpoint means. For example, in Hudson and Kühner‘s (2009) study of 
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productive and protective welfare, a reader can tell that by achieving a score of 
one on the Education Training set, a country has an expenditure level in this arena 
at or above 25% as a proportion of GDP. When variables are aggregated such 
statements become more complex and their denotations become much more 
ambiguous. Take for example the arena of taxation. When constructing the 
competition state index, a composite of three variables was labelled as the tax 
dimension. Not only would it be possible for extreme behaviour on one of these 
variables to affect the overall dimension or set score, it would be difficult to set 
meaningful breakpoints. To continue with the example of taxation, a composite set 
would require breakpoints at both zero and one to be set qualitatively. Such 
breakpoints, as covered, would usually relate to a real situation, however with a 
composite set one would have to qualitatively set a breakpoint at which behaviour 
on the average of three variables is fully out or in the set. Not only is this the type 
of approach fuzzy-set ideal type analysis seeks to avoid, it is also incredibly 
messy. The averages of three measures are not meaningful to the researcher or 
reader as real numbers and it becomes extremely difficult to justify any qualitative 
breakpoint used in a composite fuzzy-set. 
Once again the fuzzy set methodology requires the researcher to engage with 
existing scholarship and allow theories to crystallise around what lies at their core 
and in turn represents the most important features. With regards taxation, all three 
variables relate to expectations of the competition states. In terms of the average 
worker, we would expect competition states to levy a smaller tax than is required 
in a more redistributive welfare state because this increases the amount of 
disposable income that can be used for the procurement of goods and service. 
Also, with fewer services to fund, the state should require less. In terms of the top-
rate of income tax, this levy impacts those in the category from which the 
entrepreneurial class is so often drawn (Cerny and Evans 1999:22). These are the 
small and medium enterprise (SME) executives and owners, whose innovation is 
crucial to the competition state (Cerny and Evans, 1999:22). And finally there is 
corporate taxation, seen as a tax on business, innovation, and trade (Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:22). All three variables represent important elements of the 
competition state thesis. However it is develop a rationale for the selection of one 
over the others. As Kvist (2007), Hudson and Kühner (2009), and Vis (2007) show, 
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such justifications need not be so definitive as to stifle debate or critique, simply 
that the researcher must have a rationale to support their given selection. In this 
study the decision was taken to operationalise corporation tax, not because of any 
deficiency with the other variables, rather because corporation tax strikes at the 
heart of the competition state‘s apparent success. If capital flight represents the 
risk Cerny and Evans opine it does (Cerny and Evans, 2003:25), corporations 
represent perhaps the key non-state players in nations‘ engagement with and 
success in the global economy. A successful economy and with it competition 
state relies on business and its willingness to host at least some of its processes 
within the national territory. In his invocation of Adam Smith, Hay notes that the 
proprietor of stock would, rationally, abandon any country that burdened him with 
taxation (Hay, 2001:209). Providing a favourable environment for business is then 
pivotal for avoiding capital flight and establishing a successful economy.  
When operationalising the PWCS as a fuzzy set, the decision to choose between 
the two measures of the same variable50 is made easier by the compelling case 
made by Vis (2007) for constructing a set that offers a little more detail. In her 
study of the shift from welfare to workfare, Vis operationalises an activation set 
that measures ALMP relative to GDP per unemployed person (Vis, 2007:111). To 
achieve this Vis multiplies each country‘s ALMP expenditure by one hundred and 
divides it by its standardised unemployment rate. This provides a measure that is 
not artificially driven by the unemployment rate as it generates a score that is 
equal to the percentage of GDP spent on ALMPs per 1% of the unemployed (Vis, 
2007:111). 
The final set to operationalise pertains to the government regulation of industry. If 
we recall, this was a composite dimension consisting of Product Market Regulation 
(PMR) and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). The former is a measure 
compiled by the OECD, of the ―relative friendliness of regulations to market 
mechanisms‖ (Nicoletti, et al, 2000:2) and for similar reasons to those mentioned 
in the discussion of corporation tax is crucial to establishing a country as a place 
industry wishes to do business. As for EPL, which is essentially a measure of how 
difficult or easy it is to fire an employee, it has been argued that strictness 
                                                          
50
 ALMP expenditure as a proportion of GDP and ALMP expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure. 
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presents a particular difficulty for new industries, especially those requiring the use 
of new technologies for which the market is uncertain (OECD Economic Outlook, 
2004:20). Both seem like useful measures this dimension represents the hardest 
to reduce to just one measure. The decision to operationalise EPL rather than 
PMR owes more to the existence of similar studies that have operationalised EPL 
as a fuzzy set than it does to its superiority as an indicator. This approach can be 
justified on two grounds: fist, as establishing the qualitative breakpoints represents 
perhaps the most profoundly subjective stage in fuzzy-set ideal type analysis 
(Ragin, 2009:93:118), it is the process that requires the keenest engagement with 
existing scholarship. Here the existing scholarship establishes a solid precedent 
for both the operationalisation of EPL and the setting of qualitative breakpoints in 
such a set (See Hudson and Kühner, 2009; Vis, 2007). Second, where EPL has 
been operationalised it has been done so in accordance with the same underlying 
principles and expectations as it is in this study, which means transfer of principles 
and breakpoints is relatively straightforward.  
While a tentative rationale for selecting and operationalising EPL has been 
advanced, it is clear that this is a subjective decision that owes as much to the fact 
that there is precedent to follow as it does to its suitability or more precisely, its 
preferability for operationalisation. Again this could be viewed as a weakness of 
the fuzzy set method or this study‘s application of it. However, following the lead of 
Ragin and others who insist that even the calibration of sets and presentation of 
results and analysis represent work in progress (Ragin, 2000:125:318), the 
omission of PMR at this stage need not see it removed from all analysis and 
discussion. Indeed, for Ragin, all researchers should engage in a process of 
refinements and sensitivity analysis to ensure that their findings and conclusions 
are robust (Ragin, 2000:318). So while the fuzzy set will be presented with EPL 
operationalised rather than PMR, the whole process will be repeated with PMR 
operationalised. While this second approach will not be presented in full, data will 
be appended and a brief discussion of the differences and similarities between the 
two approaches will be presented alongside the main findings. 
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6.2.3: Calibrating competition state fuzzy sets 
Having established exactly which dimensions and variables are to be 
operationalised as fuzzy sets, the next stage is to decide how these will be 
calibrated. This involves establishing a rationale for setting the qualitative 
breakpoints of zero and one. Following the examples of Vis (2007) and Hudson 
and Kühner (2009), the crossover point will be set arithmetically and not 
subjectively as Ragin demonstrates is possible (Ragin, 2009:91-92). 
The first set to be calibrated is the minimal welfare set, which uses data on social 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP. An important observation must first be made 
pertaining to the direction of the data. As Ragin suggest, best practice requires the 
score of zero to be consistently applied to cases that fall out of the set and the 
score of one to be applied to countries that are fully in the set. As a higher welfare 
expenditure runs contrary to the expectation of the competition state it is 
necessary to invert the scores that are generated so that the score of one does 
represent inclusion in the minimal welfare set of the competition state. As this set 
has not been operationalised before, at least not in this way51, there is no 
precedent to follow in terms of choosing the breakpoints. The method used to set 
these breakpoints does however follow the general approach of Hudson and 
Kühner in the calibration of their Education Training set. Here they utilised an 
historical analysis of behaviours and trends and in accordance with Ragin 
(2000:292) consulted the data itself and the standard deviation found within 
(Hudson and Kühner, 2009:39). This process was undertaken in dialogue with 
both the data and existing scholarship in order to establish meaningful 
breakpoints. Similarly, the calibration of the minimal welfare set in this study owes 
much to an historical analysis of data, which shows that those countries often 
referred to as generous or as having a big state have maintained spending levels 
as a proportion of GDP over 25% for the last thirty years, while average 
expenditure has held steady at close to 20% (OECD, 2010). This score of 25% is 
taken as the first qualitative breakpoint of zero or fully out of the minimal welfare 
set. It would be possible to set the second breakpoint at 15%, which represents a 
stable floor to the data, but this would simply replicate the problem of membership 
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 Welfare state generosity has been operationalised before (see). 
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of the set being relative rather than qualitatively driven. Instead, a tougher 
threshold is set at 10%, which ensures that there can be little ambiguity 
surrounding those countries that score one and are accordingly considered full 
members of the set. The point at which a country would be more in the set than 
out, the 0.5 level, would therefore be set at 17.5%. While setting the breakpoint at 
10% may seem rather low, a country can still score higher than the historical data-
floor52. Moreover, adhering to a ‗stringency principle‘ and setting such a breakpoint 
helps avoid errors akin to type one errors in statistical analysis; accepting that a 
condition is happening when it is not (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:163). To reduce 
the possibility that this may happen a more stringent breakpoint is subsequently 
established. Of course this raises the likelihood that a type two error, rejecting the 
existence of a condition when it does exist (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:163), may 
occur. Neither of these errors are ideal and as such sensitivity analysis that sets 
the breakpoint at 15% is undertaken and discussed later. However, as the 
competition state thesis –while important within the literature- is not universally 
accepted (See Hay, 2001 for perhaps its most rigorous critique), it is prudent to 
apply tougher rather than more lenient expectations on cases and as such, the 
qualitative breakpoint for full inclusion is set at 10%. 
The second set -that of activation- is more straightforward than the minimal 
welfare set. This is because here there is a precedent that is useful, meaningful, 
and transferable. In accordance with Vis, the first qualitative breakpoint of zero53 is 
set at 554. Vis sets this threshold as it represents expenditure of 0.05% of GDP per 
1% of unemployment and is so low that any country exhibiting scores at such 
levels cannot have a realistic intention to activate its unemployed citizenry (Vis, 
2007:111). Conversely, she argues, countries that spend more than 0.25% of GDP 
per 1% of unemployment can be considered as having a high level of dedication to 
activation (Vis, 2007:111). Consequently the breakpoint of 1 is set at 25. 
Operationalising the EPL set is similarly straightforward as once again, this study 
follows a precedent. Here the qualitative breakpoints used by both Vis (2007) and 
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 Established as one standard deviation below the mean. 
53
 Note that Fully out of this set does not require any inversion of the data as it is already ‘pointing’ in the 
right direction. 
54
 Recall scores were generated by multiplying ALMP expenditure as a proportion of GDP by 100 and then 
dividing this score by the unemployment rate. 
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Hudson and Kühner (2009) are adopted once inverted. Here Vis breaks down the 
EPL variable into its 14 constituent elements and suggests that any country that 
achieves a high score on half of the protective dimensions should be considered 
as part of the fully protective set (Vis, 2007:112). This of course runs contrary to 
the expectations of the competition state and as such in this study, exhibiting such 
behaviour would see a case as fully out of the set. To demonstrate membership of 
Vis‘ set, a country would need to exhibit a score over 3, which could only be 
achieved if a country received a high score on at least half of the indicators that 
make up the EPL score and consequently it would prove difficult to terminate an 
employee‘s contract in that country (Vis, 2007:112). The score of three then 
represents the qualitative breakpoint of zero in the competition state 
operationalisation of EPL. The second breakpoint of one, which represents full 
membership, is achieved using a similar thought process on Vis‘ part. Here she 
demonstrates that a score of 0.5 can only be achieved if a country scores the 
maximum high score on only one of the fourteen indicators. Vis insists that where 
this is the case, a country has weak protective legislation and the termination of 
contracts is not difficult (Vis, 2007:112).  
As mentioned, sensitivity analysis was undertaken replacing EPL with PMR. Here 
the same logical procedure is followed with the difference in breakpoints being 
accounted for by the increased number of constituent elements to the PMR 
dimension. Consequently the breakpoints of zero and one are set at 3.2 and 0.35 
respectively55. These once again represent the levels at which a country would 
achieve a high score on at least half of all dimensions for full membership and 
exhibit a high score on no more than one indicator to be deemed as fully out. 
Finally we turn to the operationalisation of the tax set, which as with the 
operationalisation of the minimal welfare set follows no precedent. Setting the 
qualitative breakpoints for this set involved a dialogue between historical data, the 
data that was to be used, and existing scholarship. With no concrete examples to 
follow, these breakpoints represent perhaps the most qualitative or subjective in 
this study. However, not only do they represent a process of theoretical 
engagement, in accordance with Ragin, they are not set as absolutes (Ragin, 
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 There are 17 constituent elements of the PMR measure, which is scored from 0-6.  
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2000:318), perceived by the author as in some way infallible. Indeed, as with the 
government regulation and minimal welfare sets, sensitivity analysis was 
conducted with alternative breakpoints. Nevertheless, the breakpoints make 
qualitative sense and furthermore bear relevance to both historic and 
contemporary data.  
The fist breakpoint, fully in the competition state set for corporate taxation was set 
at 20%. The rationale for setting this level was really a product of descriptive 
statistical analysis of contemporary data, an acknowledgement of 
recommendations made by the CBI, and the adoption of the ‗stringency principle‘ 
utilised in setting the qualitative breakpoints for the minimal welfare set. With 
regards the data that is analysed, 20% represents a level just below one standard 
deviation below the 2007 mean. In qualitative terms, it is accepted that corporate 
tax rates have become much less burdensome since 2000 and the overall picture 
within the OECD has consequently become much more business friendly (CBI, 
2008:29; Devereux et al, 2008:1211; OECD, 2008:3). It could be argued that using 
extreme relative behaviour in 2007 as a breakpoint for full inclusion in the tax set 
across all years would be acceptable. The rationale being that 2007 represents the 
year in which tax rate competition reaches its most competitive and therefore 
business friendly within this study, and that 20% represents a demanding 
threshold within that year‘s data.  This approach could be criticised for setting such 
a demanding threshold, however it should be noted that this level is not so low as 
to preclude countries from being fully included; even without setting the second 
breakpoint and subsequent crossover point, a threshold of 20% would see three 
countries gaining full membership in 2007. Moreover, so as not to overstate the 
existence of the competition state, setting a more demanding threshold for full 
membership is pertinent. The establishment of the first breakpoint of full 
membership at 20% is lent credence by recent reports by the CBI. This body, 
which represents the interests of business in Britain, insist that a tax rate that is 
significantly below the current OECD average is required to ensure that the British 
business is not only competitive in the short term, but also in the medium term 
(CBI, 2008:42). The target they advocate, of 18%, represents the rate at which 
they believe a country would have a significant advantage in attracting business in 
the first instance and then successfully sustaining and retaining that business 
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activity (CBI, 2008:15). The confluence of these three factors, descriptive data 
analysis, the recommendations of the CBI, and a generally stringent approach to 
setting the qualitative breakpoints, suggests that 20% represents a reasonable 
threshold to set. 
Setting the second breakpoint involved a similar process, however 
recommendations from either the academy or the business world were not 
forthcoming. Consequently, the breakpoint was set through an analysis of historic 
trends, a descriptive analysis of the data that is used in this study, and ultimately 
relied on the strength of a qualitative statement.  
Having failed to follow a precedent or locate any substantial evidence to support 
the setting of any breakpoint, the researcher is left to consider what, in qualitative 
terms, it means to be fully out of this set. At what tax rate can we say a country is 
definitely not acting like a competition state? It would of course be possible to 
follow previously cited examples and analyse the suitability of using standard 
deviations from the mean. Indeed, such an approach is useful for a researcher in 
becoming better acquainted with the concept (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:41; see 
also Ragin, 2000:292). To follow the logic used in setting the first breakpoint, 
which suggested that 2007 represented the most competitive year in terms of tax 
policy, it would make sense to look at data from 1997 to establish a point that is 
uncompetitive. Here we see that one standard deviation above the mean would be 
just above 45%. Historically, rates at and above this level were common until the 
end of the twentieth century, representing stability not just through the golden age 
of the welfare state, but also throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Clausing, 
2007:122; Devereux et al, 2008:1222). The rate of 45% would then seem like a 
reasonable candidate for the second qualitative breakpoint. However, to 
acknowledge that this rate was derived through what was undoubtedly the least 
robust process relative to the setting of all other breakpoints, it was felt that extra 
consideration and to a certain extent caution, was warranted. A stringency 
principle had been applied to the establishment of the first breakpoint to ensure 
that countries were not mistakenly labelled as full members of the set. It seems 
only right that a similar principle be applied at the opposite pole to ensure that no 
country is unfairly categorised as fully out of the set. As such, a slightly higher 
breakpoint was established at 50%. While this level still bears relevance to 
209 
 
historical trends and the data for 1997, it also has a neat clarity to it in qualitative 
terms. It may very well be that the breakpoint could have been set lower and to 
ensure best practice, sensitivity analysis was carried out to explore the impact of 
different breakpoints. However, it is with extreme confidence that we can say that 
where a country takes over half of a corporation‘s profits, it is most definitely not 
acting like a competition state.  
Table 6.4: Illustration of how sets have been constructed and calibrated 
Set Variable First qualitative 
breakpoint (1= 
fully in) 
Second qualitative 
breakpoint (0= 
fully out) 
Minimal 
welfare 
Social expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP 
10% 25% 
Activation ALMP expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP 
multiplied by 100 and 
divided by the 
unemployment rate 
25 5 
Regulation EPL 3 0.5 
Tax Corporate tax rate 20% 50% 
 
Table 6.4 summarises the variables used to construct sets and the breakpoints 
used to calibrate them. Having constructed and calibrated the sets, the next stage 
in the process of operationalising the competition state as a fuzzy concept, 
involves defining the property space. This involves establishing all possible models 
that can be created via the use of the Boolean operators AND (●) as well as NOT 
(~) and explaining how these relate to the overall concept. In this study this 
involves identifying which models represent distinct theoretical types of 
competition state and applying appropriate labels. Table 15 (overleaf) shows all 
sixteen possible combinations derived as a result of the number of combinations 
being equal to 2k, alongside the models expressed in Boolean algebra. As table 15 
shows, the sixteen possible combinations have in certain instances been 
combined and as such, twelve types are presented. While these twelve types are 
deemed qualitatively distinct enough to merit separate classification, it is possible 
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to loosely group some types in a way that reflects the underlying principles of the 
competition state.  
6.24: Labelling types 
Before the grouping of certain types is discussed, a brief discussion of each type, 
the label it has been accorded and how that label relates to the model(s) to which 
it is attached, is presented. In the studies of Hudson and Kühner (2009), Kvist 
(2007), and Vis (2009), the authors identify ideal-types and in the case of Hudson 
and Kühner, a range of ‗hybrid‘ types (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:38-39). 
Essentially the same process is followed here, although the term hybrid is in some 
instances.  
Before discussing how the types have been configured, it is useful to reflect on 
how the sets relate to the competition state thesis. Essentially these four sets can 
be divided into two or three domains depending on certain criteria pertaining to the 
competition state thesis. The first categorisation is to consider competition state 
approaches to be either forward or backwards facing. By this we refer to whether a 
competition state behaviour is one aimed at establishing a positive approach to the 
competition state and favour competition state policies through future actions. Or, 
conversely, whether the behaviour relates to another crucial dimension of the 
competition state thesis: dismantling or considerably restructuring and limiting the 
welfare state. These two approaches represent two different and for some 
countries, opposite domains of competition state action. 
It can be argued that the manipulation of tax and employment protection policies 
represents an attempt to adopt a range of approaches that make competition more 
achievable. These do not necessarily impact the traditional structures and 
instruments of the welfare state, rather relate to the competition state‘s pro-
business agenda. The welfare and activation sets on the other hand deal directly 
with the embedded structures and economic consequences of the welfare state. 
Lower expenditure represents a rejection (of sorts) of the welfare state while 
increased activation can be seen as a restructuring of the ethos within the welfare 
state (Clarke, 2005:448; Deacon, 2003:133; Driver, 2008:53). Both the forward 
and backward facing domains are ultimately integral to the establishment of the 
competition state. However, one domain is more concerned with the exploitation of 
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the opportunities offered by the global economy, whereas the other is concerned 
with ensuring that existing features of the state (namely the welfare state) do not 
act as barriers to such opportunities. 
Table 6.5: Competition state ideal-types 
 Minimal Welfare 
expenditure (W) 
ALMPs 
(A) 
EPL (E) Corporation 
Tax (T) 
Model 
Pure IN IN IN In W•A●E●T 
Weak ‘pure’ In 
In 
In 
In 
In 
Out 
Out 
In 
W•A•E•~T 
W•A•~E•T 
Strong Neo-liberal 
plus 
In Out In In W•~A•E•T 
Neo-liberal plus In 
In 
Out 
Out 
In 
Out 
Out 
In 
W•~A•E•~T 
W•~A•~E•T 
Neo-liberal In Out Out Out W•~A•~E•~T 
Strong Active plus Out In In In ~W•A•E•T 
Active plus Out 
Out 
In 
In 
In 
Out 
Out 
In 
~W•A•E•~T 
~W•A•~E•T 
Active Out In Out Out ~W•A•~E•~T 
PWCS In In Out Out W•A•~E•~T 
Pro-competition 
state policy 
Out Out In In ~W•~A•E•T 
Weak Pro-
competition state 
policy 
Out 
Out 
Out 
Out 
In 
Out 
Out 
In 
~W•~A•E•~T 
~W•~A•~E•T 
Conservative 
welfare 
Out Out Out Out ~W•~A•~E•~T 
 
A second way of categorising sets is to consider once again EPL and taxation as 
representing an engagement with the global economy, belonging to a domain that 
is separate from considerations about the welfare state. While these two sets 
remain linked, the welfare and activation sets are separated into separate domains 
in acknowledgement that membership of the welfare state owes much to a neo-
liberal macro approach, whereas activation places much more emphasis on the 
human capital investment in the individual. Ultimately both sets relate to the 
embedded elements of the welfare state, however whether a country is a full 
member of one of these sets rather than the other (or is a member of both) may 
reflect extremely divergent approaches to the competition state. As such it is 
possible to state that while these two sets can be grouped as per the example 
above, they can also be categorised as representing separate domains of the 
competition state. Consequently we can consider the competition state types as 
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being configurations not just of sets, but also distinct domains that represent 
diverse processes within the competition state thesis. 
The first competition state type illustrated in table 6.5 is that which has been 
labelled as pure. As will be demonstrated, it is useful to group this type with a 
similar, yet weaker type. As the model indicates, to be a member of this pure ideal 
type a country would have to demonstrate membership of each set. In this sense 
such a country can be said to conform to competition state expectations on every 
dimension that has been operationalised. Chapters four and five revealed that 
even in relative terms, only Ireland managed to demonstrate such uniform 
competition state behaviour across all dimensions at any stage in the study. 
Moreover, by 2007 not even Ireland acted like a competition state across all 
dimensions relative other countries, exhibiting a negative score in the dimension of 
activation. Using the results of chapters four and five, one would not expected 
many countries to demonstrate pure competition state membership, largely 
because the trend for conformation to the active expectations of the competition 
state seems to run contrary to that of welfare expenditure. A weaker ‗hybrid‘ 
version of this type is also defined, qualitatively different form the pure type insofar 
as it does not require membership of all four sets. This weak pure set does 
however not only require membership of three sets, it requires membership of all 
three types of sets as outlined in the second example outlined earlier. In this way a 
country occupying this type must demonstrate membership of both of the 
backward looking sets, welfare and activation, and one of the forward looking sets. 
It does not matter which of the forward looking sets a country is a member of, 
which explains why there are two possible models to describe membership of the 
weak hybrid of the pure ideal type. What is important is that a country in this type 
conforms to all three domains of the competition state using the three domain 
example and both domains using the two domain example outlined earlier. A 
country that conforms to either the pure or weaker pure type are qualitatively 
similar in as much as they can be said to be pursuing a macro approach that is 
contrary to that which is typical of the welfare state, has taken steps to activate its 
unemployed, and has pursued policy in one area that is consonant with the 
expectations of the competition state. The only difference between countries in 
these types is simply whether they have pursued pro-competitive policies in both 
213 
 
the arenas of employment protection and corporate tax, or merely in one of these 
areas. 
The next grouping of types includes those that have been labelled neo liberal, neo 
liberal plus, and strong neo-liberal plus. Two conditions bind all three of these 
types: their membership of the minimal welfare set and their lack of membership of 
the activation set. Conceptually it may seem rather strange to label any type that 
specifically does not include membership of a set as being neo liberal. After all, 
activation and the shift from welfare to a workfare or post welfare environment are 
central to the competition state thesis (Cerny and Evans, 2003:30-38). Moreover, 
the pure competition state is for Cerny, the neo liberal competition state (Cerny, 
1997:266; 2008:16; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3:7; Cerny et al, 2005:21-22). Why 
then is a lack of activation central to the neo liberal types and by extension, why is 
the term neo liberal not applied to the pure and weak pure types discussed above? 
Quite simply, the activation of citizens, while undoubtedly a rhetorical aim of the 
competition state and those states that Cerny and Evans identify as competition 
states, has not translated into significant government action. The US for example, 
which is perhaps the birthplace of workfare (Deacon, 2000:11), simply does not 
spend much either in total or relative to the size its unemployed population. When 
Clinton referred to the carrot and the stick of the workfare/welfare mix (Clinton, 
2005:271-272:720), he obviously favoured the stick, with low levels of expenditure 
and generosity clearly a more favoured tool in the process of discouraging 
unemployment. Ragin implores the researcher to not only consider their sets, 
models, and types in consultation with existing scholarship, but also with the data 
that is collected (Ragin, 2000:125). When the data is consulted, it is clear that 
activation is not a policy goal that is translated into policy action in any of the 
countries that have historically been labelled as neo liberal. In America, where neo 
liberalism is undoubtedly embedded in the macroeconomic approach activation 
may occur but it is not paid for, rather simply enforced through stringent, 
ungenerous benefits. 
Expecting members of the neo liberal types to not be members of the activation 
set is combined with an expectation that such countries would be members of the 
minimal welfare set. Indeed, this basic dichotomy of activation non-membership 
and welfare membership is sufficient for inclusion in this grouping of countries. It is 
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enough to be considered as a neo liberal competition state by simply conforming 
to the principle of modest overall social expenditure. At the most basic level, even 
if this is the only set that a country demonstrates membership of, we can say that it 
has an environment where state activity does not ―crowd out private enterprise‖ 
(Cerny, 1997:259). Where a country exhibits membership of only the minimal 
welfare set, it is consequently labelled as neo liberal. A stronger demonstration of 
a neo liberal approach would be to combine competition state behaviour on this 
set, with a competitive approach to the third domain of competition state activity, 
the forward looking, pro-competitive policies. Combining a competition state 
approach with regards to welfare expenditure with membership of one of the pro-
competitive sets is duly considered as a stronger form of the neo liberal 
competition state and is labelled as neo liberal plus. Similarly, membership of the 
minimal welfare set and both sets in the third competition state domain is identified 
as the strongest demonstration of a neo liberal competition state and is awarded 
the title of strong neo liberal plus. As with the weak pure type discussed earlier, 
because the neo liberal plus type can include either membership of the tax set or 
membership of the EPL set alongside membership of the minimal welfare set, 
there are two possible models for membership of this type, as outlined in table 
fifteen. 
The next grouping of competition state types includes those types that are built 
around an embracing of activation and rejection of the neo liberal approach to 
overall expenditure. To this end, membership of this group requires the opposite 
behaviour in terms of these two central domains that was necessary to be a 
member of the neo liberal group. Also, as will be outlined, the approach of 
countries to pro competitive policies plays a similar role in determining how deeply 
embedded in this group of competition state types a case is. As with the basic neo 
liberal type, a country is considered as a member of the active type through 
conformation to the two basic principles underlying the active group: membership 
of one set and non-membership of another. In this case, a country is labelled 
active if it exhibits membership of the activation set alone. We can say that any 
such country is making little effort to limit the size of the state in terms of 
expenditure and similarly making no effort in the third competition state domain 
through the pursuit of pro-competitive policies. Countries in this type are however 
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engaging with the rise of the competitive global economy through a process of 
activation, which may represent a restructuring of the basic welfare state approach 
to the provision of passive benefits. Of course an historical analysis may suggest 
somewhat contrarily that such an active approach is an embedded feature of a 
country‘s policy approach and pre-dates the rise of the competition state, rather 
than a consequence of the rise of the competition state. The ALMP history of any 
country that demonstrates membership of the active type should therefore be 
explored and form part of a discussion of countries that fall into this type. 
Again, as with the neo liberal group of types, the active group is divided by 
behaviour within the third domain of the competition state. Where a country 
demonstrates membership of the active set, non membership of the minimal 
welfare set, and membership of one of either the EPL or tax set, it is labelled as 
belonging to the active plus type56. Where membership extends to both sets in the 
third competition state domain, while meeting the other requirements of the active 
grouping a country is considered as belonging to a strong active plus type. How 
well populated the active plus and strong active plus types prove to be is 
particularly interesting and has potentially important implications for the 
competition state thesis.  
The findings in chapter four suggested that some countries were conforming to the 
expectations of a competition state in the PWCS dimension but no other. 
However, their behaviour in this category was sufficient to produce a high enough 
overall score to be considered as a competition state. While the findings of chapter 
five demonstrate that most countries that conform to the expectations of the 
competition state in the PWCS arena also demonstrate competition state 
behaviour in either the EPL or tax dimension, the picture that emerges from this 
chapter will be extremely important in shaping the discussion about whether these 
active countries can really be considered as competition states. That is because 
the active type detailed in this study is qualitatively close to the Conservative 
welfare type that will be outlined shortly. If the only feature of the competition state 
that a country demonstrates is the one feature that data analysis shows is not 
exhibited by the countries considered in the literature as core competition states, it 
                                                          
56
  As with the neo-liberal plus type, there are two possible models that result in membership of the active 
plus type. 
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could be argues that such countries are not competition states. This would be a 
particularly compelling argument if analysis of historic data shows that those 
members of the active type had an active approach that pre-dates the rise of the 
global economy and competition state as a coherent theory.  
If this chapter finds that most active countries are members of either the active 
plus or strong active plus types rather than simply the active type, a stronger 
argument can be made for the emergence of a competition state. While 
membership of the active type may be considered as only a weak conformation to 
the competition state or even a rejection of it, the stronger active types would 
place the active approach in a more orthodox competition state context. Having 
set meaningful qualitative breakpoints rather than simply relying on relative 
patterns in additive indexes, it may be that we can finally discover whether 
countries are simply active in their approach to welfare, or active as part of a 
competition state approach. If countries are populating the active plus and strong 
active plus types, it would offer much in the way of support for the suggestion that 
activation represents an important element of the competition state, and that the 
conceptualisation of an active competition state form is robust.  
The final group of types are derived from three possible models. The pro-
competition state policy type and the weak pro-competition state policy type are 
formed when the only domain on within which a country demonstrates 
membership of a set is the forward looking competition state policy focused 
domain. Here a country can be considered as pursuing competition state 
behaviours, undoubtedly to exploit the global economy, without substantially 
altering the approach to welfare provision. As such, a necessity for inclusion in this 
group is non-membership of both the welfare and activation sets and membership 
of at least one of the tax or EPL sets. As with the neo liberal and active groups, the 
strength of membership is decided by whether a country is a member of both or 
just one of the pro-competition state policy sets. For membership of the weak pro-
competition state policy set, a country simply has to exhibit membership of either 
the tax set or the EPL set, alongside non-membership of the welfare and active 
sets. This of course means that there are two possible models that can be 
categorised as demonstrative of this weak type. For inclusion in the pro-
competition state policy ideal type, a country would have to belong to both the EPL 
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and tax sets and demonstrate non-membership of the active and minimal welfare 
sets.  
Again, as with the discussion of the active grouping, how well populated the 
grouping of the pro-competition state policy will provide much to discuss about the 
very nature of the competition state thesis and facilitate a more critical analysis of 
some of its underlying principles. Countries that populate this group will of course 
stand as evidence that such a competition state type exists, which has three 
implications for the competition state thesis itself. First, it is yet more proof that 
countries are indeed conforming to competition state expectations. Second, it is 
another piece of evidence that there is heterogeneity within competition state 
approaches. And third, it casts doubt on the assertion that the competition state 
qualitatively disempowers the welfare state; if competition state approaches can 
be adopted in an environment that is marked by high levels of social expenditure 
and low levels of activation, can the competition state and welfare state exist side-
by-side? 
Finally we turn to two types that are not grouped with any others. The first, the 
PWCS is conceptualised as a situation where welfare expenditure is low and 
activation is high, but where there is no substantial pursuit of pro-competition state 
policies. The model as outlined in table fifteen represents a possible combination 
of sets that can be labelled in accordance with the competition state thesis and as 
such is included. However, a cursory glance at the findings of chapters four and 
five suggest that it is unlikely that any country will come to inhabit this type. The 
only country to exhibit competition state behaviours on both the welfare and active 
dimensions of the competition state index, also demonstrated extreme competition 
state behaviour in terms of taxation. Furthermore, those countries that did not 
seem to adopt pro-competition state policy also appeared to lack competition state 
behaviours in either or both the welfare and active dimensions. Consequently, 
even though those results were based on a rather different methodology, the data 
that underlies the results means that it is unlikely that we would witness any 
countries populating this type.  
The only remaining model that has yet to be discussed is that which involves non-
membership of each set in this study. This model can be considered as indicative 
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of a rejection of the competition state and acceptance of many of the features of 
Conservative welfare states and as such is accordingly labelled ‗Conservative 
welfare‘. Of course, dense population of this type would have fairly self-
explanatory implications for the competition state thesis. Not only that, it would 
highlight the difference between the methodology of chapter five and the 
methodology adopted here, prompting discussion about the role played by 
methodology in shaping results and conclusions.  
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6.3: Findings 
6.3.1: Fuzzy set ideal-type country memberships in 2007 
As figure 6.1 (overleaf) illustrates57, all but one country in 2007 demonstrate 
membership of a competition state type, with the weak pro-competition state policy 
(WPCSP) type being the most densely populated. Three of the four groups of 
types are populated and at this group level, most countries‘ memberships make 
qualitative sense, fitting with established welfare state and competition state 
literature, as well as the findings of chapters four and five. While there are 
obviously a few interesting cases just in the snapshot of 2007, on the whole, the 
findings presented here appear consonant with many of the observations made in 
chapter five. First, we should note that there does appear in 2007 to be separate 
competition state forms, falling loosely into three groups or worlds. Furthermore, 
within these worlds there is heterogeneity, with countries falling into different types 
within groups. Perhaps the most striking observation that can be made of figure 
one is that no country occupies the pure, hybrid pure, or PWCS types. Indeed, as 
we will see, only one country at one point in time manages to occupy any of these 
three types. The hybrid pure and PWCS type are throughout the time period 
studied, along with the pure type in 1997 and 2007, quite simply logical yet 
unpopulated competition state types. Ragin refers to such types as ‗logical 
remainders‘ as they represent possible models or combinations of models, which 
without being aware of the findings, the researcher would expect to find populated 
(Ragin, 2000:107:198). They key message to be taken from this observation is 
that neo-liberal aspects of the competition state and active aspects, do not present 
together. These three types represent the only models whereby membership of 
the type required membership of both the welfare and activation sets. Quite simply 
no case presented this behaviour. 
The implication of this finding, that active and neo liberal behaviours are not 
reconciled by any country, is particularly interesting. Two logical conclusions 
present themselves at this juncture. Either a), the activation is not an indicator of 
the competition state, or b), the active/neo liberal split represents two profoundly 
                                                          
57
 Only data for 2007 is presented in this manner, with simplified diagrams illustrating shifts over time 
presented at a later stage of the discussion. Similar diagrams to the above for the years 1997 and 2002 are 
appended. 
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divergent poles within the competition state. The fact that so many countries 
occupy the active group as a whole, while none populate the active type may be 
instructive. 
Figure 6.1: Fuzzy set ideal type country memberships (2007) 
Note: Countries are listed in rank order according to the strength of their membership within the 
relevant type. Types are grouped as outlined on pages 23-27. 
 
As was discussed earlier, the active type could be considered by sceptics of the 
competition state thesis as being almost akin to a rejection of the competition 
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of at least one other competition state feature adds credence to the notion that 
activation can play a role within the competition state. Indeed, as figure one 
shows, in 2007 the active type is a logical remainder in the same sense as the 
pure, hybrid pure, and PWCS types. Where chapter four suggested that some 
nations owed their relatively lofty position in the competition state index solely to 
the ALMP expenditure, both chapters five and six suggest that this is not the case. 
Indeed, the active type is, as we shall see, only populated by one country at one 
point in time and even then, the Netherlands actually occupies both the active and 
the active plus types at the crossover point. That aside, the active group as a 
whole is populated in much the way one would expect. As figure 6.1 outlines, this 
active grouping is entirely populated by those countries identified by Esping-
Andersen as social democratic in terms of decommodification, along with 
Switzerland, which just misses out of this group in Esping-Andersen‘s study 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990:52). Indeed we will return to discuss the fact that Esping-
Andersen‘s three worlds does seem to be paralleled rather neatly in figure 6.1. 
If we turn to the neo liberal grouping, those countries that demonstrate 
membership of one of the neo liberal types come as no real surprise. The fact that 
the USA is labelled as a neo liberal plus nation and not a strong neo liberal plus 
nation may come as a surprise. Stripped of the necessity to demonstrate 
activation, one would perhaps expect the drag that was evident on the index score 
of the US to disappear. The fact the US occupies the neo liberal plus set rather 
than the stronger variant is a product of its high levels of corporate taxation. High 
levels of US corporate taxation is acknowledged by Desai and Hines (2004:5), and 
Devereux et al (2004:3; 2008:1222) and is seen as a barrier, along with structural 
problems within the corporate tax system, to competitiveness (Desai and Hines, 
2004:27; JEC, 2005:16). Indeed, it is argued that the confluence of high 
corporation tax rates and the fact that corporations based in the US but trading 
elsewhere are in essence taxed twice or perhaps more accurately face a tax top-
up, render the US‘ corporate tax policy extremely unfriendly to business (Desai 
and Haines, 2004: 5:22; JEC, 2005:10). The fact that the US corporate tax system 
and rate is not conducive to business is reflected in the extremely low score and 
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rank58 received by the US in the WEF competitiveness indicator of macroeconomic 
environment (WEF, 2010:19). That said, while the US performs poorly on this 
indicator, its overall position of fourth suggests that other features of the US 
economy are more conducive to business. 
It is true that had personal income taxation been operationalised rather than 
corporation tax, the US would have earned membership of the strong neo liberal 
plus type59. However, notwithstanding the fact that a powerful rationale for 
operationalising corporate tax rather than personal income tax was established 
earlier, it is clear from even a cursory engagement with the literature that corporate 
taxation represents an arena in which US policy has severe impacts on its 
competitiveness. Moreover, while the average tax burden of a single male at 100% 
of the average weekly wage of a production worker may be more in line with 
competition state expectations, the same cannot necessarily be said for other 
family types, or workers in other sectors. Indeed, had the top rate of personal 
income tax been operationalised60 the US would have been extremely close to the 
0.5 crossover point between membership and non membership of the set. 
Ultimately, the US‘ membership of the neo liberal plus type rather than the strong 
neo liberal plus type can be considered as an accurate reflection of its approach to 
welfare expenditure, activation, employment protection, and taxation. 
While the neo liberal group of types offers little by the way of surprises in terms of 
those countries that are members, the omission of New Zealand and the UK from 
this grouping does run contrary to expectations. As the model would denote, these 
countries are included in the pro-competition state policy (PCSP) type owing to the 
fact that they achieved membership of the EPL and tax sets, while demonstrating 
non-membership of the activation and minimal welfare sets.  By consulting the raw 
data we can see that both New Zealand is mostly in and the UK is firmly61 in the 
sets of EPL and taxation, firmly and almost fully out – respectively- of the 
activation set, and mostly and fairly –again respectively- out of the minimal welfare 
set.  Before discussing the implications of this, it should be acknowledged that with 
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 The USA ranks 87
th
 out of 139 in terms of the competitiveness of its macroeconomic environment, which 
places it just below Vietnam and Nepal and one place in above the Dominican Republic. 
59
 On the basis of either the same breakpoints being used, or the use of standard deviations from the mean in 
calibrating the set. 
60
 Assuming breakpoints at levels equivalent to one standard deviation above and below the mean. 
61
 Both qualitatively and through the use of Ragin’s nine-point scale. 
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an alternative breakpoint set for the minimal welfare set, whereby 15% rather than 
10% represents full membership, New Zealand would become a member of the 
minimal welfare set and ultimately, the strong neo-liberal plus type.  The UK on the 
other hand would remain within the same type as outlined in figure one. While the 
rationale for establishing the breakpoint at 10% is justified and merits confidence, 
it is pertinent to reflect on how a small change in the decision process could affect 
the findings of such a study. 
The UK and New Zealand memberships of the PCSP type is particularly 
interesting for two reasons. Firstly, as Lunt discusses, the British and Kiwi 
competition states have much qualitatively in common (Castles and Mitchell, 
1992:11:14:18-21; Lunt, 2010:34). Both, he says, have worked to establish a 
national narrative within which to place the competition state project, fusing neo 
liberal elements with social investment and opportunity (Lunt, 2010:31-32). 
Interestingly however, one dimension in which the Kiwi and British cases are 
assumed to behave similarly is that of activation (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 
2003:79; Lunt, 2010:31). Indeed analysis shows they do, though contrary to the 
suggestions of Lunt, demonstrating non-membership rather than membership of 
the activation set. It is true that a relatively small -though still significant alteration- 
to the breakpoints used to calibrate the minimal welfare set would produce a shift 
in New Zealand‘s type membership. However, it would take substantial alterations 
to the calibration of the activation set to alter the set membership of either New 
Zealand or the UK. In the case of the UK, non-membership of the minimal welfare 
set can be considered as fairly strong and in terms of activation, the UK is almost 
fully out. Coupled with the fact that the UK is fairly in the tax set and almost fully in 
the EPL set, all trends that remain stable over time, UK membership of the PCSP 
type can be considered relatively strong, stable, and consequently, robust. 
The second reason that UK and New Zealand membership of the PCSP is 
interesting, lies in the fact that the competition state thesis is largely built around 
the US and UK cases, with occasional references to Australia and New Zealand 
(Cerny, 1997; 2000; 2008; 2010a; Cerny and Evans, 1999; 2003; 2004; Evans, 
2010:105). The implications of UK and New Zealand membership of the PCSP 
type are not only a challenge to some of the assumptions made about the British 
and Kiwi competition states, but almost perversely, a vindication of the broad 
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thesis. While Cerny insists that the neo liberal model represents the orthodox and 
likely only long term competition state model, both he and Evans accept that at 
certain points in time variant forms may exist (Cerny, 1997:251:263; Evans, 
2010:112). All variant forms would of course still conform to some core areas of 
the competition state thesis, just as the PCSP type does. Importantly, this 
researcher must acknowledge that while a longitudinal study of nations‘ behaviour 
does help to illuminate trends and while one key trend witnessed in chapter five 
and outlined later in this chapter, is one of stability, the rise of the competition state 
represents a process that may not yet be finished. Ultimately, revisiting the data in 
three or ten or twenty years may highlight a trend towards neo liberal or even pure 
types. In the here and now though, the PCSP represents a type quite distinct from 
either the active or neo liberal groups of types. Moreover, its members cannot be 
considered as ‗new‘ democracies; these are established economies with traditional 
Beveridgean/keynesian welfare state histories (Castles and Mitchell, 1992:17-18: 
Lunt, 2008:409). Furthermore, as we shall see, these two old nations with long 
democratic roots and deeply embedded welfare states, around which many of the 
core arguments on which the competition state thesis were able to crystallise, 
exhibits stable membership of the PCSP over time. There is a degree to which the 
stable membership of two such nations adds credence to the suggestion that 
variant competition state forms exist. 
What the PCSP type and its members tell us about the competition state thesis is 
unclear. On one hand it could quite simply be that the years selected for study 
were atypical. Perhaps both countries are at the point of transition and an 
extension of this study with data that is available in the future will point to this. 
Maybe both of these factors are genuine and are compounded by the calibration 
or choice of sets. None of these explanations can or should be ruled out. On the 
other hand, the PCSP may represent a type in which not only will New Zealand 
and the UK prove to be long-serving tenants far into the future, revisitations may 
reveal that other countries have joined, perhaps from the WPCSP type. The 
stability of the PCSP coupled with the steadiness of UK and New Zealand 
membership may be taken as evidence that a country can compete in the global 
economy without fundamentally altering its welfare provision, as long as it adopts 
pro-competitive policies in other domains. As discussed earlier, this would cast 
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doubt on Cerny and Evans‘ assertion that the competition state qualitatively 
disempowers the welfare state (Cerny and Evans, 1999:1-3). However, when this 
is considered in the overall context of what seems to be strong evidence for the 
existence of variant forms of the competition state and almost universal 
membership of OECD nations to a competition state type, such doubts would 
relate to that statement rather than the thesis as a whole. 
Where the membership of the PCSP is particularly interesting largely because the 
countries that made up its membership are often considered as core neo liberal 
competition states, the WPCSP is interesting for a range of reasons. First, this 
type is populated in 2007 by an eclectic mix of countries. In this type we find 
countries labelled as corporatist by Esping-Andersen (1990), as well as countries 
belonging to amongst others: Fererra‘s ‗Southern‘ model (1996); Liebfried‘s ‗Latin 
Rim‘ model (1992); Siaroff‘s ‗Late Female Mobilization‘ model (1994); Vis‘ 
‗Conservative Welfare‘ model (2007); and Hudson and Kühner‘s ‗Weak productive-
protective‘, ‗Weak protective‘, and ‗Productive-protective‘ models (all 2009). 
Second, the WPCSP type, despite being a manifestation of two models, is almost 
completely homogenous in its construction, with all cases except Japan owing 
their membership of this type to their membership of the tax set. Third, as we will 
see, many countries became members of this type after 2002 and as such, this 
represents a recent transition within the competition state. Fourth, again as we will 
see, this transition is far from homogenous, with a diverse range of trajectories 
travelled by the countries that came to rest in this type as of 2007. In particular, 
many countries demonstrated membership of this set and another at some point, 
exhibiting crossover scores of 0.5. Finally, this type is interesting as it represents 
the only one of three types in which membership of only one set was sufficient for 
membership of that type, which was actually populated in 2007. As mentioned, the 
neo liberal and active types, by being logically possible, but with no observed 
cases of membership, are referred to as logical remainders. Countries that 
demonstrated membership of the respective necessary set uniformly 
demonstrated membership of at least one other set, ensuring that the active and 
neo liberal types remained unpopulated. With the WPCSP type, this was not the 
case however. 
226 
 
The fact that the WPCSP type is the most populous in figure 6.1 suggests that 
while the findings of this chapter can be considered as tentative support for the 
broad thrust of the competition state thesis, many countries still only exhibit the 
minimum level of behaviour required to achieve the status of competition state. 
When one considers this alongside the fact that many of the countries in this type 
exhibit membership scores extremely close to the 0.5 crossover between the 
WPCSP and the Conservative welfare type62, it should rightly temper the urge to 
make bold statements. Many of the countries that are in 2007 members of the 
WPCSP were in fact members of the Conservative welfare type in 1997. 
Furthermore, the WPCSP type counts amongst its members many of the countries 
that were considered in chapters four and five as not presenting competition state 
behaviours in 1997. From this we can draw two conflicting conclusions. It could be 
argued that this set represents only scant acknowledgement of the competition 
state at best, with behaviour not conforming to competition state expectations 
outweighing behaviour that does conform. To be a member of this type after all 
requires a country to demonstrate non membership of three-out-of-four 
competition state sets. Conversely, we can perhaps consider membership of this 
type as representing the first step towards greater competition state behaviours. 
Indeed, as we shall see, some nations in this sample have moved from 
membership of this type towards types embedded within the neo liberal and active 
groups. It is also worth noting that even what can be considered as rather mild 
competition state membership represents a fundamental shift for countries such as 
France and Italy with their strong conservative/corporatist roots (Castles and 
Mitchell, 1992:9: Esping-Andersen, 1990:27; Keeler, 1985:246). 
6.3.2: Fuzzy set ideal-type memberships over time 
What the WPCSP underscores is that the shifts over time are extremely important. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from a WPCSP membership that is stable over 
time is rather different from those that can be drawn from a membership that 
burgeons only towards 2007 and includes many nations with only weak 
membership. In the interests of brevity, the data for 1997 and 2002 will not be 
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 A lengthy table outlining each country’s membership score for each type is appended. 
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deconstructed in quite as much detail. Instead more parsimonious diagrams are 
utilised to illustrate the changes over time63. 
Chart 6.1 shows the trajectories of countries that were classified in 2007 as 
belonging to a type within the neo liberal group. While only the US and Korea 
demonstrate stability across all three time points, Canada and Australia64 also 
display stability of group membership. Similarly, while there is a departure from the 
neo liberal group in 2002, Ireland begins and ends within the group. The only 
country included in chart 6.1, which does not demonstrate membership of the neo 
liberal 
Chart 6.1: Fuzzy membership across time for those countries that were members of the 
neo liberal group in 2007 
Type 1997 2002 2007 
Pure 
 
   
Strong neo liberal 
plus 
 
  Ireland    Australia 
              Canada 
                             Slovak Republic 
Neo liberal plus 
 
                               USA          Korea 
Neo liberal 
 
   
Pro competition 
state policy 
   
Conservative 
welfare 
 
   
Note: Colours relate to trajectories, where trajectories are shared the countries share the same 
colour. A line that is dashed denotes that the country followed two separate trajectories by virtue of 
demonstrating a crossover score of 0.5 at some stage. Solid lines are used when a country‟s 
trajectory is contained within one group of types. Dotted lines signify that a country‟s trajectory left 
the destination group at some stage
65
. 
 
group in 1997 is the Slovak Republic. The Slovak Republic‘s surge from 
membership of the Conservative welfare type, to the PCSP type, and eventually 
the strong neo liberal plus type is concordant with the findings of chapter five and 
in some respects was expected. Such a shift is impressive, representing a journey 
form a position where there is no engagement with any domain of the competition 
state, to a situation where the Slovak Republic conforms to two of the three 
domains of the competition state, in a relatively short space of time.  
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 Though for completion diagrams similar to figure one for the years 1997 and 2002 are appended. 
64
 Though Australia’s second route involves a departure in 2002 
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 This note relates also to charts 6.2 and 6.3. 
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As we will see, only two other countries (Japan and Portugal) demonstrated 
membership of the neo liberal group at any time. These countries populated the 
neo liberal group only in 1997 and in Portugal‘s case, membership was shared at 
the crossover point with the Conservative welfare type. Chart 6.1 therefore depicts 
what can be considered as the stable, core membership of the liberal group. While 
the non-membership of both the UK and New Zealand comes as a surprise, as 
mentioned, those countries that are present are as expected. The fact that this 
group remains stable over time and includes the countries one would expect, 
offers much to suggest that as a broad model, the neo liberal competition state is 
robust. Moreover, as chart 6.1 shows, membership of this group is in fact 
membership of only the stronger neo liberal types.  
The US, which has witnessed much policy debate that has identified corporation 
tax as a worrying barrier to competition in the global economy (JEC, 2005:16), is 
joined by Korea in the neo liberal plus type. While policy debate suggests that 
shifts in corporation tax would likely see future iterations of this method place the 
US in the strong neo liberal plus type (Desai and Hines, 2004:5; Devereux et al, 
2004:3; 2008:1222; JEC, 2005:16), the prospects of Korean transition are less 
clear.  
The barrier to Korean membership of the strong neo liberal plus type is 
consistently its failure to demonstrate membership of the EPL set. Park (1999) 
suggests that the prevalence of ‗disguised‘ employment, which he insists 
represents an extremely large and burgeoning sector of employment, may hold the 
key to Korea‘s non membership of the EPL set (Park, 1999:12). While protection 
of recognised contracts may be relatively strict, many Koreans find themselves in 
employment that is not official and as such does not fall under the purview of 
existing laws, most notably the Labor Standards Act (Jones, 2005:5; Park, 
1999:12:25). Chung and Jeong (2008) also highlight that stricter EPL is a policy 
option for those countries that cannot afford or are unwilling to exhibit high levels 
of unemployment benefit expenditure (Chung and Jeong, 2008:144). With regards 
to Korea, this, Chung and Jeong insist, dovetails with the propensity of ‗fast-
growing‘ countries to favour EPL of unemployment benefits (Chung and Jeong, 
2008:144).  
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The confluence of strict EPL for regular workers and increasing reliance in the 
workforce on non-regular workers has according to Jones, ―negative implications 
for both equity and efficiency‖ (Jones, 2005:5). This is due to the fact that non 
regular workers receive lower salaries and fewer benefits than regular workers, 
and their use in the workforce has resulted in a strengthened resolve of regular 
workers and Korean society to not weaken EPL (Jones, 2005:4). The OECD has 
recommended that the Korean government ease the strictness of its EPL in order 
to ensure a flexible and equitable labour market and should this happen, future 
studies will see Korea as a member of the strong neo liberal plus set. More 
importantly, if disguised employment accounts for the proportion of the Korean 
workforce that Park (1999), Chung and Jeong (2008), and Jones (2005) intimate, 
perhaps the experience of the majority of Koreans is already akin to the 
experiences of citizens in strong neo liberal plus competition states. 
The speculation that future repeats of this study may find both the US and Korea 
in the strong neo liberal plus type may of course prove to be unfounded. However, 
the fact that Korean strictness of EPL and American corporate taxation are 
acknowledged as barriers to economic success within the academy of both 
nations is not insignificant. In the US case this acknowledgement has similarly 
been registered within the political sphere and direct policy intent seems 
forthcoming. Whether this occurs or not is of course important and as yet unclear, 
however what is clear in both the US and Korean cases, is that the rhetorical 
position is one that seems to back reform of these barriers to success. At least, 
one would expect the US and Korea to hold steady their trajectory within the neo 
liberal plus type, any deviations seem certain to be towards the strong neo liberal 
plus type rather than away from it. 
However the US and Korea chart their future trajectories, Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, and the Slovak Republic are already ensconced within the strong neo 
liberal plus type. The fact that these nations shifted to this type between 2002 and 
2007 is possibly indicative of a move towards stronger manifestations of the neo 
liberal competition state. Conversely, this may simply represent a temporary 
membership. In each case the time spent in the strong neo liberal plus type is 
230 
 
shorter than the time spent out of it66. The fact that each country converges on the 
stronger type at the same time may be pertinent, perhaps reflecting a response to 
homogenous global pressures, though evidencing such a claim would prove 
difficult of course. It should also be noted that each country, while demonstrating 
membership of the strong neo liberal plus type, were classed as only more or less 
in the type. No country demonstrated membership at a stronger level and in the 
case of Canada, its score was rather close to the crossover point of 0.5. What can 
be said of all countries in the neo liberal grouping is that the empirical evidence 
shows that their membership has proven stable over time. Furthermore, both 
qualitative and quantitative evidence, whilst inconclusive regarding possible 
transitions to, or stability within, the strong neo liberal plus type, support the notion 
that membership of the neo liberal group as a whole is likely to remain stable. 
If we turn now to chart 6.2 we can see the trajectories of those nations that 
demonstrated membership of the active group in 2007. 
Chart 6.2: Fuzzy membership across time for those countries that were members of the 
active group in 2007 
Type 1997 2002 2007 
Strong active plus 
 
                     Denmark         Switzerland 
Active plus 
 
                Norway           Sweden 
                     Netherlands  
               Austria             Belgium 
Active 
 
   
Weak pro 
competition state 
policy 
   
Conservative 
welfare 
 
   
 
We can see from chart 6.2 that he majority of countries that were located in the 
active group in 2007, had been members of the group throughout the study. 
Indeed, given that the Netherlands was never more out of the active plus type than 
in, we can also say that those countries that demonstrated stability within the 
group, were equally stable within their respective types. Where the stability of the 
neo liberal group existed alongside movement within, this does not appear to be 
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 If we take Australia’s route through the Conservative welfare type. 
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the case here. Indeed the shifts within the neo liberal group prompted questions 
about the future direction of countries‘ trajectories and stimulated discussion of 
whether we would likely see a shift towards the stronger type. Here there is 
perhaps more to suggest that the active plus (A+) and strong active plus (SA+) 
represent stable differentiated types, with neither seeming to lead to the other.  
Whether Austrian and Belgian membership of the active group and A+ type is 
likely to prove stable is less clear, however the fact that they have joined the A+ 
type rather than the active type is interesting. In the Austrian case this reflects the 
fact that pro competition state policy was already in evidence prior to joining the 
active group. The stability of the Austrian membership of the tax set ensured that 
any shift towards the active group would by-pass the active type. While it is 
unlikely that Austria would find itself in the active type owing to its membership of 
the tax set, its long term membership of the A+ type is far from certain. Such 
pessimism reflects the fact that Austria exhibits a membership score of only 0.51 
for the A+, a consequence of an identical membership score within the activation 
set.  
While the Austrian commitment to some form of competition state policy appears 
stable, it is possible that its membership of the active set is more transient. Such 
an unstable membership of activation could be explained if 2007 represented a 
year in which there was a substantial decline in unemployment. As the activation 
measure reflects both expenditure and the unemployment level either an increase 
in expenditure, a decline in unemployment, or a combination of both factors would 
explain a shift towards activation. In the scenario whereby unemployment declines 
but expenditure holds and as such the country appears more committed to 
activation may owe much to the nature of the policy process. If ALMP expenditure 
is a tool to combat unemployment, ALMP expenditure may simply experience a 
lag and possibly level out in the following years. It is then possible that 2007 
represents such an atypical year. However, there is no clear consensus that ALMP 
expenditure is that closely tied to the unemployment rate. Moreover, if we look at 
the raw data for Austria, it is clear that Austrian membership of the activation set in 
2007, however weak it may be, is driven by ALMP expenditure rather than the 
unemployment rate. Furthermore it represents the latest stage in what is an 
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upward trend across the time period, rather than simply a jump between two time 
points.  
Chart 6.3 (overleaf) compares the Austrian SUR and ALMP expenditure trends 
over the three time points. As we can see, the SUR holds relatively stable while 
ALMP expenditure rises steadily across the time period. Moreover, the trend in 
SUR extends beyond 2007, holding steady at 4.5% to 4.6% throughout 2010, 
while ALMP expenditure in 2008 matches that of 200767 (OECD, 2010). 
Consequently we can be extremely confident in stating that the Austrian 
membership of the A+ type reflects a genuine strengthening of its commitment to 
activation. 
While Austria owes its membership of the A+ type to its longer term membership 
of the taxation set and recent strengthening of its activation commitment, 
Belgium‘s membership is built on recent transitions in both the taxation and 
activation sets. Moreover, not only is the Belgian transition later, it is also weak 
with regards its membership of both the activation and taxation sets. 
Chart 6.3: Line graph showing the Standardised Unemployment Rate in Austria, along with 
Austrian expenditure on ALMPs over time 
 
Overall Belgian membership of the A+ type is stronger than Austria‘s, however 
where Austria‘s weakness lay in its activation, Belgium‘s weakness relates to its 
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membership of the taxation set. In the Austrian case, while it must be 
acknowledged that the shift towards activation may prove to be only fleeting, 
evidence suggests it is part of an upward trend in ALMP expenditure. In the 
Belgian case, while it is obviously true that taxation lowered, hence the shift 
towards membership of the tax set, it did so only in the last time period and with 
little literature and no newer data, making predictions about the future pathway of 
taxation membership relies more on guesswork than conjecture.  
The dividing line between the A+ countries and the SA+ countries is drawn as a 
consequence of differences in EPL set membership. All countries in the active 
group combine the necessary membership of the activation set with membership 
of the tax set. It is in the arena of EPL that the active countries demonstrate 
heterogeneity. Here only Austria and the Netherlands make in a progress towards 
membership of the EPL set by 2007. Even then, both countries are still more out of 
the set than in. Sweden and Belgium remain consistently ‗fairly‘ out of this set, 
while Norway is consistently almost fully out of the EPL set. Denmark and 
Switzerland on the other hand demonstrate membership of the EPL set and 
consequently the SA+ type. The reasons that determine the membership or non-
membership of the EPL set within the group of countries featured in figure three 
undoubtedly owes much to domestic factors such as the strength of unions 
alongside the path dependent nature of policy (Albaek et al, 2002:472-473). To 
this end, Norway representing the strictest arrangement can be reasonably 
considered a consequence of the fact that Norway was a front runner in 
establishing EPL as a priority as early as the 1930s (Sigeman, 2002:258). 
While there are reasonable grounds then to suggest that NL+ countries may make 
the transition to the SNL+ type in the near future, it is more difficult to make a 
similar prediction regarding the transition from A+ to the SA+ type. Interestingly 
however, had PMR been operationalised in place of EPL, the picture may be 
rather different. In terms of the neo liberal group, only Korean membership would 
have changed, shifting from the NL+ type to the SNL+ type in 2002 and holding 
steady through 2007. Within the active group however, the shift is more dramatic. 
Of course only Korea and the US could move from within the neo liberal group 
towards the SNL+ type as all other neo liberal nations already inhabit that type. In 
the active group however, the majority of countries inhabit the A+ type on account 
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of their non-membership of the EPL set. Replacing EPL with PMR has no effect on 
type memberships within the active group in 1997. By 2002 however Sweden, 
Norway, and the Netherlands would all demonstrate membership of the SA+ type 
and in 2007 they would be joined by both Austria and Belgium. Austria and 
Belgium would still only join the group in 2007 as it is only at this point that they 
meet the necessary activation requirement, however rather than joining the A+ 
type, they would be members of the SA+ type. This once again serves to 
underscore the fact that the findings of fuzzy-set ideal type analysis are beholden 
to the decisions made by the researcher in the construction and calibration of sets 
(Kvist, 2007:477: Ragin, 2000:151).  
Regardless of whether the replacement of EPL with PMR would change the types 
that countries joined, the overall group membership would not change even with 
the adoption of all the alternative breakpoints mentioned on pages 16 and 18. This 
suggests that the active approach is stable over time and, with equal stability, 
involves the conformation to one other domain of the competition state thesis. It 
can therefore be convincingly argued that the active approach to the competition 
state represents a stable and robust competition state form. Indeed such an 
argument is strengthened by the fact that activity within this group is confined to 
those types that fuse activation with the pursuit of pro-competition state policies. 
The stability of such a group while supporting many of the key assertions of the 
competition state thesis does challenge the suggestion that competing competition 
state forms represent only a short-term alternative to the orthodox model (Cerny, 
1997:251:263). Cerny bases this assertion on the belief that the neo liberal model 
represents the most economically successful and ultimately, in the final reckoning, 
this is all that will matter (Cerny, 1997:259; 2008:10:25; 2010a:17; Cerny and 
Evans, 2003:25; 2004:51:61).  
In chapter five we saw that a high score on the index and thus, behaviour more 
akin to the expectations of a competition state was positively correlated with 
economic growth and negatively correlated with debt. The measures used were 
central government debt as a proportion of GDP and the annual growth rate. 
These are in no way the only measures of economic success, but for the 
purposes, act as reasonable proxies. Revisiting data on growth and debt is 
interesting; whereas chapter five only facilitated a correlation between overall 
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index scores and these measures of success, it is now possible to compare the 
success of neo liberal and active competition states. A simple comparison of 
means shows that growth is higher and debt much lower in neo liberal countries 
than it is in the active group68. On the face of it, this lends much credence to 
Cerny‘s suggestion that the neo liberal model is more successful. Furthermore we 
could perhaps conclude that either countries can cope with or offset the lack of 
success brought about by not adopting the neo liberal model, or alternatively, that 
the future will vindicate Cerny‘s assertion that non-neo liberal competition state 
forms are only fleeting havens (Cerny, 1997:251:263). If we delve a little deeper 
however, there is possibly a slither of evidence to suggest that there is another 
explanation. If we remove the countries that have arrived late to the active group 
and as such may not have yet fully reaped the benefits of a more competitive state 
form, we see an altogether different picture. The neo liberal countries still exhibit 
slightly lower levels of debt and slightly higher levels of growth, however the two 
group means remain close in terms of growth and become extremely close in 
terms of debt once Austria and Belgium are removed.69 Perhaps then, the active 
competition state represents not only a stable competition state form, but also a 
reasonably successful model. 
If we turn now to our final group of competition state types, chart 6.4 illustrates the 
fuzzy memberships over time for those countries that populated the PCSP and 
WPCSP types in 2007.  
The stability of the UK and New Zealand membership serves to underscore much 
of the earlier debate, suggesting that the PCSP type represents an important and 
stable competition state form. Whether it represents a competition state type that 
is accessible to other nations, or whether it is simply a moniker for the British and 
Kiwi competition states can perhaps be illuminated by exploring the pathways 
taken by countries in the WPCSP type. 
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 Mean debt in the neo liberal group in 2007 equalled 25.81 as a proportion of GDP compared to 40.04% in 
the active group. The mean growth rate for 2007 stood at 4.34 in the neo liberal group compared to 3.12 in 
the active group. 
69
 When Austria and Belgium are removed the mean debt level falls to 27.37% while growth decreases 
slightly to 3.04%  
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Chart 6.4: Fuzzy membership scores across time for those countries that were members of 
the pro-competition state policy group in 2007 
Type 1997 2002 2007 
Neo liberal plus 
 
   
Neo liberal 
 
   
Pro competition 
state policy 
      UK 
                       New Zealand 
Weak pro 
competition state 
policy 
 
               Finland                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                               Spain           Greece              
              Portugal 
           Poland           
         Japan 
                                 Czech Republic 
                                 France          Italy 
Conservative welfare 
 
                                   
                                 Germany 
 
What is most striking about chart 6.4 is how messy it is compared to previous 
comparable graphics. If we focus on those countries that populate the WPCSP 
type, we can see a multitude of various pathways taken to reach membership in 
2007. As we can see, only Finland demonstrates a completely stable pathway 
within the WPCSP type over time. Furthermore, Finland‘s membership appears 
secure as well as stable, exhibiting scores of 0.64; 0.71; and 0.61accross the time 
period70. Despite this, Finland is not the country that demonstrates some degree of 
stability; Greece, Spain, and Poland all exhibit crossover memberships at some 
stage and thus have two pathways illustrated within chart 6.4. For each of these 
three countries one of these pathways represents stable membership of the 
WCPCSP type and by 2007 all countries appear reasonable secure within the 
type, with Greece demonstrating a membership score of 0.7. 
The remaining five members of the WPCSP type can be split into two categories 
for discussion. The first, which consists of Portugal and the Czech Republic is 
used to structure discussion simply because both countries demonstrate 
membership of the WPCSP type in both 2002 and 2007. Furthermore, the Czech 
Republic‘s pathway begins in the Conservative welfare type as does one of the 
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 The second highest score Finland exhibits is 0.39 in the PCSP type, all other scores are extremely low. 
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two possible Portuguese pathways. Despite similar pathways, the two countries 
have different membership strengths and their trajectories and membership scores 
suggest they may have different future memberships. If we look at the progression 
of Portuguese membership scores we can see that Portugal shifts from non-
membership (score being 0.42), to weak membership (0.57), and finally 
reasonably strong membership (0.78). By 2007 the highest score Portugal exhibits 
in any other type is 0.22 in the Conservative welfare type. Moreover, Portugal is 
consistently fully out of the PCSP type, which precipitates the conclusion that the 
WPCSP type may house Portugal at least in the near future. 
Where Portuguese non-membership of the EPL set and as such the PCSP type 
appears unlikely to shift, the future trajectory of the Czech Republic is less clear. 
When the Czech Republic shifted to the WPCSP type in 2002 it demonstrated a 
membership score (0.63) that while not strong enough to classify it as ‗fairly in‘ 
using Ragin‘s scale, was reasonably distanced from the crossover point. This 
score had reduced slightly by 2007 (to 0.58), but taken on its does not suggest too 
much. What is particularly pertinent is the fact that unlike Portugal, the Czech 
Republic does not demonstrate particularly strong non-membership of the EPL 
set. As such its membership scores for the PCSP type, while insufficient for 
inclusion in the type are much closer to the 0.5 crossover point and as such, 
Czech Republic ‗ascension‘ to the PCSP type would require a less extreme policy 
shift than would be necessary for Portuguese membership. That said, while the 
Czech Republic demonstrates EPL scores much closer to the 0.5 crossover point, 
there is no evidence of an upward trend. On the contrary, Czech Republic 
membership of the EPL reduces slightly between 2002 and 2007. Both countries 
then appear stable within the overall competition state policy group, whether they 
remain stable within the WPCSP type is perhaps less clear. 
The second category includes three countries that made the transition to the 
WPCSP type after 2002. To this end Italy and France would appear to have more 
in common with each other than they do with Japan. However, it should be 
acknowledged that all three nations are often grouped together in comparative 
studies (Esping-Andersen, 1990:52; Korpi and Palme, 1998:670:675). This is 
largely as a consequence of their perceived corporatist, conservative, and on 
occasions pluralist tendencies (Esping-Andersen, 1990:52; Howard, 1998:216; 
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Keeler, 1985:244). What unites France and Italy within the data as well as 
separating them slightly from Japan is that both France and Italy are members of 
the Conservative welfare type in both 1997 and 2002 before making the shift 
towards membership of the WPCSP type in 2007. In addition, both countries 
exhibit membership scores that while more in than out are still reasonably low71. It 
could be argued then that it is too early to predict whether either country is likely to 
enjoy long-term membership of the WPCSP type.  
What divides Italy and France relates to the probably trajectory any exit of the 
WPCSP in the near future would take. In the Italian case, the main ‗threat‘ to 
continued residence membership of the WPCSP type comes from its membership 
of the PCSP type. While currently insufficient for membership, the score of 0.47 is 
reasonably close to the 0.5 crossover point and reflects a shift in Italian EPL 
behaviour. Here the raw data shows that Italy‘s EPL membership rose from being 
fully out in 1997, to 0.42 in 2007 and 0.47 in 2007. Not only is the most likely 
challenger for Italy‘s membership close in terms of overall membership scores, the 
PCSP type has the upward trend to is advantage; if Italy‘s EPL scores were to 
continue on the same trajectory, it would soon gain membership of the EPL set 
and consequently, the PCSP type. 
The possible Italian movement from the WPCSP to the PCSP in the near future 
stands in contrast to the prospects of any potential movement in French 
membership. Here the raw data illustrates the fact that France seems more likely 
to slip back into the Conservative welfare type than move into the PCSP type. Of 
course the French membership of the WCSP type may prove stable, but the fact 
that across the full time period France remains resolutely fully out of the EPL set 
suggests that any movement is unlikely to be in the direction of the PCSP type. 
France, home to a strong history and ethos of collective worker solidarity 
(Abraham et al, 1994:4; Howard, 1998:201; Shorter and Tilly, 1971:67), seems 
unlikely to radically alter its approach to EPL in the near future. Whether it will 
reverse the recent trend in relaxing corporation tax is also unclear and as such, 
the future membership of France is ambiguous. 
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 France scores 0.51 while Italy scores 0.53. 
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The Japanese case is unique insofar as it represents the only example of a 
country moving from one of the other competition state groups to the policy pro-
competition state focused group. Japan has, contrary to the expectations of the 
competition state thesis, actually reversed competition state behaviours in one 
domain, that of neo liberalism. We can see that Japan‘s membership is split 
between the Conservative welfare and the neo liberal types in 2002 as it 
presented scores at the crossover point of 0.5 for both types. By 2007 
membership was unquestionably no longer of the neo liberal group and instead 
Japan demonstrated membership of the WPCSP type. This rejection of neo 
liberalism seems strange given the insistence of Cerny that neo liberalism once 
established would lock itself in (Cerny, 1997:264-266; 2008:16). This has clearly 
not happened, though it is worth noting that even when Japan shifts to the 
WPCSP type, it still exhibits scores on all types within the neo liberal group, that 
are just below 0.5. Perhaps then, the near future will see a return to membership 
of the minimal welfare set and as such, Japan would rejoin the neo liberal group. 
Another interesting feature of the Japanese case is that as opposed to all other 
nations that exhibit membership of either set in the third domain of the competition 
state, Japan‘s third domain membership is built around EPL rather than tax. In 
2007 only three countries from the entire sample –Germany, the US, and Japan- 
demonstrate membership of the EPL set but not membership of the tax set. With 
regards taxation, the trend is towards membership of the set, but by 2007 Japan is 
still ‗fairly out‘.  
The fact that Japan‘s WPCSP membership is built around EPL and not taxation 
means that even if PMR had been operationalised rather than EPL, Japan would 
not have demonstrated membership of the PCSP type. Here again Japan 
represents the exception within the WPCSP type. Had PMR replaced EPL in the 
analysis, the make-up of the group as a whole would be markedly different by 
2007. While the findings of 1997 would be almost identical, by 2002 many of the 
WPCSP nations would demonstrate PCSP membership as a consequence of 
replacing EPL with PMR. In addition, Belgium, France, and even Germany would 
meet the necessary criteria to qualify for membership of the WPCSP. By 2007 the 
UK and New Zealand would be joined by Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, and even France, leaving only Poland, Greece, and Japan in 
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the WPCSP type. Once again we see the substitution of PMR for EPL as affecting 
the overall picture. Interestingly, in each instance that such sensitivity analysis has 
been explored, the impact of replacing EPL with PMR has only begun to show by 
2002 and only seems profound by 2007. It would appear that approaches to PMR 
and EPL were similar in 1997, but that behaviour has shifted in terms of the former 
quicker than it has in terms of EPL. Whether trends in EPL will follow is less clear; 
although there is a decline in the strictness of EPL over time, it is rather gentle, 
especially compared to the decline in PMR scores. 
The discussion of the WPCSP type opened by noting how messy it appeared 
graphically. Despite the fact that there appeared to be a considerable amount of 
heterogeneity within the type, this masked a substantial amount of similarity. Every 
country except Japan was a member of the tax set rather than the EPL set. Many 
countries appear to be securely ensconced within the type, displaying only 
moderate evidence that they may make the transition to either the PCSP or 
Conservative welfare type in the near future. Where there is diversity in terms of 
the strength of membership or the route taken to membership it may very well be 
explained by the fact that this represents the most basic and in many cases only 
engagement with the competition state. If this is indeed such a paradigm defining 
moment, the sort Cerny and Evans suggest occurred within the UK and US during 
the 1980s, it is understandable that it represents a time of instability and as such, 
the diversity of pathways towards competition state behaviour and relative ‗mess‘ 
depicted in figure four makes qualitative sense. 
 
6.4: Reflection 
It is perhaps useful to begin a discussion about the bigger picture by mentioning 
Germany and Ireland. Throughout the entire time period Germany held resolutely 
to a rejection of the competition state thesis. For some, such an achievement 
surely represents a triumph of national identity, national priorities, and national 
sovereignty over the global economy. While economic growth has been relatively 
low and debt levels high in Germany72 when compared to the averages amongst 
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 In 2007 the annual growth rate was a 2.66% increase on the previous year. Debt stood at 39.43 as a 
percentage of GDP 
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both the neo liberal73 and active74 groups, Germany fares better when compared 
to those countries in the pro-competition state policy group. Here we see that while 
Germany still has a lower growth rate, it has a much lower level of debt than the 
average for the pro-competition state policy group75. Indeed Germany‘s level of 
central government debt is comparable to that of the US and the UK and is lower 
than that of Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy. 
German persistence in terms of its rejection of the competition state coupled with 
relative economic success in some respects, poses key questions for the 
competition state thesis. Does Germany stand as testament to the fact that nations 
are not forced into a competition state? Is the German case evidence that 
adoption of the competition state is not the only mechanism for survival in the 
global economy? Or finally, is it simply a matter of time. While Germany has 
remained consistently within the Conservative welfare type, on the activation, tax, 
and EPL sets, Germany has moved from strong non-membership to much closer 
to the crossover point. In terms of tax and EPL, Germany has moved from being 
fully out and fairly out of the sets respectively in 1997, to being only more out than 
in by 2007. While Germany clearly rejects the competition state in 2007, whether 
such a rejection will last is far from clear. Given that France, Italy, and Belgium -
countries often grouped with Germany (Abraham et al, 1993:15; Bonoli, 1997:361; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990:74; Korpi and Palme, 1998:670:675; Scruggs, 2006:354)- 
all vacated the Conservative welfare type with similar slow downward trends in 
EPL and taxation, we might predict that Germany will follow suit in the near future. 
While Germany came to represent a rejection of the competition state thesis, 
Ireland‘s performance as its standard bearer seems altogether more muted. 
Having demonstrated the most extreme scores in both chapters four and five, 
Ireland failed to stand out here in chapter six. This is undoubtedly in part due to 
the fact that the fuzzy-set methodology negated the impact of extreme behaviour 
on one dimension as a compensatory factor on others. The Irish case is still 
extremely interesting and perhaps still represents the best candidate for a future 
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 In 2007 the annual growth rate was an average increase on 4.34% on the previous year. The average debt 
level stood at 25.81 as a percentage of GDP. 
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 In 2007, with Belgium and Austria removed, the annual growth rate was an average increase on 3.04% on 
the previous year. Average debt stood at 27.37 as a percentage of GDP. 
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 In 2007 the annual growth rate for the WPCSP type was an average increase of 3.85 on the previous year. 
Average debt stood at 68.41 as a percentage of GDP. 
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inhabitation of the pure type. Ireland populated this type in 2002, but by 2007 
found itself back in the SNL+ category, with a reasonably weak membership score 
of only 0.57. The fact that Ireland appears so weak is not a reflection of a low 
score in the welfare, tax, or EPL sets, rather a low score in the non-membership of 
activation set. ALMP expenditure remained in 2007 at the level that had given it 
membership of the activation set in 2002, however unemployment increased 
slightly. Even so, Ireland‘s activation score of 0.43 is by no means emblematic of a 
wholesale rejection of activation on the part of the Irish government. Indeed, there 
is always the possibility that future data will show an Irish readjustment to redress 
the impact of rising unemployment. Ultimately, while at the time of writing things 
may seem less clear, as of 2007 the Irish competition state is still alive. The fact 
that it seems less strong is a reflection of the model underpinning the SNL+ type 
rather than a shift away from competition state behaviours. In essence, Ireland is 
unevenly punished for not quite demonstrating membership of the active set. 
The overall picture presented here does substantiate some of the observations 
made in chapter five. There is undoubtedly a general shift towards the competition 
state, with only Germany having resisted at this stage. For many of the recent 
converts to the competition state, this shift is largely driven by taxation policy, 
however in many cases trends suggest that this will not remain the case. Only a 
few of the more recent additions to the overall competition state project have 
cleaved to either the active or neo liberal models however, suggesting that while 
these countries recognise the need to harness the global economy, at this stage 
they are not prepared to fundamentally scale back their welfare state. Such an 
approach seems also to be favoured by the UK and New Zealand, two nations to 
which the neo liberal label is frequently applied (Beech, 2008:6; Bray and Walsh, 
1998:368; Larner, 2000:15; Lunt, 2008:410). The two key conclusions that can be 
drawn from the fuzzy-set methodology adopted here are that the overall shift 
towards a competition state seems to have occurred, and that stable, differentiated 
competition state forms do survive the shift from an additive index to a more 
theoretically driven methodology. 
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6.5: Conclusion 
The previous chapter suggested that not only was there a general shift towards a 
broad competition state environment, but that nations could be categorised as 
belonging to different forms of the competition state. Where chapter four had 
suggested that two competing models existed in the forms of neo liberal models 
and active models, chapter five suggested that an extra model driven by taxation 
may exist. This investigation sought to address these findings through the use of a 
different methodology, one that avoided some of the limitations of a z-score based 
additive index approach. 
The key weaknesses of an additive index approach are that it is subject to outlier 
effects and perhaps most importantly, such an approach only furnishes the reader 
with a illustration of the relative picture. As the previous chapter concluded, just 
because a nation acts the more like a competition state than any other, doesn‘t 
mean it is a competition state. The methodology adopted here avoids many of the 
limitations of additive indexes by requiring the researcher to set clear breakpoints 
to determine what is and what is not a competition state. Of course to achieve this 
the researcher must engage with existing scholarship to ensure that the decisions 
he or she makes truly reflect what constitutes a competition state. By comparing 
how countries fit the expectations laid out by the researcher within individual 
dimensions of the competition state and how such behaviours combine to give a 
complete picture, it is possible to categorise nations in a more nuanced way than 
is possible through additive indexing. 
Having operationalised the competition state thesis as a fuzzy-set ideal type 
investigation, the findings were remarkably similar to those in chapter five. The key 
messages were still that a shift towards the competition state seemed to have 
occurred over time for some nations, while others appeared stable within the 
competition state. Furthermore, membership of a competition state did not imply 
homogeneity, rather a range of competition state types were seen to exist. This 
study outlined four basic approaches to the competition state, each of which could 
be further differentiated, as well as a rejection of the competition state. The four 
approaches reflected behaviour along three domains of the competition state 
thesis, two that can be considered as backward looking, one that can be 
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conceptualised as forward looking and one that combined both forward and 
backward looking elements. The first approach to the competition state was built 
around a smaller financial role for the state, which in many cases would require 
the rolling back of expenditure where high levels were the historical norm. The 
second approach centred again on the need to restructure the existing approach 
of the state, but through the use of activation as a tool for restructuring rather than 
simply the reduction of spending. The third approach focused less on the existing 
operations of the established welfare instruments of the state and more on 
harnessing the potential of the global economy. And finally, the fourth approach, 
which was labelled as the pure competition state form, represented a blend of 
each domain. Each broad approach could be broken down into stronger and 
weaker forms and in most cases more than one form of each broad approach was 
populated by countries at some stage. 
The findings of this study suggest that not only are variant forms of the competition 
state theoretically conceivable, their existence is confirmed by the data that is 
available. While the pure form of the competition state was only fleetingly 
witnessed in terms of a case demonstrating membership, the other three 
approaches were healthily populated. Perhaps most importantly, each of the three 
broad approaches included much evidence of stability within their constituent 
types. On the whole the findings of this chapter hold few surprises; countries with 
a social democratic tradition cleaved towards the active model, those from Esping-
Andersen‘s liberal regime were, in the main, found in the neo liberal group, and the 
conservative/corporatist countries occupied the grouping that was built around pro-
competition state policies. To this end, only the UK and New Zealand confounded 
traditional groupings, finding themselves together as the only two nations in the 
pro-competition state type. 
The competition state would appear then to take many forms, each with one key 
purpose in common, to chase the competitive advantage. How nations approach 
that objective and the zeal with which they pursue this ideal differs between 
nations. There is much in common between the approaches of each country, 
which is reflected in the fact that many nations cluster within types and groups, but 
there is also a diversity of approaches open to countries. While these approaches 
are ultimately geared towards economic success and are as such bound together 
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in that respect, there is substantial qualitative difference between the various 
types, sometimes to such extent that they represent opposite and mutually 
exclusive approaches.   
What should be made of the core findings of this and the two preceding chapters 
is not entirely clear. On one hand the existence and stability of varying competition 
state forms represents a clear challenge to the competition state thesis. 
Conversely, the orientation of all competing models within a broad church of 
competition state rubric confirms that Cerny and Evans‘ competition state thesis 
holds much explanatory power. Equally, given that Cerny and Evans pin the blame 
on globalisation for the rise of the competition state we would expect such a rise to 
be nearing completion by 2007; while globalisation continues apace, surely those 
countries sampled in this study have been exposed for over twenty years now? 
However, perhaps the stickiness of institutions, the power of path dependency, 
and the incremental nature of the policy process has proven unexpectedly resilient 
in the face of globalisation and the big changes are yet to come. Even in the case 
of Germany we cannot say with certainty that the rise of the competition state has 
been resisted. 
In the next chapter the findings of all three empirical chapters will be considered 
with regards to what they tell us about the competition state and the welfare state. 
Reflecting on the literature surrounding the competition state thesis it must be 
noted that while this thesis provides much for Cerny and Evans to consider, many 
of the findings can be neatly woven into the competition state tapestry. 
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Chapter 7: Discussions and Conclusion 
7.1: Reflection: what was done and why 
7.1.1: Introduction 
This thesis opened with a discussion of how the welfare state had evolved in a 
time where the impact of policy and politics reached only as a far as the water‘s 
edge. For many, the seas that divided nations are now continuously parted by the 
global economy. How this change has affected nations is a source of great debate, 
with the spectrum or argument ranging from those who insist that the impact has 
been slight at best, to those who believe that everything we once knew has 
fundamentally changed. Many social scientists, placed at various points on this 
spectrum, have sought to explain the changing world and draw conclusions that 
deal directly with the welfare structures that were established when the world 
seemed like such a smaller place (See Bonoli, 1997; Castles, 2004; Esping-
Anderson, 1990; Hudson and Kühner, 2009; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Scruggs and 
Allan, 2006; and Vis, 2007, to name a few). 
7.1.2: The competition state thesis 
The purpose of this study was explore one of the many theories that sought to 
conceptualise and explain the shifts in political economy many feel we have 
witnessed during the last thirty years. The competition state thesis as articulated 
by Cerny and Evans (1999; 2003; 2004) holds that alongside and as a 
consequence of globalisation, the world has witnessed the rise of the competition 
state and the decline of welfare states around the world. This competition state is 
the product of a fundamentally different ethos to that which underpinned all forms 
of the welfare state, prioritising the needs of the economy over the needs of a 
country‘s citizenry. This is a profound and important notion, one that suggests 
however well-intentioned governments may be, they can no longer set important 
welfare targets unless they also produce economic success (Cerny, 1997:259; 
2008:10:25; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2003:25; 2004:51:61). This has of 
course profound implications for social policy, suggesting that strategies to combat 
social exclusion, poverty, ill-health, unemployment, and poor education are 
prioritised only when there is an economic benefit to doing so. The competition 
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state thesis is a comprehensive analytical tool for understanding and studying the 
many changes wrought by globalisation and the establishment of a global 
economy. It is also a summary of how the authors believe the world is. Much of 
what Cerny and Evans say makes qualitative sense, tapping into a sense that the 
collective bonds of society have weakened as the means of production have 
become less central to the economy. With this weakening of collective bonds 
being replaced by the atomistic nature of a more consumer led society, they insist 
that much of the welfare state‘s legitimacy has been stripped away (Cerny, 
1995:10; 1997:255; 2008:10; Cerny and Evans, 1999:3; 2003:25; MacGregor, 
2003:62). 
There is no real consensus as to whether Cerny and Evans are correct, with some 
taking particular exception to their thesis. For some the competition state is simply 
a stylised moniker attached to the existence of neo liberal policy goals in a couple 
of countries (Hay, 2004:43). For others it is almost a product of a right-wing dupe, 
aimed at justifying ideological decisions taken in the early 1980s (Castles, 
2004:179). Other advance many of the same arguments as Cerny and Evans, 
whilst stopping a little short of some of the competition state thesis‘ more extreme 
assertions (Ellison 2006:33:45; Giddens, 2002:9; Held et al, 1999:7; Hudson and 
Lowe, 2009:35). What is important however is that it has captured the attention of 
many in the social policy and political science world. 
7.1.3: An empirical investigation 
It is undoubtedly true that the competition state is a powerful thesis, one that sits 
easily with the changes we have witnessed over the last twenty to thirty years. In a 
parsimonious manner it offers explanations for those changes and prompts the 
social scientist to consider many important questions regarding the future of 
welfare provision. It is a testament to the strength of Cerny and Evans‘ convictions, 
their persuasive power, and the fact that their work has continued to ring true with 
people from academic, government, or lay backgrounds, that it remains pertinent. 
The thesis has however taken much for granted, seeking to explain how the world 
is, how almost all contemporary phenomena can be incorporated into the rubric of 
the competition state thesis, and how the future world will be. Other than 
persuasive arguments though, very little empirical evidence has been advanced to 
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support the thesis. Whether it has been an unwillingness to address the 
ambiguities that Evans himself acknowledges exist (Evans and Lunt, 2010:2), the 
endeavour to incorporate almost all events within the rubric of the competition 
state (Hay, 2004:42; Taylor, 2010:41), or the lack of systematic empirical research, 
the Competition state thesis is possibly at risk of slipping from its privileged 
position within the political economy literature. The main protagonists have worked 
tirelessly to ensure that the thesis remains contemporary and pertinent, however 
the lack of systematic empirical evidence to support what are particularly bold 
claims made within the competition state thesis represents a clear limitation. 
The relative merits and weaknesses of the competition state thesis have been 
debated widely and as such the most important and useful impact this thesis could 
have had on the competition state debate was clearly to address this lack of 
empirical exploration. It is only by doing so that this thesis could offer something 
new to the debate and genuinely inform that debate. The broad aim of this thesis 
was simply to explore the competition state through empirical means. What would 
an empirical investigation tell us about the competition state thesis, the health of 
the welfare state in various nations, and the wider political economy debate? The 
first stage would naturally involve investigating whether an empirical investigation 
would be possible and how it would be best approached. As the competition state 
is advanced as a replacement for the welfare state, it seemed logical that the 
many principles behind empirical studies of the welfare state could be applied to 
the study of the competition state and indeed this proved to be the case. 
Key questions that this thesis sought to address were: is there evidence to 
suggest that the competition state exists? Given that the competition state would 
replace welfare states that were comparatively diverse, would we uncover any 
evidence of differentiated models of the competition state? How would the 
competition state change over time? Does the competition state truly signal the 
death of the welfare state? Does an empirical approach tell us anything 
unexpected, perhaps not even addressed within the competition state thesis? And 
finally, are the implications of the competition state as outlined by Cerny and 
Evans evidenced in any way? For example, is the state qualitatively 
disempowered? 
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The empirical investigation utilised two main methodologies; an index based 
methodology and fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. In both cases the purpose was to 
identify competition state behaviours amongst OECD countries. This additive 
index utilised a methodology based on the Z-scores generated by measurements 
of different government actions within dimensions of the competition state. The Z-
score based approach is, like Esping-Andersen‘s famous decommodification 
index, devised to place welfare states into different ideal types (Esping-Andersen, 
1990), based upon deviations from the mean. This is a useful approach, which 
avoids many of the problems faced by Esping-Andersen‘s work (See Ditch, 
1999:118; Pierson, 2006:174-176; Scruggs and Allen, 2006:1-5), producing a 
league table of scores that reveals ―how far a country falls above or below the 
average for the group as a whole‖ (UNICEF, 2007:7). Owing to the limitations of 
the z-score methodology, a slight alteration was made to allow for the comparison 
of countries‘ scores over time, but essentially, the first and second empirical 
chapters followed the same broad methodology. 
The fuzzy-set ideal type methodology represented a departure not only within this 
thesis, but also from the orthodoxy of comparative welfare studies. The method, 
which has some important strengths is still relatively unused within welfare studies, 
however key recent publications (Kvist, 2007; Hudson and Kühner, 2009; 2010; 
Ragin, 2000; Vis, 2007) have placed it very much at the forefront of comparative 
studies. This method was adopted in an attempt to not only address some of the 
questions raised in the second empirical chapter, but also to tie the quantitative 
analysis much tighter to the qualitative, theoretical approach of the authors and of 
the CST as well as the observations of other commentators. While the 
standardisation of data in the form of z-scores allowed the construction of an index 
that was able to capture the overall picture of a process that involved elements 
that were at times contradictory, it still faced some major limitations. In terms of the 
data, z-score indexes, along with factor analysis and cluster analysis is dependent 
on mean averages, which as Hudson and Kühner highlight, ―mask important 
elements of cross-national diversity‖ (Hudson and Kühner, 2009:36; 
2010:169:170).Fuzzy-set ideal type analysis avoids many of the limitations of 
additive indexes and as such allows the researcher and reader to reach firmer 
conclusions from the data. 
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The real strength of employing this methodology is that is allows the researcher to 
operationalise a concept that has distinct dimensions in a way that ensures that 
the behaviour in one dimension is quantified and analysed separately from the 
other dimensions, while still being considered in the ‗final reckoning‘ when one 
address the concept as a whole (Hudson and Kühner, 2010:170). This is achieved 
through the method itself, which requires the researcher to set thresholds that 
relate to the behaviour they are measuring (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 
2009:25-26; Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009:77; Ragin, 2000:150:318; 
2009:93:118; Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:132). 
7.2: Synthesis of findings 
The three empirical chapters of this thesis have all been analysed and discussed 
individually and at length. Furthermore, with the three chapters reflecting the 
organic development of the investigation, the findings of chapter six represent the 
most important of this thesis. That said, it is useful to take a brief look at the 
complete picture, to explore the similarities and any differences within the results 
of three methodologically distinct approaches and therein lies the purpose of this 
small summary. In the interests of brevity and as an acknowledgement that the 
reader has already been subjected to many charts, tables, and much raw data, the 
focus here is on general trends and findings, and not a re-analysis of data. 
Briefly, if we recall, the first empirical chapter set out to test whether the 
competition state thesis could be operationalised in a meaningful way. To that end, 
perhaps the key finding was that it could. While the argument advanced within this 
thesis is that additive indexes have shortcomings that are substantial enough to 
merit the utilisation of an alternative methodology, this clearly represents a good 
first step. Indeed the index method enabled a comparison with Esping-Andersen‘s 
seminal work The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). The second 
empirical chapter built upon the first while redressing its key short-coming; the fact 
that the first chapter offered a snapshot of only one year. The third was shaped 
very much by the findings of the longitudinal study undertaken in the second 
chapter and can be viewed as complementing, refining, and concluding the task 
undertaken in the second empirical chapter. As the conclusion will note, the 
methodology adopted in third empirical chapter has limitations, but its key strength 
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is that allowed firm assertions about the competition state thesis to be aired and 
many of the questions raised in earlier chapters to be answered (for now). 
Across all three empirical chapters the key finding has consistently been that 
competition state behaviours are in evidence globally. When time-series is 
introduced, it is clear that engagement with the competition state has occurred 
across the OECD over time. For some countries engagement was evident in 1997; 
the first point of study. For other nations the assimilation within the norms of the 
competition state came later. Importantly though, while there exists a general 
acceptance of the competition state, it is clear that there is much diversity with 
respect to how countries have engaged with the competition state and the extent 
to which they have engaged with it. In the first two empirical chapters this was 
demonstrated by the relative scores exhibited by countries. In the most basic 
terms, there appeared to exist leaders and laggards in terms of competition state 
behaviours. The diversity within the overall picture reflected the diversity within the 
constituent elements of the index and the subsequent league tables they begat. 
On each dimension there were leaders and laggards, as of course there must be 
when cases are ranked. An important finding of the first empirical chapter -one that 
ran contrary to the expectations of the competition state thesis- was that the 
leaders of some dimensions were not necessarily the leaders of other dimensions, 
or indeed leaders in the final overall reckoning. An important and extremely 
interesting finding of the first empirical chapter, a finding that was to emerge in the 
subsequent chapters, was that countries engaged with different elements of the 
competition state, with varying degrees of intensity. 
Early evidence, that is to say the findings of that first empirical chapter, suggested 
that there existed two poles within the competition state, one built around low 
spending and a lack of generosity and another built around a more active model of 
the competition state. These two models stood both the test of time as well as 
changes in methodologies. Time-series suggests however that there is even more 
diversity within competition states and that just as countries may take a low-spend, 
ungenerous approach, or alternatively a high-spend, more generous yet active 
approach, there were other countries that simply seem concerned with attracting 
business. The output in the form of league tables from the additive index approach 
hinted at many issues and raised many questions; chiefly it suggested that 
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countries configured their competition states in different ways and asked whether 
there was a typology that could be built around such configurations. The third 
empirical chapter sought to address these suggestions and questions and 
concluded that that was exactly what has happened over the last decade-and-a-
half.  
Since 1997 the picture within the OECD has been one of engagement with the 
competition state. Given that most OECD nations could not be classified as neo 
liberal in 1997 and given that the orthodox neo liberal conception of the 
competition state is one marked by profound retrenchment and limitation of the 
state‘s welfare function, this would seem like a profound statement. Indeed in 
some senses it is. However the most important finding that has emerged 
throughout all three empirical chapters is that demonstration of competition state 
characteristics does not necessarily spell the end of the welfare state or even 
welfare provision. Had we insisted that for a country to be considered as a 
competition state it must adhere to competition state expectations on all 
dimensions that were operationalised, we would have been forced to reach two 
conclusions. The first conclusion would have been that given that most countries 
did not historically conform to the low-spend, ungenerous ideals of the competition 
state, displaying such behaviour here would signal that the competition state had 
been adopted by such countries at the expense of their welfare state. Through the 
analysis of data, the second conclusion would be that no country except perhaps 
Ireland could be classified as a competition state. Quite simply, countries do not 
conform to all expectations of the competition state thesis. In the first and second 
empirical chapters this was evident owing to the fact that all countries except 
Ireland exhibited negative scores on at least one dimension of the index. By 2007 
even Ireland exhibited a negative score in one dimension. In the third empirical 
chapter the fact that the pure type remained almost completely unpopulated 
across the three time periods stands as testament to the fact that countries do not 
engage with all aspect of the competition state. 
The fact that countries engage with only some of the competition state thesis, and 
that the areas that are engaged with vary country-to-country is interesting. What is 
perhaps even more thought provoking is that not only do approaches to the 
competition state differ, but some approaches appear to be mutually exclusive. 
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Indeed, with the exception of Ireland, an active approach seems to always exist in 
an environment of high expenditure and a low expenditure approach seems to 
always preclude an active approach. It would appear that these represent two 
largely incompatible competition state goals. This could prompt debate about 
whether the active approach is a true reflection of the competition state. However 
a finding consistent to both the second and third empirical chapters is that where 
countries demonstrate competition state behaviour with regards either welfare 
expenditure or activation, they also always exhibit such behaviours on another 
dimension. 
That there are different types of competition state, both theoretical and in evidence 
is clear. It is clear also that these can be grouped into four broad categories based 
on how behaviours on three key domains of the competition state are combined by 
each country. In accordance with Cerny and Evans, the pure competition state 
would blend all three domains (Cerny and Evans, 1999:11), adhering to the 
expectations of the competition state in all respects. The remaining three groups 
are a result of impure blends of behaviours. The pro-business policy group 
involves spending levels that are discordant with the competition state as well as a 
lack of activation. The active group holds activation at its core, rejecting low levels 
of expenditure and blends those features with varying levels of engagement with 
the pro-business policy goals of the competition state. The neo liberal group by 
contrast rejects activation, and conforms to the low-spend ideals of the competition 
state thesis. Countries that follow such an approach are differentiated further by 
the degree to which they demonstrate pro-business competition state policies. Of 
course a fifth approach, one that is evidenced most consistently by Germany, is a 
complete disengagement from the competition state. 
Cerny‘s belief that the neo liberal model reflects the orthodox competition state 
form (Cerny, 1997:259; 2008:10:25; 2010a:17; Cerny and Evans, 2003:25; 
2004:51:61) is severely tested by the stability of the alternative competition state 
forms. Not only does the active approach seem to stand in contrast to the neo 
liberal approach, it showed no signs of abating over time and appeared as clearly 
and as robust across all three empirical chapters. To return to the earlier point, 
those nations that have demonstrated an historic commitment to a generously 
funded welfare state do appear to have accepted at least some competition state 
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norms. They haven‘t however borne witness to the demise of the welfare state. 
Furthermore, not even the existence of a neo liberal group of competition states 
stands as evidence that such a process has occurred at all. The countries that 
occupy this group fall into two broad categories: those that are long-established 
industrial economies that have at best been home to a lean welfare state; and 
newly industrialised or in some cases newly formed economies that have never 
developed a welfare state to speak of. It is reasonable to suggest that within this 
neo liberal group, social expenditure as a proportion of GDP is much lower than 
would be expected in a welfare state. However even in the ‗golden age‘ of welfare 
states, none of the countries in this group ever demonstrated expenditure levels 
that one would expect of a welfare state, or that were comparable with other 
welfare states (Arjona et al, 2002:18; Castles, 1986:675). Ultimately, classification 
as a neo liberal competition state could have only been achieved by most of the 
countries sampled in this thesis if they had experienced substantial retrenchment 
at some stage. In the cases of those countries that are classified in this study as 
neo liberal countries, no retrenchment was necessary as their social expenditure 
levels were historically and consistently low. 
The final key finding, which was alluded to in the second empirical chapter and 
crystallised in the third empirical chapter is that some countries simply adopted a 
competition state approach moving forward, without focusing attention on those 
elements of the welfare state that Cerny and Evans suggest are reshaped to fit a 
globalising world (Cerny and Evans 2003:24). Here countries did not exhibit social 
expenditure or ALMP expenditure levels expected within a competition state, 
rather their competition state approach was dominated by providing an 
environment that was friendly for business. Most countries achieved this through 
their tax policies. The stronger variant of this approach used tax policy alongside a 
more business friendly approach to employment protection. That is of course to 
say less protection for employees from dismissals. Interestingly, both New 
Zealand and the UK occupied this category and held their membership thereof 
throughout the entire study. While the memberships of most countries within the 
fuzzy-set ideal type approach of the third empirical chapter were to be expected, 
mirroring as they did the findings of the first two empirical chapters, the UK and 
New Zealand classifications came as a surprise. The suggestion is of course that 
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despite all the rhetoric and regardless of the fact that the UK represents one of the 
two ‗founding competition states‘ around which Cerny and Evans built their thesis, 
the rise of the UK and New Zealand competition state has not signalled the end of 
their respective welfare states. Undoubtedly both countries have vigorously 
pursued the economic benefits that competition state policies are purported to 
bring, but this doesn‘t appear to be at the expense of previous welfare 
arrangements. 
Taking a step back, one finding is particularly striking and that is how very similar 
the groupings produced in the third empirical chapter are to Esping-Andersen‘s 
three worlds of welfare. Of course there are extra countries in this study, but they 
fit round already established clusters of Esping-Andersen‘s liberal, conservative, 
and social democratic nations. Indeed the only countries that really escape their 
three worlds‘ groupings are the UK and New Zealand.  That is not to say that the 
competition state typology is the same as Esping-Andersen‘s. While many of the 
countries that were grouped together in Esping-Andersen‘s study are grouped 
together here, many have shifted between competition state types over time, 
reflecting a transition in approaches, and many exhibit qualitative differences from 
one another. What the apparent explanatory power of Esping-Andersen‘s 
groupings serves to underscore is that just as with the form a nation‘s welfare 
state takes is a reflection of many domestic factors and active decisions, so is its 
competition state form.  
To summarise then: the three empirical approaches adopted in this thesis confirm 
that the competition state thesis can be operationalised in a meaningful way. This 
first broad finding is central to all other that follow it; the index method and the 
fuzzy-set method draw on the established scholarship to ensure that any output is 
meaningful. The second key finding is that there appear to be variant forms of the 
competition state. The third important finding is that over time nearly all countries 
demonstrate competition state behaviours. The fourth finding is that the rise of the 
competition state has not been homogenous; there has been no wholesale 
adoption of the neo liberal model. The fifth finding is that stability over time exists 
in all forms of the competition state. A sixth finding is that competition state groups 
are in many ways analogous to Esping-Andersen‘s three worlds of welfare. And 
finally, the seventh and perhaps most important finding is that the adoption of 
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competition state practices does not necessitate the stripping back of social 
expenditure. 
7.3: Discussion: From welfare state to competition state? Or Welfare state to 
competition states? The rise of the differentiated competition state and the 
stability of welfare 
Both methodologies revealed much of interest and despite their differences in 
approach, most of the key findings were common to both. The main finding, 
consistently demonstrated across all three empirical chapters, was that countries 
do exhibit behaviours consistent with the competition state. This in itself is 
extremely important as it represents the first systematically reached empirical 
endorsement of the competition state thesis. When time series analysis was 
introduced, the evidence seemed even more compelling. Where a snapshot of one 
year had suggested that all nations demonstrated some engagement with the 
competition state, a longitudinal analysis illuminated trends towards stronger 
expressions of competition state behaviours over time. Of course, by arranging the 
nations in a league table based on their scores, competition state leaders and 
laggards emerged. However, as Esping-Andersen argues in terms of welfare 
states, the concept of leaders and laggards is misleading where nations are 
actually playing different games (Esping-Andersen, 1990:27-28:32). This was not 
an anticipated issue; the body of literature authored by Cerny and Evans both 
collectively and individually on the issue of the competition state points very clearly 
to only one approach. Both concede that alternative models may fleetingly exist, 
but that the orthodox neo liberal model represents the most successful and that as 
economic success is the engine room of the competition state, it is naturally the 
long-term competition state form (Cerny, 1997:263:266; 2008:16; Cerny and 
Evans, 1999:3:7; Cerny et al, 2005:21-22).  
All three empirical chapters presented clear evidence that nations do indeed 
engage with different elements of the competition state. While the evidence was 
not conclusive in the first two empirical chapters, the fuzzy-set ideal type 
methodology clearly illustrated a differentiated approach to the competition state. 
Moreover, while a snapshot of only one year left open the possibility that these 
alternative competition state forms were indeed fleeting manifestations of early 
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engagement with the competition state, the longitudinal fuzzy-set results 
illuminated the stability of this diversity. More importantly, the data analysed hinted 
at an insurmountable divide between two of the key competition state models. Put 
simply, activation and low expenditure were incompatible.  
7.4: Reflection on the thesis as a whole: meeting the aims of the study and 
making an original contribution to knowledge 
7.4.1: Meeting the aims of the study and contributing to knowledge 
As stated, the aim of this thesis was to shed new light on the competition state 
thesis. As it was put in the introduction, quite simply, this thesis asked what a 
systematic empirical approach to the competition state tells us. Does it answer 
questions? Does it pose new questions? It is clear that as with most investigations, 
this thesis poses as many questions as it answers. 
The purpose of any thesis is of course to make an interesting, original contribution 
to knowledge; to further the understanding of a given subject. To this end the 
pursuit of an empirical investigation of the competition state, one conducted in a 
comparative setting clearly addresses a gap in scholarship. The publication of the 
findings of the first empirical chapter within this thesis stands as testament to the 
potential impact this investigation can have. The approach taken and the findings 
that have been uncovered add a depth to existing competition state literature as 
well as broadening the debate to cover countries that have to date only been 
referred to in passing. By demonstrating that the approaches taken through 
investigations of welfare states can be equally applied to the concept of the 
competition state and that such a project yields interesting and meaningful 
findings, perhaps goes some way to answering some of the accusations levelled 
by Hay at the competition state thesis. 
In reality the key contributions to knowledge are that in the first instance, a 
rigorous empirical investigation of the competition state finds substance and not 
merely a stylised account of capitalism under Thatcher and Blair (see Hay, 2004 
for such an argument). It is clear that over time nations have, at the aggregate 
level, embraced the competition state, or perhaps have been embraced by the 
competition state. The second key contribution is the evidence that supports the 
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notion of diversity within this overall embracing of the competition state. While 
cautiously acknowledging the limitations of the study and accepting that the 
transition towards a single competition state model over time is still possible, his 
thesis provides compelling evidence of diversity. This should not be used to refute 
the core messages of the competition state thesis, rather underscore the value 
attached to competing in the global economy irrespective of historical approaches 
to welfare. 
7.4.2: Limitations 
It is important however that a researcher acknowledges where a thesis can be 
strengthened or might be flawed. The limitations of any quantitative study are well 
aired (See Goldstein, 1986:608; Kaplan and Duchan, 1988:572; Ragin, 2000:106-
107; Walle, 1997:525). As indeed are the limitations of qualitative research, 
inductive research and deductive research. At times this thesis blended all four 
approaches to the study of the competition state and while this was undertaken 
with the intention of capturing their strengths, undoubtedly some will point to the 
short comings of such an approach. That said, this thesis never intended to 
represent the only possible approach to operationalising the competition state, 
rather it sought to provide a meaningful empirical study and explore what such a 
study could tell us. To that end it succeeded and to hold as a limitation of the 
thesis the fact that it adopted one approach over another is to engage in a zero 
sum game. That is not however to say that this thesis was not replete with 
limitations, as any study of its nature is bound to be. There are genuine limitations 
that relate to decisions made within the methodologies adopted. It is such 
limitations that represent a constructive debate around what could have been done 
differently and on reflection, perhaps what should have been done differently. 
The first obvious limitation of this thesis is that it operationalised only sections of 
the thesis. This was because either data didn‘t exist for some elements, or 
conceptually it seemed almost impossible to operationalise some elements. On 
reflection however, perhaps more could have been operationalised, though this 
would in turn have presented methodological issues. A prime example of this type 
of limitation can be seen in the decision not to operationalise the ‗recasting of party 
ideology‘. This represents a core dimension of the competition state thesis and is 
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one of the dimensions highlighted by Cerny and Evans as providing an empirical 
foundation for testing the competition state (Cerny and Evans, 1999:11). It was 
argued in the first empirical chapter that while it is possible to think of the 
‗recasting of party ideology‘ as a theoretically measurable indicator of the 
competition state, operationalisation would prove difficult. The objection to 
operationalising this feature was built around the fact that while there is general 
agreement that in the UK, New Labour has undergone profound ideological 
change, how one would measure the scope of this is unclear. It was posited that a 
simple dichotomy of ‗undergone ideological recasting‘ on one hand and ‗not 
undergone recasting‘ on the other hand tells us very little. Furthermore, the very 
notion that parties haven‘t adjusted naturally over a fifteen to twenty year period is 
possibly naïve. The discussion concluded by insisting that attempting to 
differentiate the different degrees to which a party has recasted its ideology would 
prove a subjective and ultimately arbitrary task, and would again tell us very little. 
All of these are reasonable and valid points, however it is clear they gained more 
traction because the initial methodology that was adopted was the z-score based 
additive index. As this relied on quantification and was employed in a way that 
reflect previous scholarly uses of the index approach, the recasting of party 
ideology hardly seemed like a compatible concept. 
In retrospect the recasting of party ideologies may have lent itself to 
operationalisation as a fuzzy set. This would have involved an innovative 
employment of the method and represented a truly mixed methods approach and 
may have enriched the findings. However, as the methodologies developed 
organically from that first empirical chapter, this approach was not considered. 
Indeed, the fact that no extra elements of the competition state thesis were added 
to the study once the fuzzy-set method was adopted represents a limitation in 
itself. In reality even the operationalisation of a recasting party ideology set within 
the fuzzy-set ideal type approach would have still been ambitious at best and 
potentially inappropriate. As this thesis frequently reiterated, constructing and 
calibrating sets requires a sound and deep understanding of and familiarity with 
the substantive knowledge needed to operationalise a concept. In the case of 
party ideologies across the OECD, not only would this require the collection of a 
staggering amount of primary resources from undefined sources, it would require 
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the researcher to understand such information. This would require proficiency in 
over a dozen languages, but also an appreciation of the subtle nuances that may 
have been context and culturally specific. Operationalising such a set within the 
confines of this thesis would no doubt have proven unfeasible and to undertake 
such a task without the aforementioned skills would produce meaningless sets. 
The issue of ideological change was not the only example of a dimension that 
went un-operationalised; Evans points out that the paper published with the 
findings of the first empirical chapter failed to address the importance of policy 
transfer (Evans, 2010:104). Indeed this is correct and other examples can 
undoubtedly be highlighted. The subjective nature of the decisions behind what 
was operationalised was undoubtedly compounded by the methodologies used. 
To this end, while fuzzy-set ideal type analysis undoubtedly represented a useful 
approach that redressed many of the limitations of the index approach, it did 
necessitate a substantial loss of information. By only operationalising four of the 
five dimensions analysed in the first two empirical chapters as sets within the third 
chapter, a substantial amount of information was lost. Similarly, disaggregating the 
tax and regulation dimension also led to information loss. It is definitely true that 
the fuzzy-set approach enriched the information that was used, giving it more 
meaning within the debate, however this came at the expense of a substantial 
amount of raw information. 
7.4.3: Lessons to be drawn 
While it is important to acknowledge the limitations of any study, it is important to 
note that this thesis succeeded in operationalising the competition state as the 
subject of empirical study. Furthermore, the findings that were uncovered will and 
already have begun to impact on the competition state debate. In terms of a 
scholarly impact, this thesis necessitates a reappraisal of two key assertions of the 
competition state thesis. It is taken for granted in the works of Cerny and Evans 
(1999; 2002; 2004) that there is only one viable model of the competition state and 
that owing to this, the demise of the welfare state, if not already underway, is 
sealed and unavoidable. As with many theories, it is important that empirical 
evidence is blended with theoretical debates. In the case of the competition state, 
most of what Cerny and Evans posit makes sense and much of this is 
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subsequently supported when empirical evidence is explored. Some assertions 
are not supported however and in the face of empirical evidence, it is important 
that these are revisited. The empirical evidence should not be considered infallible 
of course; there are limits to what the methods adopted in this thesis can tell us. 
Perhaps an alternative approach to operationalising the competition state, the 
selection of different countries, variables, and time periods would have yielded 
different results and as such, different conclusions. The task now is to assimilate 
these findings into the competition state debate, perhaps even challenging them 
with different empirical approaches. 
For now, the key message for those interested in social policy must be that there 
is clearly an alternative. Social policy is not wholly subsumed to the needs of the 
economy and even when a countries polity is dominated by the pursuit of the 
competitive advantage, this need not restrict core social policy options. Castles is 
convinced that the narrative of the new global economic order replete with new 
economic realities has been overstated by those who wish to see the narrowing of 
policy options (Castles, 2004:46:179). This predisposition to narrow policy options 
is often considered a reflection of the desires of a competition state elite consisting 
of the actors who stand to gain the most from economic success (Cerny, 
2000:448; 2008:34; Cerny, 2010b:129; Cerny et al, 2005:19; Cerny and Evans, 
1999:17; 2003:39; Hacker and Pierson, 2010:45-46). However, it is clear that he 
varying forms of the competition state offer similar patterns of economic success. 
There may then be a bigger role for the ideals and beliefs of decision makers than 
the competition state thesis suggests. Economic success cannot be the sole 
determinant of what form a country‘s competition state takes as evidence shows 
there is great variance in debt and growth levels within and between different 
competition state forms. This leaves other processes such as decision making 
within the policy process, implementation and feedback, path dependency, and 
institutions with key roles in determining the type of competition state a country 
develops.  
7.4.4: Where next? 
This thesis never aimed or purported to ‗close the case‘ on the competition state 
thesis. Rather it represents one approach to operationalising and analysing it. 
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There are others and it may be that the exploration of these is worthwhile. Within 
the approach adopted here there is also still much to be done. Whether the 
typology advanced here proves useful as an explanatory tool for a range of 
welfare outcomes is particularly interesting. Is it reasonable to hypothesise that 
human capital is higher within the active competition states? Is unemployment 
lower in the active group or the neo liberal group? Are nations more equal if they 
have active competition states rather than neo liberal competition states? Which 
competition state form proves economically more successful over time? There is 
also the need to revisit the study with data as it is published in order to assess 
whether the models remain stable; whether the trends that seemed to be in their 
infancy take off or flatten out. What effect will or perhaps has the worldwide 
financial crisis have on competition state types? 
Further avenues of study involve the newly emerging global players: India, China, 
Brazil, and Chile amongst others. Comparable data is unlikely to become available 
for past years, however as ascension to full member status within the OECD is 
achieved, it is hopeful future data may become available. Even where data is 
patchy, it may be possible to operationalise lone sets within the fuzzy set approach 
and while this does not represent a complete investigation, it is a start. Of 
particular interest will undoubtedly be the emergence of China as a major global 
player. Will China come to represent an ideal competition state type as Cerny 
suggests (Cerny, 2010a:17)? Or will the sheer size of the Chinese economy be, as 
Taylor predicts (Taylor, 2010:41), sufficient to guarantee success without needing 
to conform to the competition state approach? 
Cerny and Evans are correct, how countries respond to the global economy in the 
21st century is sure to be the main challenge of the foreseeable future. But comfort 
should be drawn from the knowledge that they have options. 
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Appendix 
A.1: Bar chart showing overall welfare scores in 2002 with 1997 as a 
reference year 
 
A.2: Dimension bar charts for 2007 omitted from the main body of the thesis 
A.2.1 
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A.2.3 
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A.3 Tables showing results of sensitivity analysis when PMR is 
operationalised instead of EPL. 
A.3.1: Fuzzy set membership for 1997 where PMR is operationalised rather than EPL 
Country Membership with PMR Membership with EPL Change 
Australia Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Austria weak pro-cstat policy Weak pro-cstat economic 
policy 
No change 
Belgium Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Canada Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Czech 
Republic 
Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Denmark Active+strong Active+strong No change 
Finland Weak pro-cstat policy Weak pro-cstat economic 
policy 
No change 
France Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Germany Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Greece Con welfare/Weak pro Con welfare/Weak Pro-
cstat economic policy 
No change 
Ireland Neo-lib+ Hybrid Pure Changed group 
Italy Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Japan Neo-liberal Neo-liberal+ Membership less pronounced 
Korea Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Netherlands Active/Active+ Active/Active+ No change 
New Zealand Pro-cstat policy Pro-cstat economic policy No change 
Norway Active+ Active+ No change 
Poland Conservative welfare Weak pro-cstat economic 
policy 
Membership less pronounced 
Portugal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal No change 
Slovak 
Republic 
Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Spain Conservative 
welfare/Weak pro 
Conservative welfare 
/Weak Pro-cstat 
economic policy 
No change 
Sweden Active+ Active+ No change 
Switzerland Active+ Active+strong Membership less pronounced 
United 
Kingdom 
Pro-cstat policy Pro-cstat economic Policy No change 
United States Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Notes: 1). Less pronounced denotes that when EPL is replaced in the analysis by PMR, a 
country’s membership of the overall group (i.e Neo-liberal, active, Conservative, or Pro-
competitive policy) becomes weaker. An example would be Switzerland, which was a 
member of the Active group overall in both analyses but moved from the active+strong set 
to the active+ set when EPL was replaced by PMR.  
2). Twenty one countries showed no change when EPL was replaced by PMR, three 
countries saw their membership of overall groups become less pronounced and one 
country moved changed group. In the case of Ireland, movement was towards the overall 
grouping it came to inhabit in 2002 using EPL. 
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A.3.2: Fuzzy set memberships for 2002 where PMR is operationalised rather than EPL 
Country Membership with 
PMR 
Membership with EPL Change 
Australia Strong Neo-lib+ Strong Neo-liberal+ No change 
Austria Pro-cstat policy Weak Pro cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Belgium Weak pro-cstat policy Conservative welfare Changed group 
Canada Neo-liberal+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Czech 
Republic 
Pro-cstat policy Weak Pro cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Denmark Active+strong Active+Strong No change 
Finland Pro-cstat policy Weak Pro cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
France Weak pro-cstat policy Conservative welfare Changed group 
Germany Weak pro-cstat policy Conservative welfare Changed group 
Greece Con welfare/weak 
pro-cstat 
Con welfare/Weak pro 
cstat policy 
No change 
Ireland Pure Pure No change 
Italy Conservative welfare Conservative welfare No change 
Japan Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal Membership more pronounced 
Korea Strong Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ Membership more pronounced 
Netherlands Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
New Zealand Pro-cstat policy Pro-cstat policy No change 
Norway Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
Poland Weak pro-cstat policy Pro cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Portugal Pro-cstat policy Weak Pro cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Slovak 
Republic 
Pro-cstat policy Con welfare/Weak pro 
cstat policy 
Membership more pronounced 
Spain weak/pro Con welfare/Weak pro 
cstat policy 
Membership more pronounced 
Sweden Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
Switzerland Active+strong Active+strong No change 
United 
Kingdom 
Pro-cstat policy Pro cstat policy No change 
United States Neo-liberal+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Note: Replacing EPL with PMR sees twelve countries develop stronger membership of their 
overall group. Three countries change with respect to overall group membership, one of 
which (France) displays with PMR the overall membership it goes on to display with EPL in 
2007. Ten countries remain unchanged. 
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A.3.3: Fuzzy set memberships for 2007 where PMR is operationalised rather than EPL 
Country Membership with PMR Membership with EPL Change 
Australia Strong Neo-lib+ Strong Neo-liberal+ No change 
Austria Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
Belgium Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
Canada Strong Neo-lib+ Strong Neo-liberal+ No change 
Czech Republic pro-cstat  policy Weak Pro-cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Denmark Active+strong Active+strong No change 
Finland pro-cstat  policy Weak Pro-cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
France pro-cstat  policy Weak Pro-cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Germany weak pro-cstat policy Conservative welfare Changed group 
Greece weak pro-cstat policy Weak Pro-cstat policy No change 
Ireland Strong Neo-lib+ Strong Neo-liberal+ No change 
Italy pro-cstat  policy Weak Pro-cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Japan weak pro-cstat policy Weak Pro-cstat policy No change 
Korea Strong Neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ Membership more pronounced 
Netherlands Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
New Zealand pro-cstat  policy Pro-cstat policy No change 
Norway Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
Poland weak pro-cstat policy Weak Pro-cstat policy No change 
Portugal pro-cstat  policy Weak Pro-cstat policy No change 
Slovak Republic Strong Neo-lib+ Strong Neo-liberal+ No change 
Spain pro-cstat  policy Weak Pro-cstat policy Membership more pronounced 
Sweden Active+strong Active+ Membership more pronounced 
Switzerland Active+strong Active+strong No change 
United Kingdom pro-cstat  policy Pro-cstat policy No change 
United States neo-lib+ Neo-liberal+ No change 
Notes: 1). More pronounced denotes that when EPL is replaced in the analysis by PMR, a 
country’s membership of the overall group (i.e Neo-liberal, active, Conservative, or Pro-
competitive policy) becomes stronger. An example would be Sweden, which was a member 
of the Active group overall in both analyses but moved from the active+ set to the 
active+strong set when EPL was replaced by PMR.  
2). Changed membership of group denotes a country’s membership has shifted between 
overall groupings as a consequence of replacing EPL with PMR. Germany is the only case 
where this occurs. 
3). Replacing EPL with PMR sees eleven countries develop stronger membership of their 
overall group. One country changes with respect to overall group membership. Twelve 
countries remain unchanged. 
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A.4: Figures showing fuzzy set memberships for 1997 and 2002 
A.4.1: Figure showing fuzzy set ideal-type country memberships for 1997 
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A.4.2: Figure showing fuzzy set ideal-type country memberships for 2002 
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A.5: Table showing full breakdown of countries’ memberships of each fuzzy 
set 
Country Model 1997 2002 2007 
Australia Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.01 
0.47 
0.53 
0.28 
0.01 
0.01 
0.28 
0.43 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.28 
0.04 
0.50 
0.33 
0.28 
0.04 
0.04 
0.50 
0.33 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.28 
0.10 
0.60 
0.33 
0.26 
0.10 
0.10 
0.40 
0.40 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.26 
Austria Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.53 
0.27 
0.27 
0.27 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
0.53 
0.43 
0.42 
0.42 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
0.49 
0.43 
0.51 
0.17 
0.17 
Belgium Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.34 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.66 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.47 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.43 
0.33 
0.53 
0.47 
0.43 
Canada Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.10 
0.77 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 
0.49 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.01 
0.38 
0.51 
0.38 
0.01 
0.01 
0.38 
0.49 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.11 
0.00 
0.53 
0.47 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.46 
0.46 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
Czech 
Republic 
Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
0.00 
0.37 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.41 
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Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.37 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
0.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.56 
0.27 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.44 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
0.41 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
0.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
Denmark Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.53 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.37 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.40 
0.17 
0.00 
Finland Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.64 
0.31 
0.31 
0.31 
0.27 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.39 
0.70 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.39 
0.61 
0.38 
0.38 
0.20 
0.20 
France Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.28 
0.01 
0.28 
0.31 
0.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.49 
0.00 
0.38 
0.38 
0.51 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.00 
0.32 
0.32 
0.48 
Germany Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.26 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
0.37 
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Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.26 
0.31 
0.69 
0.31 
0.37 
0.48 
0.52 
0.17 
0.17 
0.17 
0.63 
Greece Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.47 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.07 
0.25 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.11 
0.24 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.76 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
Ireland Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.36 
0.47 
0.53 
0.26 
0.36 
0.36 
0.26 
0.26 
0.17 
0.26 
0.26 
0.17 
0.60 
0.40 
0.25 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.37 
0.25 
0.37 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
0.57 
0.24 
0.00 
0.24 
0.24 
0.42 
0.24 
0.42 
0.24 
0.00 
0.00 
Italy Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.85 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.42 
0.47 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.53 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.47 
0.53 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.43 
Japan Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.55 
0.45 
0.23 
0.23 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.23 
0.23 
0.31 
0.02 
0.30 
0.46 
0.50 
0.02 
0.02 
0.30 
0.46 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.50 
0.00 
0.37 
0.42 
0.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
0.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
Korea Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
0.00 
0.10 
0.08 
0.40 
0.00 
0.39 
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Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.61 
0.32 
0.08 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.61 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Netherlands Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.21 
0.11 
0.00 
0.11 
0.50 
0.50 
0.00 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
0.51 
0.48 
0.00 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.18 
0.33 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.62 
0.18 
0.00 
New Zealand Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.22 
0.34 
0.34 
0.14 
0.22 
0.14 
0.57 
0.43 
0.22 
0.22 
0.14 
0.14 
0.16 
0.44 
0.44 
0.44 
0.16 
0.16 
0.56 
0.43 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.39 
0.23 
0.44 
0.43 
0.39 
0.23 
0.23 
0.56 
0.43 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.39 
Norway Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.12 
0.12 
0.21 
0.12 
0.21 
0.12 
0.21 
0.21 
0.12 
0.73 
0.27 
0.21 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.18 
0.33 
0.18 
0.67 
0.27 
0.27 
0.28 
0.12 
0.14 
0.12 
0.28 
0.28 
0.12 
0.14 
0.12 
0.72 
0.27 
0.14 
Poland Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
0 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.60 
0.00 
0.13 
0.13 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0.01 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.01 
0.01 
0.44 
0.56 
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Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.27 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Portugal Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
0.50 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
0.13 
0.13 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.00 
0.57 
0.00 
0.37 
0.37 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
0.17 
0.07 
0.07 
0.00 
0.78 
0.00 
0.07 
0.07 
0.22 
Slovak 
Republic 
Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.33 
0.48 
0.48 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.48 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.00 
0.47 
0.37 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
0.53 
0.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
0.00 
0.62 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Spain Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.03 
0.28 
0.28 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.32 
0.09 
0.09 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.09 
0.09 
0.50 
0.01 
0.01 
0.23 
0.23 
0.19 
0.19 
0.01 
0.58 
0.01 
0.19 
0.19 
0.42 
Sweden Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.21 
0.21 
0.30 
0.70 
0.27 
0.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.70 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.36 
0.30 
0.64 
0.27 
0.27 
Switzerland Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
0.42 
0.32 
0.37 
0.37 
0.43 
0.43 
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Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.28 
0.26 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
0.28 
0.58 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
0.37 
0.37 
0.26 
0.15 
0.32 
0.26 
0.63 
0.26 
0.15 
0.15 
0.26 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.41 
0.41 
0.57 
0.26 
0.04 
0.04 
United 
Kingdom 
Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.27 
0.32 
0.32 
0.10 
0.27 
0.10 
0.67 
0.33 
0.27 
0.27 
0.10 
0.10 
0.05 
0.30 
0.30 
0.10 
0.05 
0.05 
0.67 
0.33 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.10 
United States Pure 
Strong Neo-liberal+ 
Neo-liberal+ 
Weak Neo-liberal 
Hybrid 'pure' 
PWCS 
Pro cstat policy 
Weak pro cstat policy 
Active + Strong 
Active + 
Active 
Reject 
0.00 
0.35 
0.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.59 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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A.6: Line graphs replicated with fewer countries in each graphic 
A.6.1: Charts showing changes in total index scores over time 
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A.6.2: Charts showing changes in PWCS scores over time 
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A.6.3: Charts showing changes in government regulation of industry scores 
over time 
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A.6.4: Charts showing changes in taxation scores over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
280 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abel-Smith, B. (1953). The Reform of Social Security, Fabian Social Research 
Series 161. London: Fabian Publications. 
 
Abel-Smith, B. (1994). The Beveridge Report: Its Origins and Outcomes. In Hills, 
J., Ditch, J., Glennerster, H. (1994). Beveridge and Social Security. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Abraham, K.G., Houseman, K.G. (1993). Does Employment Protection Inhibit 
Labor Market Flexibility? Lessons from Germany, France and Belgium. Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper No. 93-16. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. 
 
Albaek, K., Van Audenrode, M., Browning, M. (2002). Employment protection and 
the consequences for displaced workers: a comparison of Belgium and Denmark.  
In Kuhn, P. (ed). (2002). Losing Work, Moving On: International Perspectives on 
Worker Displacement. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
 
Alcock, P. (1998). Poverty and Social Security. In Page, R., Silburn, R. (1998). 
British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Alcock, P. (1999). Development of Social Security. In Ditch, J. (1999). Introduction 
to Social Security: Policies, benefits and poverty. London: Routledge. 
 
Alcock, P, Craig, G. (2001). International Social Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Alcock, P. (2005). From social security to social inclusion: the changing policy 
climate. In Benefits. (2005), No.43, Vol.13, Iss.2, pp.83-88. 
 
Andres, K., Jacobs, J. (1990). Punishing the Poor: Poverty under Thatcher. 
London: Macmillan. 
 
281 
 
Arjona, R., Ladaique, M., Pearson, M. (2002). Social Protection and Growth. In 
OECD Economic Studies, Vol.35, No.2, pp.7-45. Accessed at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,3746,en_2649_33733_2510440_1_1_1_1,00.
html 
 
Armstrong, D. (1998). Globalization and the social state. In Review of International 
Studies, 1998, Vol.24, pp.461-478. 
 
Arts, W.I.L., Gelissen, J. (2002). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A 
state-of-the-art report. In Journal of European Social Policy, Vol.12, No.2, pp.137-
158. SageOnline. DOI: 10.1177/0952872002012002114 
 
Atkinson, A.B., Micklewright, J. (1989). Turning the Screw. In Atkinson, A.B. 
(1989). Poverty and Social Security. Hertfordshire: Harvester and Wheatsheaf. 
  
Atkinson, A.B. (1989). Poverty and Social Security. Hertfordshire: Harvester and 
Wheatsheaf. 
 
Atkins, J. (2010). Assessing the Impact of the Third Way. In Griffiths, S., Hickson, 
K (eds). (2010). British party politics and ideology after New Labour. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Baldwin, P. (1994). Beveridge in the Longue Durée. In Hills, J., Ditch, J., 
Glennerster, H. (1994). Beveridge and Social Security. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Bairoch, P., Kozul-Wright, R. (1996). Globalization Myths: Some Historical 
Reflections on Integration, Industrialization and Growth in the World Economy. In 
UNCTAD Discussion Papers, 1996, No.113. Geneva: UNCTAD. Accessed at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_113.en.pdf on 7/11/2009. 
 
Balakrishnan, R., Berger, H. (2009). Comparing Recessions in Germany, the UK, 
and Spain. Released on 18/11/2009 at IMFonline. Accessed at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NUM111809A.htm on 
20/5/2010. 
282 
 
 
Bambra, C. (2007). Going beyond The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: 
regime theory and public health research. In Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, Vol.61, No.1, pp.1098-1102. BMJ Journals: 
doi:10.1136/jech.2007.064295. 
 
Bartholomew, J. (2004). The Welfare State We‟re In. London: Politico‘s. 
 
Becker, U., Schwartz, H. (eds). (2005). Employment „miracles‟: A critical 
comparison of the Dutch, Scandinavian, Swiss, Australian and Irish cases versus 
Germany and the US. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 
 
Beech, M. (2006). The Political Philosophy of New Labour. London: Tauris 
Academic Studies. 
 
Beech, M., Lee, S (eds). (2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Beech, M. (2008). New Labour and the Politics of Dominance. In Beech, M., Lee, 
S (eds). (2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Berg-Schlosser, D., De Meur, G., Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (2009). Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach. In Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (eds). 
(2009). Configurational Comparative Analysis: Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) and Related Techniques. Number 51 in the Applied Social Research 
Methods Series. California: Sage. 
 
Berg-Schlosser, D., De Meur, G. (2009). Comparative Research Design: Case and 
Variable Selection. In Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (eds). (2009). Configurational 
Comparative Analysis: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related 
Techniques. Number 51 in the Applied Social Research Methods Series. 
California: Sage. 
 
283 
 
Beveridge, W. (1942). Social Insurance and Allied Services; Report by Sir William 
Beveridge. London: HMSO 
 
Beveridge, W. (1944). Full Employment in a Free Society. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
 
Blair, A. (1991). Article. In Marxism today. Published October 1991. 
 
Blair, A. (1995). The rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe. Speech delivered at 
the Spectator Lecture, 22nd March 1995. 
 
Blair, A. (1996). New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country. London: Fourth 
Estate. 
 
Blair, A. (1996). Speech to the CPU Conference, Cape Town. 
 
Blair, A. (1998). The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century. London: The 
Fabian Society. 
 
Blair, A., Schroder, G. (1999). Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte. London: 
The Labour Party. 
 
Blair, A. (2005). Speech to the Labour Party Conference. Delivered on 27/9/2005. 
Accessed at www.guardian.co.uk/uk/sep/27/labourconferencespeech on 
7/10/2009 
 
Blair, A. (2007). Speech at Blenheim Palace. Delivered on 1/10/2007. Accessed at 
http://tonyblairoffice.org/2007/10/tony-blair-speech-blenheim.html on 7/10/2009. 
 
Blair, A. (2008). An Alliance of Values: visiting lecture at Yale University. Delivered 
on 18/12/2008. Accessed at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/alliance-values on 
7/10/2009. 
 
Blair, A. (2010). A Journey. London: Hutchinson. 
284 
 
 
Bochel, H., Defty, A. (2007). Welfare Policy under New Labour: views from inside 
Westminster. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
Boeri, T., Burda, M.C. (1995). Active Labour Market Policies, Job Matching and 
the Czech Miracle. In European Economic Review, Vol.40, pp.805-817. 
DOI:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00091-7  
 
Bonoli, G. (1997). Classifying Welfare States: A Two Dimension Approach. In 
Journal of Social Policy, Vol.26, No.3, pp.351-372. 
 
Booth, C. (1892). The Life and Labour of the People of London. London: Williams 
& Northgate. 
 
Bowen, H.P., Wiersema, M.F. (1999). Matching Method to Paradigm in Strategy 
Research: Limitations of Cross-Sectional Analysis and Some Methodological 
Alternatives. In Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 20, pp.625-636. 
 
Bradshaw, J., Hoelscher, P., Richardson, D. (2007). An Index of Child Well-being 
in the European Union. In Social Indicators Research, Vol.80, pp.133–177. DOI: 
10.1007/s11205-006-9024-z. 
 
Bradshaw, J., Richardson, D. (2009). An Index of Child Well-being in Europe. In 
Child Indicators Research, Vol.2, No.3, pp.319-351. DOI: 10.1007/s12187-009-
9037-7. 
 
Bramley, G., Morgan, J. (1998). Low Cost Home Ownership Initiatives in the UK. 
In Housing Studies, Vol.13, No.4, pp.567-586. 
 
Bray, M., Walsh, P. (1998). Different Paths to Neo-Liberalism? Comparing 
Australia and New Zealand. In Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and 
Society, Vol.37, No.3, pp.358-387. DOI: 10.1111/0019-8676.00092. Accessed at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0019-8676.00092/abstract 
 
Brindle, D. (1996). The end of the welfare state. Guardian 8/5/96. 
285 
 
 
Brown, G. (2005). Speech to the Labour Party Conference. Delivered on 
26/9/2005. Accessed at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/sep/26/speeches.labourconference on 
26/09/2009. 
 
Brundage, A. (2002). The English Poor Laws, 1700-1930. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Brunsdon, E., Dean, H., Woods, R. (eds). (1998). Social Policy Review, Vol. 10. 
London: Social Policy Association. 
 
Bryman, A., Cramer, D. (2005). Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS 12 and 13: 
A Guide for Social Scientists. London: Routledge. 
 
Buller, J. (2008). New Labour and the European Union. In Beech, M., Lee, S (eds). 
(2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Burchardt, T., Hills, J. (1999). Public expenditure and the public/private mix. In 
Powell, M (ed). (1999). New Labour, New Welfare State? Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Burrows, R. Loader, B. (eds) (1994). Towards a post-Fordist Welfare State? 
London: Routledge. 
 
Bush, G.W. (2010). Decision Points. London: Random House. 
 
Cable, V. (1995). The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic 
Power. In Deadalus, 1995, Vol.124, No.2, pp.23-53. 
 
Callaghan, J. (1976). Speech to the Labour Party Annual Conference, Blackpool, 
28th September. 
 
Calmfors, L., Forslund, A., Hemstrom, M. (2002) Does Active Labour Market 
Policy Work? Lessons From The Swedish Experience. CESifo Working Paper 
No.675. Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic 
286 
 
Research. Accessed at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=305360 
 
Caramani, D. (2009). Introduction to the Comparative Method with Boolean 
Algebra. Number 158 in the Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences 
Series. California: Sage. 
 
Carree, M., van Stel, A., Thurilk, R., Wennekers, S. (2002). Economic 
Development and Business Ownership: An Analysis Using Data of 23 OECD 
Countries in the Period 1976–1996. In Small Business Economics, Vol.19, pp.271-
290. 
 
Castells, M. (1998). The Information Age: Economy, Society, Culture. Volume III: 
End of Millenium (1st edition). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Castles, F. (1986). Social Expenditure and the Right: A Methodological Note. In 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol.14, pp.669-679. 
 
Castles, F. G., Mitchell, D. (1990). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or Four? 
Canberra: Australian National University Public Policy Programme Discussion 
Paper no 21. 
 
Castles, F. (2004). The Future of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Castles, F. (2004). A Race to the Bottom. In Pierson, C, Castles, F (eds), 2006. 
The Welfare State Reader (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
CBI. (2008). UK Business Tax: A Compelling Case for Change. London: CBI. 
 
Cerny, P. (1995). Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action. In 
International Organization, Vol.49, No.4, pp.1-22. 
 
287 
 
Cerny, P. (1997). Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political 
Globalization.  In Government and Opposition, Vol.32, No.2, pp.251-274.  
 
Cerny, P. (1999). Globalization, governance, and complexity? In Prakash, A., Hart, 
J. (eds). (1999). Globalization and Governance. London: Routledge. 
 
Cerny, P. (2000). Political Agency in a Globalizing World: Toward a Structurational 
Approach.  In European Journal of International Relations, Vol.6, pp.435-463. 
 
Cerny, P. (2008). Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic 
Paradigm.  In The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-
46. 
 
Cerny, P. (2010). Rethinking world politics: a theory of transnational neopluralism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Cerny, P. (2010). The competition state today: from raison d‘Etat to raison du 
Monde.  In Policy Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.5-22. 
 
Cerny, P., Evans, M. (1999). New Labour, Globalization, and the Competition 
State. CES Working Papers Series 70. 
 
Cerny, P., Evans, M. (2003). Globalization and Social Policy. In Ellison, N., 
Pierson, C. (eds). (2003). Developments in British Social policy 2. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan Press. 
 
Cerny, P., Evans, M. (2004).Globalisation and Public Policy Under New Labour. In 
Policy Studies, 2004, Vol.25, No.1, pp.51-65. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd. 
 
Cerny, P., Soderberg, S., Menz, G. (2005). Different Roads to Globalization: 
Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World. In 
Soderberg, S., Menz, G., Cerny, P. (eds). (2005). Internalizing Globalization. The 
Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
288 
 
 
Chadwick, A., Heffernan, R., (eds). (2003). The New Labour Reader. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Chauhan, R. (2005). The Financial Times European Business Schools Ranking 
2005: How The Table Was Compiled. Accessed at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fd62015e-6324-11da-be11-
0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=b29636b0-20ee-11d8-81c6-0820abe49a01.html on 
23/05/2007. 
 
Christenson, J.A. (1984). Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: Testing the Spatial and 
Communal Hypotheses.  In Social Forces, Vol.63, No.1, pp.160-168. 
 
Chung, J., Jung, Y., Yang, D. (2006) Optimal monetary policy in a small open 
economy: the case of Korea. In Journal of Asian Economics Vol.18, pp.125-143. 
 
Chung, Y-K., Jeong, J. (2008). Analysis of employment protection laws and 
unemployment benefits. In Economics Letters, Vol.99, No.1, pp.144-146. 
Accessed at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.015  
 
Clarke, J. (2005). New Labour‘s citizens: activated, empowered, responsibilized, 
abandoned? In Critical Social Policy, 2005, Vol. 25, No.4, pp.447-463. 
 
Clausing, K. (2007). Corporate Tax Revenues in OECD Countries. In International 
Tax and Public Finance, Vol.14, No.2, pp.115-113. 
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-006-7983-2. 
 
Clinton, W.J. (2005). My Life.  London: Arrow Books 
 
Cochrane, A., Clarke, J., Gewirtz, S. (eds). (2001). Comparing Welfare States. 
London: Sage Publications Ltd.  
 
289 
 
Conway, P., V. Janod., G. Nicoletti. (2005). Product Market Regulation in OECD 
Countries: 1998 to 2003. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.419. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: 10.1787/783417550348 
 
Cotter, J. (2004) International equity market integration in a small open economy: 
Ireland, January 1990-December 2000. In Social Science Research Network — 
Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999567 
 
Cressey, P. (1999). New Labour and employment, training and employment 
relations. In Powell, M (ed). (1999). New Labour, New Welfare State? Bristol: 
Policy Press. 
 
Cronqvist, L., Berg-Schlosser, D., (2009). Multi-Value QCA (mvQCA). In Rihoux, 
B., Ragin, C. (eds). (2009). Configurational Comparative Analysis: Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Number 51 in the Applied 
Social Research Methods Series. California: Sage. 
 
Crosland, A. (1956). The Future of Socialism. London: J. Cape. 
 
Crowther, M. (1988). Social Policy in Britain 1914-1939. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
Cruddas, J. (2006). New Labour and the Withering Away of the Working Class. In 
Political Quarterly, (2006), Vol.77 No.1, pp.205-213.  
 
Daguerre, A. (2004).Importing Workfare: Policy Transfer of Social and Labour 
Market policies from the USA to Britain under New Labour. In Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 38, No.1, pp.41-56. 
 
Daguerre, A. (2007). Active Labour Market Policies and Welfare Reform: Europe 
and the US in Comparative Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Daily Mirror. (2/12/1942).  Beveridge tells how to BANISH WANT: Cradle to grave 
plan; All pay – all benefit. Headline in the Daily Mirror. 
290 
 
 
Daley, M. (2001). Globalization and the Bismarckian Welfare States. In Sykes, R., 
Palier, B., Prior, J. (eds). (2001). Globalization and European Welfare States, 
challenges and change. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
 
Daly, M. (2005). Recasting the story of Ireland‘s miracle: policy, politics or profit? 
In Becker, U., Schwartz, H. (eds). (2005). Employment „miracles‟: A critical 
comparison of the Dutch, Scandinavian, Swiss, Australian and Irish cases versus 
Germany and the US. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp.133–57. 
 
Davig, T., Leeper, E.M. (2010). Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal 
stimulus. In European Economic Review. Available online from 25/5/2010 at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.04.004 
 
Deacon, A. (2000). Learning from the US? The influence of American ideas upon 
‗new labour‘ thinking on welfare reform. In Policy & Politics, 2000, Vol.28, No.1, 
pp.5-18. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
Deacon, A. (2002). Perspectives on welfare. London: Open University Press. 
London. 
 
Deacon, A. (2003). Levelling the playing field, activating the players: New Labour 
and the cycle of disadvantage. In Policy & Politics. (2003), Vol.31, No.2, pp.123-
137. 
 
Department of Health and Social Security. (1985). The Reform of Social Security, 
Volume 1. Cmnd 9517. London: HMSO. 
 
Department of Social Security. (1998). New ambitions for Our Country: A new 
contract for welfare. Cm3805. London: The Stationary Office. 
 
Department of Social Security. (1998). A new contract for welfare: Principles into 
practice. Cm4101. London: The Stationary Office. 
 
291 
 
Department of Trade and Industry (Byers, S). (1999). Our Competitive Future. UK 
Competitiveness Indicators 1999. London: HMSO. 
 
Desai, M.A., Hines, J.R. (2004). Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax 
Policy in a Global Setting. Ross School of Business Paper No. 920. 
DOI:10.2139/ssrn.606222.  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=606222  
 
Devereux, M., Griffith, R., Klemm, A. (2004). Why Has the UK Corporation Tax 
Raised So Much Revenue? In Fiscal Studies, Vol.25, No.4, pp.367-388. 
   
Devereux, M., Lockwood, B., Redoano, M. (2008). Do Countries Compete Over 
Corporate Tax Rates? In Journal of Public Economics, Vol.92, pp.1210-1235. 
Accessed at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.09.005 
 
Ditch, J. (1999). Introduction to Social Security: Policies, benefits and poverty. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Drezner, D.W. (2001). Globalization and Policy Convergence. In International 
Studies Review, 2001, Vol.3, No.1, pp.53-78.  
 
Driver, S., Martell, L. (1998). New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Driver, S., Martell, L. (2006). New Labour. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Driver, S. (2005). Welfare after Thatcherism: New Labour and social democratic 
politics. In Powell, M., Bauld, L., Clarke, K (eds). (2005). Social Policy Review 17, 
pp.255-272. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
Driver, S. (2008). New Labour and Social Policy. In Beech, M., Lee, S (eds). 
(2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Dwyer, P., Ellison, N. (2009). We nicked stuff from all over the place: policy 
transfer or muddling through? In Policy and Politics, Vol. 37, No.3, pp.380-407. 
292 
 
 
Eatwell, J. (1998).  The Liberalisation of International Capital Movements: The 
Impact on Europe, West and East. In Understanding Globalisation: The Nation 
State, Democracy and Economic Policies in the New Epoch.  Stockholm: Almquist 
and Wiskell. 
 
Eatwell, J., Jellin, E., McGrew, A., Rosenau, J. (1998). Understanding 
Globalisation: The Nation State, Democracy and Economic Policies in the New 
Epoch. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiskell.  
 
Eicher, T.S., Garcia-Penalosa, C. (2006). Institutions, Developments, and 
Economic Growth. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Books. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Ellison, N, Pierson, C. (eds). (2003). Introduction – Developments in British Social 
Policy. In Developments in British Social policy 2. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan Press. 
 
Ellison, N, Pierson, C. (eds). (2003). Developments in British Social policy 2. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 
 
Ellison, N. (2006). The Transformation of the Welfare State? Oxon: Routledge. 
Oxon. 
 
Ellison, N., Ellison, S. (2006). Creating ‗Opportunity for All‘? New Labour, New 
Localism and the Opportunity Society. Social Policy and Society. (2006) Vol.5, 
No.3, pp.337-348. 
 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. In Pierson, C, 
Castles, F (eds), 2006. The Welfare State Reader (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
 
293 
 
Evans, E. (1997). Thatcher and Thatcherism. London: Routledge. 
 
Evans, M. (2008). New Labour and the Rise of New Constitutionalism. In Beech, 
M., Lee, S (eds). (2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Evans, M. (2010). Cameron‘s competition state. In Policy Studies, Vol.31, No.1, 
pp.95-116. 
 
Evans, M., Lunt, N. (2010). Editorial: Understanding competition states. In Policy 
Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.1-4. 
 
Evans, P. (1997). The Eclipse of the state? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of 
Globalization. In World Politics, 1997, Vol.50, No.1, pp.62-87. 
 
Fay, R.F. (1996). Enhancing the Effectiveness of Active Labour Market Policies: 
Evidence from Programme Evaluations in OECD Countries. In OECD Labour 
Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, No.18. Paris: OECD, Directorate for 
Employment, Labour and Social Affairs 
 
Ferge. Z., J. E. Kolberg, J.E. (ed) Social Policy in a Changing Europe. 
Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag. 
 
Ferrera, M. (1996) The ―Southern‖ Model of Welfare in Social Europe. In Journal of 
European Social Policy, Vol.6, No.1, pp.17–37. 
 
Feldstein, M.S. (2009). Rethinking the Role of Fiscal Policy .In the NBER Working 
Paper Series, Vol. w14684. (January 2009). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335709 
 
Field, A. (2006). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (Second Edition). London: 
Sage. 
 
294 
 
Fielding, S. (2003). The Labour Party: continuity and change in the making of „New 
Labour‟. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Finlayson, A. (2007). Making Labour safe: globalisation and the aftermath of the 
social democratic retreat. In Hassan, G (ed). (2007). After Blair: Politics after the 
New Labour decade. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
 
Finlayson, A. (2010). Opinion: Did Blair advance social democracy? In Griffiths, S., 
Hickson, K (eds). (2010). British party politics and ideology after New Labour. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Finn, D. (2003). Employment Policy. In Ellison, N., Pierson, C (eds). (2003). 
Developments in British Social policy 2. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.  
 
Finn, D. (2005). Welfare to work: New Labour‘s ‗employment first‘ welfare state. In 
Benefits. (2005), No.43, Vol.13, Iss.2, pp.93-97. 
 
Fraser, D. (2003). The Evolution of the British Welfare State. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Freeden, M. (1999). The Ideology of New Labour. In Political Quarterly, 1999, 
Vol.70, No.1, pp.42-51. London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Fuwa, M. (2004). Macro-level Gender Inequality and the Division of Household 
Labor in 22 Countries. In American Sociological Review, Vol.69 No.6 pp.751-767. 
Sage. DOI: 10.1177/000312240406900601.  
 
Gamble, (2007). New Labour and old debates. In Hassan, G (ed). (2007). After 
Blair: Politics after the New Labour decade. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
 
Giddens, A. (1998). The third way: the renewal of social democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (2000). The third way and its critics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
295 
 
 
Giddens, A. (ed). (2001). The Global Third Way Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (2002). Runaway World. London: Profile Books. 
 
Giddens, A. (2006). Positive Welfare. In Pierson, C., Castles, F (eds). (2006). The 
Welfare State Reader (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (2010). Response to Atkins and Legget. In Griffiths, S., Hickson, K 
(eds). (2010). British party politics and ideology after New Labour. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Ginsburg, N. (1998). Housing. In Page, R., Silburn, R. (1998). British Social 
Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Glennerster, H., Evans, M. (1994). Beveridge and his Assumptive Worlds: The 
incompatibilities of a flawed design. In Hills, J., Ditch, J., Glennerster, H. (1994). 
Beveridge and Social Security. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Glynn, S. (1998). Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Market. In Page, 
R., Silburn, R. (1998). British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Glyn, A., Wood, S. (2001). Economic Policy under New Labour: How Social 
Democratic is the Blair Government? In Political Quarterly, 2001, Vol.72, No.1, 
pp.50-66. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Goldstein, R.J. (1986). The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying 
Human Rights Abuses. In Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.8, No.4, pp.607-627. 
Accessed at http://www.jstor.org/stable/762195?origin=JSTOR-pdf  
 
Gough, I. (1991). The United Kingdom. In Pfaller, A., Gough, I., Therborn, G (eds), 
(1991). Can The Welfare State Compete? Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. 
 
296 
 
Gough, I. (1996). Social welfare and competitiveness. In New Political Economy, 
Vol.1, No.2, pp.209-232. Routledge online:  
DOI: 10.1080/13563469608406253 
 
Gray, J. (1998). False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism. London: Granta 
Books. 
 
Griffiths, S., Hickson, K (eds). (2010). British party politics and ideology after New 
Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Guehenno, J.M. (1995). The End of the Nation State. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Haas, R., Knox, O. (1991). Policies of Thatcherism: Thoughts from a London Think 
Tank. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Hacker, J.S., Pierson, P. (2010). Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made 
the Rich Richer – and Turned Its Backs on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
 
Hall, S, Jacques, M (eds). (1983). The Politics of Thatcherism. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
 
Hall, S. (1983). The Great Moving Right Show. In Hall, S, Jacques, M (eds). 
(1983). The Politics of Thatcherism. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
 
Hansard. (1991). House of Commons Debates. Vol. 191: 13-23/5/91. London: 
HMSO. 
 
Harris, J. (1977). William Beveridge: A Biography. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Harris, J. (1994). Beveridge‘s Social and Political Thought. In Hills, J., Ditch, J., 
Glennerster, H. (1994). Beveridge and Social Security. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
297 
 
Hassan, G (ed). (2007). After Blair: Politics after the New Labour decade. London: 
Lawrence & Wishart. 
 
Hattersley, R. (1999). Up and down the social ladder. In New Statesman. January 
1999, pp.25-27. 
 
Hattersley, R. (2001). It‘s no longer my party: Tony Blair's dream of a meritocratic 
Britain is not the dream of a true social democrat. In The Observer, 24th June, 
2001. 
 
Hay, C. (2001). Globalization, Economic Change, and the Welfare State: The 
Vexatious Inquisition of Taxation? In Pierson, C, Castles, F (eds), 2006. The 
Welfare State Reader (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
 
Hay, C. (2004). Re-Stating Politics, Re-Politicising the state: Neo-liberalism, 
Economic Imperatives and the Rise of the Competition State. In The Political 
Quarterly, Vol.75, No.1, pp.38-50 
 
Hay, C., Rosamond, B. (2002). Globalisation, European Integration and the 
Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives. In Journal of European Public 
Policy, 2002, Vol.9, No.2, pp.147-167. London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
Hays, J.C. (2009). Economic Globalization and the New Politics of Embedded 
Liberalism. New York: Oxford Unity Press. 
 
Heffernan, R. (2001). New Labour and Thatcherism. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Held, D. (2001). Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics. In Giddens, 
A. (ed). (2001). The Global Third Way Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
298 
 
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., Perraton, J. (1999). Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Held, D., McGrew, A. (eds). (2002). Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and 
Global Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Held, D., McGrew, A. (eds). (2003). The Global Transformations Reader: An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd edition). Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Held, D., McGrew, A. (2003). The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction. In 
Held, D., McGrew, A. (eds). (2003). The Global Transformations Reader: An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd edition). Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Hewitt, M., Powell, M. A. (1998). A Different Back to Beveridge? In Brunsdon, E., 
Dean, H., Woods, R. (eds). Social Policy Review, Vol. 10. London: SPA. 
 
Hewitt, M. (1999). New Labour and social security. In Powell, M (ed). (1999). New 
Labour, New Welfare State? Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Hills, J., Ditch, J., Glennerster, H. (1994). Beveridge and Social Security. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Hinrichs, K. (2001). Elephants on the Move: Patterns of Public Pension Reform in 
OECD Countries. In Leibfried, S. (ed). (2001). Welfare State Futures. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hirst, P. (1997). The global economy – myths and realities. In International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 - ), 1997, Vol.73, No.3, pp.409-425. 
London: Blackwell. 
 
Hirst, P., Thompson, G. (1999). Globalization in Question (2nd Edition). Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
299 
 
HM Treasury. (1997). The Modernisation of Britain's Tax and Benefit System: 
Employment opportunity in a changing labour market. London: The stationary 
Office. 
 
HM Treasury. (1998). The Modernisation of Britain's Tax and Benefit System 
Number Three: The Working Families Tax Credit and Work Incentives. London: 
The Stationary Office. 
 
Hobson, J.M., Ramesh, M. (2002). Globalisation Makes of States What States 
Make of it: Between Agency and Structure in the state/Globalisation Debate. In 
New Political Economy, 2002, Vol.7, No.1, pp.5-22. London: Routledge. 
 
Holton, R. (1998). Globalization and the Nation-State. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Horsfall, D. (2010). From competition state to competition states? In Policy 
Studies, 2010, Vol.31, No.1. London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
Howard, D. (1998). The French Strikes of 1995 and their Political Aftermath. In 
Government and Opposition, Vol.33, No.2, pp.199-220. Accessed at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1998.tb00790.x 
 
Hudson, J. (2003). E-galitarianism? The information society and New Labour‘s 
reposition of welfare. In Critical Social Policy, 2003, Vol.23, No.2, pp.268-290. 
London: Sage 
 
Hudson, J. (2006). Inequality and the Knowledge Economy: Running to Stand Still. 
In Social Policy and Society, 2006, Vol.5, No.2, pp.1-16. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Hudson, J., Lowe, S. (2004). Understanding the Policy Process. Bristol: The Policy 
Press. 
 
Hudson, J., Lowe, S. (2009). Understanding the Policy Process (2nd edition). 
Bristol: The Policy Press. 
300 
 
 
Hudson, J., Kühner, S. (2009). Towards productive welfare? A comparative 
analysis of 23 OECD countries. In Journal of European Social Policy, Vol.19, No.1, 
pp.34-46. 
 
Hudson, J., Kühner, S. (2010). Beyond the Dependent Variable Problem: The 
Methodological Challenges of Capturing Productive and Protective Dimensions of 
Social Policy. In Social Policy and Society, Vol. 9, No.2, pp.167-179. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1474746409990327 
 
IMF. (2009). World Economic Financial Surveys: World Economic Outlook Crisis 
and Recovery. April 09. Washington: IMF. 
 
 
IMF. (2010). Joint Statement on Ireland by EU Commissioner Olli Rehn and IMF 
Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Press release no.10/461, released 
on 28/11/10.  
Accessed online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10461.htm.  
 
 
IMF. (2010). IMF Completes Second Review Under Stand-By Arrangement for 
Greece, Approves €2.5 Billion Disbursement. Press release no.10/502, released 
on 17/12/10.  
Accessed online at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10502.htm  
 
IMF. (2010). Greek Economy at a Crossroads. IMF Survey Magazine: interview. 
Accessed online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/int121710a.htm on 17/12/2010  
 
IMF. (2010). Joint Statement on Ireland by EU Commissioner Olli Rehn and IMF 
Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Press release no.10/461, released 
on 28/11/10.  
Accessed online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10461.htm.  
 
301 
 
Jenson, D., Saint-Martin, D. (2003). New Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship 
and the Social Investment state. In Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol.28, No.1, 
pp.77-99. 
 
Jessop, B. (1988). Regulation Theory, post-Fordism and the state: more than a 
reply to Werner Bonefield. In Capital and Class, Vol.12, No.1, pp.147-168. 
 
Jessop, B. (1994). The Transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian 
Workfare State. In Burrows, R. Loader, B. (eds) (1994). Towards a post-Fordist 
Welfare State? London: Routledge. 
 
Jessop, B. (1999). The Changing Governance of Welfare: Recent Trends in its 
Primary Functions, Scale and Modes of Coordination. In Social Policy and 
Administration, 1999, Vol.33, No.4, pp.348-359. 
 
Jessop, B. (2000). From the KWNS to the SWPR. In Lewis, G. Gewirtz, S. Clarke, 
J. (eds). (2000). Rethinking Social Policy .London: Sage. 
 
Jessop, B. (2002). The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Joint Economic Committee (US Congress). (2005). Reforming the US Corporate 
Tax System to Increase Tax Competitiveness. Report presented by Rep. Jim 
Saxton (New Jersey), Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee of the United 
States Congress. Presented May 2005. 
 
Jones, H. (1998). Health. In Page, R., Silburn, R. (1998). British Social Welfare in 
the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Jones, R. S. (2005). The Labour Market in Korea: Enhancing Flexibility and 
Raising Participation. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 469. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: 10.1787/548701741108 
 
302 
 
Jonasson, E., Pettersson, L., S dersten, B. (ed) (2004). Employment and non-
employment: a study of the Swedish labour market. Globalization and welfare 
states pp. 172-194. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Kaplan, B., Duchon, D. (1988). Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in 
Information Systems Research: A Case Study. In MIS Quarterly, Vol.12, No.4, 
pp.571-586. Accessed at http://www.jstor.org/stable/249133 
 
Kavanagh, D. (2010). Response. In Griffiths, S., Hickson, K (eds). (2010). British 
party politics and ideology after New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Keeler, J.T.S. (1985). Situating France on the Pluralism-Corporatism Continuum: 
A Critique of and Alternative to the Wilson Perspective. In Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 229-249. Accessed at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421731 
 
Kemp, P. A. (2005). Social security and welfare reform under New Labour. In 
Powell, M., Bauld, L., Clarke, K (eds). (2005). Social Policy Review 17, pp.5-32. 
Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
Kennett, P. (2001). Comparative Social Policy. Buckingham: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Kenworthy, L., Malami, M. (1998). Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A 
Worldwide Comparative Analysis. In Social Forces, Vol.78, No.1, pp.235-269. 
North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press. 
 
King, D., Wickham-Jones, M. (1999). Bridging the Atlantic: the Democratic (Party) 
origins of Welfare to Work. In Powell, M (ed). (1999). New Labour, New Welfare 
State? Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Klein, R., Rafferty, A. (1999). ‗Rorschach‘ politics: Tony Blair and the Third Way. In 
The American Prospect. (1999), Vol.10, No.45, pp.373-382. 
 
303 
 
Kleinknecht, A., Wengel, J.T. (1998). The myth of economic globalisation. In 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1998, Vol.22, pp637-647. 
 
Kluve, J., Lehman, H., Schmidt, C. (1998). Active Labour Market Policies in 
Poland: Human Capital Enhancement or Benefit Churning? Working Paper 
No.215. Michigan: The William Davidson Institute at the Michigan Business 
School. 
 
Korpi, W., Palme, J. (1998). The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of 
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western 
Countries. In American Sociological Review, Vol. 63, No. 5, pp. 661-687. 
Accessed at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657333.   
 
Kosonen, P. (2001). Globalization and the Nordic Welfare States. In Sykes, R., 
Palier, B., Prior, J. (eds). (2001). Globalization and European Welfare States, 
challenges and change. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
 
Krugman, P. (1996). Pop Internationalism. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
 
Kuhn, P. (ed). (2002). Losing Work, Moving On: International Perspectives on 
Worker Displacement. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
 
Kühner, S. (2007). Welfare State Change and its Determinants: A Critical 
Evaluation of Macro-Quantitative Approaches to Model Institutional Constraints on 
Welfare Reform in Advanced Industrialized Democracies (1980-2001), 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of York 
 
Kvist, J. (2007). Fuzzy Set Ideal Type Analysis. In Journal of Business Research, 
Vol.60, pp.474-481. DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.01.005. 
 
Labour party. (1997). New Labour because Britain deserves better (Labour Party 
Manifesto: 1997). London: Labour Party. 
 
304 
 
Land, A., Lowe, R., Whiteside, N. (1992). The Development of the Welfare State 
1939 – 1951: A guide to documents in the Public Record Office. London: HMSO. 
 
Land, K.C., Lamb, V.L., Meadows, S.O., Taylor, A. (2007) .Measuring Trends in 
Child Well-being: An Evidence-Based Approach. In Social Indicators Research, 
Vol.80, pp.105–132. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-006-9023-0 
 
Larner, W. (2000). Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality. In Studies in 
Political Economy, Vol.63, pp.5-25. Accessed at: 
http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/6724 
 
Larsen, J.E. (1991). The Welfare State and Unemployment Policies in Denmark 
and Other European Countries. SPRC Reports and Proceedings No.91. New 
South Wales: Social Policy Research Centre, The University of New South Wales. 
 
Lee, S. (2008). The British Model of Political Economy. In Beech, M., Lee, S (eds). 
(2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Leggett, W. (2010). What Makes Progressive Ideology? Lessons from the Third 
Way. In Griffiths, S., Hickson, K (eds). (2010). British party politics and ideology 
after New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Lehman, H. (1995), Active Labor Market Policies in the OECD and in Selected 
Transition Economies. Background paper for the World Development Report 1995. 
Policy Research Working Paper 1502. Washington: World Bank. 
 
Leibfried, S. (1992). Towards a European welfare state? On Integrating Poverty 
Regimes into the European Community. In Ferge. Z., J. E. Kolberg, J.E. (ed) 
Social Policy in a Changing Europe. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag. 
 
Leibfried, S., Pierson, P. (eds). (1995). European Social Policy: Between 
Fragmentation and Integration. Washington D.C: Brookings Institution. 
 
305 
 
Leibfried, S. (ed). (2001). Welfare State Futures. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Leisering, L. (2001). Germany: Reform from Within. In Alcock, P, Craig, G. (2001). 
(eds). International Social Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Lewis, G. Gewirtz, S. Clarke, J. (eds). (2000). Rethinking Social Policy .London: 
Sage. 
 
Lindbeck, A. (2004). An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics. In Sødersten, B. (ed). 
(2004). Globalization and the Welfare State. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Lister, R. (1998). Fighting social exclusion with one hand tied behind our back. In 
New Economy, Vol.5 No.1. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Lindsay, C., Mailand, M. (2004). Different routes, common directions? Activation 
policies for young people in Denmark and the UK. In the International Journal of 
Social Welfare, Vol.13, pp.195-207. 
 
Lister, R. (2004). Poverty. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Lister, R. (2007). The real egalitarianism? In Hassan, G (ed). (2007). After Blair: 
Politics after the New Labour decade. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
 
Loader, B. Burrows, R. (1994). Towards a post-Fordist welfare state? The 
restructuring of Britain, Social Policy and the future of welfare. In Burrows, R. 
Loader, B. (eds) (1994). Towards a post-Fordist Welfare State? London: 
Routledge. 
 
Lowe, R. (1993). The Welfare State in Britain since 1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 
 
306 
 
Lowe, R. (1994). A Prophet, Dishonoured in his Own Country? The Rejection of 
Beveridge in Britain, 1945-1970. In Hills, J., Ditch, J., Glennerster, H. (1994). 
Beveridge and Social Security. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lowe, S (2004). Housing Policy Analysis: British Housing in Cultural and 
Comparative Context. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Lubyova, M., van Ours, J.C. (1998). Effects of Active Labour Market Programs on 
the Transition Rate from Unemployment into Regular Jobs in the Slovak Republic. 
Working Paper No.213. Michigan: The William Davidson Institute at the Michigan 
Business School. 
 
Lunt, N. (2008). From Welfare State to Social Development: Winning the War of 
Words in New Zealand. In Social Policy and Society, Vol.7, No.4, pp.405-418. 
Accessed at: DOI: 10.1017/S1474746408004387 
 
Lunt, N. (2010). Winning hearts and minds for the Competition State. In Policy 
Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.23-38. 
 
Lunt, N., Evans, M. (2010). In conclusion: How the West was won? In Policy 
Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.129-131. 
 
MacGregor, S. (2003). Social Exclusion. In Ellison, N, Pierson, C. (eds). (2003). 
Developments in British Social policy 2. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 
 
Martin, J.P. (2000). What Works Among Active Labour Market Policies: Evidence 
From OECD Countries‘ Experiences. In OECD Economic Studies, No.30, pp.79-
112. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/35/2732343.pdf 
 
McCafferty, T., Mooney, G. (2007) Working for welfare in the grip of the ‗iron 
Chancellor. In Mooney, G., Law, A (eds). (2007). New Labour/Hard Work? 
Restructuring and resistance inside the welfare industry. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
307 
 
McGee, R.W. (1996). The Philosophy of Trade Protectionism, its costs and its 
implications. The Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research. New Jersey. 
 
McGrew, A. (1998). Globalization: Conceptualizing a moving target. In Eatwell, J., 
Jellin, E., McGrew, A., Rosenau, J. (1998). Understanding Globalisation: The 
Nation State, Democracy and Economic Policies in the New Epoch. Stockholm: 
Almquist and Wiskell.  
 
Mishra, R. (1984). The Welfare State in Crisis. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
 
Mooney, G., Law, A (eds). (2007). New Labour/Hard Work? Restructuring and 
resistance inside the welfare industry. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Morgan, K. (1984). Labour in Power, 1945-1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Mullard, M., Swaray, R. (2008). New Labour and Public Expenditure. In Beech, M., 
Lee, S (eds). (2008). Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Munck, R. (2002). Globalisation and labour: the new great transformation. London: 
Zed Books. 
 
National Economic Social Council (NESC). (2005). The Developmental Welfare 
State: NESC Report 113, May 2005. Dublin: NESC. 
 
Newman, J. (2001). Modernising Governance: New Labour, policy and society. 
London: Sage.  
 
Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., Boylaud, O. (2000). Summary Indicators of Product 
Market Regulation with an extension to Employment Protection Legislation. 
OECD. Paris. 
 
Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S. (2006). Regulation and Economic Performance: 
Product Market Reforms and Productivity in the OECD. In Eicher, T.S., Garcia-
308 
 
Penalosa, C. (2006). Institutions, Developments, and Economic Growth. 
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Books. 
 
Noboru, S. (2004). A Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach: Report by the Chair 
of the Heads of Delegation Working Group on the Enlargement Strategy and 
Outreach, Ambassador Seiichiro Noboru. Paris: OECD. Accessed at: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/15/37434513.pdf  
 
OECD. (1998). The tax/benefit position of employees 1997 (1998 edition). Paris: 
OECD. 
 
OECD. (2000). OECD in Figures (2000 edition). Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2004). Economic Outlook. Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2005). General Indicators. Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2005). OECD in figures (2005 edition). Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2005). Labour Force Statistics. Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2006). Taxing Wages. Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2008). Reforming Corporate Income Tax (Policy Brief, July 2008). Paris: 
OECD. 
 
OECD. (2009). OECD in Figures (2009 edition). Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD. (2010), Social Expenditure: Aggregated data, OECD Social Expenditure 
Statistics (database). 
Doi: 10.1787/data-00166-en Accessed at 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=951879  
 
309 
 
OECD. (2010). Country Statistical Profiles. Paris: OECD. Accessed at 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=951879 
 
OECD. (2010). Taxing Wages: Comparative tables, OECD Tax 
Statistics (database). Paris: OECD. DOI: 10.1787/data-00265-en. Accessed at 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=951879 
 
OECD. (2010). Convention on the OECD. Accessed online at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.
html on 27/10/2010 
 
Ohmae, K. (1990). The Borderless World. Power and Strategy in the Interlinked 
Economy: Management Lessons in the New Logic of the Global Marketplace. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers. 
 
Ohmae, K. (1995). End of the Nation State. London: HarperCollins Publishers. 
 
Oppenheim, C., Lister, R. (1996). The Policies of Child Poverty 1979-1995. In, 
Pilcher, J., Wagg, S. (1996). Thatcher‟s Children? Politics, Childhood and Society 
in the 1980s and 1990s. London: Falmer Press. 
 
O'Riain, S. (2004) State, competition and industrial change in Ireland 1991-1999. 
In The economic and social review Vol.35, No.1, pp.27-53. 
 
Page, R., Silburn, R. (1998). British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Park, J-H. (1999). Employment Situations and Workers Protection in Korea. Korea 
Labor Institute. Unpublished paper prepared for the ILO, November 1999. 
 
Pascall, G., Lewis, J. (2004). Emerging Gender Regimes and Policies for Gender 
Equality in a Wider Europe. In Journal of Social Policy, Vol.33, No.3, pp.373-394. 
Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/S004727940400772X.  
 
310 
 
Patriquin, L. (2007). Agrarian Capitalism and Poor Relief in England, 1500-1860: 
Rethinking the Origins of the Welfare State. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Patton, C. (1999). New Labour‘s health policy: the new healthcare state. In Powell, 
M (ed). (1999). New Labour, New Welfare State?: the Third Way in British social 
policy. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Peters. G. (2003). Governance and the Welfare State. In Ellison, N, Pierson, C 
(eds), (2003). Developments in British Social policy 2. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan Press. 
 
Peters, G., Pierre, J., King, D. The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict 
in Historical Institutionalism. In the Journal of Politics, Vol.67, No.4, pp.1275-1300. 
  
Pfaller, A., Gough, I., Therborn, G (eds), (1991). Can The Welfare State Compete? 
Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. 
 
Piachaud, D. (1998). The prospects for poverty. In New Economy, Vol.5, No.1, 
pp8-13. 
 
Pierson, C. (1998). Beyond the welfare state? The new political economy of 
welfare (2nd edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Pierson, C. (2006). Beyond the welfare state? The new political economy of 
welfare (3rd edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Pierson, C, Castles, F (eds), 2006. The Welfare State Reader (2nd Edition). 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the 
policies of retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pierson, P. (1995). Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the 
Development of Social Policy. In Governance, 1995, Vol.8, pp.449-478. 
311 
 
 
Pierson, P. (1996). The New Politics of the Welfare State. In World Politics, 1996, 
Vol. 48, No. 2, pp.143-179. 
 
Pierson, P. (2001). Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring 
in Affluent Democracies. In Pierson, P. (ed). (2001). The New Politics of the 
Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pierson, P. (ed). (2001). The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Pilcher, J, Wagg, S. (1996). Thatcher‟s Children? Politics, Childhood and Society 
in the 1980s and 1990s. London: Falmer Press. 
 
Pimlott, B. (1988). The Myth of Consensus. In Smith, L (ed.). (1988). The making 
of Britain: echoes of greatness. London: Macmillan. 
 
Pinker, R. (1998). New Liberalism and the Middle Way. In Page, R., Silburn, R. 
(1998). British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press. 
 
Plant, R. (2008). Blair‘s Liberal Interventionism. In Beech, M., Lee, S (eds). (2008). 
Ten years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Powell, M., Hewitt, M. (1998). The End of the Welfare State? In Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol.32, No. 1, 1998, pp1-13. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
 
Powell, M (ed). (1999). New Labour, New Welfare State?: the Third Way in British 
social policy. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Powell, M., Bauld, L., Clarke, K (eds). (2005). Social Policy Review 17.Bristol: The 
Policy Press. 
 
312 
 
Prakash, A., Hart, J. (eds). (1999). Globalization and Governance. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Prior, P.M., Sykes, R. (2001). Globalization and the European Welfare States: 
Evaluating the Theories and Evidence. In Sykes, R., Palier, B., Prior, J. (eds). 
(2001). Globalization and European Welfare States, challenges and change. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
 
Radcliffe, S. (2010). Non-rational aspects of the competition state – the case of 
policy consultancy in Australia. In Policy Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.117-128. 
 
Ragin, C. (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Ragin, C. (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond. Chicago. 
The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ragin, C. (2009). Qualitative Comparative Analysis using Fuzzy Sets (fsQCA). In 
Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (eds). (2009). Configurational Comparative Analysis: 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Number 51 in 
the Applied Social Research Methods Series. California: Sage. 
 
Ransome, A. (1912). Oscar Wilde: A Critical Study. New York: Mitchell Kennerley. 
 
Reich, R. (1992). The Work of Nations. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Rentoul, J. (2001). Tony Blair: Prime Minister. London: Little, Brown and 
Company. 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997). Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, 
Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
313 
 
Ridley. N, (1988). The Local Right: Enabling Not Providing. In Haas, R., Knox, O. 
(1991). Policies of Thatcherism: Thoughts from a London Think Tank. London: 
Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (eds). (2009). Configurational Comparative Analysis: 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Number 51 in 
the Applied Social Research Methods Series. California: Sage. 
 
Rihoux, B., Ragin, C., Yamasaki, S., Bol, D. (2009). Conclusions – The Way(s) 
Ahead. In Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (eds). (2009). Configurational Comparative 
Analysis: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. 
Number 51 in the Applied Social Research Methods Series. California: Sage. 
 
Roberts, D. (2010). Greek debt crisis: how did the Greek economy get into such a 
mess? In the Guardian 6/5/2010. Accessed online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/06/greek-debt-crisis-economy on 
20/5/2010. 
 
Robinson, P. (2000). Active Labour Market Policies: A Case of Evidence-Based-
Policy-Making? In Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.16, No.1, pp.13-26. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rosenau, J.N. (2002). Governance in a New Global Order. In Held, D., McGrew, 
A. (eds). (2002). Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Rowntree, B.S. (1901). Poverty: A Study of Town Life. London: Macmillan. 
 
Rowntree, B.S. (1941). Poverty and Progress. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
 
Rugman, A., Moore, K. (2001). The Myths of Globalization. In Ivey Business 
Journal, September/October 2001, Vol.66, No.1, pp.64-68. Toronto: Ivey 
Management Services. 
 
314 
 
Rustin, M. (2008). New Labour and the theory of globalization. In Critical Social 
Policy, 2008, Vol.28, No.3, pp.273-281. London: Sage 
 
Sainsbury, D. (ed). Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage. 
 
Salonen, T. (2001). Sweden: Between Model and Reality. In Alcock, P, Craig, G. 
(eds). (2001). International Social Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Sanderson, M. (1998). Education. In Page, R, Silburn, R. (1998). British Social 
Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Sanger, M.B. (2003). The Welfare Marketplace: Privatization and Welfare Reform. 
Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute. 
 
Sassen, S. (2009). The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation and 
More Executive Powers. In Schinkel, W. (ed). (2009).Globalization and the state: 
Sociological Perspectives on the state of the state. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Schama, S. (2000). A History of Britain 1, 3000 BC – AD 1603: At the Edge of the 
World? London: BBC Worldwide. 
 
Schama, S. (2001). A History of Britain 2, 1603 – 1776: The British Wars. London: 
BBC Worldwide. 
 
Schama, S. (2002). A History of Britain 3, 1776 – 2000: The Fate of the Empire. 
London: BBC Worldwide. 
 
Schiantarenelli, F. (2008). Product Market Regulation and Macroeconomic 
Performance: A Review of Cross-Country Evidence. In Boston College Working 
Papers in Economics, No.623, Boston: Boston College Department of Economics. 
 
Schinkel, W. (ed). (2009).Globalization and the state: Sociological Perspectives on 
the state of the state. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
315 
 
 
Scruggs, L., Allan, J. (2003). Trends in Welfare State Decommodification in 
Eighteen Advanced Industrials Democracies, 1972-2000. Paper prepared for 
delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
Philadelphia: American Political Science Association. 
   
Scruggs, L., Allen, J. (2006). Welfare state decommodification in 18 OECD 
countries: a replication and revision. In Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 16, 
No.55, pp.1-19. 
 
Scrugs, L. (2006). The Generosity of Social Insurance, 1971–2002. In Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, Vol.22, No.3, pp.349-364. DOI:10.1093/oxrep/grj021 
 
Sefton, T. (2005). Inequality and redistribution under New Labour. In Benefits. 
(2005), No.43, Vol.13, Iss.2, pp. 
 
Shorter, E., Tilly, C. (1971). The Shape of Strikes in France, 1830-1960. In 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp.60-86. Accessed 
at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/178198.pdf 
 
Sianesi, B. (2008). An Evaluation of the Swedish System of Active Labour Market 
Programs in the 1990s. In Review of Economics & Statistics Vol. 86, No.1, pp.133-
155. Accessed at 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=15&sid=70e94a9
7-8c03-4787-afff-6a00d005f915%40sessionmgr4 
 
Siaroff, A. (1994) ‗Work, Welfare and Gender Equality: a New Typology‘, in 
Sainsbury, D. (ed). Gendering Welfare States, pp. 82–100. London: Sage. 
 
Sigeman, T. (2002). Employment Protection in Scandinavian Law. In Scandinavian 
Studies in Law, Vol. 43, pp.257-275. Accessed at: 
http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/index.php/display  
 
316 
 
Silburn, R. (1998). Introduction. In Page, R., Silburn, R. (1998). British Social 
Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Slack, P. (1988). Poverty & Policy in Tudor & Stewart England. New York: 
Longman. 
 
Smith, L (ed.). (1988). The making of Britain: echoes of greatness. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Smith, JG. (1997). Full Employment: A Pledge Betrayed. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press. 
 
Soderberg, S., Menz, G., Cerny, P. (eds). (2005). Internalizing Globalization. The 
Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Sødersten, B. (ed). (2004). Globalization and the Welfare State. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Stewart, J. (1998). The Twentieth Century: an Overview. In Page, R., Silburn, R. 
(1998). British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press. 
 
Stewart, K., Hills, J. (2005). A More Equal Society? New Labour, Poverty, 
Inequality and Exclusion. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
Sullivan, M. (1996). The Development of the British Welfare State.  Hertfordshire: 
Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Sunley, P., Martin, R. Nativel, C. (2006). Putting workfare in place. Local labour 
markets and the new deal. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Sykes, R., Palier, B., Prior, J. (eds). (2001). Globalization and European Welfare 
States, challenges and change. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
317 
 
 
Taylor, M. (2010). Evolutions of the competition state in Latin America: power, 
contestation and neo-liberal populism.  In Policy Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.39-56. 
 
Thane, P. (1996). Foundations of the Welfare State. New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman Limited. 
 
Thatcher, M. (1993). The Downing Street Years. London: Harper Collins. 
 
Timmins, N. (2001). The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State (2nd 
edition). London: HaperCollinsPublishers. 
 
Titmuss, R. (1958). Essays on the Welfare State. London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 
 
Tomlinson, J. (1998). Paying for Welfare in the Twentieth Century. In Page, R, 
Silburn, R. (1998). British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Tonnies, F. (1887)[1957]. Community and Society. New York: Harper & Row 
 
Torgersen, U. (1987). Housing: the wobbly pillar under the welfare state. In Turner, 
B., Kemeny, J., Lundqvist, L. (eds). Between State and Market: housing in the 
post-industrial era. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wicksell International. 
 
UNICEF. (2007). Child poverty in perspective: An overview of child well-being in 
rich countries, A comprehensive assessment of the lives and well-being of children 
and adolescents in the economically advanced nations. Innocenti Report Card 
Seven. Florence: UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre.  
 
Vis, B. (2007). States of welfare or states of workfare? Welfare state restructuring 
in 16 capitalist democracies, 1985-2002. In Policy and Politics, Vol.35, No.1, pp. 
105-122. DOI: 10.1332/030557307779657720.  
Accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/030557307779657720 on 20/52010 
318 
 
 
Walker, R., Wiseman, M. (2003). Making Welfare Work: UK Activation Policies 
Under New Labour. In International Social Security Review. (2003), Vol.56, pp.3-
29. 
 
Walle, A.H. (1997). Quantitative Versus Qualitative Tourism Research. In Annals 
of Tourism Research, Vol.24, No.3, pp524-536. Accessed at: doi:10.1016/S0160-
7383(96)00055-2 
 
Walton, T., Ragin, C. (1990). Global and National Sources of Political Protest: 
Third World Responses to the Debt Crisis. In American Sociological Review, 
Vol.55, No.6, pp.876-890. Accessed at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095752  
 
Warhurst, C. (2008). The Knowledge economy, skills and government labour 
intervention. In Policy Studies, 2008, Vol.29, No.1, pp.71-86. 
 
Watt, A., Nikolova, M. (2009). A quantum of Solace? An assessment of fiscal 
stimulus packages by EU Member States in response to the economic crisis. 
Working paper 2009.5. European Trade Union Institute. Brussels: ETUI. 
 
Webster, C. (1990). Conflict and consensus: explaining the British health service. 
In Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 1:2. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
 
Weiss, L. (1999). Globalization and national governance: antinomy or 
interdependence. In Review of International studies, 1999, Vol.25, No.5, pp.59-88. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Winter, K, Connolly, P., (1996). Thatcherism and the Children Act 1989. In Pilcher, 
J, Wagg, S. (1996) Thatcher‟s Children? Politics, Childhood and Society in the 
1980s and 1990s. London: Falmer Press. 
 
Wood, S. (2001). Labour Market Regimes under Threat? Sources of Continuity in 
Germany, Britain, and Sweden. In Pierson, P. (ed). (2001). The New Politics of the 
Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
319 
 
 
Woods, N. (2002) Global Governance and the Role of Institutions.  In Held, D., 
McGrew, A. (eds). (2002). Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
World Economic Forum (WEF). (2010). The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-
2011. Geneva: WEF. 
 
Wriston, W. (1993). The twilight of sovereignty. In Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 
1993, Vol.17, No. 2, pp.117-130. 
 
Yamasaki, S., Rihoux, B. (2009). A Commented Review of Applications. In Rihoux, 
B., Ragin, C. (eds). (2009). Configurational Comparative Analysis: Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Number 51 in the Applied 
Social Research Methods Series. California: Sage. 
 
Zadeh, L.A. (1972). Outline of a New Approach to the Analysis of Complex 
Systems and Decision Processes. California: Electronics Research Laboratory, 
University of California. 
 
 
 
 
